

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

LECTURES AND PAPERS ON

PHILOSOPHY,

CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE,


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EDITED BY

CHARLES F. DEEMS, LL.D.

PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.



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CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

THE LIMITS AND USES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

[A Paper read before the Institute of Christian
Philosophy, May 3d, 1888.]

BY CHARLES L. HOGEBOOM, M.D., JAMAICA, L. I.

THE question naturally arises, are there any limits to scientific research? If there are, of what nature are they? Are there any ethical limits? Is the scientist morally debarred from prosecuting his researches with the intent to question or deny the truth of any religious belief? Are there any physical limits? Is it possible that discovery after discovery will continue until the whole realm of Nature shall be explored? Contemplating the amount of knowledge which has been acquired of the physical constitution of the sun and of various members of the solar system, are we warranted in declaring that means will not be found to continue, *ad infinitum*, scientific discoveries in all directions in the realm of Nature? Considering the marvellous discoveries which have been made during the last two centuries—for it must not be forgotten that the Copernican system was established nearly three centuries ago; that Kepler, who confirmed its truth, died about two hundred and fifty years ago, and that Huygens and Newton made their great discoveries, which form the basis of much of our present scientific knowledge, in the seventeenth century—in the light of all the advance in physical discovery which has since been made, are we quite sure that there is an insurmountable limit to scientific research? Is the time coming when science can make no further advance, and if it comes, what will remain undiscovered? Will the stellar universe have been completely

explored? Will there be a way found to measure the sidereal distances? Will the star clusters into which some of the formerly supposed *nebulæ* have been resolved by the telescope be found to belong to our own sidereal system, or to constitute independent universes, so far removed from the farthest star that the imagination is bewildered at the contemplation? Will it ever be possible to form even an estimate of the distance of any of those star clusters, since the nearest fixed star's distance can only be roughly approximated? Will it ever be possible to form an idea of their constitution or of their dimensions? Can we ever, from this earth, form an idea of the glorious structure of the ring nebula in the constellation *Lyra*, which appeared as a mere film with the telescope of Sir John Herschel, but which Lord Rosse's powerful reflector partially resolved into brilliant points? Are any of the star clusters, which apparently exceed in glory anything else which is visible, or can be made visible, the habitations of sentient beings, or are they incandescent worlds in the process of formation? Or are the luminous points alone incandescent suns with planets revolving about them, as our earth and sister planets revolve around our sun? Are they more favored worlds than ours, where the commandments of God have never been disobeyed? But, as to our own earth, will science ever be able to tell if there is another place, in all the realms of infinite space, which is the habitation of a being like man, with an immortal soul, for the salvation of which an infinite sacrifice has been made? What evidence is there of such life anywhere else? Not in our solar system if the conclusions which Whewell arrived at in his book "*The Plurality of Worlds*" rest on good foundations. But was all the infinite universe made for the benefit of man alone? Solve the problem, boasting scientist, you who pretend to enter into the councils of God and comprehend the methods of Creation. Tell us of the limits of the universe to which the myriads of immortal souls, born on this atom of dust, the earth, shall be restricted. "Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the *Pleiades*, or loose the bands of *Orion*? Knowest thou the ordinances of Heaven? Canst thou set the dominion thereof in the earth?" Is it not evident that there must be a limit to man's researches, and that

that limit is far more circumscribed than he often imagines? Will science ever be able to tell what cosmic force really is, and what relation it bears to the Creator? Will biology ever be able to tell what life is? How much nearer the great problem of Creation will man be when he has discovered all that his limited science can discover? Will his finite reason enable him to comprehend the plans of the Infinite Being? The man who is able to measure the wave-lengths in different rays of light by means of mechanical contrivances, or to tell us how much heat and how much light there is in a certain part of the solar spectrum, and how much of the light and how much of the heat is absorbed when a beam is passed through various solid, liquid, or gaseous media—the man who can tell at a glance to what natural family a given paleontological specimen belongs, or who can estimate the quantity of potential energy contained in a given weight of digested albumen—is he fitted to reason better about the nature of God than was Socrates or Plato? He can tell us much about the *phenomena* of physical force, but will he ever be able to tell more about its *cause* than any of the ancient philosophers? And of the spiritual world, can he tell us as much as Paul has told?

A naturalist observes certain resemblances in animal structure, finding a general similarity in each animal sub-kingdom, the radiates having a general resemblance to each other, the mollusks also, while the articulates are formed upon a plan around which all the classes, families and species are arranged with typical harmony. In the vertebrate sub-kingdom there is also a general plan of skeletal structure, of wide range, but of wonderful unity of type, and to a great extent, of detail. A close resemblance is observed in different divisions; the spinal column having the same general plan, and the spinal cord within it having the same anatomy. There will be found a great similarity between the muscles and their attachments to the bones, and in their functions in man and quadrupeds of all kinds, so that these muscles, to a great extent, receive the same names. In examining the vascular structure of mammals, fishes, and reptiles, there will be found bloodvessels arising from the heart called aortic arches, and in the embryonic

development of the mammal, man included, there will be found at a certain stage an evolution of these aortic arches similar to that which obtains in adult fishes, and a little later such as exists in reptiles; facts which are held to furnish evidence of the descent of all mammals from fishes, or some fish-like form, perhaps undiscovered, through a reptilian form. Moreover, it will be found by the aid of a microscope that the epithelial tissue in man is the same as the epithelial tissue in many lower animals, and that the bloodvessels have the same structure and are furnished with the same kind of nucleated cells. Mr. Darwin, Mr. Wallace, and others, have shown that certain variations in form, and other characteristics are produced by changes of environment, apparently indicating a tendency to change of type, only that such change has not actually been observed—although geology is said by the evolutionists to furnish such examples. But the argument from embryology is unsound, because the facts are equally consistent with the doctrine of independent creations, for how could development take place except in accordance with a general plan, having necessarily many parallelisms? If there were no certain indications of contrivance establishing the fact of creative intervention, and therefore of the existence of a Creator, then would science be obliged to seek in evolution the cause of the production and development of life. But it is said that evolution need not necessitate a belief in materialism, for it is quite as reasonable to believe that God is personally present in all matter, and in the manifestation of all life, and that He always acts by evolution. But would an Omnipotent Creator need to observe the slow processes required by the theory of evolution for the formation of an animal type? Is it not inconsistent to believe that He would take millions of years to evolve man through a series of mollusk, fish, and reptilian life—to believe that He inhabits the forms of repulsive and noxious animals, and is the direct mover of all human action, good and bad? The human mind is so constituted that the majority of men will always regard it as more rational to believe that a Creator who is intelligent, personal and omnipotent would create by the power of His Will and develop according to laws which He institutes for that purpose, than by any

other method. Whenever man's speculations tend to diminish the power and wisdom of the Creator we may be sure that there is a defective link in the chain of reasoning. It is a very difficult point to settle—the line of descent of animals which have lived thousands of ages before or after each other. Anatomical resemblances offer a basis for classification; but to conclude that they did not, or could not, have had an independent origin is transcending the limits of scientific reasoning except upon the hypothesis that there is no Creator.

Again, are there any moral limits to scientific research? Can there be any moral limits to a reverent or earnest pursuit of science? Can man make great discoveries if he is estopped by the fear of discovering something which may change his ideas of his Creator, or cause him to doubt the truth of that revelation upon which his highest hopes have rested? There are those who do not hesitate to say that nothing must stand in the way of a search after truth. But does that assertion really meet the question? How far are we to feel reliant that we shall find the truth because we are searching for it, or that we have found it because we have searched earnestly, and have formed a theory which seems to justify our belief that we have found it? It must be remembered that the results of scientific research are not uniform, and that scientific opinions are constantly undergoing changes. The ethical limits of research will therefore depend much upon the animus with which it is prosecuted. If others are to be led into religious doubt upon insufficient evidence, ought not scientific investigations, as well as philosophical speculations, when they affect the belief in the Supreme Being, to be pursued with caution, and conclusions arrived at with great circumspection?

Considering the differences of opinion regarding the origin of the mind, it is probable that less is known of its laws than mental philosophers are willing to admit; but it is reasonable to assume that when the mind attempts to demonstrate the truth of propositions which are opposed to the instinctive and the highest conceptions of God, it is liable by a spiritual law to become blinded and to fall into dangerous error. We are not *egos* of intellect only, but of various sentiments quite as impor-

tant as the principle of pure reason—of reverence, of faith, of loyalty—and the argument is Mephistophelean which would urge the human mind to boldly pursue a chain of thought tending to lessen the majesty of Omnipotence. I know that the ready answer of the atheist is that the God of the Old Testament commanded His chosen people to commit acts which the moral sense of humanity to-day refuses to believe right. Of one thing, however, we may be sure—if there is an Omnipotent Being it is a logical sequence that He has made a special revelation. If He made man and breathed into him a living soul, He has also—it could not be otherwise—had an interest in his welfare ever since, and it is not conceivable that He has never manifested Himself except in the works of nature. Not only does the existence of a Supreme Being attest the necessity, and therefore the truth of revelation, but the revelation in turn is evidence of the existence of a Supreme Being, for all history tells us that Christianity has been the means of giving to mankind the highest culture, the purest morals, the loftiest patriotism, and the most exalted sentiments of which human nature is capable. It gave strength to the thousands of Christians who were thrown to wild beasts in Roman amphitheatres, and it gave courage to Paul to stand on the brink of his grave and declare his confidence in the faith for which he had fought the good fight, and in Him who had appeared to him at Damascus.

But what examples are there of the uses of scientific research, and of the transgression of its limits? I answer: When Agassiz, by the most remarkable researches in comparative embryology, and by the study of natural history generally, demonstrated, as clearly as the human intellect can, that the creation of animal forms was accomplished by the formation of successive types, in accordance with a plan and by Creative Will, he was working within the rational limits of scientific research. "I find it impossible," said he, "to attribute the biological phenomena which have been, and are still, going on upon the surface of our globe, to the simple action of physical forces. I believe they are all due, in their entirety, as well as individually, to the direct intervention of a Creative Power, acting freely and in an automatic way. I have tried to make this intentional plan

in the organization of the animal kingdom evident by showing that the differences between animals do not constitute a material chain analogous to a series of physical phenomena bound together by the same law ; but present themselves as the phases of a thought formulated according to a definite aim. The metamorphoses of certain animals, especially of insects, so often cited in support of this idea, prove, by the fixity with which they repeat themselves in innumerable species, exactly the contrary. In the persistency of these metamorphoses, distinct for each species, and known to repeat themselves in a hundred thousand species, and to have done so ever since the present order of things was established on the earth, have we not the most direct proof that the diversity of types is not due to external, natural influences?"

Professor Haeckel said in his "Evolution of Man" that "Agassiz can hardly himself have believed in his theosophic phrases," that "the great American, who as Carus Sterne rightly said, laid the foundation of much natural science, was, in reality, gifted with too much genius actually to believe in the truth of the mystic nonsense which he preached. Crafty calculation and well-judged reliance on the want of understanding of his credulous followers, can alone have given him courage to pass the juggler's pieces of his anthropomorphic Creator as true coin." This is transgressing the limits of scientific controversy, and when he devoted over forty pages of his book to explain how an ascidian, a molluscoid animal, about a half-an-inch in length, and having a provisional tail about twice that length in its larval stage, and which has some resemblance to the spinal column and cord of vertebrate animals, but with important anatomical differences, and which tail it casts off on attaining its permanent condition—seeking by this method to bridge the chasm between the vertebrate and non-vertebrate sub-kingdoms—he exposed the weakness of the Darwinian theory.

When Harvey investigated the action of the heart and respiratory apparatus, and traced the course of the blood through the arteries and veins, he was making discoveries which were destined to stand forever among the foundations of the rational practice of the healing art.

When Galileo, watching the oscillations of a lamp in the cathedral of Pisa, observed that they were made in the same time, whether in smaller or greater arcs, as simple as the matter seems, he made one of the most important discoveries of all time; and when he pointed his telescope to the heavens and discovered the satellites of Jupiter, he was moving within the limits of scientific research, and adding a glorious page to the book of knowledge.

When Huygens, improving on the construction of Galileo's telescope, discovered the rings of Saturn, and by mathematical calculations predicted when the periodical appearance of the rings should return; and when, not long after, he propounded and maintained the undulating theory of light, which has aided so much in the investigation of molecular physics; and when he demonstrated his thirteen immortal theorems on centrifugal force, he laid the foundation for future scientific labors, and cleared the way for Newton to make his crowning discovery of the law of universal gravitation.

When, more than a century afterwards, Thomas Young took up the subject of the undulatory theory of light, which had not been received in England, and demonstrated its truth by investigating the subject of "interference of light," more perhaps than in any other way, he was vindicating the fame of a great scientist and the truth of a great theory.

When, in 1818, Faraday investigated the subject of sounding flames, and proved that they were produced by vibrations in the air similar to those produced in a flute, and not by the collapse of particles of vapor, and when in 1822 he investigated the subject of the liquefaction of gases under the action of cold and pressure, he was adding to the knowledge of the phenomena of vibration, of the laws of heat and of conservation of force, by means of which great inventions and improvements have been made. The manufacture of artificial ice by machinery is the result of Faraday's experiments in vaporization. When, in 1830, he investigated the induction of electrical currents, and the evolution of electricity from magnetism, he was laying the foundation for most of the improvements in the various electrical inventions of the day, such as the telegraph, the telephone,

medical and other electrical apparatus. In fact, he made the science of magneto-electricity substantially what it is to-day, the late improvements being nearly all based upon his discoveries, as his, of course, were upon the original discovery by Oersted in 1819 of magnetism by electrical induction. When, in 1833, he studied the laws of electro-chemical decomposition, and devised his voltameter, by means of which he showed that the quantity of electricity generated in a galvanic battery is in proportion to the amount of decomposition in the battery solution, he furnished some of the most important theoretical and practical knowledge which the world now possesses. All his labors were performed while professing a belief expressed in the following words uttered in a lecture on mental education in 1854: "High as man is placed above the creatures around him, there is a higher and far more exalted position within his view; and the ways are infinite in which he occupies his thoughts about the fears, or hopes, or expectations of a future life. I believe that the truth of the future cannot be brought to his knowledge by any exertion of his natural powers, however exalted they may be; that it is made known to him by other teaching than his own, and is received through simple belief of the testimony given."

Mr. Darwin observed many valuable facts in natural history, but his whole life was given to the elaboration of a theory which has been used by his followers as evidence of a non-purposive, unconscious creation. Are they right who say that this theory has done no harm? Is it true, as has been said by Col. Ingersoll, that "His discoveries, carried to their legitimate conclusions, destroy the creeds and Scriptures of mankind"? and who also says that "In the light of natural selection, the survival of the fittest, and the origin of species, even the Christian religion becomes a gross and cruel superstition." Here the opponents and the defenders of the theory of evolution are alike agreed as to its tendency. Followed to its legitimate conclusions, and not departed from by reason of religious considerations, it would end in a belief which he professes to hold "that there can be no Infinite Being—that religion has been the enemy of social order, because it directs the attention of

man to another world—that no one can be held responsible for his thoughts—that there is no opportunity of being honest or dishonest in the formation of an opinion.”

When Professor Haeckel also says that Mr. Darwin has incontestably proved that the creation has arisen through unconscious, non-purposive causes, we must infer that he also believed man to be a non-purposive automaton—that we are all like the molecules of matter in the line of a galvanic current—that our likes and dislikes are involuntary molecular movements of protoplasm, whose action depends entirely on their momentary environment. Was the world created on the principle that our highest aspirations must be blighted ; that the mother may never hope again to behold the child she has laid in its grave—that since we are all automata there can be no satisfaction in doing right ? The continued attempt to believe this would end, at last, in a degeneration of the race and an obliteration of the moral sense worse than that which exists among the lowest savages, who are, perhaps, the result of some similar cause of degeneration from a previously higher condition, as the Duke of Argyll has well suggested.

When Professor Tyndall says : “Believing, as I do, in the continuity of Nature, I cannot stop abruptly where our microscopes cease to be of use. Here the vision of the mind authoritatively supplements the vision of the eye. By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of experimental evidence and discover in matter the promise and potency of terrestrial life,” he is not only crossing the boundary of experimental evidence, but the limits of scientific thought, and is assigning to matter the functions of the Creator. If he had said “When our last and deepest vision only finds life whose various aspects flee as fast as we pursue, we can only meet the boundary which separates the sentient world from its Author to bow reverently before Him and confess our utter inability to go any farther without guidance,” he would have uttered a thought more easily responded to by humanity.

When Professor Huxley tells us in his paper on “Mr. Darwin’s Critics” that “Mr. Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an intelligent agent, a sort of supernatural Sir John Sebright, to

produce even the animal frame of man, while Mr. Mivart requires no divine assistance till he comes to man's soul," he is uttering thoughts which have no rational basis beyond the application of their sarcasm to the half-and-half evolution theories of these scientists; and when he says "If it were given me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time, I should expect to be the witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not living matter," he is transcending the limits of scientific thought and employing a most unwarrantable hypothesis to support a theory which, we are told, if carried to its legitimate conclusions will destroy the creeds and Scriptures of mankind. A mystery will always surround the manifestations of Deity—a necessary mystery, the finite being unable to comprehend the infinite. Why do not all things, human institutions especially, move in perfect harmony? If God were ever present in person, and not as a rule, by the manifestation of His power by necessary, impartial laws, causing it to rain alike upon the just and upon the unjust, we cannot believe that much of the present disorder, and which springs from the necessary exercise of man's free will, would exist. Why this should all be so we, finite creatures, cannot explain or understand, but it is reasonable to believe that while God surrounds and sustains us, His existence is independent of the world which He created, and of all living creatures. Must not a belief contrary to this resolve itself at last into pantheism? Is it not wiser to believe that in Him we live and move and have our being, but that He lives and moves within us must depend, if there is any foundation for such a belief, upon man's spiritual condition? There are many things in the spiritual world which will always be hidden from speculative thought, while scientific research cannot penetrate them at all. St. Paul got much farther than the whole metaphysical or scientific world ever got, or ever can get in this direction. Man can make no progress in investigating the spiritual world from the materialistic stand-point of evolution.

The principal uses, therefore, of scientific research are not in analyzing the nature of God, but in training the mind to explore the wonders of Nature, and to use her powers for His advantage, by making mechanical and chemical inventions.

The marvellous perfection of the steam-engine, of the printing-press, of the loom, of the telegraph and telephone ; the arts of making and dying various fabrics, the improvements in optical instruments, and in the various discoveries by which medicine and surgery alleviate pain and disease, are all instances of the functions of scientific research. But there is no aristocracy of science which may arrogate to itself a better or a higher knowledge of the Creator, or a higher spiritual culture than can be attained by any pure-minded, honest man or woman.

Why is it insisted by evolutionists that all living forms have arisen from one or only a few forms or particles of protoplasm ? Why should the millions of forms which have existed be restricted to one progenitor, or perhaps two, or four ? Mr. Darwin thought that he saw grandeur in this view of life, but I believe that it is natural for the human mind to regard that view which believes that the Creator in His majesty and omnipotence created the world and its inhabitants by the power of His Will, and that He breathed the breath of life in man and he became a living soul, as the one which has the most grandeur, and therefore the one which has the best foundation. Why could not the Creator vitalize a million, or any number of germs, having different qualities and different tendencies of development, as well as to form one or four ? But why suppose that He created germs first ? Do we know anything of the production of germs, except from organisms ? That was the spontaneous generation idea, now exploded and abandoned, unwillingly, by those who hoped to make it an efficient support of the theory of evolution. The fact is, that when we approach the origin of life we approach the presence of Creative Power, which, to us, is incomprehensible ; but, as we ought to believe, able to create just such forms, and provide just such contrivances as His wisdom may dictate, by special creation or development within types ; but in whatever way, with the majesty of Omnipotence.

Passing over the philosophical speculations of the eighteenth century, let us briefly examine the proposition of one of the ablest scientists of the day to supplement scientific research by theistic philosophy to establish the Darwinian theory of evolu-

tion. I refer to Professor Joseph Le Conte, of the University of California, who says in his recent book on "Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought," "Remember that the forces of Nature are naught else than the different forms of Divine energy. Remember that, as just shown, this Divine Omnipresent energy has taken on successively higher and higher forms in the course of cosmic time. Now, this upward movement has been wholly by increasing individuation, not only of matter, but also of force. This universal Divine energy, in a generalized condition, unindividuated, diffused, pervading all Nature, is what we call physical and chemical force. The same energy, in higher form, individuating matter, and itself individuated, but only yet very imperfectly, is what we call the life force of plants. The same energy, more fully individuating matter, and itself more fully individuated, but not completely, we call the anima of animals. This anima, or animal soul, as time went on, was individuated more and more until it resembled and foreshadowed the spirit of man. Finally, still the same energy, completely individuated as a separate energy, and therefore self-conscious, capable of separate existence, and therefore immortal, we call the spirit of man." Again, he says: "Self-consciousness especially seems to me the simplest sign of separate entity or spirit-individuality, and its appearance among psychical phenomena the very act of spirit birth. We may imagine man to have emerged ever so gradually from animals; in this gradual development the moment he turned his thoughts inward in wonder upon himself, and on the mystery of his existence as separate from Nature, that moment marks the birth of humanity out of animality." Now, is this the manner of the birth of an immortal soul—to be born or become independent just at the moment that it perceives itself as separate from Nature, *i. e.*, from the objects and beings around it? Do not many animals perceive that they are separate beings? Descartes denied this, as we know, and denied them consciousness in any degree, but it would be impossible to account for the actions of animals on any such hypothesis. What the difference is in the intelligent principle of man and animals we do not positively know, and speculation upon it only carries us to

various conclusions, leading at last to confusion. Again, Professor Le Conte says, "We have already shown that if the brain of a living, thinking man were exposed to the scrutiny of an outside observer with absolutely perfect senses, all that he would, or could possibly see, would be molecular motion, physical and chemical, but the subject himself, the thinking, self-conscious spirit, would experience and observe by introspection only consciousness, thought, emotion, etc. On the outside only physical phenomena ; on the inside only psychical phenomena. Now, must not the same be true of Nature also ? Viewed from the outside by the scientific observer, nothing is seen, nothing can be seen, there is nothing else to be seen, but motions, material phenomena ; but behind these, on the other side, on the inside, must not there be in this case also psychical phenomena, consciousness, thought, will ; in a word, personality ?

. . . . Thus, then, we see that our own self-conscious personality behind brain phenomena compels us to accept consciousness, will, thought, personality, behind Nature. Now, I assert that once get this abstract idea in the mind, and by a necessary law of thought, it gradually expands without limit, and eventually reaches the form of infinite consciousness, power, will, thought, etc., and therefore of an infinite person." Would not these thoughts lead, naturally, to as great a number of modifications of theistic, pantheistic, and spiritual belief as did the ancient philosophy or religion of the Vedas ? The comparison of an infinite spirit inhabiting the universe, and related to it as the human soul is related to the body, is most fanciful and illogical. The universe is not an organism in the sense that the human body is, and the comparison involves the idea that the Divine spirit is a product of evolution, as well as the human soul. Another quotation from his book, I think, will give a fair idea of his cosmical theory and its relation to life and man's origin, On page 295 he says, "I believe that the spirit of man was developed out of the anima or conscious principle of animals, and that this again was developed out of the lower forms of life-force, and this in its turn out of the chemical and physical forces of Nature ; and that at a certain stage in this gradual development, viz., with man, it acquired the property of immor-

tality precisely as it now, in the individual history of each man at a certain stage, acquires the capacity of abstract thought."

But the idea of the formation of the human soul from matter by the continued action of Divine energy, or cosmic energy, is inconceivable. The Supreme Being, not universal energy, must be regarded in any theistical system as the Great First Cause. But there is no accessible stand-point from which to view the operations of the Omnipotent and the Infinite, and there is no resting-place for the finite human mind so satisfactory as that which is offered by revelation. Man will never discover as much by his own powers in regard to his origin as is contained in the words, "And the Lord God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living soul." Whenever it is undertaken to explain just how God formed man and how He breathed into him the breath of life, or how he became possessed of a living soul, the limits of speculative thought or of scientific research are reached, and the mind is turned back on itself, completely foiled, and if it persists in its inquiry, becomes confounded, and at last unsettled. It is probably well that we cannot solve the problem. If it would have been better for us to comprehend it we would have been informed in a more direct manner than by the investigation of Nature, which does not solve it, but, as we see, leads to so many contradictory beliefs. But the evolutionist asserts that he has discovered the method of creation of animal life, although he is obliged to bridge the chasm between the vertebrate sub-kingdom and the lower sub-kingdoms with an ascidian molluscoid one-half an inch long, with a temporary larval tail, which he likens to the spinal cord, the central axis of life in the vertebrate animal.

The tendency of the theory of evolution must ever be in the direction of atheism or pantheism, or of unstable religious belief. It logically leads to an abandonment of a belief in a Supreme Being, a Personal Creator, and it must be confessed that its ablest supporters to-day are atheists or pantheists. Man may supplement the theory with spiritual beliefs, but his conceptions of his Creator will constantly change, giving rise to various theological and pantheistical doctrines. As an illustration I

will quote again from the work of Professor Le Conte. After asserting that the law of evolution is even more certain than the law of gravity, he says : " The human brain is a wonderful instrument, by means of which, in some inscrutable way, viz., in our own experience, we do get behind, on the other side, on the inside of some material phenomena, and in so far become partakers of the Divine nature. But behind other phenomena of nature we may never hope to penetrate, either by observation or experience, but only in a dim way by the highest reason. Science, even in the case of the brain, cannot pass from the one kind of phenomena to the other. If she would study the inside she must abandon the outside—she must abandon the microscope and take to introspection." Now, if we are going to come to a comprehension of our relations to the unseen world by " introspection," and by " the dim light of the highest reason," we, of course, must enter the supernatural world in search of God with the various speculative philosophers, modern and ancient.

In commenting on the Upanishads—the philosophical treatises attached to each of the Hindu Vedas—Ram Chandra Bose, of Lucknow, India, says : " Let an underlying substance be posited, and we have the species of materialism which traces creation to self-evolving matter in the shape of atoms or a primordial form. Again, let an underlying spiritual substance, originally unconscious, but coming up in time to consciousness, be assumed, and we have all the varied forms of pantheism to which homage has been paid, both in and out of India."

Touching a proposition to reconstruct Christian theology Professor Le Conte says : " If the law of gravitation be regarded as the Divine mode of sustentation, there is no reason why we should not regard the law of evolution as the Divine process of creation. It is evident that if evolution be materialism, then is every law of Nature, and all science materialism. If there be any difference at all it consists only in this : that, as already said, here is the last line of defence of the supporters of supernaturalism in the realm of Nature. But, being the last line of defence—the last ditch—it is evident that a yielding here implies not a mere shifting of line, but a change of base ; not a readjustment of details only, but a reconstruction of Christian theology.

This, I believe, is indeed necessary. There can be little doubt in the mind of the thoughtful observer that we are even now on the eve of the greatest change in traditional views that has taken place since the birth of Christianity." After announcing his belief that it has become necessary to purge religious belief of dross in the form of trivialities and superstitions, "which ever has been and ever will be the function of science," he tells us: "Either God is far more closely related with Nature, and operates in a more direct way than we have recently been accustomed to think, or else [mark the alternative] Nature operates itself and needs no God at all. There is no middle ground tenable." Are the believers in that revelation which is founded on supernatural power ready to accept these declarations, to which Professor Huxley and Tyndall would not object, and acquiesce in the opinion that there is needed a reconstruction of Christian theology? Is the believer in revelation willing to admit that the middle ground, which he now occupies, and which supposes God to be strictly a personal Being and not a pantheistic force, is no longer tenable, and that modern evolutionism must be accepted as the foremost article in his confession of faith? Both Professor Le Conte and Professor Huxley, although avowing different religious beliefs, perceive that the theory of evolution is inconsistent with, and subversive of current religious thought. In a work which Professor Le Conte wrote several years ago, entitled "Religion and Science," although attempting to account for the evolution of the human soul in substantially the same way as in his recent work, there are many thoughts which are scarcely consistent with those in the latter. For instance, "The Bible is, we believe, a still clearer revelation of Deity (*i. e.*, than that contained in history), but even this revelation was not made in a form which compels immediate and universal conviction. On the contrary, it depends upon the condition of our hearts and wills, upon the temper with which we study it, whether or not we recognize its Divine origin. If we approach with a pure heart, desiring truth, the evidences of Divine origin will grow brighter and brighter to the light of perfect day." Again he says: "Now, I repeat, if we accept the Scriptures at all as a Divine revelation, let us

accept them in the same frank spirit of undoubting trust. There may sometimes seem to us to be a mistake ; there may sometimes be apparent inconsistencies. Let us conclude that it is because our interpretation is false—we must change our reading."

After all, are we not forced to the conclusion that the ways of God are past finding out, and that faith, sublime faith, will carry us farther toward a knowledge of the spiritual world than either science or introspection? And if we are to put our microscopes away and take to introspection, it is difficult to see how we will get any farther than the ancient Greeks or Hindus. But who are the men who could now be expected to reconstruct Christian theology? How many different beliefs would be the result of the process of introspection by the various minds who would take that function on themselves?

One of the difficulties which we are laboring under at the present time is, that men are striving too much to explain things which cannot be explained. It is expected by many that modern science is able to banish all mysteries—not perceiving that all life and all nature is one continual mystery—that the power of the eye to perceive form and color, and of the ear to distinguish the various sounds and qualities of sounds, are continual mysteries, entirely, in their profoundest relations, beyond the comprehension of the mind of man ; that this earth is moved in its course through the heavens by supernatural power ; that the essential properties of mind are mysteries, and that notwithstanding the telescope, with the aid of mathematics, has solved many celestial problems ; still, the addition to knowledge, which is great, is exceeded by the addition to the mystery ; and although the microscope may pry into the secrets of organic structure, and the knowledge so gained be of great advantage, still the wonders and mysteries increase in greater proportion, and will continue to increase with the widening circle of man's knowledge, which after all must be limited ; for, veiled behind all nature and all life ; free, independent, not bound to matter, but acting above and controlling it—how far we do not know, how near we cannot imagine—exists that Omnipotent Being, upon whom no mortal eye can rest, and whose ways are past finding out.

IS IT TIME FOR AN INSTITUTE OF THEOLOGY?

[The following paper was published in the Andover Review and forwarded by its author for the official attention of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. We republish it for consideration, and shall be glad to hear the candid views of the members of the Institute on the matter therein contained.—ED. CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY REV. GEORGE A. JACKSON, Swampscott, Mass.

OPPORTUNITY for thought upon this theme was recently furnished by the American Society of Church History, in directing its council to confer with the American Historical Association, with reference to merging the former society with the latter as a section of the same. The proposition has called out somewhat widely divergent views.

The fact that such a proposal was made is in itself complimentary to the Church History Society. It shows that the scholars representing this department of theological science in America have broken away from the old narrow conception of Ecclesiastical History, and hold that Church History is as broad as the world in its scope; that it interpenetrates, and finds a field for Christian thought in the political and social, as well as the distinctively religious life of the race.

Whether or not the proposed union should be effected is a different thing, and calls for thought upon several distinct points.

1. *As to the aim of learned societies in general, and of learned theological societies in particular.* Perhaps no better idea of the aim of such societies in general could be given than that embodied in the name of two of the best known British and American societies, namely, the British and the American Associations for the Advancement of Science. Here it is in a word. Busy men, whose time is thought and power, do not come together to pose as academicians, or to worship their respective sciences, but to advance those sciences through the interchange of thought and experiences.

Nor should it be otherwise with learned societies of theologians. The words *theology*, *theologian*, let it be said, are used in this article in their broad sense, as embracing all that pertains to the ministerial profession. The writer has been surprised to find how persistently even clergymen and scholars narrow their conceptions of theology to the special field of dogmatics, instead of placing the word beside the words *law* and *medicine*, as covering all that belongs to the first of the learned professions. Using theology in this broad sense, then, learned societies of theologians are formed to advance the science of theology. They have no other reason for being. If, in any of its departments, theology is to be separated from all other sciences, by being held to have reached its ultimatum of development, a learned society for that department is a mere exhibition of pedantry; for the theologian on leaving the seminary may be as profound a scholar in that department as any of the revered fathers of the profession. In some branches of theology, room for progress is admitted by all. No one doubts, for example, that the knowledge of the Scripture text possessed by the late Revisers was more accurate than that possessed by the translators of the Authorized Version; or that the future discovery of ancient manuscripts may make such knowledge yet more broad and accurate. Nor will it be denied that through the study of comparative philology Biblical scholars have a better knowledge of the meaning of certain Scripture words than their fathers had. Hence there exists, and every one grants that there is a field for, societies of Biblical exegesis. And what is thus conceded in one department, the writer holds to be true of all departments of theological science. All could profit by rightly constituted learned societies; for they are all susceptible of advancement. As general history has had its Niebuhr, since whose day it has taken on a truly scientific spirit, Church history has had its Mosheim, and Neander, and von Ranke, not to speak of more recent writers, no one of whom has left this science where he found it. The several branches of Systematic Theology, too, show the same progress. What professor of theology would to-day put off a class in apologetics with the same lines of thought that were followed before the rise of the more recent scientific

thought? Who would think of dismissing the subject of Christian ethics, without certain restatements in view of the theories of men like J. S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer, and Leslie Stephen? Or, coming to the very sanctuary of theology, to dogmatics pure and simple, the teacher were monumentally archaic, who should to-day propound verbatim the doctrines of Calvin, or Luther, or Edwards, or take his system bodily from "Beveridge on the Articles," or "Watson's Institutes"; all oblivious of the thought of Schleiermacher, or Coleridge, or Thomas Erskine, or the Oxford writers; wholly uninfluenced by the "New School" writers of New England, and of the Presbyterian Church; and never referring to the school of Channing, or to the influence of Horace Bushnell. Once more, in the various departments of Practical Theology, advancement is almost the order of the day, as witness the present missionary activity of the Church, and its wide-reaching Sunday-school and Bible work. Changes and, presumably, improvements are also making, in almost every branch of the Church, in the order and methods of worship; while the economizing of power by a better co-operation of all the Christian forces is just now an end devoutly longed and prayed for. Here, it is to be admitted, scholarly theories have less prominence than elsewhere. Still, sound theory should underlie all practical work, and as will be seen later, experience has taught our eminent workers in this department that they need to call together in a quiet way their choice men, to discuss in a thoughtful and scholarly manner their methods of work and worship.

In all her departments, then, theology has a field for scholarly societies, organized for the advancement of theological science.

2. *As to the relation of Church history to theology.* To say that it is a recognized department of this science is a truism. The most liberally endowed of our American universities has no chair of Church history outside its theological department. In the popular estimate, Church history is as closely affiliated with theology as geology is with natural science as a whole. The question then arises, Is the popular estimate just? Or, should Church history, instead of being left for its scholarly study to the professional school, be relegated to the academical curriculum, to

be pursued as assiduously by the prospective business man or politician as by the prospective theologian? Some advantages would certainly accrue from this. No man to-day can claim to be well educated who is ignorant as to the great moral powers that sway the world. If Church history were taught in colleges as the history of the development of one of the great elemental forces of society, men who now make the mistake of forgetting this element would recognize it, perhaps to their own and to the country's good. But Church history is too vast a subject to be more than outlined in any academical course. It has relations with philosophy, and with our conceptions of the divine government and our ideas of teleology, such as to preclude its thorough study by undergraduates. It is therefore of necessity left to post-graduate study. True, it might then be pursued, as are political science and history, in the post-graduate department of philosophy; but as a matter of fact, where one man, for special reasons, does this, ten thousand graduates study in the theological seminaries. We must therefore conclude that the popular estimate is also the scholarly estimate; that Church history belongs legitimately to theology.

But because thus a branch of theological study, its scope is not narrowed by the trammels of ecclesiasticism. Simply to traverse the fortunes of the Church as an organized institution is not, in its truest sense, to write Church history. Time was when the Church historian was the mere chronicler of the succession of bishops, the decrees of councils, the extension of the religious orders, or the miracles wrought at holy shrines. The idea of tracing important ecclesiastical occurrences to causes other than the direct will of God would have been deemed profane, had any one been bold enough to make the suggestion. But this stage was long ago passed. For more than a century, as rational methods have been applied to the study of Church history as to the study of political history. But now a new era of Church history is dawning, not as to its methods, but as to its contents. Our meaning can again be illustrated by a name. When Green's "Short History of the English People" appeared, its title was a popular lecture upon the office of history. It suggested that the history of a nation was to be found, not so much in the fortunes of dynasties and minis-

tries, or in the progress of wars and political revolutions, as in the every-day life of the people of the nation. These state events might afford the showy elements ; but they all happened for the sake of, and were of value only as they ultimated in, changes and improvements in the condition and character of the people. So in Church history. The Church as an organized institution may be compared to the state, its clergy to sovereigns and statesmen, its councils to parliaments, its doctrines to theories of government, its reformations and changes in polity to revolutions and political reforms. With all these, Church and political historians must continue to deal, and they will always constitute the framework of history. But more and more in both departments, penetrating writers will be impatient of spending their strength on what are, after all, only means ; and will be eager to trace the outcome of all this elaborate organization in the every-day life of the millions. And in this, their best work, the writers of what is called secular, and of what is called Church, history will more and more find themselves crossing each other, or rather treading the same ground. Still the instinct of the true historian of the Church will cause him to walk this common ground with a spirit of his own. From councils, and doctrinal controversies, and forms of worship, he will gravitate to the identical social problems to which the political historian penetrates through party politics and acts of legislation. But he will look upon all these problems with the eye of his Master ; not indeed indifferent to what men eat and drink and put on, yet chiefly concerned with their attitude toward the Kingdom of God and His righteousness. He will ask, What has been the influence of popes and prelates or of presbyters and deacons, of cathedrals or of meeting-houses, of sacraments or of preaching, of orthodoxy or of heterodoxy,—not in magnifying the Church or multiplying Church-members,—but in causing the multitudes of earth, amid their poverty and their wealth, their sorrows and their joys, to take on something of the divine likeness?

So we find the Church historian, not only by popular and by scholarly consent, but by the very fundamental principles upon which he works, a theologian.

3. *As to the duty of Church historians to the world at large.*

It is the glory of this department of theology that it has seen the interpenetration of the Church and the world, of the religious and the secular, and that it has therefore awakened to a sense of its duties outside the lecture-room. Church histories are now written, like the recent work of Professor Fisher, which are intended not simply for text-books in seminaries, but for general reading. Efforts are making to give the valuable parts of the literature of the Church a popular circulation. Professors of Church history are not men of the cloister, but, in the high sense of the phrase, men of the world, uttering themselves in the hearing of the world. Not to emphasize these above similar contributions, but simply from convenience of illustration, we may note the work of Professor Schaff on the relations of Church and State in America, read in outline before, and issued as a publication of, the American Historical Association; and the review of Jansen's "History of the German People," by Professor Emerton of Harvard Divinity School, printed in full in the proceedings of the same Association.

It might be invidious to claim that the historical has outstripped the other departments of theology in this recognition of its relations and obligations to the scholarly work of the world, but for one thing: it is the business of the historian to be looking outside his books into the lives and thoughts of men, that he may the better depict the evolution of such life and thought in the past. The Biblical exegete may be excused if the nature of his scholarship is such as to divorce his thought from the passing thought of the world. The systematic theologian can hardly be blamed if in his devotion to abstract truth he fails to come in contact with popular currents of opinion. The historian, however, to know how men have thought in the past, must know how they are thinking now. And no one can study the thought of the past twenty-five years without observing the growing recognition of religion by the world as one of the constituent and influential elements of the world's life. Witness the attitude of the secular press toward the Church. An important religious convention, or a vigorous religious controversy, which a generation ago would have been alluded to only in a paragraph, if at all, is now chronicled with as much fullness

as important political events. The leading dailies have their religious as well as their literary editors, and homilies appear from time to time in their editorial columns which would do credit to any metropolitan pulpit. And to such advances, reciprocity is desired. The pulpit is expected to know what is passing in the world and, without forgetting the unchanging elements of human nature and divine grace, to adapt its ministrations to the surroundings and peculiar and pressing wants of congregations. The scholars of the profession, too, are genuinely welcomed whenever they are willing to bring their professional learning to bear upon any of the vital problems of the day. That the Church History Society has so far recognized its obligations to the general historical scholarship of the country as to think of becoming a part of the Historical Association is, as has been said, a tribute to the breadth of thought among its members. If the Society considers only its direct opportunity of letting its light shine upon the non-religious world, it will doubtless effect the union. It is to be hoped, however, that men of such breadth of thought and sympathy will, before acting, ponder another question, namely :

4. *As to the duty of Church historians to their own profession, and to the world through that profession.* Sixty out of sixty-six members of the American Society of Church History are clergymen. The writer remembers that in the seminary one of his professors, who has nobly illustrated his teaching, said to the class, "Young gentlemen, bear in mind that as educated ministers you have a duty to your profession. You will have your pulpit and parish or professorial duties ; but that should not excuse you from contributing in some way — by a helpful book, or by improved methods of work, or by opening up new fields for Christian effort — to enrich your profession. See to it that you make the ministry a more respected and more influential calling — more noble it cannot be — than when you entered it." Let that charge be pondered. It is a larger thing to be a theologian, in the broad, best sense of that word, than to be a Church historian. Of two theological scholars going before the world to discuss important social problems from the Christian standpoint, that one who is accredited by the common voice of his profession will be received

with greater deference than that one who speaks for any single department. This being true, may it not be the duty of the Church History Society, with its enlightened views of Christian scholarship, to stand loyally by its theological associates, to communicate to them its own outreaching spirit, and so to hasten the day when theologians shall again be recognized as first among their equals in the world's great guild of scholars? This is a position which can be, and to increase its power and usefulness ought to be, won by our profession. What so world-embracing in its tendency as the thought of the profession which seeks to understand and to unfold the whole counsel of the Eternal? Not physical science, certainly, which so often forgets that there is a spiritual world. And not metaphysics, which despises the material world. Nay, where look for the scholar of uncircumscribed thought, if not among followers of Him who, in the beginning, or ever the world was, conceived that world as His thought; and who again hungered and thirsted and wept and prayed, a sharer of that stern sense-bound life which blinds the many to things unseen?

And the scholarly representative of such followers is the theologian; who ought therefore to rejoice in every discovery of natural science, and in every contribution of philological lore, or of historical research, as truly as in every right result of Biblical criticism; since all are tributary to that knowledge of God and the good which it is his aim to promote. Ought to, but too often, truth to say, does not rejoice; but looks askance at the progress of all science which seems to threaten his own private notions as to Biblical interpretation. And when will this state of things be improved, if the first among theological scholars to recognize their affiliation with the scholars of the world forsake their fellows, and go up unaided to a work which demands the united and determined effort of the whole profession? The only battle of the late war in which an entire army was annihilated or scattered to the four winds was the battle of Nashville. But previous to this battle Schofield had retreated before Hood, and joined forces with General Thomas's whole army; which army, after waiting and gathering strength, became irresistible. So might the power of the theological profession become irresistible against

all boastful, unscientific skepticism, if all its scholarly forces could be brought into line for the contest.

A desirable end, but its realization calls for further thought :

5. *As to a practical way of uniting theological scholars.* On the side of general scholarship, the doors of the Historical Association stand open, tempting one of our societies to enter and find scholarly fellowship. On the side of theology there is no such opening. The American way in such a case is to make an opening ; and we therefore ask, May not an organization of theological scholars be effected which shall (1) compel the respect of the world for the scientific scholarship of the profession, and (2) make that scholarship more practically available to the world?

The writer, with this thought in mind, has recently visited and conversed with well-known scholars representing six of our more important theological centres. His impression, after hearing the views of these gentlemen, is that such an association is practicable. There are already in existence in this country three national societies, representing three of the four great departments of theology, to wit : the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis ; the American Institute of Christian Philosophy ; and the American Society of Church History. A fourth organization, representing the department of Practical Theology, is likely to be formed this summer by the leaders of the recent Church Congress movement. Other societies not so well known to the writer might be equally available with these for effecting the proposed organization.

Suppose what we aim at to be called, THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THEOLOGY ; to be incorporated by Act of Congress, with power to hold a moderate amount of property ; and to propose as its object the advancement of the scholarly work of the theological profession. Let the plan of organization be in the main that of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, though with some features more like that of the Institute of France. The purpose should be to have each of the four great branches of theological science represented by one or more constituent societies ; the several societies having a certain independence, like the academies of the French Institute, but all to be under the general direction of the Institute.

Assuming that each of the constituent societies had its own president and council, suppose the general organization to be as follows: The president, who shall be expected to make an address at the annual meeting upon some topic of general interest to the profession. A first vice-president. As other vice-presidents, the presidents of the several constituent societies. Secretary; treasurer. A council, composed of the above officers and two members from each of the constituent societies. The council to have general direction of the affairs of the Institute. Members should be elected by this general council, but only upon nomination by the councils or executive committees of the composing societies; and when elected they should be attached to the nominating society. The number of members to be limited, and to be rightly apportioned to the several societies. By this plan, each society could guard its own membership. The Exegetical Society for example would not have to receive the man who contends that "the sun do move" simply because he is a somewhat famous preacher. On the other hand, final election by the general council would secure for the Institute, as would become its dignity, something more than a mere company of specialists. At the annual meeting of the Institute, the different societies might do their distinctive work in separate gatherings; but the common meetings, with the president's address, of equal interest to all, would not only give added zest to the special work, but would command the attention of the world as meetings of specialists would not. Who would claim that the work of the British or of the American Association could have been wrought by as many separate societies as they have sections, each of these meeting at its own time and place, without stimulus from the others, and without the dignity accruing to its work from the popular interest in science in general?

If now such an Institute is desirable, it can easily be realized. Two of the existing societies could come together with but little change of their present form. As a member of the Exegetical Society said to me, his society would have nothing to lose and much to gain by the union. So think not a few of the members of the Church History Society. The society mentioned as representing the department of systematic theology is less obviously

fitted for such a scholarly undertaking. It is modelled after the Victoria Institute of Great Britain, and at present devotes itself chiefly to one sub-department of theology, namely, apologetics. Its work is professedly popular, and its present membership has not been determined by scholarly qualifications. Still by an arrangement hereafter suggested, it might furnish the starting point of a strictly scholarly society of Christian Theology, which in time would make contributions to the study of Christian ethics and even of dogmatics. Coming to the department of practical theology, it is an interesting fact, and bears closely upon the subject in hand, that the gentlemen who brought about the great gatherings at Hartford and Cleveland, known as Church Congresses, and looking towards more united and effective Christian work, now feel the need of calling together at Pittsfield a select company of working divines, to approach their work in a more scholarly way than is possible in a great popular assembly. These men may be called experts in the work of applying Christianity, through the various Church organizations, to the lives of men. Who will question that the deliberations of such a company of chosen men are needed to give direction and success to the work of their great public assemblies? If their organization should become permanent, embracing professors of homiletics and the pastoral work, and the more eminent of our preachers and pastors; and if then they should become one of the constituent bodies of an Institute, might they not contribute to the whole profession valuable principles and methods of work, which now have only a local or denominational sway? The whole subject of liturgics, for example, needs to be dealt with in a broad catholic spirit. Who more fitted for such a task than a company of devout and scholarly divines, willing to learn from each other, and seeking the good not of any denomination, but of the entire Christian work of the country.

Of course this precise form of organization is only a suggestion. Other and better ways might occur to men who set themselves in earnest to secure such a general co-operation. Criticism would no doubt be made of this plan from a financial point of view. The existing societies, it is said, have hard work to maintain themselves now, when each receives annual dues from its

members, and not a few persons belong to all three ; it would be suicidal to have but one membership fee from these instead of three. But would it ? A gentleman who is now a member of the Exegetical Society, the Church History Society, and the Institute of Christian Philosophy, has told me that his annual expenditure in connection with the three aggregates some forty-five or fifty dollars, two-thirds of which consists of expenses in attending the three meetings. If he lived farther away from a great centre, as do most of the members of the societies, these travelling expenses would be increased ; but suppose his case to be an average one. Divide the cost of the three meetings, \$30.00, by two, covering the cost of one longer meeting at \$15.00. He could then afford to pay a membership fee of \$10.00 to the Institute, and reduce the annual cost from \$45.00 to \$25.00, an item worth noting in most ministerial accounts. This fee properly apportioned would suffice to meet all expenses of the general and constituent societies, outside the printing of papers ; and, even at the outset, would enable members to receive these at a reduction upon their cost. And the probabilities are that by printing only papers of permanent value, and so uniting those of the several departments in one publication, a sufficient sale would soon be secured to enable members to have all publications free.

Another objection might be urged from the fact that the Institute of Christian Philosophy is a popular body, and holds a summer assembly at a popular resort ; an expensive work, and one foreign to the purpose of the Institute. A valid objection surely, and one which might make the co-operation of this society impracticable. In this case a still better way would be open, namely, for representative teachers of theology of the various schools to form outright a Society of Christian Theology. Still, liberty might remain with any of the constituent societies to do whatever outside popular work they might choose, only requiring that for the prosecution of such work they supply their own funds. To this end, liberty might be accorded to the societies to have associate members of their own, elected by them, and responsible only to them ; which associates, however, should not in any sense be members of the Institute. By this means popu-

lar work could be supported, and the strictly scholarly work not be impeded.

It is possible that the plan of associate membership in the Institute would approve itself to some, and from a financial point of view it might be a desirable feature. Judging, however, from the example of the Victoria Institute, which has such associates, it would be a doubtful expedient. To be of any lasting value, such an Institute as is proposed must be a distinctively scholarly and scientific body. Compromise with this principle would be fatal. The best men of the profession, who alone can make it a success, will not join it upon any other terms. A venerable college president, as honorably known in Great Britain as in America, expressed to the writer his opinion that the Victoria Institute had not been greatly helpful to the world, for the reason that its members were not willing to approach the vital questions which it professes to discuss, in the sole and simple interest of truth. Thinking at first that the Institute here proposed might be of the same timorous and unscholarly character, this eminent scholar exclaimed with some warmth, "What is the use of a Theological Institute? Ministers won't face the truth fairly, and discuss it in a scientific way. No, sir, when I want to discuss great truths, bearing upon the relations of religion to science or social life, I will go straight to the scientific societies, and fight the materialists on their own ground." To my demurrer against the unwillingness of our profession to face the truth he replied: "What does it mean then that the——and the—— (mentioning two prominent religious newspapers) treat men as unbelievers who accept the doctrine of evolution, when there is not a young man of thirty in the country but knows that it is true?" When assured, however, that it was the aim of the projected movement to secure the discussion of truth among theological scholars in the same unbiased way in which honest scientists approach truth; and that the co-operation proposed was with a view to spreading this scientific spirit, which already obtains with some theologians, to all theologians, he replied: "Such an Institute I shall be glad to join." The same substantial opinion as to the scholarly and scientific character of any successful society was expressed to me by others of the foremost

theological scholars of the country. To this end, members would need to be chosen from men who in their several departments had done honorable and useful work, and who would be interested solely to advance their profession, without side glances at the personal or denominational relationship of their work. It passes also without saying that such an Institute would need to be untrammelled by creed or confession. Its discussions must be as free as thought. Such a body would need to exist but a few years, before membership in it would be so prized that it need not go begging for members, but might choose them from the choicest men of the profession, confident that its elections would be accepted.

It only remains to suggest who should act in this matter. The forming of the organization should be undertaken, if at all, by our foremost theological scholars. True, as was said to me by a venerable Yale professor, these distinguished men have nothing to gain personally by the undertaking. There are, perhaps, a score of theologians in the country whose name and fame could not be increased by being at the head of such an Institute in its ideal form. But men with name and fame in our profession are supposed to consult something beyond personal interests. And the influence of a score of such men, given with determination to this task, might not only free the theological scholarship of this country from the charge of timorous and unscientific thought, but might do much toward advancing every department of the profession to a higher rank.

Let us hope, at least, that such action may be taken this summer by the other theological societies that the Society of Church History need not feel compelled to go outside the profession to which it legitimately belongs to find scholarly fellowship.

CHARLES DARWIN.

[From Unitarian Review, by permission.]

BY THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D.,

Ex-President Harvard University.

IF history be, as Emerson says, simply a collection of biographies, then these volumes * constitute one of the most interesting chapters of history that have recently appeared. No man in our times has had a wider celebrity than Darwin, or has more thoroughly aroused the activities of the human mind. A large proportion of the scientific world have accorded him a place among the great discoverers, the great leaders of science. He has unquestionably given a stimulus to the study of zoölogy and botany, which has produced a rapid and healthy growth of those sciences. He has been granted an honorable sepulture in Westminster Abbey. His good fortune has followed him after death, giving him a biographer thoroughly acquainted with his habits of thought and action, and possessed of sufficient literary and artistic skill to present us his father's portrait in a very acceptable manner. The portrait itself is attractive and even fascinating: it shows us a man of great powers and great attainments, retaining a modest simplicity; patient and indefatigable in labor, patient also under protracted suffering; kind-hearted, affectionate, truthful and honest; a man whom it is impossible not to love. In reading this biography, we have learned why Agassiz, who both publicly and privately expressed strongly his dissent from Darwin's theories, always spoke of the man himself with the warmest enthusiasm. He not only recognized Darwin's valuable special contributions to geology and zoölogy, but the charm of his personal character. When we landed near the eastern end of the Straits of Magellan, and found there a pond of salt water, twenty-five fathoms above the sea, but containing the same animals as those then living on the coast, the chief pleasure to

* *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, including an Autobiographical Chapter. Edited by his son, Francis Darwin. [D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. 2 vols.]

Agassiz seemed to be that it showed Darwin's view of the recent elevation of the Patagonian plains to be correct. Throughout all the voyage of the "Hassler," it seemed to please him when we found any confirmation of Darwin's observations, and to give him pain when our results differed from his. It is pleasant to learn (vol. ii. 11) that Darwin's "cordial feelings towards the great American naturalist remained strong to the end of his life." One might fear that his feelings had been chilled by the absurd misunderstandings and consequent misrepresentations of Agassiz made to him (*e.g.*, vol. ii. 152).

It is this exceptionally high moral as well as scientific character of the man, conjoined with his wonderful industry in scientific labor, with the fascinating character of his speculations, and with the remarkable universality of his fame, that justifies his son in the minuteness of the biography before us. We have here Darwin's opinions, not only on science, but on almost every conceivable subject, and all the details of his daily life, down to the very tones of his voice as he spoke to his dog; and we find ourselves interested and charmed by it all. Of course, the biographer, being a loving son, cannot be absolutely impartial; but he succeeds remarkably well in the attempt to describe his father for us with scientific conscientiousness. The volumes give us Darwin's life and character with as much accuracy as the photographs by which it is illustrated give us his personal appearance.

One who is thoroughly familiar with the writings of the grandfather, Erasmus, is constantly reminded of points of similarity to him in the grandson, which neither Darwin nor his biographer appears to see. One of these points of resemblance is the exuberance of his fancy in theorizing, which the biographer thinks he kept in check much better than his grandfather; but upon that point there may be differences of opinion. Another is his desire to exalt plants to a relationship to animals (vol. ii. 506); another, his peculiar view of music (vol. ii. 364)—that its expression is not the same to all hearers, but depends upon individual personal association of ideas. In the beginning of his speculations upon the origin of species, as shown by his notebook of 1837 (vol. i. 371), he appears to attach importance to an idea which was unquestionably at the foundation of his grand-

father's speculations ; namely, that it was a more simple and sublime conception of creation to suppose that the earliest animals were endowed with capacity to develop into a multitude of species. This is the grand *a priori* conception which, in various branches of science and philosophy, goes under various names, such as the law of parsimony, Occam's razor, and the principle of the least action. In mathematics and physics, it has proved, as announced by Maupertuis, a veritable horn of plenty. But Darwin afterwards receded from this strong foundation of his grandfather, to build on what he fancies to be inductive reasoning. He has therein, in our judgment, knocked away a granite underpinning, in order to build upon brush-wood. In his own comment upon the *Zoönomia*, he complains that there is too much theory there in proportion to the facts ; and he has evidently endeavored, in his own scientific labor, to avoid this error by careful multitudinous observations of nature and by careful examination of the observations of other men.

But, for satisfactory scientific induction, the facts must not only be abundant, they must be pertinent to the theory which we would induce. The great Balaam of the inductive sciences gives, at the end of the *Novum Organon*, a notable example of how induction should not be practised, drawing a true theory of the nature of heat from a multitude of phenomena, in many of which heat, in the true sense of the term played no part whatever. It is true that Darwin introduces and uses, in his theory of the origin of species and of the descent of man, a myriad times as many facts as those which are quoted in the *Zoönomia* and the *Phytologia* ; but the great question is, What is the bearing of the facts ? To many specialists in the biological sciences, they all seem to confirm Darwin's theories. And if we could accept that remarkable definition of truth given, about a dozen years ago, by a vice-president of the Royal Society,—that truth is the opinion of the majority of those qualified to judge,—we might be compelled to say that the facts did bear out Darwin's inferences ; but, for our part, we have never been able to accept that definition of truth, and we must still retain the liberty of judging for ourselves whether the arguments set before us are sound. Of course, we yield to the testimony of observers as to

the existence of the facts, but, when they argue from the facts, they appeal to us to judge of the strength of the argument, and imply that we have the ability to do so.

Let us take then, for example, the argument drawn from the variation of domesticated plants and animals. Soon after the publication of Darwin's volume upon that subject, we met a farmer, a very intelligent man, entirely without theological prejudices, who of his own accord spoke of the book as exceedingly unsatisfactory. It was, he said, very interesting; but he did not see that it bore at all upon the question of the origin of species, because the variations spoken of had no similarity, as far as he could see, to the differences between species. The fragments of a fantail or pouter pigeon's bones would say, to a man like Jeffries Wyman, exactly the same thing as the bones of an ordinary pigeon. In natural species, the difference extends to the minutiae, so that the smallest fragment of the solid frame tells the story of its origin. Darwin himself argues, when speaking against any deduction from a monstrosity in *Begonia*, that the monstrous *Begonia* would in all its details be *Begonia* (vol. ii. 70). In another letter, he says that we ought not to expect the same differences under domestication that we find in nature. But of course he admits some of the same kind of differences, else his argument from variation under domestication would not apply at all to his grand theories. And if variation under cultivation has any bearing at all upon the question of the origin of species, then it seems to us that Alphonse de Candolle's researches into the origin of cultivated plants tell very strongly against Darwin's views. De Candolle is an adherent to Darwin's theory, and yet, after a very careful examination, admits that the forms anterior to cultivation have commonly remained, side by side with those which cultivators employed and propagated, from century to century, so that of two hundred and forty-seven species, belonging to fifty-one different families, not one species can be shown to have been permanently altered, sufficiently to disguise its specific character, by a cultivation of even four thousand years.

If we understand the arguments by which Darwin and his followers attempt to show the common origin of various species,

and to prove that the differences between them have been produced by the process of insensible variations and the survival of the forms best adapted to victory in the struggle for life, they are built chiefly upon four series of facts: First, that there are analogies and homologies common to organic beings; and these analogies and homologies are found in the minute details of organized structures. Organic nature has a unity more complex than that arising from the mere fact of both vegetables and animals being composed of cells. To take an extreme case, there are particulars in which even the fungus and alga constituting a lichen are similar to human beings. Secondly, all species are subject to variation, and some of them to great variations, so that very frequently, between allied species, a series of specimens may be arranged in such a manner that it would be difficult to decide at what point the one species begins and the other ends. With the majority of writers who advocate Darwin's theory, this second series of facts is dwelt upon as though it were their main reliance. Thirdly, in the successive geological ages there appears to have been a succession of species in a regular progression, so that, as in the celebrated case of Agassiz before the British Association, a man well acquainted with the fossils of two different layers could predict what could be found in the intermediate layer. Fourthly, there is in the development of any embryo, in the egg, a certain analogy in the successive forms which it assumes to the succession of species in the geologic periods and to the various forms of the division of the animal kingdom to which the embryo belongs. This analogy of embryonic growth to the series of species and genera is a strong point with Darwin himself, and he insists upon it that it should never be lost sight of. There are also a great many facts, which are appealed to in evidence of his theories, which are not capable of being arranged under either of these four heads.

The Darwinian inference from these facts is that species have always been evolved from preceding species by a gradual variation in every direction, giving to certain individuals, from time to time, some peculiar advantage over their fellows in the struggle for life. Darwin does not admit the probability of there ever having been sudden changes, such as frequently occur (as

“sporting”) under cultivation ; nor does he admit the probability that Asa Gray’s views are correct, that the variation and survival have been in predetermined lines. According to the true Darwinian doctrine, the progress must be exceedingly slow, the variation in all conceivable directions, and the lines determined altogether by the superior adaptation of one form over another to the particular circumstances of the position. Any writer who cannot see that the facts adduced bear out this inference is usually spoken of in uncomplimentary terms, as being either blind or unwilling to see. The very heat which is engendered in this discussion is an indication that the evidence is not overwhelming. To us there are two facts which seem never to have been fairly considered in the controversy. One is that which is stated so strongly by De Candolle : that cultivation for four thousand years has not produced any difference like the difference of species. De Candolle, it is true, escapes the force of his conclusions by a process which, with all respect to him, we must say, if we may use Darwin’s own jocose expression, seems “wriggling.” He says that his facts may be explained in two ways. The first is that four thousand years is too short a time. When Agassiz showed how long the coral-builders in Florida had been unchanged, and playfully referred to Chamisso’s man with a queue, the answer was ready,—that that kind of creature was peculiarly invariable in its forms. But here De Candolle examines two hundred and forty-seven species, belonging to fifty-one different families, and they all seem invariable in their forms, as far back as human experience goes. His second mode of escape from the force of his own conclusions is that the seeds of cultivated plants are continually dispersed, and that, mingling with the truly wild congeners, they keep up a similarity which might otherwise have been destroyed. This seems to us equivalent to denying the value of his own careful investigations, and also to forgetting that it invalidates the very testimony by which he has shown the antiquity of the cultivated plant.

The other great fact which does not appear to us to be fairly considered is the nature of the geological record. We cannot learn that any advocate of the views of Darwin and Wallace pretends that there is any record whatever of changes taking place,

but only of changes having taken place. It is true that every stratum of rock, if we understand the testimony of the geologists, shows that species have always been variable ; but no stratum shows a continuous variation in any one direction. Of course, even such a fact can be disposed of by "wriggling." Darwin and his admirers are fertile in multitudinous hypotheses ; but it does not become laymen like ourselves to enter into a discussion of any of these points, on which specialists alone have a right to form a judgment. Our own inability to accept the Darwinian theory, whether built upon the granite foundation of Erasmus Darwin or the less solid underpinning of his grandson, does not arise chiefly from a consideration of these special points. Nor have we any theological prepossession against it ; for we agree cordially with Dr. Gray that the theory itself, when properly explained, is hostile neither to teleology nor to morphology. But there are, in our judgment, fundamental difficulties in the general logic and philosophy of every scheme of the evolution of species which we have ever seen. . . .

The second of the fundamental principles of Darwinian evolution, which we are unable to accept, is its demand for an "almost unlimited time" (vol. i. 479). We were driving one day, on the shores of Penobscot Bay, with an ardent Darwinian, and in the course of conversation remarked that the physicists did not seem inclined to grant sufficient time for evolution by natural selection. He instantly, and somewhat sharply, replied that it was so much the worse for the physicists ; for there had certainly been as much time in the past as there would be in the future. This was in perfect accord with Hooker's and Darwin's challenge of astronomy (vol. ii. 283) and denial of her right to be called the queen of sciences. Yet it is rather hard for the astronomer and the physicist to understand why ten times one does not make ten, in discussing the origin of species as truly as in any other discussion. And even should the mathematician admit that all the exceedingly minute and delicate observations of physical astronomy are erroneous, or should he acknowledge Pierce's or Siemens's methods of feeding the sun sufficient to warrant us in granting almost unlimited time, he cannot readily understand how even unlimited time can ever change an absurdity into truth. Darwin

speaks repeatedly with contempt of Lamarck's views, and two or three times of the monstrous idea of evolving a reptile from a fish or a fish from a crustacean. Nevertheless, had he nothing but his three expressed postulates to build upon,—constant variation in all directions, survival of the fittest, and unlimited time,—there would be nothing monstrous in either of those metamorphoses. His indignant rejection of them arose evidently from his holding also, unconsciously, postulates which were virtually equivalent to Asa Gray's predetermined lines of descent. In other words, Darwin took the actual series of embryological developments into account, in judging of the possibility of developments occupying many million-fold longer times. He was thus inconsistent in both claiming the potency of an almost unlimited time and yet in denying it.

But behind all these considerations there lies a third reason why we have been unable to accept Darwin's theory as even probable truth. That theory is built upon faith in the variability of species in this sense: that a given form may gradually change, from generation to generation, until a creature of the simplest organization has become one of the most complex. Such a variation seems to us in the highest degree improbable, because it is opposed by the analogies of all physical nature. The atoms appear to be so invariable in their properties, and so sharply defined, that no length of time has produced a variation and no closeness of relationship has indicated any transmutation of species. The elements in the sun have been subjected, according to the physicists for thirty millions of years, and according to Darwinism for a still longer time, to a temperature over five thousand times hotter than molten steel, while those upon the earth have been for the same length of time enduring our temperate climates; and yet spectroscopic analysis indicates no change in the atoms. So far as science can go in the decision of such a matter, molecules also are as permanent as the atoms. The science of crystallography has led to some suspicion that there may be slight perturbations in the proportions of chemical compounds; but certainly those perturbations, if they exist at all, are enclosed within very narrow limits. The forms of crystals are susceptible of various modifications, but those modifications are as

strictly conformable to law as the original crystals. The mineralogist would recoil from the idea of a crystal in one system passing gradually into another system, as vigorously as Darwin does from a fish turning into a reptile. The forms of the planets and the forms of their orbits are subject to perturbations; but those perturbations are strictly limited, and conform to the same geometric law that governs the regular orbit.

The individual plant and the individual animal always show a geometric law in their formation: even monstrosities indicate the presence of such law. The differences between the great classes, in the organic kingdoms, are certainly susceptible of geometric representation. All these considerations would lead us to expect that the whole arrangement and relationship of species is also capable of geometric representation. Certainly, the classification of the organic kingdoms is built primarily upon form; for, in the majority of the fossil species, the naturalist has form alone to guide him. It is in the highest degree improbable that these forms are incapable of reduction to a connected series of laws, and nothing but the most positive and overwhelming evidence should induce us to admit that they are indeterminate and lawless in their genesis. And it would be an exceedingly improbable assumption to assume the possibility of any being passing by insensible gradations from one form to all the others. Yet, in spite of Darwin's horror at Lamarck and at the *Vestiges*, this is the assumption of his theory: if his theory were true, geometrically, the fish might run down to the original archetype of vertebrates, and then ascend to the form of the reptile. His instinctive horror, as a naturalist, at supposing such a transformation, justifies our instinctive geometrical horror at the theory of insensible variations proceeding to such lengths as he supposes.

When one line crosses another, the point of intersection belongs to both lines. Yet the law of movement, which carries a point along one line, will, in general, utterly forbid its switching off at that common point and going into the other line. When one railway crosses another, it requires a special arrangement of interconnecting switches to allow the train on one to pass to the other line. In like manner, a series of geometrical forms may be arranged upon a line, and a second series so chosen that,

being arranged on a similar line, crossing the first, some one figure may be common to both series. But the law which leads you to that figure in the one series will not permit you there to branch off upon the other. It would be easy to give, for example, a dozen series of curves, each perfectly connected in itself and each one of which includes a circle. But, unless there chanced to be a system of interconnecting switches on two of the series at that point where the circle occurs, it would not be possible to pass from one to the other. Take, for example, a slender strip of whalebone, and, holding it by its two ends alone, it can be put into a vast variety of forms,—a straight line, waves of greater or less amount of undulation, alternating loops like a thread of gimp, a figure 8, a series of loops all on one side, or a perfect circle. But all these forms would have a bond of perfect connection, and one could pass into the other by insensible gradations. Their generation could be governed precisely by the law of insensible variation and survival of the fittest. Again, take a circular plate of metal, and cast its shadow upon a level surface. The form of that shadow may pass through a vast variety of forms: hyperbola or parabola, passing into infinite distance; an ellipse of great length or of shorter; a circle, when the plate is parallel to the plane; and a straight line, when the plate is held edgewise towards the light. All these forms, also, pass one into the other by insensible gradations. This series has a circle in common with the series formed by the piece of whalebone. But you could not pass from the circle in one series into the circle in the other. They are absolutely of the same shape, and may be absolutely of the same size; but the intellectual law of formation in the two is different. The physical law of generation is different; and you can neither practically nor theoretically make any other of the forms of the series of shadows by the elastic rod, nor any other of the forms of the elastic rod by the shadow of the plate.*

*The elastic curve bends, is curved, in simple proportion to its *distance* from the axis; the edge of the shadow of a circle is curved in a complex proportion to its *approach* to the axis. In the Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science for 1886, we have described a curve, which, passing through its series, would to the eye appear always of infinite length, and always to move by insensible gradations; while reason proves that in the middle of the series there is a break of infinite magnitude, and that a circle is poised over that unfathomable abyss.

Precisely so, we may have the egg of a reptile and the egg of a bird so nearly alike that an unskilled observer may not be able to tell which is which. Let us suppose that it was even impossible for the zoölogist to distinguish one from the other. It would prove nothing. The hatching of the eggs would, however, soon begin to develop the striking difference. Yet from the adult reptile you can go back by insensible gradations to the egg, and from an absolutely indistinguishable egg go up by insensible gradations to the bird. The most ardent Darwinian, of course, admits that that proves nothing. We confess that we do not see how the passage from one species to another by insensible gradations of the fully developed form proves anything more. When individuals of two species of the same genus can be so arranged side by side that you pass by insensible gradations from either species to an intermediate individual, concerning whose place you are doubtful, it creates a presumption that the two species are but varieties of one; but the presumption may in many cases be entirely overthrown by other considerations. There may be as complete a logical impossibility, of making the two one, as there is of bending a piece of whalebone into an ellipse. . . .

The highest intellectual life of man consists in his dealings with the three great entities, of mind, time, and space. But Darwin, as he grew older, appeared to lose clearness of perception in regard to all three; and many of his followers regard that latter state of his mind as superior to that of his earlier years. We have alluded to Darwin's rebellion against astronomy: he seemed equally unwilling to recognize the validity of any philosophy or any mathematical truth which militated against his views. He confesses (vol. ii. 234-6) that he sees no explanation of the law of phyllotaxy, but dares say there is "some explanation as simple as that for the angles of the bees' cells." By the word "explanation," Darwin means the reduction of the phenomenon to some merely mechanical law, combined perhaps with the law of the association of ideas. Inasmuch as he seems to have no clear conception of geometrical necessity, he does not see that the only thorough explanation of any fact is to be found in the reduction to a geometric or kin-

ematic necessity. Explanation, in his sense of the word, is simply the reduction of a particular physical fact to a wider class of facts, standing in still greater need of explanation than the case which it professes to explain. Thus the case of the bees' cell, which Darwin appears to think has been very simply explained, really remains as wonderful as ever. The bees' comb consists of two series of hexagonal cells, arranged, the bottom of one series to the bottom of the other, in such wise that the base of each cell is supported by three walls of the cells of the other series, and is dished down, in three planes, in such manner as to save more material from the walls which support it than it expends by enlarging its own area. Two "simple explanations" have been given: one, that two series of soap-bubbles, pressing upon each other, would take this form of maximum capacity and minimum amount of wall; the other, that the shape of the bee's body necessitates that form. Then the form and proportions of the bee might be accounted for on the principles of natural selection,—by the advantage which the swarm of bees would gain in the struggle for life, through the economy with which they expend their wax. But all this ingenious "wriggling" does not alter the facts: that the wasp, who builds of paper, uses its cheap material very freely; while the bee, who builds of costly material, uses it with great economy. Furthermore, it is a curious misunderstanding of these arguments of natural theology to object that the cells are not absolutely uniform and absolutely perfect in their geometrical form.

Darwin speaks also of "an astonishing amount of nonsense" having been spoken concerning the sand-wasps' knowledge of anatomy, who sting other insects to lay up as food for their larvae when hatched. We have a steel-blue wasp, common in our Atlantic States, which builds mud cells to contain its eggs, and fills each cell with spiders, stung in such a manner as merely to paralyze or intoxicate each spider without killing it. Another of our wasps encloses its eggs in a bomb-shell of clay, which it then fills with canker-worms, stung in a similar fashion. Children who rear caterpillars for the sake of watching their transformations, and who have been exceedingly careful to take young caterpillars, and to guard them closely under very fine netting,

are nevertheless often disappointed to see the chrysalid suddenly change color, and then, instead of giving them a butterfly, giving them an ichneumon. To ordinary apprehension, these are wonderful instances of what might be called innate knowledge. The wasp appears to know in what spot and to what depth to sting, in order to keep the game for her unhatched progeny alive, but helpless, until it is needed for eating. The ichneumon grub seems to be instinctively led to avoid the vital parts of the caterpillar until it is itself ready to assume the pupa stage, even although, as in the case of the *Asterias* butterfly, the caterpillar has itself previously become a chrysalid. Yet ordinary observers do not suppose that the insect has any conscious knowledge of the anatomy of its prey ; it has only instinctive knack. But they think that there must have been a conscious knowledge somewhere, behind so perfect an adaptation of means to ends. Darwin alone, if we understand him (vol. ii. 420), gives this conscious knowledge to the mud-wasp itself. He describes the Guachos on the plains of La Plata acquiring a knack of thrusting a pointed knife into the spinal marrow of a cow, and adds : " Now, I suppose that the sand-wasps originally merely killed their prey by stinging them in many places on the lower and softest side of the body, and that to sting a certain segment was found by far the most successful method, and was inherited, like the tendency of a bull-dog to pin the nose of a bull, or of a ferret to bite the cerebellum. It would not be a very great step in advance to prick the ganglion of its prey only slightly, and thus to give its larvæ fresh meat instead of old dried meat." What dwarfed and withered creatures the sand-wasps must have been before their parents had learned how to provide fresh meat for their larval state, and they had to live on old dried meat ! How proud they must have been to take the slight " step in advance " for their children ! and how earnestly they must have wished,

" As duteous sons, their fathers were more wise " !

We must acknowledge that those larvæ whose parents took this step would have a great advantage in the struggle for life, and rapidly supplant the others. The difficulty of accounting for the instinct to lay up the bodies of spiders at any rate, and the difficulty of feeding the larvæ on dry food, remain ; but these

difficulties could, of course, be easily disposed of by new "wiggles."

Darwin prided himself on never having evaded a difficulty: he or his friends have always been able to find some ingenious hypothesis to explain it. It astonishes us, as we read their writings, to see the ease with which they find an answer to any special difficulty by making a special hypothesis to meet it. But, in regard to more general objections, Darwin is by no means so strong. He confesses frankly that he does not understand or at least "cannot appreciate deductive reasoning" (vol. ii. 371, etc.). In another place, he speaks of "Agassiz's weak metaphysical and theological attack" (vol. ii. 123); but, as he repeatedly speaks of Agassiz with the most profound respect, it is probable that the sole weakness of the attack consisted in its being metaphysical and theological, and therefore above Darwin's capacity of comprehension. In many other passages he alludes to his own inability to understand philosophical and mathematical reasoning. The naturalists, in their discussion of his theories, are accustomed to say that no one has any right to an opinion on the subject who has not paid special attention to natural history sufficient to earn the right to be called a botanist or a zoölogist. And yet, in reference to these wider theories concerning the origin of things, it is manifest that the mere observation and generalization of special facts into larger groups of facts are not sufficient. One is almost tempted to say that, upon general questions like that of the origin of species, no man who is incapable of appreciating deductive reasoning or mathematical lines of thought has any right to an opinion. Of course, Darwin does possess some slight power in that direction, and at times indicates by his very forms of speech that he is resting upon axiomatic truth rather than upon observed facts. For example, he speaks of the doctrines of Lamarck in terms which show that he regarded them as monstrous and inconceivable.

There are two senses in which we use the word "inconceivable"; and even so great a man as Hamilton, of Edinburgh, sometimes confounds them. He tells us, in stating his philosophy of the conditioned, that all attainable truth lies between two contradictory extremes, one of which must be true, but both

of which are inconceivable. As an example, he mentions that space must be either limited or else illimitable, both of which, he adds, are equally inconceivable. He apparently does not perceive that bounded space is inconceivable in an entirely different sense from unbounded space. That space is illimitable is not properly inconceivable. The proposition is not only true, but clear and incontrovertible. What Hamilton means is simply that illimitable space transcends the grasp of the imagination, and is in that sense unimaginable. But reason goes far beyond the imagination, and demonstrates that this particular unimaginable thing nevertheless exists. On the other hand, that space is limited is both unimaginable and inconceivable : the imagination cannot picture it, nor can the reason admit for an instant that it is true. Both propositions are unimaginable,—inconceivable to the imagination ; but the second alone is inconceivable to reason. Darwin appears never to have perceived anything to be truly inconceivable, but he frequently rejects what is to him simply unimaginable. In all the riper years of his life, he appears to have fallen into the habit of regarding the senses as the only sources of knowledge : generalizations from observations and mentally sensuous imaginations of visible changes were almost exclusively the only foundations of his beliefs. He not only repeatedly admits, but constantly betrays, his entire want of mathematics, of metaphysics, and of deductive logic. His so-called inductions have, therefore, very frequently no force whatever : they are simple hypotheses of greater or less plausibility. His arguments for these theories are usually merely attempts to show that the process of natural selection is capable of a mentally sensuous representation in the imagination, and not to prove that it has been the actual course of nature. Thus, also, his explanations of difficulties are mere suggestions of what may have been the course of nature, and not the bringing forward of any independent proof that such was its course. His suggestions of what may have taken place frequently suggest what may be pictured by the fancy, but must be rejected by the reason.

Take, for example, his treatment of the geological record. He freely admits that the geological record, as it stands, is decidedly adverse to the theory of gradual evolution by continuous

variation, since there is no continuous change visible in any one stratum, but only decided changes when we have passed from one stratum to another. The explanation of these facts given by believers in gradual evolution is that in every fossil species in a given stratum we find a variability in the form, and that between the successive strata, there were probably long intervals of unrecorded time. Now, the variability of form in a fossil species is, like the variability of form in a living plant or animal, no logical evidence either that the variability is unlimited or that it is progressive. No paleontologist, so far as we are aware, has ever discovered a difference in the general character of a species in the lower part of a stratum and that of the same species in the upper part of a stratum ; in other words, has ever detected the process of the foundation of a new species in time. It is really upon contemporaneous, not upon successive, variation that the theory of gradual evolution is built. Hence we must admit, as an induction from the largest survey of facts possible to man, that, if the rate of evolution were gradual and continuous, it must have been excessively slow, and the gaps of unrecorded time between the strata must be exceedingly large, so that the recorded time has been but a small fraction of the unrecorded. Moreover, if the evolution has been slow, continuous evolution, there must have been an almost unlimited time before the records began ; for the lowest strata contain already very highly developed and very highly differentiated forms. But the geologist shows us that the rocks give us the records of many millions of years,—so many that the physical astronomer says that they include nearly all the time that there has been since the earth was red-hot. The student of natural history has surely no right to cast aside this testimony of the geologist and the astronomer, simply because it conflicts with his theory of slow, continuous evolution. The only proper way to defend that theory against this objection would be Pierce's method,—by trying to invent some way to put back the cooling of the earth into a more remote antiquity. No such way satisfactory to astronomers and physicists has, however, yet been discovered.

Another illustration of Darwin's peculiar mode of reasoning has already been alluded to in the matter of the bees' cell and

of phyllotaxis. The latter point deserves a careful attention. In the early part of the century, Braum, Schimper, the Bravais brothers, and other botanists, called attention to the fact that the leaves of plants are arranged in particular methods about the stems, so that, if the stem is vertical, the leaves are in equidistant vertical rows. In some plants there are only two rows, in some three, in others five, etc. The number of rows is regularly one of the series 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, etc. Moreover, if a string be wound in a helix about the stem, in such manner as to touch successively the insertions of the leaves, then the string returns to a leaf directly over that from which it starts, after going round the stem a number of times indicated by the second number (of the above series) before that indicating the number of rows. Thus, if there are eight vertical rows, the string passes round three times, and any two successive leaves make a horizontal angle with each other of $\frac{3}{8}$ of a circumference. This was about all that the botanists had discovered when, in 1849, Peirce showed them that the whole facts could be put into the form of saying that the horizontal angle between two leaves is always an approximation towards a theoretical angle (nearly $^{\circ}137.508$). Chauncey Wright, soon after, took the further step of showing that this angle would scatter the leaves evenly about the stem. Had Darwin, or his botanical friends, ever really understood what Wright had shown, they could very readily have turned it into a support of the doctrine of "natural preservation," or "survival of the fittest." They need only say that the plant whose leaves are evenly scattered about the stem gets more air and more zenith light, and is more vigorous; or they could readily apply to it merely mechanical explanations,—that the buds would naturally spring out where there was the best chance, and would thus scatter themselves evenly. But we are not aware that either Darwin, Hooker, or Gray, ever really understood what Peirce and Wright had done. Darwin's playfully pathetic appeal to Dr. Gray (vol. ii., 235) shows it had arrested his attention, but that he had failed to understand it. The wonderful value of his labors to the botanists is as evident as their utility to the zoologists, but his was not the mind which could appreciate this very remarkable contribution to botany made by the two American mathematicians.

To a mathematical mind, we think that this phyllotactic angle gives evidence that organic nature is not susceptible of the gradual variation required by the theory of natural selection ; or at least that, if natural selection has played any part in producing the various adaptations of nature, it has been only a limited part. The buds upon a stem are arranged by a law which distributes them more thoroughly than any other conceivable law. The theory of natural selection would make this law the result of the fact that a plant with its leaves well distributed, to get air and zenith light, would be more healthy and vigorous, and thus propagate its kind more freely. But there are several great difficulties in the way of accepting that explanation. In the first place, an over-development of leaves is not altogether favorable to the formation of seed, as every gardener knows. Secondly, and more to the point, the law of equal distribution is almost never actually carried out in the leaves, so that the presence of the law escaped the botanists. They were obliged to call in the aid of the mathematician, to interpret the varying angles. In the actual plants, the stems are by no means always perpendicular ; and each leaf, even when the stems are perpendicular, is shaded by the second, third, or fifth, rarely the eighth, leaf above it. After Peirce and Wright had shown the full mathematical meaning of these facts, botanists failed to catch the meaning, and referred to the matter as if to some fanciful theory. But, although the law is thus concealed even from the special botanical observer, the mathematicians demonstrated its presence by as rigid an induction as that which proves that five times four make twenty. The alternate leaves of an elm branch, the three-ranked sedge, the five-ranked cherry branch, the eight rows of leaves on a sucker from a currant, are sufficient to give the sure induction that they are all governed by one single law, which neither of them rigidly obeys, but which, nevertheless, each of them distinctly, fully, and unmistakably acknowledges.

From the law obtained from these simple examples the closer approximations are readily foretold, and the predictions are fulfilled most wonderfully in cases in which the eye requires the aid of reason to see the fulfilment. We have already said

that the theoretical value of the horizontal angle between two successive buds, on a vertical stem, is $^{\circ}137.508$; and, in examining the seeds of the common sunflower, we have found the actual angle frequently coming within about one-thousandth of a degree, sometimes above, sometimes below, the theoretical value. In other words, were the sunflower magnified until it was one hundred feet in diameter, two successive seeds around the border would not vary more than the hundredth of an inch on one side or the other of the theoretical distance apart (nearly one hundred and twenty feet). The inference seems to us irresistible; namely, that in the organic body there is something else at work besides the chemical and physical properties of the atoms and molecules, and that this something else, whose presence has never been shown to exert force or energy, nevertheless guides the forces of the atoms and molecules according to law,—laws as intellectually sharp and well defined as those of crystallization, although not carried out so rigidly. Numerical and geometrical laws certainly govern the organic form of an individual plant and of an individual animal just as certainly as they govern crystals, molecules, and atoms. But the laws of organic form are different from those of the inorganic. The inorganic forms are stable; in them space triumphs over time,—geometry takes precedence of algebra. The organic forms are less rigid. The atoms in them, so long as the organism is living, are, to a greater or less extent, in motion; time holds joint sway with space; algebra modifies the geometry. Nevertheless, the geometry is there; and no speculation concerning insensible variations in all directions can be sound if it overlooks that fact. This presence of geometrical law in the plant and in the animal must, of necessity, check and limit the variation. It is to us an inconceivable hypothesis that one form can flow out, even in an unlimited time, into all other forms. “There is no vice in the constitution of things:” the universe is intelligible. No scientific man can admit that there is anything irrational, thoroughly inexplicable, in nature. But Darwin, after he had once started upon this investigation of the origin of species, seems to have assumed that the only rational explanation of any organic phenomenon is to reduce it, by some hypothesis or other, to a phase of gradual, irrational, and lawless evolution.

We acknowledge the great fascination of the theory, as announced by Erasmus Darwin and as first conceived by Charles. If it were possible that one microbe should gradually evolve into all the forms of vegetable and animal life, it would be a grand work to trace back the lines of descent. But, even were it possible and actual, those lines of descent would certainly have been predetermined, fixed by an intellectual and intelligible law : the whole macrocosm and microcosm unite in declaring that. There are, however, grave doubts whether such an evolution were possible. To us it seems inconceivable. It is true that the geometer can — by an evolution which he calls involution — produce any required curve from any given curve ; and, were this proposition left thus unexplained, it would seem to say that any organic form can be developed from any other. But in that geometric involution the geometer is obliged to watch every step, and insert, at each step, new quantities chosen with reference to the end at which he aims. These new quantities are called arbitrary constants ; that is constants selected at will. Were such evolution to take place in nature, it would not be in the manner of Darwin or even in that of Asa Gray, but rather like that which Agassiz hints at in his article, “Contemplations of God in the Cosmos.” Agassiz thought that science was not yet ready to attack the problem of the origin of species. Nevertheless, in the article referred to, he plainly intimates that he thinks it probable that viviparous species at least were created in the ovaries of a previous species, an arbitrary constant being added, in order to change the form. He does not say so, but the line of his argument seems to us to point unmistakably towards that view.

Darwin has apparently a strong repugnance to the word “create,” and explains that by once implying that something was created he simply meant that he could not explain its origin. We thought that that was what everybody meant by it. Theists accept, as the broadest and most certain of all results of human thought, that truth announced in the opening sentence of Genesis : “First of all, it was God created the heavens and the earth.” Therefore, when they run back in their investigations to something (like the atoms of the chemist) behind which they cannot

get, they simply say, "God made it so." In this sense, Agassiz declared that species were special creations,—not that he put the imaginations of *Paradise Lost* among historic facts, but that he considered specific differences to be inexplicable by any known laws of embryonic changes or geologic succession or variability of species, but readily explicable by reference to an intellectual plan in creation. The vital objection to the theory of insensible variation and survival of the fittest is that it deliberately declines to look at the organic kingdoms as having any intellectual unity. It refuses to see that those kingdoms are, in their totality, the embodiment of a plan, which in the progress of science has been ever better and better understood ; in other words, that theory makes plants and animals intellectually less worthy of study than the earth out of which they apparently spring. Apparently, we say, not really, since to these we may emphatically apply the words of Emerson,—

"For out of Thought's interior sphere
These wonders rose to upper air."

Neither is it religious feeling which leads to this recognition of law in nature : it is recognition of the law that awakens the feeling.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NECESSARY TRUTH— HOW ARE THEY OBTAINED? *

BY CARL W. SCOVEL,

Of Robert College, Constantinople.

THE doctrine of Intuitionism holds that the mind has the power of perceiving, immediately, necessary truth in individual cases, even when these cases are hypothetical, and of generalizing axioms from such perceptions.

The principal reason of the disagreement of theorizers upon this subject is that most of them do not observe a necessary distinction between *experience* and *intuition*, the two factors under whose action first principles are acquired. These terms, experience and intuition, have several distinct meanings. During the present discussion, let us limit ourselves to the following definitions:—Let experience be the immediate perception of fact, so far as it does not include the perception of the necessary, or logical, relations of fact; and let intuition be the immediate perception of logical, or necessary, relations.

It will be our aim in this discussion to show, first, the importance of experience as the *condition* of acquiring necessary truths; and secondly, to show the manner in which our knowledge of necessary relations is gained by intuition.

The term "experience" has often been employed in a much wider sense than that of our definition. For example, it has been used to designate *all our immediate perceptions of fact*, whether inward or outward. It was in this sense that the term was employed by Locke. Revolting against the extreme and *a priori* philosophy of his predecessors, he asserted the doctrine of "experience," or of "sensation and reflection." By sen-

*This Paper is a class exercise by one of the students pursuing metaphysical studies under Prof. Hamilton, of Hamilton College, N. Y. He was the valedictorian of the class of 1888. We wish that many young men might take so much interest in these higher studies, and so successfully. Mr. Scovel goes to Robert College, Constantinople, where he will have a great field, and we trust, great usefulness.

sation he meant, not bodily feeling, but all our immediate perception of material things and qualities. Our consciousness of these perceptions, and of other internal operations, and the work of the mind in combining our cognitions, he called *reflection*. Sensation and reflection together constitute experience. Locke's "experience," therefore, includes the three components of the presentational phase of the intellect, — viz., sense-perception, consciousness, and concomitant perception. Our "experience" is only a part of Locke's. It is the immediate perception of *fact merely as such*, and is thus the first beginning of intellectual life and progress.

Now, in addition to this perception of mere fact, another kind of cognition is constantly taking place. By intuition, which is *a special power of concomitant perception*, we perceive the necessary, or logical, relations of fact.

Let us consider briefly what these relations are. They are those set forth in what are called *first principles*, such as mathematical or metaphysical axioms, or those canons of induction which pertain to the relations of cause and effect. These fundamental truths never conflict with each other, and are universally accepted by the common sense of mankind. At what date they are first consciously apprehended, it is impossible to state. Gained without any *process* of thought, they are acquired unconsciously. Yet the fact that, when they are mentioned to us, we recognize them as familiar truths, although we have never *consciously* considered them before, shows that they may have already existed in our minds for a long time.

Our *intuitions* of these first principles may be divided into three classes. For a necessary truth may be perceived either *presentationally*, or as an *actualistic inference*, or as an *hypothetical inference*.

In regard to the presentational intuitions, we remark first, that they may be "occasioned by, but not derived from, experience." They take place at the same time with perceptions of simple fact, but must not be confounded with these perceptions. For example, we see three groups of marbles lying before us, and perceive that each group contains five. Thus much we gain by experiential perception. But we also perceive that *the first and*

second of these groups cannot each contain the same number of marbles with the third group without containing the same number with each other; and this concomitant perception of necessary truth can be clearly distinguished from the perception of mere fact.

Actualistic inferential intuitions, the second class, are distinguished from the presentational in that the latter attend our immediate experiential perception of *all* the objects involved, and do not arise on the view of a logical antecedent merely, while the former are steps in which consequents are inferred as connected with given antecedents. The inferential intuition, being a *single step*, is to be distinguished from a discursive course of reasoning; but it is a conclusion immediately deduced from perceived facts.

The inferential intuitions, of which we are now speaking, attend perceptions of actual fact and may be illustrated as follows: A shoreman sees a wrecked vessel pounding to pieces upon the rocks. Immediately what intuitions flash across his mind! That shattered ship is the *effect of a cause*,—skilled workmanship. It has been brought here during the night by some driving power, for it was *not* here yesterday. It is contending hopelessly with conditions of time and space and force. Without help it must be destroyed. These convictions irresistibly arise in the mind; yet the only objects experientially perceivable are the stranded ship and the waves around it.

The last class of intuitions, the *hypothetical*, might be regarded as a second division of inferential intuition in general. They differ from the intuitions just considered in that they do not arise directly upon the perception of fact. They assert what is “necessarily true, but not always what is necessarily existent.” Here, in separation from the outside world, and in its own secret workshop, the mind advances in knowledge by means of its own necessary perceptions.

The value of our hypothetical intuitions can hardly be overestimated. The discussions of philosophers relate chiefly to them, and are occupied with two suppositions, respecting the mode of their first formation. Granted that we have the *power* to make inferential intuitional judgments, it may be claimed, first, that the mind is able to exercise this power without having

previously formed any perceptions of fact. On the other hand, it may be held, that perception of fact is the necessary preliminary to forming inferential intuitions, and that actualistic intuition *necessarily* precedes hypothetical intuition. In short, this second supposition sets forth the following order of perceptions as necessary:—first, *experiential cognition*; secondly, *presentational intuition*; thirdly, *actualistic inferential intuition*; and lastly, *hypothetical inferential intuition*—which last is intuition *par excellence*.

In some respects, the first supposition seems preferable, and particularly as to intuitions of moral truth. The view that these receive no aid from previous perception is held by Kant and Coleridge. “The human mind, in its rational development has an intuition higher than the immediate perceptions of sense, which apprehends the universal and necessary principles of morality. The organs of sense have no connection with this higher intuition, either directly or remotely, since no reflection upon what is perceived by sense,—combining, abstracting, or comparing,—can give these necessary principles.”

But, while this may be true of moral and religious truth, in the intuitions respecting quantity, number, space, time, cause and effect, etc., the second supposition is more natural, and more in accordance with the *sensus communis* of mankind. For, granting that man has the power of conceiving these truths, what is it that will put this power into action, so that the effect will be the acquisition of first principles? Is it not experience, or contact with externality?

Here, however, let us repeat what we have already stated,—that the intuition is not the result of the experience, but only a necessary concomitant, which possibly would not be formed, unless it were thus given an occasion to introduce itself, and assert its verity.

This thought may be illustrated by the formation of a mathematical intuition. Suppose that a man, in connection with his experience of fact, has acquired a few first principles or axioms. In his travelling, he has been convinced that “a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.” Again he has perceived that “two parallel lines do not, and cannot, meet.” Now

in further hypothetical inference, he continues the lines on toward infinity, and, though the antecedent is no longer perceived but merely supposed, *he is equally convinced that they can never meet*. Indeed, from simple intuitions, first formed in connection with experience, and from a continuous perception of hypothetical truth, there may pass before the "inward mental eye," in a systematic procession, the whole field of mathematics; lines, surfaces, and solids, in regular order, obeying the irresistible guide of axiomatical laws, form into triangles, squares, cubes, globes, and prisms; and thus developing, through demonstrations, whole branches of mathematics are carried forward and completed in the mind.

Having explained the three forms of intuitional perception, we close our discussion by considering the secondary process of *principiation*; secondary in time, not in importance. In any particular judgment respecting, for instance, a cause and its effect, or the necessary equality of two quantities which are each equal to a third, we must bear in mind that our "judgment does not depend on the whole nature of the things observed, but only on certain elements of their nature, which we perceive as the *fundamenta* of the necessary relations." The whole body of intuitions may be divided into two classes, cosmological and ontological. Cosmological intuitions are *specific, or singular, judgments* whose validity depends on their conformity to ontological laws,—our immediate judgments regarding things around us. To illustrate, let us consider some judgments as to causes and effects. After a bitter cold night in fall, we awake to find the ground covered with hoar-frost. While various perceptions of truth attend our observation of several such occurrences, we especially observe that *a similar cold will, under like conditions, produce a like frost*. This is a cosmological intuition, and it takes place in accordance with the *universal and fundamental rule* that "like causes produce like effects."

Thus from special and individual observations of cause and effect, one of the great "first principles of necessary truth" is generalized. In like manner, other *first principles* are deduced from other *specific intuitions*. Thus the theory of the *principiation of intuitions*, the doctrine that individual, or singular, per-

ceptions of necessary relations justify universal truths, completes the answer to the question, "How are the first principles of necessary truth obtained?"

We probably owe our present doctrine of Intuition and our understanding of this abstruse subject to the revolution in philosophy caused by Locke. Although he did not clearly develop the idea of Intuitionism in his writings, yet we believe this was really his theory respecting the acquisition of what have been called *a priori* truths. Distrusting Locke's "Empiricism," Leibnitz developed an opposite theory — that of "Innate Ideas." He asserted that ideas of necessary truth are not received posterior to birth, but are the mind's "original furniture." Kant attempted to place this doctrine in a more acceptable light, but failed because he introduced *conceptions* in the place of *cognitions*.

The doctrines of Kant and Leibnitz, and all merely subjective theories are insufficient. The true doctrine must recognize and explain both "experience and intuition"; and this is done only by Intuitionism.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

DR. ABBEY'S QUESTION.—In CHRISTIAN THOUGHT for October, 1887, was published a Symposium at the Summer School last summer on a question submitted by R. Abbey, D.D. The Doctor has reviewed that symposium in an article in the *Texas Christian Advocate*. It lately caught our eye in a pile of exchanges. That Dr. Abbey would have been welcomed to our pages is shown by the fact that we consider it valuable enough to copy. It would have been copied earlier if we had seen it earlier. It is entitled "Darwinian Evolution Breaks Down in the Hands of its Advocates." After speaking of the "Institute" and "Christian Thought," Dr. Abbey says:

The third article in the October, 1887, number is what is called "A Symposium, by R. Abbey, D.D., Prof. Elliott Coues, Prof. Edward D. Cope, Lester F. Ward, A.M., Sir John W. Dawson, LL.D., Mr. J. P. Lesley, Mr. S. P. Langley, and A. H. Lewis, D.D."

The article opens by the editor in this wise: "Last March the Rev. R. Abbey, D.D., of Mississippi, addressed to the president of the Institute a letter, in which he suggested for discussion the question, Whether persons of acknowledged scientific authority have specifically denied the Divine origination of matter or of man, and placed such denial on logical grounds; and if so, when and where?"

"In reply to that question several gentlemen favored the Institute with communications, which were read at the Institute's summer school, Aug. 17, 1887, and are here reproduced, in the hope that their publication may draw other contributions on the same subject, and suggest other pertinent questions for discussion in the Institute."

Then follows my letter to the president. This is only two or three pages in length, and consists only in some general observations. This was read before the Institute by Mr. P. W. Lyon, one of the members. And then follow the six responses above alluded to by the editor. The last named person in the symposium

sium, Rev. Dr. Lewis, is a member of the Institute. The other six are scientific gentlemen of the highest repute in the evolution school. Two of them are in England and four in the United States. The President of the Institute, Dr. Deems, sent circulars to these gentlemen, asking of each a reply to my question. The replies are all very respectful, and occupy ten pages of the *THOUGHT*. And to the casual reader it will certainly seem strange that none of them furnish an answer to my question. They tell us about the belief and non-belief of Mr. Darwin and others concerning the origin of matter and of man. Opinions and beliefs were not inquired about. The question asked for argument—a long or short, or good or bad, argument in some logical form, which denied the facts stated by Moses. And the result is, they can find none!

Some of these writers undertake to dispose of the question by saying that as scientists they are not in controversy with Christianity—that their calling is merely scientific—that they are only working out scientific problems, etc. This is a ruse which cannot be admitted. It is a well-known favorite resort of Mr. Huxley.

Everybody knows that for more than thirty years past this school of geologists has been constantly throwing out, in scores of directions, alleged discoveries which contradict Scripture statements; and that it is this alleged conflict between Scripture and science, and this alone, that has called theologians to the front in defense of the Bible. Most assuredly Christians as such have no more concern about the truth or blunders of geologists than those of astronomers, electricians, surgeons, or engineers. It is only when a geologist, a navigator, or a shoemaker brings his craft into conflict with Revelation, that the Christian is called to refute his errors. Beyond this, geologists may settle their own disputes as may men of any other calling.

It is quite too late, therefore, since this little noisy school of geologists has pushed this question of biblical veracity to the very gates of Revelation, with vociferous acclaim of triumph, when asked to show an argument on the question of this alleged conflict, to quietly reply—"Oh, we are only scientists and have nothing to do with Christianity."

They have raised the question and proclaimed it upon the

housetops, and we hold them to it. And when we ask them to point us to something in the shape of a logical argument in support of their theory, they find themselves driven to the wall, and frankly, or at least plainly, confess—"We have abundance of opinions, beliefs and disbeliefs, but have not been able to formulate an argument." Verily, some of us thought so!

The Rev. Dr. Lewis, a member of the Institute, in commenting on the Question and Replies, said: "The question of Dr. Abbey seems to me to have a deeper meaning than lies on the surface. It is this: 'Can science logically deny the Divine origin of matter and man?' He is correct in suggesting that they have not done this. They have made the denial as polemics, or dogmatists; but not on logical grounds. They cannot do this." His further remarks of the same trend, two or three pages, are too long to copy in this little notice.

Dr. Lewis struck the point exactly. Science has no means whatever of even instituting an inquiry as to the truth of these biblical statements. And so, on the other hand, those theologians, though they be many and learned, are equally without support in attempting to prove the truth of them. Flippant declarations, "I don't believe"—are easily made, but what do we know of the origin of either matter or man? The exact limit of our knowledge of either is this:

We read in a printed book the mere dogmatic statement that God brought both matter and man into being; the one was "in the beginning," whenever that was, and the other at a more recent period, about six or seven thousand years ago, supposing our chronology to be somewhat correct. But it is utterly impossible for us to either prove or disprove the truth of these statements. Where is proof to come from in either case?

Prof. Cope tells us that Haeckel writes about the "unthinkable dogma of creation." It is not quite easy to see how the professor came to blunder on so important a truth. Most assuredly creation is "an unthinkable dogma," and for this very reason there can be neither proof nor denial of it. We know that creation is, for we see it; but how it came to be, is necessarily mere matter of dogma and speculation. We believe the Bible statement, not because we understand it, but solely on authority,

and because we cannot possibly imagine a reason of any sort for disbelieving it.

But I have no argument for this place. I inquired if "persons of acknowledged scientific authority have specifically denied the Divine origination of matter, or of man, and placed such denial on logical grounds, and if so, when and where?" This is plain. I did not inquire what this or that man did or did not believe; on this point we are all well enough informed—but for some reason, good or bad, for such belief. And when the bubble is thus touched, it explodes! And some of the chiefest of the apostles of "evolution," as they call this indescribable bubble, are directly inquired of: they promptly acknowledge they know of no such denial.

Prof. Cope says: "I should doubt, that either the affirmation or denial of the point would be regarded possible on logical grounds by the majority of scientists." Verily, some few of us have long since thought so. Not one of these gentlemen has ever known of such an argument being attempted.

Then, what is the meaning of all this scientific and dogmatic noise and triumphant denunciation of the Bible? They offer us a "don't believe," a thousand times repeated, and ask us to receive that for argument. And when asked for argument—some argument, even a poor one—we are promptly answered, "We know of none."

Then, in all modesty, I inquire, if Darwinism, falsely called evolution, is not abandoned? What is it? Where is it? If its own apostles disown and ignore it, who are its patrons?

Furthermore, my own belief has long since been, that if theologians had met this fussy challenge in a logical way—that is, by way of demurrer, instead of joining a mythical and intangible issue—the explosion and the end would have been long since seen, and there would be at this late day no necessity for such explanations as this.

WILL EVERY MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE READ THIS ?—The secretary of the Institute informs us that, while the membership is steadily growing, now and then he receives letters from members residing in New York and the vicinity as well as from those residing in distant places, discontinuing their membership on the ground of their inability to attend the monthly meetings of the Institute during the winter and the schools which are held in the summer. All express fidelity to our idea and some subscribe for CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. We beg to call that special attention of members to this. If the Institute should consist of only the few persons who could be present at our meetings, it would not be worth sustaining, such ultimate object not justifying the outlay of time and strength required for the maintenance of the Institute. We desire again to call attention to the main object, namely: the production and circulation of a literature which shall be an antidote to the current infidelity of the times. Any man of practical sense will see that this requires money. Almost all thoughtful men are in positions in which they make their bread by the product of their brains. Such men would not be justified in giving such papers as we publish when those same papers could be sold to other magazines at a larger price. If it be asked why then not leave the whole matter to spontaneous production and such modes of publication as shall be remunerative to the authors ; the reply is simple. The experience of mankind has shown the value of concentration. Therefore we have associations in politics, in business, in arts, in the sciences, in religion, in philosophy. And these have their several organs to which men look when they wish to acquire information in any of these several departments.

Shall there not be one society in America which shall act as a lens to converge the rays of light on our one very important topic ? The Institute needs *the name* of every member. The very list of members of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, which is not only inserted in the opening number of each volume of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, but printed separately, is in itself a campaign document. If annually we could show the country that there were *ten thousand Christian people* willing to

give five dollars a year to produce and circulate this literature, that fact itself would be a tremendous argument. Every Christian man who approves our object and is able to pay his fee and yet withdraws his name, simply contributes to the weakening of the argument which comes from numbers.

Then there is the money consideration. Practical Christian thinkers ought to see that ours is not a magazine which can rely upon itself for sustentation to any such degree as that which is open to a periodical devoted to literature or commerce or science ! Suppose the members of the American Bible Society should withdraw their membership and their subscriptions because they find it impracticable to attend the meetings. What would be the effect upon circulation of the Holy Scriptures and religious tracts ?

Because he gives much time and labor to the work of the Institute and the editing of this magazine without a single penny of pecuniary return, the Editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT can call upon all of his Christian brethren freely to become members of the Institute; to nominate their friends for membership; to pay the fees promptly; and to make donations which will enable us to send CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, as the report of our meetings and papers and lectures, through all the schools and colleges of this country, and to all the missionary stations where they are so frequently desired as great helps in the battle in which Christianity is fighting with Paganism and Heathenism.

We, therefore, earnestly exhort all our friends to strive to create a more rapidly increasing interest in the work of the Institute. Even if it should die to-day, the Editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT would not begrudge the months of time and the amounts of money he has contributed to this high cause, being persuaded as he is that its existence has done so much good in so many quarters and especially accomplished the good work of prevention. It is because the function of such an Institute and the literature it produces, must be mainly preventive rather than curative, that it has not about it the glamour and the attraction of reformatory movements. It cannot parade large statistics of converts and must rely mainly upon that class of Christian people who walk by faith, and not by sight, who believe

in the power of truth when properly presented to encounter and vanquish all forms of error.

Hundreds of thousands of dollars could have been obtained if it had been possible to form an asylum for "crippled minds" and souls of "bad habits" and have submitted statements to the public of numbers that had been cured. This cannot be done. And our work as compared with such a movement is precisely such work as training children in Christian culture so that they do not become little drunkards, little thieves, little felons, as compared with an institute where juvenile vagrants and rogues are taken in and trained back to better living, in a way that impresses the sight.

This is written on the eve of our Summer Schools, at which we trust we shall see indications of great growth in our good work.

Without cant, may the editor ask of each member of the Institute who reads this page, whether he has put the Institute of Philosophy among his subjects for prayer? We beseech our friends everywhere to pray that the spirit of love and of a sound mind may be poured upon all who are engaged in this work and be felt in a special manner at our forthcoming Summer Schools.

In the December number of the fifth volume of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, statements were copied to the effect that, in his work on the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation, Sir Isaac Newton had predicted that men would be able to travel at the rate of fifty miles an hour, and that Voltaire had ridiculed the idea. Will some of our readers oblige us by the information *where we can find this either in the works of Newton or Voltaire?* This information is greatly desired that in a work now in hand it may be used with accuracy.

WE make no excuse for giving so many pages to the article on Charles Darwin from the pen of Dr. Hill. Whatever he writes is worth reading. In our judgment a liberal education for a young man would be to read and master all that Thomas Hill has written.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, Publisher and Bookseller, 71 Bible House, New York.]

FEW more interesting biographies have been written in late years, than that entitled "The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Including an Autobiographical Chapter." It is edited by his son, Francis Darwin, in two volumes, and published by D. Appleton & Co. Whatever may be thought of Darwinism, the man who gave it its name was one of the most unique characters in the history of science, and his works have certainly created an epoch in scientific progress. We should give space to full notice of these well-wrought volumes, but that we find our space already occupied and much of that space given to an article on the volumes by President Hill. The facts in these volumes are given in a satisfactory way and the presentation of the character seems to be as fair as any that could be made by a son. It seems proper to add that Mr. Francis Darwin has discharged his duty in a very modest manner. He has certainly made a most valuable contribution to English biography.

SO OFTEN in modern literature allusion is made to the Aryan race that it has become indispensable to have some trustworthy statement of what may be known of them. For this we are indebted to a handsome volume by Prof. Charles Morris of the University of Michigan. Its title is "The Aryan Race, its Origin and its Achievements." The intent of the learned and able author has been to seek the Aryan race in its primitive home, follow its migrations, observe the unfolding of its beliefs and institutions, and trace the steps by which it has mounted to its present high position. He has accomplished his work in a very satisfactory manner. The volume is a 12mo., 347 pp., \$1.25, published by S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

THE same enterprising firm have added to their *Philosophical Classics* a volume entitled "Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding. A Critical Exposition. By John Dewey, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Michigan." This does not strictly follow the course of the preceding volumes in the series, which do not give a summing up of the system of any author but simply a critical exposition of some one masterpiece. In this case Leibniz's "Nouveaux Essais" being selected, its very character necessitated the presentation of Leibniz's system. The work of Prof. Dewey has been performed with fidelity, showing very clearly the limitations and defects of the system of Leibniz. The price is \$1.25.

"CHRISTIAN ARCHÆOLOGY," by Charles W. Bennett, D.D., is the fourth volume of the Library of Biblical and Theological Literature, edited by Rev. Drs. George R. Crooks and John F. Hurst. Dr. Ferdinand Piper, Professor of Church History and Christian Archæology in the University of Berlin, commends it in an Introductory Notice. The volume treats of the Archæology of Christian Art, covering monuments, symbols, paintings and mosaics, sculpture, carvings, architecture, inscriptions, hymnology, etc. This handsome volume, so well printed and so excellently illustrated, is a credit to American scholarship. Its learning is full and well digested. The results of careful research and clear thoughts are seen everywhere in its pages. Intelligent laymen who wish to know something of early Christianity will avail themselves of Dr. Bennett's volume, which we predict will hereafter be regarded as an authority in this department. (Phillips & Hunt.)

THE Southern Methodist Publishing House, Nashville, has issued the second volume of Dr. Summers' "Systematic Theology." It sustains the standard erected in the first volume, which was noticed in our June number. The whole edition of volume first we learn was exhausted before the second appeared. Dr. Tigert has won for himself high praise as the young editor of the Lectures of his learned old preceptor.

ANNUAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

[CORRECTED TO JULY 1ST, 1888.]

VERY IMPORTANT.—As our publications are mailed free to all our members, it is important that we be promptly informed of changes of address to save trouble and expense.

Any errors in this list will be cheerfully corrected, with thanks to those who report them.

All names are retained on the books of the Institute until proper notification of discontinuance. The bills for membership dues are sent to each member annually. In the meantime our publications are forwarded, and members are expected to pay all arrears which may have accrued up to date of discontinuance.

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CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

THE VIBRATORY LAW OF PROGRESS.

[A lecture delivered before the Eleventh Summer
School of the American Institute of Christian
Philosophy, at Round Lake, N. Y., July 26th,
1888.]

BY HORACE C. HOVEY, D.D.,

Pastor of the Park Street Congregational Church, Bridgeport, Conn.

I SHALL try to explain and illustrate a wise and beneficent law, about whose workings many seem to be perplexed, but that runs through all nature, and affects the human soul in its relation to its Maker—the Vibratory Law of Progress.

My subject came to me in a somewhat singular way. One of my neighbors had celebrated his son's ninth birthday by giving him an instrument of torture, more commonly known as a violin. There I sat in my study trying to gather from the resources of history and science, or else to evolve from the depths of my own consciousness, something worthy of being laid before this Institute; and yonder, on his father's porch, just over my fence, sat young Maurice, his calm blue eyes full of gladness, as, "from morn till noon, and from noon till dewy eve," he drew the most excruciating sounds from that wretched fiddle.

At length, even as Samson found honey in the lion's carcase, so I found goodness in those discords. You know that, when the flying cannon-ball finds its mark, the arrested motion is at once transformed into heat; and by some such correlation of forces, those abortive attempts at music accomplished their mission by suggesting my theme.

Poor Maurice literally "drew his bow at a venture." Before one pulsation of the strings was finished, another would be

begun. These incomplete vibrations resulted in confused waves of sound. Had the bow been evenly drawn, there would have been a succession of equal waves of clear sound that might have pleased the listener. Had you, in such a case, looked critically at the shaken string, you would have seen that it was agitated by a series of double vibrations, passing rapidly from right to left across a centre of quiescence, not confined to the exact point of contact, but travelling from end to end, exciting the whole string, and deflecting every atom, in its turn, from the central line of repose. More than this, they would be propagated from one sonorous body to another, and pervade the atmosphere, until, in the hands of a Paganini, or an Ole Bull, the violin, king of melodic instruments, might pour forth a flood of sweet sounds, by which thousands should be thrilled.

This law in acoustics finds analogies in all the operations of nature. Suppose that, instead of a string, there should be a suspended metallic rod. If lateral percussion be applied at the liberated extremity, the reactionary motion will produce secondary reaction, *i.e.*, a vibration in the opposite direction. The general effect is called undulation.

Apply the same principle to fluids, or to aeriform bodies, and similar phenomena will be observed. For instance, let a column of air be confined, as in a flute, or in an organ-pipe, and then let it be excited at a given point by a transverse current of air, from the lungs or the bellows; and an effect would be produced analogous to that caused by drawing the bow across the violin string. And the law still works, though the column of air be measured by miles instead of by inches. "When the noisy weather-cocks rattle and sing of mutation," the shifting vanes show that the gale, instead of being a mass of air impelled in a straight line—and which would therefore be noiseless—is the resultant of conflicting forces to which it alternately yields, swaying to and fro in its mighty march. And when the storm strikes the ocean and uplifts its depths, the rolling billows are but successive vibrations, shifting across a central line of repose; and their awful roar is but the same sound, immensely magnified, as that emitted by the agitated water in a glass bowl whose edge is rubbed by the moistened finger.

It is probable that this law is applicable to all sorts of motion, with the possible exception of primary forces, such as gravitation, cohesion and chemism. It is applicable to light, heat and electricity, whether regarded as modes of motion, or as attenuated material substances moved by an occult force. The nature of these powerful agents remains enigmatical; yet some highly interesting discoveries have been made. It is known, for example, that those zig-zag flashes of lightning whose occurrence is so startling, are not due, as it used to be said, to a rebound from compressed atmosphere, but belong to the mode of electrical progress, and are visible even *in vacuo*. We have seen the Ruhmkorf coil flash artificial lightning more than five feet through an exhausted receiver; and the vibratory motion was even more brilliant than is to be seen when,

“ Far along,
From peak to peak, the rattling crags among,
Leaps the live thunder.”

Finer still, if possible, is the working of this law in the transmission of light and heat. The undulatory theory has now gained general belief; but if, for the sake of an illustration, we may blend with one form of this something of the old corpuscular theory, then we shall get a striking result.

It is quite uniformly conceded, at the present time, that all matter, however compact and solid, or however ethereal, is reducible to atoms, *i.e.*, to minute, unchangeable, indestructible particles. It is also held that these atoms are all isolated, and never in any instance come into actual contact but are firmly held by attraction in their respective positions and at definite distances. It is thought, moreover, that these interspaces are as great as the spaces themselves, and may be largely in excess.

Now suppose a beam of white, solar light to traverse as it may the space between the sun and our globe. It then passes through the atmosphere and finally impinges on a prism. On inspection it is found to be, not simple, but compound—a sheaf of rays capable of analysis and subdivision until, if the Newtonian theory were correct, the light would be reducible to atoms as really as is the prism through which it passes.

And now, granting all this, trace, if your imagination be equal to the task, the pathway of one of these luminous monads, assuming it to fly in and out among the coarser atoms, as the bird flies through a tropical forest, without ever beating its wings against the smallest twigs of the interlocked trees. Thus it comes quivering, trembling, vibrating, on its long, mysterious journey from yonder far-distant sun, piercing its way, till at last its divine mission is accomplished in giving the dew-drop its sparkle, the violet its heavenly blue, and the human eye power to behold the beauties of nature, and to read the sacred message proceeding from the Father of Lights.

Those huge bodies that wheel so grandly through illimitable space, are not disobedient to the law controlling the minutest molecule. For twenty centuries sages have been perplexed by the eccentricities of the single satellite that swings with our earth around the sun, and with the sun on its far longer circuit around some remote cosmic centre. To any careless observer the lunar orbit might appear to be uniformly circular. But ages before the epoch of Copernicus, it had been discovered that the moon moves more swiftly at certain points of its orbit than at others; the point of most rapid motion being termed the perigee and that of slowest the apogee. Then it was found that the line of apsides, the line passing through the centre of the earth and also of the lunar orbit, was itself in rotation, revolving once in nine years. And as to the moon's revolution around the sun, we find it so modified by its motion around the earth, continually folding in upon its own orbit, as to justify our saying that, instead of proceeding with any sort of uniformity, the body sways to and fro in its progress amid the spheres. This complicated behavior of the "inconstant moon" is merely an example near at hand, of the known and conjectured irregularities of all the starry host, including even the remotest nebulae. And we may safely leap to the conclusion, so far as the inorganic universe is concerned, that there is no motion without vibration; or stated more fully, that whenever a direct forward impulse is given to matter, it is accompanied by lateral, or transverse, impulses, seemingly antagonistic, or at least confusing, but that are usually, if not invariably, auxiliary instead.

Let us now pursue our subject in another direction. Nature's methods are uniform, and we shall see, on inquiry, that if she admits co-operation, she will constrain animated beings to conform to her unvarying laws.

Every organism is a duality. And when any living thing is in motion, as a whole, that motion is the resultant of two or more sets of forces under the control of one dominant impulse.

Take the case of the flying bird. Omit the lateral forces—the wings — and the central, or will power, is useless. One of the most pitiable objects I ever saw was an American eagle whose wings had been clipped. The proud bird raised his lordly head, made ready for his customary flight beyond the clouds; and then the gleam died from his fiery eye, his crest slowly sank and his head drooped abjectly, because those means of vibration were lacking that are essential to aerial progress. The lesson, taught by the wren as well as the eagle, appears in one of the sweetest of our childhood hymns:

“The bird that to our bosom clings,
In vain we throw on high;
Unless it wave its little wings,
It cannot reach the sky.”

That which is true of the lower orders of life may also, in a measure, be true of man himself. Look at this haughty lord of creation in one of his most commonplace performances—the familiar exercise of walking. Its dangerous character is proved by what may follow a single misstep, *e.g.*, in going down stairs. Its violent nature is manifested by the consequences of arresting the forward motion against the edge of a door, or against a low-hanging bough. Analyze the process and you will readily see that the operator bears his weight on each foot alternately, meanwhile swinging the other; his arms also maintaining a sympathetic oscillation, a reminiscence, as a Darwinian might say, of the “auld lang syne” when he went on all fours. The pedestrian thus maintains a central motion, perpetually throwing himself forward, and also a double-action pendulum movement of the limbs, whereby the violent forward motion is prevented from being destructive. Let the vibration cease, even for an instant, and the man falls; as when some mischievous boy twists the long grass into knots across his path, or when, as told

in classical story, the fair maiden tripped up the star-gazer with her milking-stool. If, on the other hand, the vibration should be excessive and irregular, as when the brain has been affected by alcoholic stimulus, but little progress is made, and in extreme cases the man falls helpless to the ground. Yet, again, if the oscillation, though disproportioned to the forward movement, should be regularly sustained to the pulse of music, it becomes the very "poetry of motion," and gay and buoyant natures are frequently bewitched by its fascinating peculiarities.

The duality of the human being is manifest in many ways besides in the act of locomotion. Man has not only two hands and two feet, but he has two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, two jaws, two lungs, and indeed is duplex from head to foot; so that, if he should be longitudinally bisected, one half of him would be almost the exact counterpart of the other half; and his very existence, and all his transactions, trivial or sublime, are consequent upon the interplay between these halves of his being.

Going still nearer the fountains of life within man's wonderful and mysterious frame, and inquiring as to the manner in which the will acts on the body, *i.e.*, physiologically regarded, we may adduce the ingenious theory of an eminent Scotch naturalist, as explanatory of the relation of muscular and nervous action. "Our muscles are the seat of two opposing forces, each so adjusted as to counteract the other; and this antagonism is so arranged as to enable us by acting on one of these forces to regulate the other. One force—an elastic, or contractile force—is supposed to be inherent in the muscular fibre; another force, that of animal electricity, in statical condition, holds the contractile force in check. When, through the motor nerves, the will orders the muscles into action, that order is enforced by a discharge of the electrical force, and upon this discharge, the contractile force is set free to act." The result is, of course, the bodily motion as previously determined by the will.

But standing on higher ground than mere physiology, it may be affirmed that man has a twofold nature, to disregard which would be both unphilosophical and irreligious. The struggle of life, instead of being simplified, has been complicated by those

who deny that mind and matter are different substances though co-existent. A substance is that which underlies a certain set of phenomena; and if there are dual phenomena exhibited in the same life, the conclusion is fair that there is a dual substance to support such phenomena. Body and Soul are recognizable by their own characteristic actions, and each is as clearly discernible as the other; and yet they are set in such a peculiar co-partnership as to share largely in each other's experiences. They not only share, but fight as to which shall have the largest share. Were matter and mind identical, they would not contend thus sharply for the mastery. Professor Cope says, in his lecture on the Theology of Evolution, that, "If we go back to the simplest animal, a drop of jelly, known as the *Amœba*, we find that these very small beings display some mental qualities." He adds that they have no structure at all worth mentioning, and claims that the successive stages of organism can be traced from the *amœba* to man, every act, from first to last, being a designed act. His grand conclusion is "that mind is the creator of organisms, under the conditions furnished by the environment;" and this he regards as "the first step in evidence of the existence of a Great Mind, since the lesser minds must have been derived from some common source."

Partnership, alliance, affiliation—yet constant antagonism! In inspired words: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Truth also clearly seen by that noble pagan and millionaire Stoic, who divided his time between writing Nero's orations and making sermons—Seneca—as proved by that brief sentence to his bosom friend, almost Pauline in its pathos and profundity, *Vivere, mi Lucilii, militare est!* ("To live, O my dear Lucilius, is to fight.") And how many, less righteous than Paul, and less brilliant than Seneca, have found life a hard-fought battle! There have been many cases in real life as strange as "The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," or as the weird tales told by Edgar Allen Poe.

It is said that, in passing from infancy to old age, the human body becomes more and more solidified; until, if we only lived long enough, we should be completely mineralized. And so the mind, if it is not fairly dealt by, becomes smothered in its wrap-

ping of flesh; it gets gross by what it feeds upon; until its subtle essence seems hardly distinguishable, having been sadly worsted in the fight. And yet, on the other hand, both body and soul may be simultaneously developed, each meanwhile struggling for the mastery, until, in the very nature of things, it becomes evident that there must be a separation, a divorce; and accordingly death benignantly intervenes; "The dust returns to the earth, as it was, and the spirit goes to God who gave it."

And yet again, not to misrepresent matters, each of these life-long antagonists has really helped the other; neither could have got along without the other; each was needful for the development, and best growth and ripening of the other.

Advancing still further in our generalization, let us now consider man in his relations to his fellow-man. His nature is at once individual and social. Could you find a perfect man, he would be both intensely personal and highly philanthropic. Yet by what a struggle is even approximation to such perfection gained!

Only look at man in his happiest social relation, that of the family. How hard it seems for even those of whom the Creator has said, "They twain shall be one," to dwell together unselfishly! How many conjugal conversations are, like poor Maurice's violin-playing, a melancholy succession of jarring discords! How many children, also, are treated like little slaves; coming to look on their parents as a sort of "friend-enemies," whom they must obey, and who, in return, supply them with food, clothing and shelter, and perhaps send them to school in order to get them out of the way.

And if this be so, what shall we look for in the wider circles of society and politics and international relations? Need we be surprised at corruption, venality, oppression, and every description of public wrong-doing? We are not surprised at it; we expect it, and habitually guard against it.

Yet all thoughtful men know that it is wise for those in public life to make mutual concessions, to exercise mutual forbearance, and to foster charity and all those admirable graces that are so antipodal to man's natural egotism! This was taught by Socrates, Aristotle, and many another sage, on mere considera-

tions of utilitarian expediency. A stronger central impulse was needed, however, to sweep into one channel these belligerent forces; even as the lordly Mississippi bears its thousand tributaries onward to the great gulf. And until this progressive impulse came from above, the earth was everywhere cursed by the most odious despotism, grasping covetousness, grinding slavery and frightful degradation. It was the thrice-blessed work of Christianity to establish such powerful control over the hearts of individuals as to unite them in a glorious rolling tide, that shall never cease to flow, till

"All men's good shall
Be each man's rule, and universal Peace
Lie like a shaft of light across the land,
And like a lane of beams athwart the sea,
Through all the circle of the golden year."

Practical Christianity effects a reconciliation between liberty and authority. That kind of communism, which sinks the individual in the social compact, and would reduce mankind to the dead level of its lowest elements, is as far removed from Christianity as is that other extreme, asceticism, which ignores the claims of society, and shuts its devotees into solitary cells, or sends them into self-exile.

We believe in personal liberty, not in the Sunday-beer-garden sense, but in the sense that every human being shall enjoy all his inalienable rights. But when the individual sees himself to be surrounded by millions of others made in God's image as much as he himself is, then he is clearly bound to respect their rights, as well as to protect his own. Hence originates the ideal Christianity, not at all visionary or impracticable, but that may sometime be realized on earth, in which each individuality shall be marked and emphasized as separate from all others, being distinguished even from God Himself; and yet in which, by voluntary co-operation and submission to rightful authority, these countless individualities shall be unified into one magnificent whole. Even as it is written, "we being many are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another."

I wish it might be said with truth that the Church had perpetually and consistently aimed to lift mankind up to this standard. The primitive Church began well, being so organ-

ized that all her members were represented in the governmental scheme. Equal power was vested in each citizen of the new Kingdom of Heaven, both as to making and executing the laws. There was community of goods and therefore an end, for the time being, to the strife between labor and capital. The sweet fellowship of the Gospel was the sole tie, and all else was voluntary. Believers were brethren, and rejoiced to demonstrate that the ethical system of the Gospel could be made also a working system. Yet step by step this delightful brotherhood became assimilated to secular modes, until, amid the darkness of the Middle Ages, the Church itself became the most arrogant, towering, unscrupulous and unchristian system that ever succeeded in trampling out the spark of freedom from the heart of mankind.

Then came that dreadful storm known in history as the Lutheran Reformation, without which the sky might never have been clear. The lightnings flashed and the thunder rolled. Nation hurled itself against nation, and war followed war in the settlement of the momentous questions raised by the daring reformers of the sixteenth century. Even a *resumé* of the socialistic theories and Utopias would be voluminous. There is an abysmal chasm between the exalted fraternity of the primitive Church, of Plato, of other religious communists, on the one hand, and that naked materialism that discards Christianity as a carcass, and whose reiterated cry is that of the prodigal, "Give *me* the portion of goods that falleth to *me*," and whose promised Paradise is the free satisfaction of individual wants, whether sensual or refined. Truly the whole world has been convulsed to such a chaotic ruin as to make us believe that the only real Utopia must come down from the skies, from the Almighty Hand that made the harmonious stars, and having for its eternal watchword the Golden Rule.

Faith makes us optimists, when else we should be the reverse. Our ears are shocked by incessant explosions. It may be doubted if the historian's pen has ever chronicled bloodier scenes than those witnessed by this boastful generation. And yet our boasting is not wholly in vain. These violent vibrations, by which whole continents are agitated, strike off the

manacles of slaves and shake despots from their thrones. These upheavals of society set at liberty the minds and persons of men, clarify the moral atmosphere, and bring up from the depths the granite blocks of truth from which the eternal Temple shall be made. Because God reigns, we trust that each battle is a step onward in the line of progress; a step ankle-deep it may be in human gore, but onward, nevertheless, toward a millennium when peace and love shall universally reign.

Fears of anarchy and wide-spread ruin are groundless. There is a God, and He must rule. Freemen who know His name and His love, will voluntarily at last submit to His holy law, until it shall finally be true that

"The whole round earth is every way
Bound by gold chains about the feet of God."

Whatever else may be in doubt, one thing is certain, namely, that true religion is a great leveller. It teaches that all men have equal worth in the sight of their Maker, an equal share in the redemptive work of the Son of God, an equal right to all spiritual blessings, and forbids those invidious distinctions so often growing from an unequal distribution of property. Hence it is axiomatic that Christianity will have as many staunch friends as there are human minds liberated by her power; and as many loyal subjects as she has friends.

Behold this refining and purifying Faith! It lifts up the poor man and clothes him in the regal robes of a noble brotherhood; it puts its protecting arm around fragile womanhood, and says, "be pure and be strong"; it clasps innocent childhood to its bosom, and at the same time accosts with balmy mercy the drunkard and the harlot. Love and gratitude are stronger links than fear and pain! Christianity enters into the whirl of broken relationships, shattered morals, dishonored natures and clouded souls, and like a mighty moral magnet, attracts to itself, in beautiful order, all that is in any way capable of assimilation.

That Garrisonian war-cry, "Agitate, agitate!" was but a recognition of the Vibratory Law of Progress; and concerning every cause of righteous reform, whether the abolition of slavery, the arrest of Mormonism, the prohibition of the terrible traffic in intoxicants, or the righting of any other wrong, the

first and greatest danger is that of apathy and stagnation. Agitate, agitate, till that mighty promise is fulfilled: "Yet once more I shake not the earth only, but also Heaven. And this word, yet once more, signifieth the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things that cannot be shaken may remain."

And now, if we let the pendulum swing from the battle-field we have been surveying, into the realm of scientific investigation, shall we find the atmosphere calm and the sky serene? Here may be no passages at arms, no garments rolled in blood, no gleaming swords and thundering artillery; but great is the strife of pens, and tongues and brains!

Having recently attended a medical convention, my mind turns to that branch of science for an illustration. Passing with slight mention the claims of mind-cure, faith-cure, prayer-cure, and water-cure, as well as many other "cures" that have alike their champions and their critics, we are reminded that no controversy between Papist and Protestant, Calvinist and Arminian ever waxed hotter than that between the allopathists and the homœopathists. There was a time when the very ground one trod upon seemed to be set with torpedoes, and even now it may be perilous to invite you to take the conflicting theories of *Contraria contrariis* and *Similia similibus*, as illustrating the Vibratory Law of Progress.

No one will dispute, however, that prior to Hahnemann, and within the memory of many now living, the old school had gone to amazing lengths in administering powerful and nauseous drugs. It would almost seem as if the physicians had concluded, seeing that all diseases were to be cured by their opposites, that their patients could not have too much of a good thing. Those were the days when the lancet was applied and blood was officially shed on the slightest pretext; days when calomel, quinine and tartar-emetic were household words; days when the outer man was scorched with blisters, while the inner man was searched by drastics that might well purge him of everything but his original sin. Beyond all praise was the complacency with which wise physicians would gaze on their tormented patients; and if, perchance, between the remedy and the

disease, the soul slipped away into another world, they would join with the preachers in recommending the survivors to wait till their own turn should come.

But Providence is merciful, as well as mysterious; and accordingly the pendulum was allowed to swing to the homœopathic extremity of infinitesimal doses. Instead of swallowing nauseous powders and choking boluses, men were to be cured, forsooth, by tasteless dilutions, or by the daintiest globules. Some of these contained, however, the most remarkable and unlovely drugs; among which I may quote, on authority, the serous fluid of the living diadem spider; the tincture of the red ant; the tincture of the honey-bee's sting; the inky juice of the cuttle-fish; and even the hydrophobic virus of the mad dog. The beauty of the system is that these are all to be given in infinitesimal doses. Thus administered, virulent poisons, such as arsenic, belladonna and strychnine, once regarded as giant forces only to be invoked on extraordinary occasions, have become favorite domestic remedies. I have amused myself by applying a little arithmetic to the subject, and find that the twentieth trituration of brimstone with an inert vehicle, such as sugar, would require a sugar sphere larger than the globe we live upon; and that the thirtieth dilution or decillionth attenuation, which they sometimes claim to give, would require a thousand times as much water as is found in all our lakes, rivers and oceans! There would certainly be some great advantages in taking strong medicines in their thirtieth dilution. Should it be necessary, in the course of human events, to administer that familiar, yet dangerous drug, alcohol,—and which may yet be found in some of our best drug-stores,—by all means let the following quasi-homœopathic prescription be followed:

“ Take a little rum;	Stir the mixture well,
The less you take the better;	Lest it prove inferior;
Mix it in the lakes	Then put half-a-drop
Of Wenner and of Wetter,	Into Lake Superior.
Dip a spoonful out—	Then every other day
Mind you don't get groggy—	Take one drop in water;
Pour it in the lake	And you'll be better soon—
Winnipisiogee.	Or at least you ought ter.”

Now if any one objects to our making a little fun of the doc-

tors, by way of digression, just let him reflect how many sly jokes they have had at the expense of the preachers. And let me hasten to say, and with all my heart, that I hold the medical profession in high honor, and would by no means charge the follies of any set of extremists on the noble army of physicians.

The point now made is that this swinging from one extreme to the other has really been beneficial and progressive on the whole; so that, in these happier days, the allopathists give as light doses as they dare to, while the homœopathists do not hesitate to give real medicine, in crude and tangible forms, whenever they may think it desirable to do so. And from these and other sources the discovery has dawned on the general public that nature herself has wonderful restorative energies, and that it is the chief office of the skilful physician, of whatever school, to aid her efforts adroitly and sympathetically, meanwhile relying on that divine healing without which nature herself must die.

Turning now to a still graver theme, we may find a final illustration of the Vibratory Law of Progress in its application to the mighty contest going on between science, in its agnostic form, and religion resting on a divine revelation.

We have seen that there is a tendency in nature to keep the equilibrium; so that action is uniformly followed by reaction. It is at least conceivable that there should be a corresponding tendency to spiritual equipoise; so that, every evil impulse being checked by a good impulse, the soul should stand upright. But, alas, there is a schism in every soul. Divided against itself it falls.

The form usually taken by this schism is that of a collision between reason and faith. In one's early years he believes whatever he is told; but after a while, finding that testimonies are contradictory, he comes to exercise his own judgment. He begins by faith without reason. He next reasons without faith. Happy is he who, finally, uses both faith and reason, each for its legitimate design.

Similar to this individual experience is that of the race collectively. We have long been taught, and have accepted the lesson, that certain things were positively true. But this is a

generation that asks questions. It is resolved to push its inquiries boldly to the farthest limits of human thought. The inevitable result is that the vibrations are violent, and many love to have it so. They like to swing!

For instance, it used to be taught that the earth was stationary, while the sun, moon and stars revolved around it. It used to be taught that the universe was made out of nothing in six literal days, and exactly 6,000 years ago. It still is pretty generally taught, at least in our churches and Sunday-schools, that the countless varieties of animated existence were successively spoken into being by a series of creative flats; and that man himself was fashioned in his full and lordly maturity in a moment of time from the inorganic dust.

Learned men have dared to question these teachings. And on getting from men who are perhaps no wiser than themselves, the solemn assurance that it is so taught in the Word of God, they have not been afraid to look into that holy Book, independently of dictation from priest or layman. And on finding some admitted interpolations, misinterpretations and seeming contradictions, they have raised anew the inquiry if this is, in very deed, a book from Heaven, and if its teachings are actually infallible.

Men are asking questions of this sort every day and everywhere, and claim the right to do so. And when alarmed conservatists try to arrest or evade such fearless investigations, they too often only embitter men of science, who may next rush indignantly into the ante-chamber of Heaven itself, and ask if there is any God.

Now, however we may condemn irreverence and acrimony, both of which are chargeable, as we regret to say, against some of the leaders of modern scientific thought, we ought to reflect that these inquiries are not in themselves dangerous. Some of them are really necessary. It is perilous to meet them cavalierly or evasively; and such a course tends to drive to the farthest contradiction those whom we should wish to win.

It should be observed, furthermore, that every man, whether friend or foe, renders essential service to religion who pries off from the Bible any merely human theory or doctrine that has

been fastened on its pages. For example, on opening one of our standard cyclopedias, to the article on Chronology, you will find it stated that, "4004 B.C., the world was created, according to the Hebrew text of Scripture." Now, if a writer for an encyclopedia, or any other man, thinks that he has sufficient reason for assigning to the globe, or the planetary system of which it is a member, an age of but 6,000 years, that is his own affair; but when he says that he is supported in his view by "the Hebrew text of Scripture," we challenge the falsehood. The Hebrew text says nothing about it; nor does any translation thereof. The commonly received date was arrived at, about 200 years ago, by an eminent Churchman who used his reasoning powers and reached what he regarded as a satisfactory chronological conclusion. But many men since his day have reasoned too, and quite as well. The result is that, during the last 200 years, no less than 200 different conclusions have been announced as to the age of the race; and by common consent the original date of creation is relegated to the indefinite, unknowable past. Drummond tells us of an experiment in which the gizzard of a gull was so changed by its environment as to resemble that of a barnyard fowl, and instead of an exclusively fish diet, it would eat grain or anything else eatable by pigeons or hens. While the majority of scientists are very sensible men, we mean no offence by saying that certain geological gulls seem to have grown omnivorous by reason of their large environment, and amuse the rest of us by grasping after all they can get. I have heard one eminent scientist assert that man has been a denizen of the globe for a million or two of years, it did not seem to matter which—possibly "for four or five geological epochs"; and have heard several say that the globe itself has rolled through space for at least 100,000,000 of years! Such statements can be nothing but wild conjectures. It is a relief to find that men so justly famous as Sir John Lubbock and Sir J. W. Dawson, the Duke of Argyle, Quaterfages and our own Dana think that the actual demands of science may be fairly met by conceding to the race a terrestrial existence of about 10,000 years; while on the other hand, our safest biblical interpreters assure us that, by warrantable modifications of chronology, this much, or even more, might

be yielded without bringing the slightest stain on the lustrous page of revelation.

Now there is one great central force that can adjust aright all decent controversies about the antiquity of the globe, the origin and descent of man, protoplasm, evolution, natural selection, and other matters under daily discussion among men of science; and that force is a *firm, unfaltering belief in the existence of God*. Belief, I say, not demonstration. Kircher, the naturalist, found 6,561 different proofs of the existence of God! And Kant, the philosopher, declared that every one of them involved a contradiction. Suppose, however, that we blend the *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments familiar to every logician, and rising from the lower court of cause and effect, take an appeal directly to the higher court of intuitional convictions, and affirm the divine existence as an axiom, the basis of all certainty, and the reconciler of all antagonisms. I hail the frank statement made by the leading American infidel, that "there is no middle ground between faith in a special Providence, and blank atheism." We seek no middle ground! Granting that remotest Force which even the atheist cannot deny, we boldly leap to its arms crying, "Abba, Father!"

This doctrine of a special—or better, a particular—Providence whether taken as demonstrated, or as a self-evident proposition, has a wonderful harmonizing power; and that is where it touches our subject. Agnostics may polish their single blocks, whether of marble or of granite, but they leave out the glorious key-stone on which the arch of truth depends for solidity. Science, without a recognition of the Creator, is but a mass of disjointed fragments.

The perfection of intellectual manhood is reached when a wise man determines his doubts in the right direction and adds to erudition a devout recognition of his dependence on a Higher Power. Perhaps we should not accord such exalted perfection in all respects to the savant who has been styled the father of the telegraph. But, at any rate, few names have been more widely known than his. And how noble was that first of all telegrams dictated by him 44 years ago, in these words, "What hath God wrought!" At a much later day, when the telegraph

had become one of the necessities of modern life, having crossed the continents and put its long arms under the oceanic billows, Professor Morse was publicly introduced to as brilliant a galaxy of wit and wisdom as could be convened in the city of Philadelphia. Compliments rained on him in a sparkling shower; and when he made his reply it was simply in these words: "After all, I am but a child of Providence; give God the glory." More wonderful still was that unparalleled spectacle when, on the sunlit sward of Central Park, under the gaze of applauding thousands, the starry flag was lifted from the bronze statue of the great inventor, while superb music hymned his praise, and eloquent lips told the story of his struggles and his victory. Then the wires diverging from New York to the four quarters of the globe were connected, and under the guidance of the sprightly octogenarian, a message was sent to the whole world: "Greeting and thanks to the telegraphic fraternity. Glory to God in the highest; on earth peace and good will to men." That message was signed by Morse in person. The electric vibrations girdled the globe, and in ten minutes replies came back from America, Europe, Asia, Africa and the islands of the sea. They found the hero of that memorable day humbly laying his laurels at the foot of the cross.

But all have not the childlike faith of Morse. Many are proud of not having faith, and it never occurs to them to give God the glory. Their boasted agnosticism differs from the humility that says of many a problem in science or morals, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high; I cannot attain unto it."

We have spoken of the harmonizing power of faith in a Personal God. Look at this in some of its numerous applications and see how resolutely it steadies the quivering balances and ends the wavering that is so fatal to success. Suppose it to be true that there is a formless substance called "protoplasm" and constituting, as Huxley asserts, "the physical basis of life"; there is, according to this faith, an omnipotent being, who dominates matter by making it instinct with life, and finally subservient to that human soul of whose vitality we have the testimony of consciousness. Suppose that this world has been, as is

asserted by Herbert Spencer, evolved from one original germ-cell; faith sees the Creator-God first fashioning that marvellous germ, and then unfolding its amazingly diversified contents. If it be true, as suggested and argued by Darwin, that man, so immeasurably superior to the brutes, was after all developed from some lower form of existence; then faith sees that development proceed, not by sudden leaps, but slowly tacking to and fro across the ages, with a Divine Hand at the helm, till the plastic simian is landed in Paradise. If there be indeed a law of natural selection, whereby the best forms of life are preferred to the poorer ones and are accordingly preserved amid the incessant struggle for existence; then our faith declares that it is God who selects, prefers, and preserves, and that it was by His sovereign choice that man, endowed with reason, conscience, love and immortality was placed at the head of the terrestrial creation with an immeasurable chasm between himself and all that lies below.

The laws of nature, of which so much has been unwisely said, are not entities, nor even intelligences. They are either forces set in operation by the first cause; or else, as I prefer to think of them, they are simply God's ways of working. Natural phenomena are merely the thoughts of our Heavenly Father. The unfolding rose is one of His thoughts; the glowing sunset is another; the stalactite and the star, the humming-bird and the raven; the mammoth and the man—these are simply thoughts of His. "How precious also are Thy thoughts unto me, O God, how great is the sum of them."

With such a vital criterion we may safely walk amid all the zig-zag paths into which we are invited by modern science. We not only may, but ought, to take and use everything of real value in every theory that has been invented by the fertile human brain. "Those things that cannot be shaken will remain."

Whatever may have been the mode of creation, the plan is intellectual. All the varied forms of life, and the periods of their appearing, were originally fore-ordained by infinite wisdom, and we ought not to accuse any devout thinker of having gone over to the skeptical camp, because he reverently enter-

tains the beautiful theory that these forms have come, not by capricious bounds across chasms, but in an orderly manner like the evolution of a plant from its seed. It is time that the word "evolution" should cease to be either a war-cry or a shibboleth. I predict the time when students of natural theology will draw their strongest arguments from the very field which so many still regard as strangely overshadowed by a deadly Upas-tree. Brave thinkers, like Henry Drummond, are doing so already. They will have many glad imitators.

My endeavor has been to show that changes, transformations, all the things I have grouped as "vibrations," are held under control by a central Law of Progress, to which they themselves are made tributary. The whole cosmic system seems to gravitate toward a coming kingdom foretold in the Word of God. As it is written: "Behold I create a new heaven and a new earth." It is conceded by Herbert Spencer that "Evolution has an impassable limit." He speaks of the visible, tangible universe. But, as a believer in the Christian religion, I declare my joyous belief that the same Finger of God that has run a central line of orderly progression through all the mutations and oscillations of the present system of things, points to higher and grander developments awaiting us in another and a future world. Of that world we have even now bright fore-gleams; and hope in a few more years to see the full unfolding of its ripened splendors. Meanwhile we would recognize, both on philosophical and religious grounds, the practical lesson that everywhere, whether in the shop, the school or the sanctuary, man advances, not always with even steps and equal speed, but according to his reception of truth, his sincerity of motives, his convictions of right and duty, his love for his fellow-men, and his humble trust in the triune God who stands revealed as our Father, Redeemer and Sanctifier.

PHILOSOPHY IN JAPAN, PAST AND PRESENT.

[A paper read before the Institute at Key East, N. J.,
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BY GEORGE WM. KNOX,

Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, Tokyo, Japan.

FEW events of the nineteenth century are deserving of more careful study than the reformation of Japan. Upon its issue rests the future of the great empires of Asia. Its success will give new hope to a continent.

The movement has been so romantic and so rapid that we have been content to watch its progress without inquiring into its causes. With an easy superiority we speak of a national genius for imitation, or are ready to call the nations fickle and superficial. Sometimes a *deus ex machina* is introduced and we fancy some miraculous influence as the direct agent in this transformation.

But the reformation of an empire is not to be so lightly accounted for. Superficial, fickle, imitative are thoughtless words that explain nothing, and we should call in the miraculous only when all other causes are exhausted. We can understand the rapid transformation only as we study the national history and philosophy.

I. *Shin-to*. Compared with India and China, Japan is young. No one now believes the misty tradition with its fables of countless ages. The government begins the national history with the ascension of Jim-mu Ten-no, six hundred and sixty years B.C. Jim-mu is a myth, and the date is a thousand years too remote for history. Real knowledge of the beginning of the nation goes no further back than the fifth century, A.D. The Ko-ji-ki, Record of Ancient Matters, is our authority for ancient Japan, and it was written early in the seventh century, A.D.*

The Ko-ji-ki is the exponent of Shin-to, the Way of the Gods. It has been the object of much curiosity and of much

* Mr. Chamberlain, of the Tokyo Imperial University, has translated the Ko-ji-ki, and has done more than all other scholars to give us the truth about the early history. Unfortunately, his valuable translation, and still more valuable introduction are buried in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.

fanciful rhetoric. One distinguished writer has assured us that it was the author of all blessings to Japan. He had never read this "Bible of the Japanese." It is a collection of dim traditions, and its value is in the picture it gives of early Japan before its contact with the Asiatic civilization.

The people were still almost barbarous. They had no writing or books, they counted only to ten. Their houses were huts. They had no commerce and were at the rude beginning of agriculture. Government and law were undeveloped. Punishments were revolting in their cruelty. Marriage was rudimentary, with no restraint upon the passions of the men. Art did not exist. Indeed we hardly recognize the people whose civilization now seems so indigenous and unique. Almost every characteristic feature was wanting.

The religion was as rude as the social life. Heaven was a great plain just above the earth. The gods were magnified men. There was no demarcation between the natural and the supernatural. The connection between heaven and earth was finally broken off—that was all. It was natural for Jim-mu, the son of a god, to be the first emperor of Japan, and it has been natural for his successors to be divine. The divine is simply the extraordinary, and the miraculous is the unexplained. Anything prodigious in this world or elsewhere is to be worshipped. The gods are mysterious, powerful,—often they are filthy and revolting. No idea of wisdom or of holiness is associated with them. The differentia is power. Our word, "God," scarcely applies at all to these existences. The government is "divine"; it has power. The sun and mountains are divine; the rivers and oceans, too. Certain trees and animals and places possess occult powers. The thing itself is worshipped often, I think, with no notion of an indwelling deity. Worship is wonder, and admiration and fear, with sacrifices in propitiation of offended power. The future life is not dwelt upon. Nothing is said of a future state of rewards and punishments. The distinction between heaven, earth, and hades is not insisted on. Some gods live in heaven, some on earth, and some in hades, and some divide their time among the three. The gods die—with no clear records of the result. Indeed, nothing is dogmatic, nothing is

consistent. It is no body of divinity, but a collection of strange tales.

There is no system of morals taught. Loyalty and obedience, even, are not enjoined. Later writers assure us that this is proof of the purity of early Japan. No ethical code was needed; men naturally did right. Ethics is a Chinese importation and came with Chinese vice. If men naturally did right, they differed amazingly from their gods. There is a super-abounding filth of word and deed. No reluctance is manifested in revealing the most hidden processes of nature. There is an absence of all standards that will excite shame. Walt Whitman is an eminent Japanese born out of due time. The freedom of conduct equalled the freedom of speech. There was cruelty, too, and treachery with no high ideal of truth or honor.

This early life, like almost all early life, is unattractive. We need to dwell upon it only long enough to learn its characteristic features. Asiatic civilization soon covered it with a foreign dress. But the *Ko-ji-ki* is still characteristic of much of the people's life and thought. There remains still something of the *Shin-to* heart after twelve hundred years of foreign creeds and dress.

The worship of the marvellous continues. There is little of the Greek perception of proportion. Exaggerated force is most impressive. The lower classes show most clearly the national characteristics as they are least touched by foreign thought and culture. Even their conversion to Buddhism did not change their real belief, for Buddhism won its final victory by a compromise with *Shin-to*. So the ancient gods, heroes and wonders are worshipped still. The simple country folk clap their hands, bow their heads, humble their prayers, and offer the fraction of a cent for the first European-built house they see. The most popular religious festival in Tokyo is in honor of a rebel against the emperor, deified for his extraordinary strength in crime. The people go in crowds to the beautiful suburb of the city, where a murderer and his harlot mistress lie buried—honoring them for their tenacious love. That shows the true *Shin-to* heart—a mere unreflecting wonder at strength of any kind with disregard of right and wrong.

The educated samurai have travelled far from faith in simple

Shin-to, yet they, too, desire strength of purpose, mind, and body most of all. Victory in a rush, tenacious perseverance, the eye that abashes an adversary, the argument that tires out the opponent, the reckless courage that takes no heed of life—these win admiration and applause. The statesman who just now is on the top-wave of popular applause, seems brutal to foreign eyes. The medieval heroes were men of hideous cruelty, joined to wonderful strength of will and hand. Even extreme debauchery can be easily condoned, as the proverb declares that "The strong in evil are strong in good." Not rounded, well proportioned men are sought, but exceptional if badly formed athletes.

The same characteristic is in the national art. The striking and grotesque in nature attract the artists. They develop some single aspect of nature, with total disregard of all else. They are impressionists and dash off pictures at a heat, leaving the imagination to fill in details. They know infinite toil also, and are sometimes minutely patient until their very perseverance seems extravagant. Their gardens are filled with strange shaped trees and shrubs, and abound in odd conceits that suggest the imagination of some ingenious child.

No people love nature more sincerely, or understand it better; but nature in Japan seems to meet their mood. Much that foreigners call grotesque and burlesque in their art has its complement in forest, rocks and streams. They feast upon aspects of nature that are foreign to our eyes. People and land wonderfully fit each other. Man answers to his environment. Soft, green, luxuriant nature conceals terrific powers. The ground rocks and quakes, volcanoes belch forth flames and death, typhoons destroy a thousand homes in an hour, the sea rolls in a deluge upon the land, raging conflagrations lay waste the busy towns. The powers of earth, sky, sea, and air are ever ready to destroy the unjust and the just alike; not symmetry or repose should we expect in such a land. The people are like their land, we may not know when the seismic forces will explode. No wonder that force and marvels hold fast imaginations and demand worship. Shin-to is the naive expression of the people's heart.

II. *Buddhism.* Buddhism had already made converts in Japan when the *Ko-ji-ki* was written. The untrustworthy tradition says that the empress Jin-go conquered Korea in the third century, A.D. Certain it is that the Chinese and Korean civilization took captive Japan during the period between the fifth and ninth centuries. Everything was transformed. Literature, law, commerce, art, organized religion replaced the primitive barbarism. Schools sprang up, a university was established, Chinese was in fashion, and the Japan which we know came into being.

Buddhism was the civilizer. It came with the freshness of religious zeal, and religious zeal was a novelty. It came as the bearer of civilization and enlightenment, and receptivity is a distinguishing feature of this clear-sighted people.

The foreigners were welcomed and given distinguished positions in the state. There was no jealousy and the strangers were content with their position and aimed only at moral influence. The first converts were of the highest position; kings and nobles were won at once. An enthusiastic emperor won victories over the unbelievers by the powers of a hidden Buddhist charm. The lower classes were slower to believe, and after hundreds of years accepted the faith only when an ingenious priest united the new and the ancient creeds.

Buddhism in Japan is of the developed northern school. It came with all the pomp of ritual and orders. It built its temples and monasteries. It appealed to the emotions and developed the latent artistic instinct. It said much of heaven and hell. It warned, it threatened, it coaxed. It was as far removed from the simplicity of Gautama's institute as is the complexity of the Church in Southern Europe from the Gospel of Jesus. Gautama was almost forgotten in the worship of Buddha's many followers, past, present, and to come. The gods of the Hindoo pantheon were in its temples cheek by jowl with the foxes and heroes of fabulous Japan. It was idolatrous and the noble eightfold path was overlaid with pilgrimages and charms and prayers, recited in an unknown tongue. It made itself all things to all men: for the ignorant it was religion, and for the initiated a philosophy.

It is idealistic. Everything is as we think it. The world is my idea. "Do you believe that Jesus is divine?" asks the priest. "Most assuredly I do." "Oh so He is." "Indeed; do you too believe?" "Why no, and so He is not God." He is, and He is not, equally and at once. Beyond our faith is naught. Hold the Buddhist to his creed and insist that such logic destroys itself, and he triumphs smilingly, "Self-destructive! Of course it is. All logic is. That is the centre of my philosophy. Evidently you are almost a Buddhist." For the people there are "ho-ben," religious parables left unexplained. "Swallowing the device of the priests, the people, well satisfied, dance their prayers." Heaven, hell, sin, salvation and the Buddhas are real entities to them. But the priest knows they have no existence apart from believing thought.

The system is not consistent with pure morality. Truth disappears and excuses for evil can always be found. There is no solid ground beneath the feet. Buddhism and immorality flourished together. When emperors shaved their heads and became monks, when nobles were priests and the land was covered with temples, when Buddhism was everywhere supreme, then sensuality ran riot. The imported civilization made the rulers of the land effeminate debauchees. All was corrupt, and the nation went down to dire disaster. From the eleventh century to the seventeenth century, A.D., darkness covered the land.

India, Thibet, China and Japan have joined in corrupting the teaching of the historic Buddha. But his system bears its share of the responsibility for the moral degradation that follows its acceptance. It denounces all desire, and offers salvation as the reward of the murder of our affections, hopes and aspirations. It is possible where conscious existence is believed to be the chief of evils. To all but the unnatural few the system invites revolt. There comes a denial of its fundamental principles—as in the Great Vehicle—or conscious and habitual hypocrisy.

Buddhism did nothing for truth. Lies are a part of its stock in trade. It did nothing for chastity. Under Shin-to the people were shamelessly indecent and Buddhism wrought no reformation. The temples are neighbors of brothels, and the priests furnish more than their quota of the immorally diseased in the

hospitals. It could not practically teach humanity. It persecuted the heretics, and the priests fought fiercely in the feudal wars. Sometimes the monks defied all the power of the empire. During the "dark ages," from the eleventh century to the seventeenth, noble fought with noble and generals did not hesitate to turn their arms against the emperors. Nowhere has there been a darker or more cruel history. Buddhism did nothing to soften strife. It proclaimed no "Truce of God." It made no determined struggle for peace and mercy. It steadily became more corrupt. And so at last, when peace and light came again, it was not through a religious reformation. Buddhism was not reformed, it was abandoned.

New sects were founded, but the development was to lower forms—with the survival of the unfittest. The wrongly called Reformed Buddhists are to-day most popular of the sects. By all standards the sect should be named "deformed." It leaves none of Gautama's doctrines untouched. It has substituted Amitabha for him of India. It promises an eternity of sensuous delight instead of Nirvana. It puts the single repetition of a magic formula in an unknown tongue in the place of the noble eightfold path. Salvation is no longer release from sin and desire, but only from misery. The priests eat flesh and marry, and the high priest, a few years ago, accepted a new concubine as a welcome gift from devout parents, whose piety prompted the offering.

It is this debased, immoral doctrine that excited the indignation of Max Müller, and long ago its immorality was attacked by Chinese and Japanese philosophers. Centuries before the recent opening of Japan, intelligent men had freed themselves from all belief—casting off its bonds in the name of a purer morality.

Buddhism has had fair field in Japan, and its outcome has not been elevating. Its influence has been æsthetic and not ethical. It added culture and art to Japan as it brought with itself the civilization of continental Asia. It gave the arts, and more, it added the artistic atmosphere. Reality disappears. This "fleetingly borrowed world" is all mysterious, a dream; moonlight is in place of the clear, hot sun. It appeals to contemplation and

repose. Its temples are in the midst of groves and gardens. Every accessory is carefully studied. It has so fitted itself to its surroundings that it seems indigenous. It professes a dreamy despair, and offers men weary of the world and its strife a poetic *ennui*. We can understand why it has a certain following in Europe and America.

III. *Chinese Rationalism*. Renaissance followed the decay of the dark ages. The House of Tokugawa gave peace from the beginning of the seventeenth century until Perry's time. The arts revived and learning became again the occupation of gentlemen. Schools and the university, long gone to decay, were re-established. Books were written, and commerce and agriculture thrived.

China and Korea again were the teachers. But now the Chinese classics were supreme, and Buddhism was despised. The classics had been studied in Japan a thousand years before, coming with the Buddhist missionaries. Then the Chinese literati were still friendly to the Indian faith. But in time a rationalistic school had arisen in China, agnostic as to the future life and bitterly hostile to Buddhism. This teaching had been supreme in China for hundreds of years, when Japan in the seventeenth century turned again to that great empire for light. Imported into Japan it soon became the creed of scholars and gentlemen.

The new philosophy attacked Buddhism as silly and immoral. Its tales may wheedle and frighten women and children. It has a kernel of truth, but its parables are not needed by intelligent men. Its priests are terribly immoral, and are so ignorant that they believe their own fables. The doctrine was invented in a barbarous land and in a time of darkness. Its founder's purpose was good, but he was a man of inferior intellect and dimly apprehended the truth. His disciples were even less intelligent and lacked his high purpose. So things went on from bad to worse, until at last Buddhism has become an obstacle to virtue. Ignorant people may possibly be frightened into goodness, but men of sense need no imaginary restraints.*

* This account of the Rationalistic Philosophy is taken directly from the books of the first teachers of this school—of the seventeenth century. Parts of it were printed in *The Independent* in 1883.

Thus the leaders of Japan handed religion over to the lower classes and thought morality enough for gentlemen. They were willing to conform to the customary rites but cared for none of these things. The philosophy of these transmitters of Chinese thought may be briefly described. It is a pantheistic theory of the universe. Mention is made of a creator or rather of a source of life, and sometimes language is used that implies conscious intelligence. In early times the Chinese seemed to believe in God, and traces of that belief remain, but in spite of such traces, intelligence and personality are expressly denied to the first cause in this modern description of the ancient system. A perfunctory bow is made to the gods, and then without more ado they are passed by. The spirits of all beings, men, animals and birds, are derived from this source of life, but itself has no spirit. In any case man owes it no direct obedience. The system of the universe will suffice for us and we need not weary ourselves with the search for origins. Two great principles underlie all phenomena, unity and order. The universe is one without distinction or separation of essence. This unity existed in chaos when all was without form and void, and it still exists though concealed under a multitude of forms. Men, animals, birds, trees, and stones differ as bubbles differ, but all are formed of the same material, are formed by the same force and speedily return to the original oneness. Men are like puppets that seem to children to have separate existence and will, but in truth each moves as it is moved and only the power behind the scenes has real being. The second great truth is closely allied to this, for the unity is manifested in a multitude of forms, and these forms exist in a series with strict subordination of lower to higher. Every thing has its own rank and place; indeed its rank and place is its sole title to a separate existence. Man, dog, tree, are but names of grades in the development of the one being, and thus while each performs its appropriate duties, all are worthy; if they escape their ordained place and neglect their duties they forfeit all rights and strictly speaking cease to be. We correctly say that "ka ka" is the crow, that the color is the flower, and that the virtues are the man. The comprehension of these two principles results in a perfect morality and happi-

ness. Sages intuitively perceive the truth and all others learn from them. But sages have appeared in China only and even there they have been very few. When they are alive the truest wisdom is to follow their example. Now there are no sages but the classics have been written and true learning consists in understanding these and regulating our conduct thereby. Thus may we polish the illustrious jewel of our hearts, but if we neglect the books and trust to the guiding of our dark and misled minds we cast away our candle and continue our search in the dark. Nor do we need great libraries; the canonical scriptures are enough and if it be objected that even these are too many for common folks, we reply that their whole meaning has been condensed into a single sentence. We need not neglect even the humble folks who cannot read. Of old the officials taught the people in every hamlet and thus these knew the truth; not reading it was as though they read. It was heart reading, while mere eye reading is to read as if we read not. We must sharply distinguish. There is the learning called "true" and "Confucian," and the other learning called "false" and "strange." True learning teaches the great principles of heaven and earth; it is disregard of self, obedience to the way and the observance of the five relations. Its eyeball is humility. Wide learning applies all this to the heart. False learning desires the honor of wide learning, envies those who excel, wishes only for fame and makes pride its eyeball. It has nothing to do with obedience and the more you have the worse you grow. All men except the sages are proud by nature; some men do not cast away this natural pride and become criminals, madmen, and followers of strange customs; they tread the evil way that leads to the brutes and to the dominion of the devils. Men are mere worms to us, proud, contemptuous. We revile our lords and ridicule our friends; evil and lust prevail, righteousness is forgotten, we are foul and low, we rebel against man's way and so we follow the way of the brutes. The sages naturally understand and fully obey, but all others must study hard and then discern with differing degrees of clearness, as climbers on the mountain side distinguish objects on the top with increasing clearness as they ascend. True learning discerns the heart of truth, and knows that

our actions are to be like the sages' actions, and our hearts like theirs and by its aid the common man may become like them. But the false learning merely learns the explanation and does not dream that the heart is to conform to it and so it is called "mouth learning" and "ear learning."

This true learning is the foundation of all things and is profitable unto the life that now is. It is the corner-stone of private and public peace and prosperity. Let us begin with the individual. Since the universe is one it is the highest wisdom for me to perceive that my interests can never be antagonistic to my fellows. All are brethren, and a nation is like one great household. Even the stranger is from the same great womb of nature and is to be treated like a friend. The infant comes into the world with a pure nature and knows no distinction between mine and thine. But with growth and evil example he falls from his first estate and the evil demon, "self," takes possession of him. Selfishness, the exalting of self at the expense of others, is sin, the only sin and the root of all evil. We must get rid of self, we must again obtain the original heart, we must become through knowledge of the "way" as little children and then sin will cease to be. Selfishness is likewise folly. It can never bring happiness for it is the root of all misery. Be rid of self and you enter heaven though you live in a hut and are clothed in rags. Yield to self and though possessed of all earthly joys hell reigns within. To seek happiness at the expense of others is like the play of boys: seated on the ground hand in hand and foot against foot, they strain and tug; the vanquished stands erect, the victor rolls back upon the ground. "All things are cultivated in a series, therefore they must not hurt each other."

Now further let us remember that we each have our appointed place in the economy of nature. The universe is still one but it is no longer chaos. There is the distinction of superior and inferior in all things. The sun is superior and utters its commands which the inferior earth obeys, the sun causing the succession of seasons, and the earth sending forth the corresponding succession of flowers and fruits. Trees, grasses, birds and animals are all arranged in well defined ranks. Man is the head of the uni-

verse, and all else is subordinate to him; but with men also there is the same natural distinction of rank. Man is to know his place and to do his duty. When envious of others he loses the dignity that belongs to the doing of his duty and yet does not attain the desired end for which he longs. The rubbish barrel may perhaps envy the gorgeous shrine for the household gods, but were it to be decked out in like fashion it would be utterly valueless for its purposed use while equally ridiculous as a dwelling-place for the gods. If a man mistakes his chief end, he degrades himself; it is like the ignorant peasant who used the priceless Masamune sword in his household work, cleaning fish and paring radish, and splitting wood, finding it inconvenient and difficult to use, dulling it, nicking it, rusting it, until at last the incomparable sword was worthy only of the rubbish heap. Thus ignorant men abuse body and mind until they, at last, are ready only for the rubbish heap. Such men are far below the brutes, for brutes are true to their calling. Out of place man is not man. Duty is more important than being, and if man neglects his duty he loses all right to his name, for duty is man.

Obedience is morality. Obedience is the unchanging way of heaven, the excellency of earth and man's guide. All good is embraced in this. It is as broad as the universe, it extends wherever the sun shines and rain falls, and is equally adapted to all. There is nothing greater than obedience, and obedience knows nothing more important than filial piety. We must put parents in the place of heaven. All virtue is included in this. To love others without loving our parents is mistaken virtue, and to reverence others without reverencing them is error. Filial piety fulfils the law. Unfilial conduct is the pain of hell and the source of all evil. From this one virtue come all others as the duty of lord and retainer. The lord owes duties to his ministers, samurai and subjects. He must respect and care for and cherish them. His ministers are to show their loyalty by giving good advice, even though it prove distasteful and though it be at the risk of life. The retainer is to obey loyally without question, sacrificing self for lord and country. The common people are to obey the laws, pay their taxes, and be diligent in business. The husband is to love his wife, but not overmuch, or

to the neglect of parents. The wife is to reverence and obey, she must be gentle, quiet and faithful, and her husband is in the place of heaven to her. The younger brother must obey and reverence the elder, and the elder is to befriend, teach and guide the younger. With friends there is to be truth, justice and courtesy, and this rule is to be extended even to strangers.

Thus the true heart-learning extends from lowest to highest, and all go therein, yet with distinction of power and place. The great highway is for all, but the travellers are of unequal strength. There are men and women, old and young, weak and strong; for every one there is a duty suited to his powers, and doing that he fulfils the law of filial piety. But when the sage appears, the divine, his virtue unites with heaven and earth, his light is one with sun and moon, he knows good and evil like the gods and devils. Yet, after all, Confucius said, "What is there even in the virtue of the sage beyond filial piety?"

Law and government and the arts of war are all offspring of this system. No natural talents or bravery can atone for the want of this learning, but as insisted on before, let our learning be of the heart and not the letter. There is no true learning without the profession of arms, nor true arms without learning. Learning governs self, family, province and empire in time of peace, and this is the true order for the government to follow. In war arms restrain the unruly and punish the evil. The two spring from the same root. The severity of government depends on circumstances. The heart of the ruler is of first importance; if he is good, his subjects will imitate him and be good without laws, but if he is bad, laws are useless and sometimes evil increases with the severity of the punishment, as dirty water becomes dirtier with stirring and clears only if left undisturbed. Really the happiness or misery of the land depends upon the heart of the ruler alone. He is responsible. But how comes it that in the world of men and things the good are few and the bad are many, the good are difficult to cultivate and the bad grow of themselves? Why are sages few and thieves many and the latter increase do what we may? Our error arises from calling one class of objects good and another bad, whereas since all are the offspring of nature, nothing is really bad, but all are

good with only the distinction of superior and inferior. All things are thus good but only few are superior, and yet the superior is the pivot of its class. As when we make a pillar there is much rubbish condemned to ignoble use brought into existence for the sake of that one pillar. Among men the wise are superior and the foolish inferior, and the wise are of course few, but if they rule, all is well. In olden times the sages were on the throne and the superior men were next in rank, while all in authority were wise, and the unwise kept their place as subjects. So from highest to lowest, wisdom determined the rank and there was no evil man in the empire, and the only distinction was this of higher and lower and all were good, as gold and iron are alike metals. But in time the sages passed away, and ignorant men were on the throne and in authority, and so evil was everywhere. Here clearly we see the true nature of sin and evil.

But how can we explain the prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the good, a state of things contrary to our philosophy and yet of constant occurrence? The answer is twofold : much in life is settled absolutely by fate while we are still unborn, and is not to be changed forever. These conditions belong to the body, but there are other and greater blessings and curses that pertain to the spirit and these are bestowed undeviatingly according to merit. And if, in spite of all, you urge that some evil men are happy and some good men miserable, we are not to form our rule from these exceptions. Are we perfectly sure after all that these are exceptions? The infamous robber, To-seki, ate human flesh and yet he died in peace in old age, while Gan-shi the most celebrated of the disciples of Confucius, died young and poor. Ignorant men are perplexed and conclude that virtue and happiness have no connection. But consider; To-seki lost his virtue, became a wretch and handed down an execrated name to posterity, while Gan-shi enjoyed the pleasures of wisdom during life, ranked among the wise after death, and is worshipped by princes. Among the blessings is a clear perception of the way and this really includes all the rest ; this is the true long life and wealth and peace, for if the heart be at peace, outward circumstances do not matter. On the other

hand an evil heart includes all other curses. When the heart is darkened, outward sorrow is not needed for punishment, all sights and sounds are painful. Thus it is that the law holds good, that virtue brings happiness and vice brings sorrow. The sage does not desire wealth nor fear poverty ; he does not desire life nor fear death ; he does not seek happiness nor flee misery, but wishes only to obey the way and keep his heart pure. Every man is to follow with unshaken heart the way in the position in which he was born. Lust is not the possessing or forsaking anything, but is disobedience. Be obedient, and rank and wealth are virtuous. Disobey, and the hermit's cell is sinful. A cell is not ennobling nor a palace polluting. There is nothing contaminating in silken robes or virtuous in the ascetic's garb. We must look deeper than this to the motive and the heart. If these are right, wealth and poverty, life and death, rank and no rank are all alike. The wise man has great wealth not to be put upon the same level with the possessions of the vulgar rich, and he will not forsake the great for the small. Even though he die young and poor he has joys unknown to common men, a joy and virtue without end, indestructible, eternal, more lasting than the earth itself.

Agreement with the original principle is true reason. The great spirit of the universe fills all the sky, calm, imperturbable, the source of all things. When man conforms to this great principle though he disappear, he does not become extinct. He returns to the primal spirit as a drop of water into the sea, as a vapor in the sky melts away. He is not destroyed but continues, as fire entering fire. Nor can we say that he may not appear again as the scattered vapor gathers again in a different form. Man thus at one with the spiritual forces behind the universe is more imperishable than the universe itself. Wisdom comprehends this truth and rests in perfect peace.

IV. *New Japan.* Two hundred and fifty years passed by and Japan still slumbered. It had exhausted the resources of Eastern civilization. The government was corrupt and no statesman suggested radical reform. No movement toward freedom and a larger life began. The links between *de facto* and *de jure* power were multiplied. There were no new impulses in litera-

ture and art. The old feudal spirit was dying out and many of the samurai were effeminate. Nothing could be hoped for on the old lines. Slow decay was inevitable unless new life should come again from abroad. Then the guns of Perry were heard in Yedo bay.

The treaties were made, the government yielding to overwhelming force, but for fifteen years there was semi-war. The government of the Shogun hesitated, prevaricated, and finally gave half-hearted assent, hoping to shut again the doors after a little. The foreign powers on the contrary opened the doors wider and wider. The samurai and daimyo hated the foreigners and came to hate the Shogun for his weakness. The government at Yedo could not keep its promises to the foreigners and could not satisfy the popular sentiment. The foreign ministers were deaf to all entreaties and trusted in their heavy artillery. The samurai, of the interior, out of range of the guns, demanded the expulsion of the barbarians and the Mikado commanded the Shogun to abrogate the treaties. Things went from bad to worse, and finally the Shogun fell and the Mikado was restored. The expulsion of the foreigners was the cry that rallied the southern clans. But the Mikado and his advisers were after all in the situation of the Shogun; face to face with foreigners, they found that they could not expel them. So they treated with them. As time went by, ignorant patriotism gave way to enlightened patriotism. The West had been awake while Japan had slept. There was much to learn. The alternative was simple: Japan must learn from Europe or it must submit to some foreign dominion. As soon as the situation was understood, hesitation disappeared. The whole nation became eager for the new enlightenment.

Thus Japan returned to national tradition. Seclusion and conservatism are not characteristic, but as we have seen, the people in the past have ever been receptive and hospitable. Shin-to a thousand years ago had offered no opposition to Buddhism. Its emptiness could not hold out against the foreign cult and creed. Its love for the strange and marvellous made it the willing disciple of the new civilization. Shin-to now is dead, but the wonders of the West make deep impression upon the Japanese.

They see our power, the triumphs of our science, our victory over the forces of nature, our enormous wealth, and they intelligently accept our leadership. They follow only for a time. They no longer accept the tradition of their divine descent, but they still have full confidence in their powers. What man has done the Japanese can do. The wonders of Western civilization shall be their own. Just now they are behind, but they will soon put themselves abreast of the foremost nations. They will do in a generation all that England has taken hundreds of years to accomplish. No problem is too difficult, no task is too great. Never were knights-errant more confident of success. And all is for beloved native land. If Japan is no longer the land of the gods, it is still loved and served with a passionate devotion. No sacrifice is too great for their ardent patriotism. This supreme patriotism is the motive in all the recent transformations. The love of country that found ignorant expression in Shin-to now is centred in the high resolve to make Japan the peer of the most enlightened lands.

Buddhism has millions of adherents, but its power over the nation's life is gone forever. It has left an impress on the national character. It emphasizes the evils of existence and casts a gloom over the landscape. "As sad as a temple bell" is a proverb. Life is a poor thing. The individual wants for very little. Men are ready to surrender the struggle with this evil world. From emperor to shopkeeper it has been the fashion to abdicate. If wrongs are not righted at once, if victory is not won in a rush, we may charge our failure to fate and give up the bootless struggle. Many a young man full of strength and hope has passed his prime before he is thirty years of age. Many a man in middle life lives in idle retirement content with contemplation and repose. The rapid descent of Buddhism to lower power has cast reproach on all religion. The upper classes were already rationalists when Japan was opened and were ready for our agnosticism.

Their rationalism was moral. It intensified loyalty and made obedience divine. The treachery of early Japan passed away and knightly loyalty took its place. Duty, that is loyalty and obedience, has been first on men's tongues and in their hearts.

Ethics is the chief end of man. We must admire this thorough-going self-devotion. But after all mere loyalty and obedience are not the whole of life. Such morality is too formal, and is barren of high results. There has been much of the ignorant heroism of the soldier who redeems a misspent life by a reckless charge in some forlorn hope. Loyalty to baron has been coincident with premeditated self-debauchery and crime. Obedience to parents has resulted in the prostitution of loyal daughters. No great reformers have appeared, and the thought of a high and pure humanity has not been evolved. The self-sacrifice has been magnificent, it has not been enlightened.

But now with a thousand motives to high exertion the men of Japan respond with eagerness. In study, in travel, in adventure, in commerce, in politics, the love of country is supreme. Not a penniless student among them all will admit that any lower motive drives him to his midnight toil. Every effort must be for great Japan.

This dogmatic philosophy blunted the spiritual sense. The future life, God, and prayer were disregarded. Most of the Confucianists are content with the enjoyments of the present. Naturally the material achievements of the West are most attractive to them. Railways, steamboats, modern machinery, commerce and agriculture, repeating rifles and ships of war, scientific medicine thus supply their needs. All else is "unpractical." The old faiths were easily cast off, and no new one sought. For a time there was a moral interregnum. Spencer, Mill, Bentham, Buckle were the Western philosophers in vogue. Certain American professors were believed when in the name of science they assured their Sunday congregations that no educated men longer accepted Christianity. Give us Western civilization, without Western religion, was the cry. Materialism was the fashion. Machinery and physical science should regenerate Japan.

There were always exceptions. Some men dimly sought for God and found Him in Jesus Christ. Young men studied the Bible and came to trust and love the Christ. A constantly increasing number of thoughtful men feel that Christianity is the only hope for the future of Japan.

The nation comes to see that a moral interregnum should

not be prolonged, and that there is only one Saviour for the life that now is. With wider acquaintance the knowledge of the scientists who deny the existence of intelligent faith is doubted; their evidence is not trustworthy as to living society, however sure concerning shell heaps and fossil men. Men of influence advocate the Christianizing of the people. It is more difficult than they had thought to separate modern enlightenment from Christianity.

The Imperial University in Tokyo is the centre of the intellectual activity of New Japan. It is technical, with professional courses. Evolution is its guiding principle, but it binds itself to no particular exposition. In religion it is neutral. Its faculty is open to earnest Christians and to professed unbelievers. It asks no questions as to creed. The College of Philosophy has the smallest number of students in attendance. In the past it has been agnostic. Now one professor, a Japanese, expounds Spencer, accepting the faith of John Fiske as to God and immortality. Many intelligent men agree to this doctrine. The foreign professor is a German follower of Lotze, and replaces an American disciple of the radical Hegelians. The tendency is towards belief. A missionary lecturer on ethics was made welcome two years ago, and some of the brightest students are Christians. There is a keen relish for metaphysics and a high ambition. The self-confidence of the students makes them demand Kant, Hegel and Lotze, while the logical powers are still untrained and the preparation is deficient. The results are not commensurate with the labor expended. It will be some future generation that will show the philosophical powers of the people, although some students already show much talent.

There is still a lingering prejudice against Christianity, but the crisis between faith and unbelief is not so acute as a few years since. There is a general faith that Christianity is to prevail. Men would prefer it without the miracles. This anti-supernaturalistic bias is not the result of the study of modern science, but is the legacy of the Chinese philosophy. As Buddhism yielded to Confucianism as the higher and purer doctrine, so will rationalism yield to the inherent truth and grace of Christ.

The argument from final causes is readily accepted. The moral argument for the being of God also wins assent. Men willingly confess a faith in the Creator, God. Christ too is accepted, as first of the sages, but His divinity is a stumbling-block. This fact of His divinity, in Japan as everywhere and always, is the article of a standing or falling Church. Many so accept Him. His truth as light, now driving away mist and darkness, His power now manifested in the regeneration of the individual and of society, His grace as superhuman, differentiating him from Confucius and Gautama, bring even rationalists to faith and adoration.

V. *The Future.* Japan's experiment will be successful only as the people are Christianized. Shin-to is dead. Buddhism is decrepit and stricken with mortal disease. Rationalism has exhausted its influence. Western agnosticism has nothing to offer beyond the message of the Chinese classics, save as it echoes the Sermon on the Mount. Christianity only has living power.

Christ is to be preached. He is the power and light of God. He must be accepted, not as sage or philosopher, but as greater than all philosophies. Not by tradition, not even on our testimony, not as the creature of governmental decree must He be believed. Japan for itself must see His light and accept Him as the living truth, whose rays scatter all darkness and reveal the eternal God.

CREATION IS REVELATION.*

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By THOMAS HILL, D.D.,

Ex-president of Harvard University.

DARWIN did not adopt materialism as a philosophy : he simply abstained from philosophizing. He became so completely absorbed in the observation of nature, and in the endeavor to establish his theory of the gradual evolution of one species from another that he seemed to lose all power to see either mathematical or metaphysical truths. In March, 1863, he writes to Hooker (vol. ii. p. 202) : " I have long regretted that I truckled to public opinion, and used the Pentateuchal term of creation, by which I really meant 'appeared' by some wholly unknown process. It is mere rubbish, thinking at present of the origin of life : one might as well think of the origin of matter." In February, 1867, writing to the same (vol. ii. p. 244), he expresses strong dissent from a position of the Duke of Argyll, which position is really that of Erasmus Darwin, and identical with Maupertuis's grand dogma, so fruitful in all physics,—that an infinitely wise God will waste no force. He says, " It is foolish to touch on such subjects." In December, 1874, in a letter to John Fiske (vol. ii. p. 371), he says : " I find that my mind is so fixed by the inductive method that I cannot appreciate deductive reasoning. I must begin with a good body of facts, and not from a principle (in which I always suspect some fallacy), and then as much deduction as you please."

These quotations are sufficient to show that the position of his mind, with reference to religion, was not at all that of disbelief in God, but only that of abstinence from all abstract thought, and particularly from the thought of Him as a creator. He thought it " foolish to touch on such subjects." He never rose into the sphere of reason, but always contented himself with his " England of the senses and the understanding."

* See the article on " Charles Darwin," in the August number of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

But, in this voluntary exclusion of himself from the fairest portion of man's intellectual field, he did his own powers a grievous wrong. The spiritual man, like the bodily, is a unit : if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. In a letter to Hooker, December, 1866 (vol. ii. p. 239), he speaks of Herbert Spencer as "about a dozen times" his own superior, "even in the master art of wriggling," and adds, "if he had trained himself to observe more, even if at the expense of some loss of thinking power, he would have been a wonderful man." This judgment on Spencer might be well supplemented by saying in like manner that, if Darwin had trained himself to think more, even if at the expense of some loss of observing power, he would have been a still more wonderful man. It is sad to find him so frequently making such confessions as that to Lyell, February, 1860 (vol. ii. p. 84) : "I could make nothing of Dana's idealistic notions about species ; but, then, I have not a metaphysical head." A little more breadth in his thinking would have shown him that John Fiske's reasoning was that of the true inductive type ; that Fiske did not reason from a single principle, like the correlation of the dependent and the absolute, or of effect and cause, but that he really started "with a good body of facts." The majority of theists, both Christian and non-Christian, have distrusted all attempts to establish the being of God by *a priori* argument, and distrusted equally every appeal to innate knowledge or instinctive faith. They have usually been in perfect accord with Darwin, so far as that goes. They have relied rather upon an induction from a great body of facts, from the numerous adaptations in nature of means to ends, and from the innumerable instances of symmetry, both in space and time, which we may almost say constitute the universe, indicating that the universe is the embodiment of thought. In the chapter on religion (vol. i. pp. 274-286), his biographer has clearly shown us that Darwin felt the strength of this theistic induction, and that even in the last year of his life it sometimes came over him with overwhelming force. But the same chapter shows us, with equal clearness, why at other times "it seemed to go away again" and leave him in a state of passive agnosticism. His view of natural selection had confused his perception

of the teleological argument, and his want of mathematical and metaphysical power had prevented his ever grasping the morphological. Some of those who accept his theory of gradual variation perceive that it does not really affect the teleological argument. "The beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell" remains as strong an evidence of an intelligent purpose in the organic world if it was produced in one way as if it was produced in another: it is certainly no chance production. It is only upon the morphological argument that gradual variation has a bearing: such variation would banish laws of symmetry and interrelation from the organic kingdom. And it is this introduction of lawlessness into the highest department of the material universe which makes Darwin's view seem to us discordant with all the analogies of science, and, therefore, in the highest degree improbable. In regard to its theological bearing, it simply gives us a particular way of looking at the method of procedure in the formation of the universe. That may divert our attention for a time from the more fundamental questions; but it cannot produce, upon sound thinkers in general, the paralyzing effect which it seems to have produced upon its author. The great body of facts set before every man with his eyes open will always testify "with overwhelming force" to an Intelligent Source of all things.

Darwin's view of the descent of man had assisted, through his lack of sharp metaphysical discernment, in making him incapable of appreciating the higher side of theological speculation. In a letter to W. Graham (vol. i. p. 285), he expresses his "inward conviction" "that the universe is not the result of chance," and then adds that, with him, "the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy." In 1876, he wrote (vol. i. p. 281) that he could not "see that such inward convictions and feelings are of any weight as evidence of what really exists." We say that he betrays in such sentences a lack of sharp metaphysical discernment; for were his theory—that the human mind has been developed from an animal mind—true, it would not follow that it remains an untrustworthy, merely animal mind. It has been developed into something higher,—just as a baby's mind is

developed in the course of twenty or thirty years into a man's mind.

As for his failure to perceive that inward convictions are any evidence of real existence, it is a failure to recognize the real basis of all knowledge. Even were his theory, to which we cannot assent, true,—that apparently instinctive knowledge and instinctive desires are an inheritance of ancestral experience,—it would be also true that such convictions and feelings are the safest guides to further experience. The new-born mammal, the newly hatched bird, are seldom deceived by their instincts. Even the individual cases in which they are deceived do nothing toward showing that the instincts are not, in general, safe guides to truth. A sound induction leads, therefore, to the conclusion that the religious instincts and convictions, which come over men with such “overwhelming force,” are, even on Darwin's theories, very strong evidence that religious verities really exist.

In 1879 he was tortured by a German youth into writing (vol. i. p. 277), “For myself, I do not believe that there ever has been any revelation.” But we must remember that men would differ very much in their definition of the word “revelation.” Joseph Henry, who retained to the end of his honored life the attitude of a devout believer in Christ, also retained, from early life to the end, the conviction that every discovery in science is an intelligible answer received from God in reply to an intelligent question. Under that aspect, the whole universe is a volume of revelation. Darwin confesses that the general impression, made by the study of the external world, of the presence of intelligible order in the universe was so strong upon him that he never for a moment denied the existence of God. Some passages in his writings imply, on the contrary, that he had a profoundly reverent faith, and that his objections to the statements of professedly religious writers (the Duke of Argyll, for example), were based on what he thought the littleness of their views of the Divine Being.

The creation, therefore, is in itself a revelation from God. The primary use of this outward world is to serve the spirit. Nature serves as commodity for our bodily needs ; but how

charmingly Emerson has shown us in that first little volume, which he has never surpassed, that she also serves, even more effectively, the spirit. She opens to us the mysteries of our own intellectual powers. She furnishes us with symbols of speech. She disciplines and invigorates our moral character. She touches and sanctifies us by her beauty. She lifts us up to the vision of eternal good, through her constant growth and decay of perishable forms. The external world is thus a school-house of God's building. According to the word of the prophets, quoted with approval by our Lord, we are therein all taught of God. All science, all literature and art, are but the fruit of the exercises in that school. Our Divine Teacher is perpetually giving us varying object-lessons, which we interpret to each other as He gives us ability. When children, we rest in the external and more obvious meaning of these objects. We are pleased with a rattle, tickled with a straw. Meanwhile, we are unconsciously and gradually gaining better knowledge and deeper wisdom. Scholars in this school, as in others, differ from each other in capacity and ability. Some rise more rapidly than others to the higher truths. But the direction of all faithful students is, on the whole, upward. Gradually, but surely, we learn that these things, which perish with the using, are leaving in the faithful mind things which are unseen and eternal. Gradually, but surely, we learn that, although the visible, sensible universe is a shadow that is passing away, it is a shadow of an intelligible world that passes not away. The lessons of nature thus do for us what the lessons of religious and philosophic teachers, attempting to interpret the words of nature, may fail to do. Nature herself at length teaches a man that the flower fadeth, the grass withereth, but the Word of God endureth forever. Heaven and earth may pass away, but the Word which created them shall not pass away. The external world has its highest value in the cultivation of the heart and the intellect ; and it has its power to cultivate the mind and the soul, from the fact that it is a partial revelation of the divine thought and of the divine love. We are by no means omnipotent. We could not draw such rich treasures of knowledge and expression from the universe, were there no wisdom and love embodied in it.

It must, nevertheless, be admitted that in some minds religious hopes and aspirations remain very feeble and weak. There is a vast difference in the religious and moral, as there is in the artistic and scientific endowment of men. There are multitudes who seem incapable of receiving scientific truth, of shaking off superstition and belief in magic. There are multitudes apparently incapable of appreciating beauty, whether in form, in color, or in tone. In like manner there are multitudes who appear unable to appreciate a high morality or to grasp firmly spiritual truth.

If we adopt the theistic faith, and believe that an infinitely wise Being, creating us men to be happy, and making our nature such that our highest happiness is in the interchange of thought and in the mutual expression of affection, has also created the outward world to be a means of our communication with each other and with Him, we must be ready to adopt the conclusions which will logically flow out of that view. But it would seem that, if we and the universe are the creation of an infinitely wise and infinitely good Being, then the recognition of that fact would be a source of high joy. The return of thanks to Him, the remembrance of His goodness, the endeavor to carry out His purposes, the discipline of our will into submission and even into unison with His will, the hope of further knowledge of Him, and a better service of Him, would indeed seem to be sources of joy greater and purer than any others. It is not credible that an infinitely wise and good Being would suffer such hopes and aspirations to be kindled in human hearts, without permitting their fulfilment also. "Whatever is really desirable is possible; and whatever is really desirable and possible will," under the administration of an infinitely wise and good Creator, "be one day actual."

Effects are a revelation of their cause, and the highest and best effects most adequately reveal the cause. We judge of the quality of a Newton, not by anecdotes about his absent-mindedness, but by reading his "*Principia*." John Milton is not to be judged by any weakness in his argument concerning divorce, but rather by his noble defences of civil liberty, his acute writings on Christian doctrine, and his marvellously perfect "*Paradise Regained*." In the great poem of the universe, we may perhaps

say that all parts are equal ; that nothing can be superior to any other thing, because all are perfect. Yet we must recognize a difference of grade in the objects of the universe. We cannot, in the external world, help regarding crystallization as being a higher phenomenon than shapeless massing. It is a more distinct embodiment of thought. We cannot but regard chemical change as more interesting and higher than mechanical effect. Again, we must admit vegetable growth to be on a higher plane of action than chemical changes, and animal life as superior to vegetable. In the animal kingdom the phenomena of consciousness rise grade above grade, until in man they take a sudden rise far above the highest animal. The ground on which we base this judgment of gradation is still the distinctness with which the phenomena embody comprehensive thought.

Man's will, his spontaneous self-determination, is a cause. We cannot go behind it in the chain of causation. We may give reasons for a choice, but the reasons did not cause the choice. The choice selected, from the reasons, those to which it would allow weight. The selection was more or less arbitrary. The human will is, therefore, a veritable cause. But it is not a self-existent being. It is a dependent being. It is limited and restricted in its action. Its range is finite in time, in space, and in power. One year before the child was born, that particular cause, which now manifests itself in the child's nascent will, was hidden in the abyss of potentiality. The human will, therefore, is not a self-existent cause. It is an effect of the first cause, and yet it is a cause; and, to us men, it is the most wonderful, also, of all the effects of the first cause. In the magnitudes of space, time, and mechanical force, other things in the cosmos far exceed man. The old philosophers therefore called the external world the macrocosm, the internal world the microcosm ; but, if we measure by dignity, by the grandeur which appeals to reason rather than by that which appeals to sense, the names should be reversed. It is philosophy which deals with the great world of thought, affection, wisdom, and love. It is science which deals with the little world of matter and motion. Matter and motion are gloried only by being the medium through which the Eternal Mind communicates expressions of thought and af-

fection, wisdom and love, to the finite mind. If "stars and tides and matter and motion" do not reveal to us the thoughts of an infinite God and unfold within us powers of thought akin to those of the great Creator, if they do not express to us the paternal love of God and awaken in us holy sentiments of grateful loyalty, then let the physical sciences be given over to the ridicule of Swift in his voyage to Laputa, to Johnson's ponderous censure in the *Rambler*, and to Coleridge's contemptuous supposition that the stars were created "to make dirt cheap."

The physical sciences are of interest and value to man only because the external world is the embodiment and illustration of the very same ideas of space and time, which are developed by us in *a priori* speculation. They thus prove our kindred, not to the things which perish, but to the eternal, uncaused, self-existent Cause of all causes. Take the so-called positive view of physical science,—that is to say, assume that science is simply a generalization of the facts of material existence, not an interpretation of the ideas and meaning of the Author of nature, derived from a study of His autograph works,—and you have made physical science a mere array of statistics put into formulæ, only as into mnemonics. The distinction between empirical and rational formulæ becomes under that view obliterated. The distinction between magnitude and greatness vanishes. It must have been to star-gazers of this kind, to whom the ephemeris of the heavens was the end and crown of astronomy, that Schiller addressed his indignant lines :

"Talk not to me, astronomers, always of stars and of motion!
 Worlds had never been made simply for Science to count.
 Grand is heaven's host doubtless. In space there's nothing sublimer ;
 But, good friends, the sublime was not embodied in space."

The sublime lies in the act of the mind, reaching out beyond all space and time, grasping at the infinite and eternal, expressing, through the fleeting finite, that which is stable and immeasurable. The value of the external world, as interpreted by physical science, lies in the light it pours in both directions upon the Infinite Mind, which created it, and upon the infinite mind, which studies it. This finite mind of man is itself the grandest thing which it can lay hold of, and make any approach toward under-

standing. It is grandest in itself, in its actual manifestation of intellect and heart and will. It is immeasurably the grandest when you perceive that in this power of thought, of affection, and of volition, is the evidence of our sonship to God. In the human mind, as the grandest product of the great First Cause, we find the surest key to the nature of that Cause. No eternal flow of mechanical forces, however great the variety of physical effects which it might produce, can be imagined as having produced this human mind, asserting itself to be more than a flow of mechanical force. No result of mechanical force can be imagined to include the evolution of a new consciousness, conscious perception, emotion, volition. The ultimate cause of this evolution must itself be a conscious Being, of infinite knowledge, holiest affections, and almighty will. We acknowledge that we can form no imagination of an infinite degree of these attributes. But reason is higher than imagination, and may demonstrate the existence of that which the imagination cannot paint. Reason shows that perception may exist in a degree which sees all the past and all the future as present. Reason shows that love may exist in an infinite, all-wise benevolence. Reason shows that a will may exist at whose single fiat the whole universe could spring out of eternal potentiality into eternal actuality. Reason goes even further than this. From the necessity of a cause adequate to produce all the effects of human intelligence, human affection, and human enterprise, she declares that such an Infinite Personality does exist, that it is His word which produced and sustains creation.

The creation is sustained by the word of God, and in one sense is His word. It is a revelation of His being, of His thoughts, and of His purposes. The duty of a created being, says Jouffroy, is defined by the design of his Creator; and the design of his creation may be discovered from a study of his organization. Of course, Jouffroy here uses organization in its largest sense. The normal plan of animal life may be discovered from the bodily organization. Agassiz, in lecturing to farmers, showed them how, from the mere skeleton of the horse and the ox, we might infer that the latter could bear confinement in a stable with less injury than the former. The very bones of ~~their~~ frame showed

unmistakably that the horse would need an abundance of daily exercise, the ox would need but little. The body of man shows, to a thorough student, the proper rules for preserving bodily health and strength. The time required for its growth to maturity indicates the normal limit of life. With equal certainty, the mind and soul of man will show, to the careful and thorough student, the best means of educating and developing its powers. This is a more important and more difficult study than the study of the body; and its progress is on that very account, much slower. Man learns more slowly than animals. They all come readily up towards the mark which is set by the best specimens of their species. In other words, the differences in the habits of animals of one species are trifling compared with the differences among men of the same race.

The capacities of a species are to be judged by the attainments of the best specimens,—the best individual specimens. The highest attainments of the best men indicate the grade to which mankind is to be elevated. The power of self-determination in man, his moral insight, his capacity for religious ideas, and his capabilities of religious emotion are very highly developed in men of the highest character. But, even in men of the lowest grade, these high powers are unmistakably present; and it is these which set man so incomparably above all the animals. They are parts in his moral or spiritual organization. They indicate the end for which he was destined. They mark out his duty. Their possession is equivalent to having sealed orders from God,—a direct command from Him to walk by their light. As these powers are unfolded in us, we feel ourselves under obligation to govern ourselves by the highest moral law, to consecrate ourselves in a religious obedience. But, when we attempt to obey this virtual command, we find immense difficulties in the way. We see constantly that a better life is possible. We labor year after year with ourselves, not trying to do what more gifted neighbors may have done, but trying to live as well and to rise as high as we think that we can and ought. Yet the progress is slow; and, in many of the best men, it goes on to the very end of a long life. When we have learned how to live, and are just beginning to live as we feel that we ought to live,

we are interrupted by death. Is that the end? Darwin (vol. i. p. 282) calls it an intolerable thought to suppose that man is doomed to annihilation.

This is the third great revelation in creation: God, Duty, Immortality. A majority of the great philosophers of the world have believed that man is immortal. They have held that, at death, man passes into a state of being where he retains consciousness, memory, and all spiritual faculties. Yet they admit that, in this new state of being, we cannot have such a body as that which we now have. To this faith in immortality, Jesus gave such new emphasis that in the Christian Church it became a doctrine new in its life-inspiring power. He does not, however, appeal to it as to a postulate. He rather develops it as a corollary. He virtually says to the Sadducees: You admit that God exerted a special providential care over Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and that He revealed Himself to Moses. Do you not see that this intercourse of the Infinite God with men proves man to be immortal? Does it not show man to have been made in the image of God, capable of intercourse with his Maker, and therefore partaking in his Maker's eternity?

This virtual reasoning of Christ with the Sadducees is, in fact, the strongest of the natural evidences for the immortality of the soul. When a man has once clearly seen and admitted that the universe is a revelation of its Maker's wisdom, love, and holiness, he very seldom fails to see that this proof of the attributes of God shows that man was made in the image of his Maker. He very seldom fails to be at once lifted by this thought into a faith in his own immortal nature. It is sometimes modestly objected that this is making God in the image of man, and degrading the Infinite Cause of all to a likeness of our earthly frailty. The objection is not of real weight to one who overcomes the false modesty out of which it arises. We are under an invincible necessity of assuming a cause for the universe. We are under an equal necessity of assuming that our best type of that cause is to be found either in conscious or in unconscious being. But it is manifest that consciousness is higher than unconsciousness, and therefore a better type of the Highest. Moreover, we also clearly see that the only real,

finite cause known to us is conscious will. This, therefore, is the only just type of the Infinite First Cause. The very process, therefore, by which the idea of an Infinite God is brought out in our minds, and contrasted with the things that He has made, leads us to see that we ourselves, in our spiritual powers of mind and heart and will, are the nearest likeness which we can have of Him who is not in the likeness of anything conceivable by us. (Vol. i. pp. 282, 283.)

Philosophers have also found, in various spiritual considerations, further confirmations of this faith that man is made in the image of God's eternity. The indivisible unity of the self-conscious spirit has been used as an argument for its indestructibility. The power of the mind to see and lay hold of ideas of the Eternal, the Infinite and Unchangeable, is an evidence of its own independence of change and motion. The moral instincts also, our ineradicable faith in God's truth and justice, demand an immortal life, wherein the inequalities of this life shall be rectified, and the righteous and the wicked dealt with more exactly, according to their deserts. This necessity of a future state for reward and punishment has been strongly felt by all nations who have shown in any marked degree a sense of moral right or any faith in the existence of a moral government of the universe. Another argument is drawn from the ever-expansive power of the soul of man. There is no limit to knowledge discernible in any department. The works of God are inexhaustible, the curiosity of man insatiable. We want an eternity in which to pursue science. The heart also expands as widely as the horizon of the mind. Art is as progressive as the arts. Social affections, social pleasures, are capable of rising continually to higher planes and taking in continually wider circles. The language of strong feeling always inclines to expressions which are called hyperbole. They surpass the present occasion. But no expression can exceed the nature of the soul that utters it. The heart has illimitable capacities for happiness, and its longings reach after an infinite love. Can these longings of the feeble human heart be greater than the riches of this whole universe? Can a feeble creature, like man, lay out in his thought and imagination a future grander, greater, more blessed, than

the totality of all existence in which he is but a part? In other words, can a small part contain immeasurably more than the immeasurable whole? Surely not. That which is really desirable for man, and which is revealed to man as desirable, is also possible, and shall one day be actual, even though it take an eternity to accomplish it.

But, in our comparative ignorance, we do not always know what is desirable. Neither is it always safe for us to pronounce upon what is possible. All philosophers of note, even those most confident of the glorious reality of spiritual things, and most firmly believing in God and duty and immortality, have nevertheless confessed the weakness and fallibility of human reason. Like Cicero, in his *Tusculan Questions*, they have acknowledged that they were simply arriving at the most probable conclusions, not at demonstrations. But, it may be asked, How is it consistent with faith in the wisdom and love of God to say that He allows these truths—the knowledge of which is so essential for our highest happiness—to be so obscurely revealed? Why did He not make them as plain as the plainest axioms of geometry?

In reply to this doubting inquiry, let us first recollect that we do not know anything of the limits of possibility. There are men who find it exceedingly difficult to grasp even the simplest truths of mathematics with any firmness of conviction. There are also men who lay hold of spiritual truths with a firmness that cannot be shaken. The cause of such differences in human minds, the possible limits of such differences, the possible elimination of them, and the advantage of their existence or of their elimination, are all alike unknown to us. In the presence of facts, we are simply to bow before the sovereignty of God, pleased and happy when we can understand the borders of His works, or reverently silent and studious when we reach the confines of our present knowledge.

We do not know why spiritual truths are not made more obviously certain to all men. But we see that, in this difficulty and obscurity of moral questions, man may find a clear test of his own moral wisdom and purity.

There can be no high happiness without a sanctified will;

nor can such a will be revealed unless there is an opportunity of choosing between right and wrong. There is no opportunity for choosing between right and wrong, unless there be times and opportunities when, at the parting of the ways, it may seem to admit of doubt which is the right way. There was a time when the Christian pulpit pressed most earnestly upon its hearers the doctrine that this life is a scene of probation, wherein men are tried whether they will choose evil or good. The teaching was full of error, and capable of gross misrepresentation ; yet there is also a true sense in which life is a scene of probation. God does not tempt us to evil, but He gives us opportunity to choose good, which of necessity implies the possibility of our choosing evil. He gives the opportunity to choose good ; and in the free choice of good lies the highest good for man, and the road to his highest happiness. Thus, also, with the perception of truth and of the greatest of all truths, our highest happiness comes from our free action. We rejoice in the truth, but especially in that truth which we have sought and found for ourselves. The moment of discovery is the moment of rapture. May not this be one reason why the God of infinite love is, nevertheless, a God that hideth himself? Spiritual truth, like mathematical and physical truth, is more highly prized and of more real value, when we discover it for ourselves.

In the Scriptures of the Jewish and the Christian faith, it is constantly implied, and sometimes distinctly asserted, that man is made in the image of God. When the reason by intuition sees this clearly, and the understanding has confirmed it by induction, and the will distinctly accepted it as a guiding and controlling law, then the heart finds in it a source of illimitable peace, immortal strength and unspeakable joy.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

DR. MCCOSH ON SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.—The Southern Presbyterian Church have established a review entitled *The Presbyterian Quarterly*, under the management of the Rev. George Summey, and the editorship of the Rev. Drs. Strickler and Barnett. It has taken a high stand from the beginning. The New York agency is with A. D. F. Randolph & Co. (\$3.00 a year.) The July number has an article from Dr. McCosh, giving a review of Dr. Dabney's enlarged edition of his philosophical work on "The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century," a book we heartily commend to all who take an interest in philosophical studies.

Dr. McCosh closes his article with a review of the philosophical systems spreading out their attractions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. We quote the paragraphs entire because we do not know where we could find for our readers a more succinct and trustworthy account of the modern schools of philosophy than that which is given by Princeton's venerable ex-President, who has in many ways laid the world of thinkers under great obligation. We do this also that we may heartily endorse what he says in regard to an American philosophy. We venture also to express the hope that our Institute of Philosophy will contribute something toward the consummation he so desires.

The following is Dr. McCosh's review:

"*The Modern English School*. We so call it for want of a more specific name. It sprang originally from Hume, and has come down to us through James Mill, John Mill, Lewes and Bain, and is now represented by Herbert Spencer and his followers, such as Fisk and Grant Allen, and, to some extent, by Sully. It is quite as defective as the sensational school, to which it adds the subtleties of agnosticism. It derives all our ideas from sensation, but goes farther, and doubts whether our senses give us any reality. It is the agnosticism of the day,

and is ably defended by Huxley and Spencer. Let us notice some of its glaring omissions.

“Even in sense perceptions it omits, it entirely leaves out, the existence of body as a substance, making it a mere sensation or impression. With Mr. John Mill it is the ‘mere possibility of sensations.’ Our inner sense, or self-consciousness, is not supposed to give us any knowledge of self, or of anything beyond feelings; with Mr. Mill it is merely a series of ‘feelings aware of themselves,’ and cannot recognize or sanction personal identity. Memory is represented as a mere reproduction of our sensations or feelings, whereas it is the recognition of an object as having been before us in time past, thus giving us the idea of time. The idea of infinity has, and can have, no place in the system. The number of relations which the mind can discover is very scanty: with some, such as Professor Bain, it is merely that of resemblance and difference, and the deeper relations, such as those of substance and quality, of identity, of cause and effect, are left out. Causation is merely invariable antecedence and consequence. Emotions, such as those of hope and fear, of approval and remorse, are mere sensory feelings, whereas they have all an underlying appetite and an idea of an object as appetible or unappetible. Moral good in the last resort is happiness, or rather mere pleasure. Free will is impossible, as all things are governed by physical necessity. There can be no proof that a soul so meanly endowed is entitled to immortality; it is not worth preserving, any more than the soul of the brute is. The argument for the existence of God utterly fails on a system which does not allow us from the traces of design in nature to argue a designer. Any God started as an hypothesis must, as Herbert Spencer maintains, be unknown and unknowable. This agnostic philosophy of the close of the nineteenth century is no better than the sensualistic philosophy of the previous ages.

“*The German School, beginning with Kant and culminating in Hegel*, or branching off with Lotze. There are passages in Dr. Dabney’s work which sound as if he might adopt the method and the leading principles of this philosophy. He calls in ‘*a priori* ideas and judgments,’ and claims to be a rationalist in philos-

ophy. But this school, logically followed out as it has lately been, issues in as fatal consequences as even sensationalism. It makes the mind perceive not things, but merely phenomena, in the sense of appearances, from which appearances we can never logically infer the existence of things without having more in the conclusion than in the premises. It supposes that in all its cognitive acts the mind adds form to things; it makes the mind create space and time, to which it gives a mere subjective existence. It does the same with substance and quality, with cause and effect. But if the mind can create these and superinduce them upon things, why may it not create, as with Fichte, the things themselves, till all existence is made ideal? We are thus kept from real things in a region of imaginary forms, and in the end are landed logically in nihilism. It is a notable circumstance that Herbert Spencer and all agnostics, when pushed hard, fall back on Kant.

"The School of Physiological Psychology. This department has been cultivated earnestly by a few men in Germany and in France for the last age or two. Lately it has been imported into the United States, where we have the able and elaborate work of Professor Ladd, of Yale. We have other diligent cultivators of the subject, such as Stanley Hall, Cattell, and Yastrow. The tendency of the school is to become narrow and exclusive. It claims to be the whole of psychology, whereas it is only a part, or rather, to use a biological phrase, only the environment of the mind. Physiological psychology has discovered a number of curious facts and a few important facts. But the peculiar, the great benefit derived from mental science as taught in America has been that it has brought young men into constant connection with mental, moral, and spiritual ideas so fitted to elevate the mind. A physiological psychology, cultivated exclusively, may lead practically to materialism quite as certainly as the sensualism exposed by Dr. Dabney. Those who look to it as furnishing a knowledge of the proper acts of the mind, or as being a philosophy, will find that they have got the husk but not the nut.

"The Scottish School; what are we to make of it? From 1763-'64, when Reid published his 'Inquiry,' down to the middle

of this century, the school had influence, not only in Scotland, but in the Irish province of Ulster, throughout America, and even in England and in France. It is now somewhat in the background. In Scotland, besides others, it has two able representatives in Prof. Calderwood and Prof. Flint, both attached to the Scottish school, but pursuing an independent course; and it is hoped that Prof. Seth, lately appointed to St. Andrew's, will advance towards it rather than Hegelianism. On the other hand, it is counteracted by two brilliant men, the brothers Caird, of Glasgow, who have created some interest in Hegelianism, and will stand by it till it dies a natural death. In other countries the Scottish philosophy has at present very little power, and is not likely to have a revival. One reason for this is that it is not pretentious. It has not raised huge systems like those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Lotze, who for the last age or two have so awed and prostrated the minds of young men. The school does not claim to have discovered all truth and settled all difficulties. In the view of ambitious youth it has the Scottish weakness of *canniness*.

"On several very important points it is very defective. I do not wish it to be understood that I am ashamed of my country or my country's philosophy; but I have been declaring all along, in the old country and in this, that the Scottish school has errors which ought to be abandoned. It does not declare clearly, unambiguously and firmly, that we know things. Reid and Stewart say that we know qualities and not things, whereas the true account is, that we know things with their qualities. Hamilton resolutely argues that man's knowledge is relative and not positive; not of things, but of the relation of things themselves unknown. This doctrine has not, so far as I know, been disavowed by Hamilton's pupils, Prof. Fraser, of Edinburg, nor Prof. Veitch, of Glasgow. It has in fact given a starting-point to Herbert Spencer's nescience, and all the consequences he has drawn from it. I have been calling on the followers of Hamilton to show that the conclusions of Spencer do not follow logically from the principles laid down by their master. Hitherto they have failed to do this.

"An American student in brooding over these systems may

find a difficulty in accepting any one of them, and he may unfortunately be allured into agnosticism, or be led to abandon the study. How are we to meet this tendency? Some will answer: Take what is good from all systems and reject the evil. But this only starts the question: On what principle are we to make the selection, that is, on what system are we to proceed? An eclectic system may be a heterogeneous and an utterly inconsistent mass, which will not cohere any more than the gold, silver, brass, iron and clay in the image seen by Nebuchadnezzar, 'which was broken in pieces together and became like the chaff of the summer threshing floor.' There is only one course for American students in these circumstances: Let them look into their own mind by self-consciousness, which will act as a magnet to draw out the metals and leave the clay. As they do this they will find out the truth, each for himself, and we shall have an American philosophy, which this country has not yet had. This I have long desired to see. I wish I could raise a cry sufficiently clear and ringing to be heard and bring such a philosophy to us. Let it hasten to fill up the vacuum at present existing.

"In accordance with the American character this philosophy will take the form of realism. It will be opposed to sensationalism on the one hand and to idealism on the other; to sensationalism which draws all our ideas from the senses, and idealism which seeks to add to nature out of the riches of the mind and to mend things which it only mars. I am not speaking against idealism, which has its place, but should be kept in its place. We do not allow idealism to come into science, to improve the laws of nature, to make gravitation and chemical affinity more attractive. Just as little should we allow it a place in philosophy.

"Americans are a composite people, drawn from all nations of the Old World, but brought into a unity by their republican constitution and laws. So it will be with the American philosophy. It will be ready to take in truth from Greek and Roman, from Britain and Germany, but it will subordinate all to its observational method. It will proceed with the Scottish philosophy in the inductive method, but in pursuing this method, with con-

sciousness, as the agent of observation, it will discover the *a priori* truths of Kant, prior to experience, above experience, and having their authority in themselves.

“This is the realism which, in a crude state, is the first philosophy, and, as purified by careful inspection, is to be the final philosophy. It begins with self and with body as affecting self, both being realities. It does not attempt to prove these by mediate probation. If it did not assume them it could never prove them. It assumes them and justifies itself in assuming them. Assuming them as real, it regards as equally real all the careful inductions and logical deductions from them, and thus lives in a world of realities. It is not the vulgar realism which looks merely at the surface of things. It draws distinctions which separate between our original and acquired perceptions, between the real and the additions which man may have super-induced. It becomes a discerning and enlightened realism, which looks on things as God has made them.”

AN UNBELIEVABLE UNBELIEF.—Mr. Darwin’s “Life and Letters” affords a very interesting and instructive illustration of certain spiritual dangers involved in the doctrine of evolution, as he held it. The antagonism of the religious world to that doctrine is not wholly due to the antagonism between the evolutionists’ theory of the origin of man and that afforded by the traditional interpretation of Scripture. It is partly due also to a conviction, more or less clearly defined, that evolution involves a degradation of man; that it reduces him from a divine to a purely animal order; that it denies to him prerogatives with which both religion and philosophy have heretofore invested him. This conviction will receive some confirmation from the successive steps in Mr. Darwin’s experience as traced in his own words in his “Life and Letters.” We group together certain expressions from his writings which will serve to make clear our meaning:

“Another sort of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the reason and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty, or rather impossibility, of conceiving this immense

and wonderful universe, including man, with his wonderful capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause, having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the 'Origin of Species;' and it is since that time that it has very gradually, and with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?"

"You have expressed my inward conviction, though far more vividly and clearly than I could have done, that the universe is not the result of chance. But then with me the horrid doubt always arises, whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value, or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"

"The Duke of Argyll has recorded a few words on this subject, spoken by my father in the last year of his life. . . . 'In the course of that conversation I said to Mr. Darwin, with reference to some of his own remarkable works on the "Fertilization of Orchids" and upon "The Earthworm," and various other observations he made of the wonderful contrivances for certain purposes in nature—I said it was impossible to look at these without seeing that they were the effect and the expression of a mind. I shall never forget Mr. Darwin's answer. He looked at me very hard and said: "Well, that often comes over me with overwhelming force; but at other times," and he shook his head vaguely, adding, "it seems to go away."'"

The thoughtful student will not, indeed, impute Mr. Darwin's skepticism wholly to Mr. Darwin's evolutionary philosophy. He will remember that like "horrid doubts" have sometimes knocked for admission at his own mind, and been barred out. He will remember that Mr. Darwin was singularly hospitable, not only to every hypothesis, but also to every question, a char-

acteristic which made him so valuable an observer, and that he was as candid to express as he was hospitable to receive all thoughts. He will reflect that Mr. Darwin's philosophy of evolution is not the only evolutionary philosophy; that it is quite possible to believe that the physical man was developed from a lower physical order, while the intellectual and spiritual man was a new and divine creation; or that the intellectual and spiritual man was developed from a lower intellectual order, and none the less his present powers are to be measured by his present achievements, not by his buried ancestry. He will not forget that Mr. Darwin was strong in his observing rather than in his logical faculties, and he will perceive that it is as illogical to conclude that man's mind cannot deal with the invisible and the eternal because it was evolved from the mind of a monkey, as it would be to conclude that man's hand cannot construct a cathedral or carve a statue because the monkey's hand possesses no such skill.

Nevertheless, there is a significance in the connection which Mr. Darwin traces between his "horrid doubts" and his philosophy. It is a doubt, the reader will observe, not merely of the Bible, of miracles, of providence, of prayer, or even of God; it is a doubt of man. It militates as much against man's power of self-government as against his power of theological conception; against his capacity for philosophy as against his capacity for a religious life. Tracing man's origin back to the brute, it imputes to him the attributes and loads him with the limitations and infirmities of a brute's nature. We may be very willing to concede that the first chapters of Genesis are poetry, not history; that man's birth is lost in the mists of antiquity; that the science of embryology gives us a hint of the science of anthropology; that the entire species has passed, as each individual passes, through periods of successive development from the lowest to the highest organism; even that there has been no race fall except a "fall upward." But we can never concede that man has to-day no capacity except that of a developed monkey; that he cannot trust his own mental operations; that he must look with perpetual suspicion on his own convictions; that he cannot trust his own consciousness or the consciousness of his fellows. Such

a doubt is indeed a "horrid doubt"; such a doctrine the doctrine of despair. It forbids all progress. It is as truly a bar to mental as to moral development; to moral as to religious development. And it is itself forbidden by the present condition of human thought and the present products of human achievement both in natural science and abstract philosophy. Man's right to trust his powers of abstract reason is attested by astronomy, which is based on mathematics, and by political development, which is based on intuitions. The trustworthiness of both have been amply verified by experience. All mental and moral progress depends upon a living trust in the mental and moral power of man. We must have a certain amount of faith in ourselves or all intellectual and moral activity would cease. The agnosticism which doubts man's right to trust his own consciousness and his own convictions would cast the evil spell of a universal sleep upon mankind, like that cast on the inmates of the palace by the malignant witch in the fairy tale of our childhood. To such an issue the nineteenth century will never consent. Human development has gone too far, human consciousness has become too clear and human convictions too strong, to be paralyzed after this fashion by any theory of human origin and the past processes of human growth. Out of whatever imperfect intellectual conditions we may have issued, we cannot by any such skepticism be thrust back in to them again. It is, however, significant that Mr. Darwin's agnosticism concerning both God and the eternal life is based wholly on his agnosticism concerning man's right to trust his own higher reason, and disappears before any real faith in his own convictions. In other words, Mr. Darwin in effect tells us that if he could trust in his own convictions he should believe in God. In short, civilization depends upon man's faith in himself, and faith in himself necessarily carries with it faith in God and immortality.—*Christian Union*.

THE POET KEATS AND HIS LOST TREASURE.—Nothing could be more pathetic or more full of solemn warning than the account of the last days of the poet, Keats, which has just reached the public eye in a letter written from Rome to Archbishop Trench by a friend. This friend having learned from

Severn, the artist, who was intimate with Keats, all about the close of the latter's life, writes as follows :

“ The sufferings of Keats were terrible and prolonged. Shelley and Hunt deprived him of his belief in Christianity, which he wanted in the end, and he endeavored to fight back to it, saying if Severn would get him a Jeremy Taylor he thought he could believe ; but it was not to be found in Rome. Another time [which is to me peculiarly painful, though it shows at the same time how little way he had proceeded in a particular line of thought], having been betrayed into considerable impatience by bodily and mental anguish, he cried, on recovering himself, ‘ By God, Severn, a man ought to have some superstition, that he may die decently.’ ”

Here was a moral tragedy indeed, in which Shelley and Hunt were the malignant actors, and poor Keats the pitiable victim. It is simply amazing how delicate and tender and kindhearted some persons can be to their friends when afflicted with bodily wants unmet, and bodily ailments which are full of distress and likely to end fatally ; and yet how inconsiderate, how remorseless these same persons can be in treatment of the souls of their friends. Shelley and Hunt no doubt would have done anything and everything to mitigate the physical pain and sooth the physical agony of Keats ; they would have shared their last loaf with him, and probably have nobly risked their own lives to rescue him from sudden and imminent peril ; but with refined cruelty and moral recklessness they did not hesitate to argue and banter him out of that belief in the living God and the world's Redeemer, which they knew perfectly well was to its possessor the chief consolation and unfading joy of the soul. To make Keats an infidel, and even an atheist, destitute of all faith in a Creator and of all hope in a Saviour was their deliberate and persistent object—and they succeeded.

But what was the nature of their success ? Did infidelity and atheism make Keats any happier ? Were his views of life, and the universe, and humanity thereby enlarged and uplifted ? Was he thus prepared for ministries to the lowly ? for stern and grand self-denials ? for contemplating death with composure ? for yearning after something beyond the grave better than any-

thing ever beheld in this world? for a triumphant entrance upon immortality through the gateway of purity and forgiven sin?

It must be frankly admitted that their work created havoc with the most precious instincts and longings of one's spiritual nature. It robbed a soul of its trust in the Divine Father and sent him an exile and orphan both from this world and the next. With what unspeakable sadness Keats wanted a restoration of his faith in Christianity in the end, and how pitiful his endeavors and struggles to fight his way back to it. What could be more touching and at the same time more harrowing in its call upon our sympathies than his desire to get a copy of Jeremy Taylor's works, in the deeply anxious hope that the energetic faith of the old divine might become contagious, that in the presence of such a heavenly spirit and beatitude the lost treasure in Christ might be refound and become his own priceless possession once more. And how timely too does he voice the inmost feelings and yearnings of all thoughtful souls in the expression that a faith in something even though it be a superstition is needful in order to "enable a man to die decently." When a mortal approaches the unseen Holy, and confronts the mysteries of a new life he does not want to take a leap in the dark, nor imagine either that death ends all, or that if there be a future world chance has anything to do with it. The soul cries out in its extremity, just as did Keats, and as did the Psalmist, for God, for the living God. Yea, as the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so thirsts the soul after God.

The moral is twofold. Let every man beware how he surrenders his religious truths. He can not afford to tamper with them even. The writer once heard a skeptic say with tears in his eyes: "I am an unbeliever, but God forbid that my children should be unbelievers. May they never experience the bitterness of unrest and harassing doubts that I, alas, know too well and painfully!" We are aware that indications are not wanting that Shelley was fast outgrowing his unbelief when that storm on Spezia Bay stopped his song and ushered him into the presence of his Maker. He indicates this with his well known prophecy:

"Now blazoned as on Heaven's immortal noon
The Cross leads generations on."

But be this as it may, the work had been done for Keats and could not be undone. Doubt if you may, disbelieve if you will, but halt and think before you endeavor to persuade others to join you in a game of playing fast and loose with the issue of eternity, remembering that a lifetime nor eternity itself may suffice to atone for one thoughtless action done.—*Christian at Work.*

SCIENCE TESTIFIES FOR THE BIBLE.—It is gratifying to notice the gradual convergence of theological and scientific opinions at points where biblical and scientific testimonies are both supposed to have a bearing. It is evident that the divergences between the representatives of theology and those of science are materially diminishing; and we may look forward to the time when science will become more religious through the spiritual interpretation of nature as illustrated in the Book of books, while religion will be more robust and intellectual from ceasing to be alarmed at the free exercise of all our powers of investigation. I wish to direct attention to two points in this convergence of opinion—the doctrine of a great deluge since the advent of man on the earth; and the doctrine of the low antiquity of that advent.

Biblical interpretation, as voiced by J. Usher, formerly placed the origination of the world at 4,004 years B.C., which would be 5,892 years ago. It fixed the Deluge of Noah at 1,656 years after Creation, which would be 4,236 years ago. It made the Deluge universal, and conceived the total destruction of the human species, and all other terrestrial beings. Geology likewise taught something touching the antiquity of the world, and also the occurrence of a great deluge. But it made the organization of the world gradual, instead of the work of six days; and carried it back through millions of years instead of about six thousand years. Its last deluge was generally held to have taken place some hundreds of thousand years ago; and, as human remains were associated with the deposits of the geologic flood, man's antiquity was carried back into periods vaster than any countenanced by the interpreters of the Bible. Here were divergences of views which have brought distress to many sin-

cere believers in the popular interpretation of the Bible, and many honest seekers after a true interpretation of Nature, forgetting, sometimes, that both were merely interpretations, and that by fallible intelligence both classes have been led to the conviction that between the Bible in its true meaning, and Nature, whose meaning science tries to express, there was a real and irreconcilable conflict. But the truth was in each; the same truth was in each. See how the interpretations have converged.

First, as to the reality of a great deluge. Biblical interpretation made the Noachian Deluge so recent, and geological interpretation made the deluge of the Champlain Epoch so remote, that it was a daring effort to identify the two. Their coincidence would result either from lengthening biblical chronology, or shortening geological. In respect to the biblical date of the Deluge opinion has not very generally changed; though some interpreters suppose that the personal names employed in patriarchal history are at least in part, the designations of families or colonies, and that some others were left without mention, so that the continuity of the lapse of time is not expressed in our sacred documents. But I judge that the approximation of the biblical and geological deluges is better effected by the abbreviation of geological time. Several considerations converge toward this end.

The first impression of geological eons is so bewildering that one is apt to abandon all attempt at limitations, and speak of them as hundreds of thousands or millions of years, without much discrimination. But not all geologic periods transcend the grasp of human intelligence; and Sir William Thomson has shown that the aggregate of geological periods is much more moderate than the fancies of some have made it. Many indications exist that the epoch of continental glaciation and the epoch of the great Champlain flood, which resulted from the rapid melting of the glaciers, were near enough to our own times to permit us to trace their connection with the current of events passing before our eyes. At the rate of progress of actual events, the great glaciers which once covered the land cannot have receded so far from the present that their retreating forms

are beyond the reach of human vision. The very glaciers of to-day are those retreating forms. We had not at first recognized them as the real remnants of the vast ice-fields which once covered Europe and North America ; but scarcely a doubt now exists that such they are. A long catalogue of facts might be cited as evidence of their recent recession. Limits of space compel the writer to refer for particular information to his work on "Preadamites."

Other considerations possess, perhaps, greatest weight. We have less than a hundred millions of years to divide among the geologic periods passed since the incrustation of the earth began. How to apportion the allotted aggregate of time we cannot certainly tell ; but if we divide it according to the thicknesses of the various formations, we shall find approximately how much must be allotted to the post-glacial period. The writer has presented in his "*World Life*" the details of such calculation. The result shows that probably but a few thousand years have elapsed since the termination of the "reign of ice" and the production of the great Champlain flood.

A third group of evidences of the geologically recent occurrence of that flood is found in the rate of erosion of river gorges. The Niagara gorge has been much studied. Estimates of the time required for its excavation have ranged from twelve thousand years to a million and a quarter. It is only recently that the rate of recession of the falls has been fixed by instrumental observation. Between 1842 and 1885, the "horseshoe" fall receded at a mean rate of three feet a year. This gives 12,320 years as the time required for the excavation of the entire seven miles of gorge, and 5,280 years for the three miles below the whirlpool. These three miles may represent all the work done since the dissolution of the continental glacier ; but we may allow a part of the gorge above the whirlpool to have been also eroded in post-glacial time, and still not need, at the determined rate of erosion, more than six or eight thousand years for all the work done since the Champlain flood began. We may add here the suggestion that during the prevalence of high water the erosion must have been more rapid than during the modern stage of the lakes.

A fourth group of considerations is afforded by the entombment of hair-covered elephants and rhinoceroses in Siberian ice masses bordering the Arctic Ocean. These, it may be said, are complete carcasses, with the flesh still in such a state of preservation as to serve for food for dogs, bears and wolves. I have elsewhere argued that circumstances prove that the entombment was sudden, and the covering continuous from the cold epoch of burial to the warmer epoch of their slow disengagement from the ice. I have argued that the burial probably corresponds with the advent of the secular snows which consolidated into continental glaciers; and the ice which incloses these remains is but the remnants of the ancient glacier, which, from their arctic situation have not yet been reached by the process of complete dissolution. Thus, on scientific grounds, not to make any reference to Aryan traditions, the great geologic flood comes down into times covered by the scope of biblical history; and nothing is more natural than the identification of the two deluges, and the employment of the scientific evidence of the one for the certification of the historic authenticity of the other.

Next, as to the antiquity of man. I will touch here only its connection with the date of the Deluge. Remains of man have been found in Europe in deposits believed to be made by the action of the continental glacier; also in caverns which may have sheltered man during the partial prevalence of the glacier, or even before its advent. But no certain evidence of preglacial man is known in Europe. As man was thus associated with the reign of ice, his antiquity was extended to hundreds of thousands of years, because it was fancied such numbers expressed the true remoteness of the glacial event. But if we modernize the event man's first occupation of Europe approaches recent times. In California remains of man have been found beneath beds of lava hitherto supposed to date from preglacial periods. But the supposition remains confessedly doubtful. Meantime it is observed that the Pacific States and territories have never been generally glaciated. It must be concluded, therefore, that the vast weight of ice which once rested over the eastern part of the continent, produced there an indentation of the terrestrial crust, while in non-glaciated regions like California, a compensating

protuberance must have come into existence. Wherever instead of protuberance the crust suffered fracture, the freer moving fluid within would escape and cover the region with a sheet of lava. Thus I connect many of the later lava sheets of the Pacific coast with pressure of a great glacier east of the Mississippi, and synchronize the two phenomena. In this view the human remains beneath the sheet of Calaveras county would date from the epoch of eastern glaciation; and American man would be coeval with European man instead of older. Finally, no evidence would exist of man's preglacial advent in Europe or America; and what I said above allows us to bring this event down into times covered by our biblical history.—*Prof. Winchell, in Christian at Work.*

HALF a century ago Dr. Whewell discussed under the name of the nebular hypothesis that theory of rotation which had been indicated by Herschel, and more largely taught by La Place, as the probable method through which the solar system has taken its form. Carefully abstaining at that early date from a formal judgment on the hypothesis, he appears to discuss it with favor, and he shows that this hypothesis, which assumes "a beginning of the present state of things," is in no way adverse to the Mosaic cosmogony. The theory has received marked support from opposite quarters. In the "Vestiges of Creation" it is frankly adopted; the very curious experiment of Prof. Plateau is detailed at length on its behalf, and the author considers, with La Place, that the zodiacal light on which Humboldt in his "Kosmos" has dwelt at large may be a remnant of the luminous atmosphere originally diffused around the sun. Dr. McCaul, in his very able argument on the Mosaic record, quotes Humboldt, Pfaff and Madler, a famous German astronomer—as adhering to it. It appears on the whole to be in possession of the field; and McCaul observes that, "had it been devised for the express purpose of removing the supposed difficulties of the Mosaic record, it could hardly have been more to the purpose." Even if we conceive, with Dr. Reville, that the "creation," the first gift of separate existences to the planets, is declared to have been subsequent to that of the earth, there seems to be no known law

which excludes such a supposition, especially with respect to the larger and more distant of their number. These, it is to be noticed, are of great rarity as compared with the earth. Why should it be declared impossible that they should have taken a longer time in condensation, like in this point to the comets, which still continue in a state of excessive rarity? Want of space forbids me to enter into further explanation; but it requires much more serious efforts and objections than those of Dr. Reville to confute the statement that the extension of knowledge and inquiry has confirmed the Mosaic record.—*The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone in the Nineteenth Century.*

“EVOLUTION” AND “DEVELOPMENT.”—The Editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT has felt that it is quite necessary, for the sake of lucidity, to keep these two words to distinguish those two theories of cosmogony or world-origin which severally represent the one that mind is the product of matter and the other that matter is the product of mind. He has held that to the former should be confined the word “evolution” as the inventor of the word and his school intended; and that to the other should be confined the word “development.” Not that this would alter facts, but that it would classify thoughts and make discussion more practicable. He believes all that has been established by science, and is ready to believe everything that can be so established, and thinks that all that is included in the theory of development. Such wise, learned, and good men as Dr. Munger and Prof. Winchell do not agree with him in seeing necessity for the use of two words. They would include in the word “evolution” all that science teaches us of any development. We have sea-room enough in the Institute for us all. Sir William Dawson seems to favor our view. In a note written January 8, 1888, he speaks of “the fallacies which encompass the word ‘Evolution’ as used to include the distinct ideas of causation and development and to confound them in the popular mind. When men shall see clearly that under this misused word they are including in a most uncritical manner the ideas of causation both primary and secondary; and of development both direct and indirect, we may hope for some rational philosophical views as to

the origins of things and the changes they may undergo. Until this mental confusion shall be dispelled, we shall have little progress in the discussion of these great subjects."

It is gratuitous concession to our methodology when the facts of the world are supposed to arrange themselves according to our mode of apprehending them.—*Prof. Schurman.*

THE SUMMER SCHOOLS OF 1888.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE Institute held two summer schools this year; one at Round Lake, N. Y., from July 26 to August 1; the other at Key East, N. J., from August 7 to August 11.

THE ELEVENTH SUMMER SCHOOL.

The first session of the Eleventh Summer School was held Thursday, July 26, at 11 A.M., in the auditorium, the use of which was generously offered to the Institute during all its sessions, by the Round Lake Assembly, at the head of which are two honored members of our Institute, Rev. Dr. Griffin and Rev. Dr. Farrar.

The devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. William Griffin, D.D., of West Troy, N. Y. The President, Charles F. Deems, D.D., LL.D., addressed the school on the objects, principles and needs of the Institute.

The regular paper of the day was by Horace C. Hovey, D.D., of Bridgeport, Ct., on "The Vibratory Law of Progress." The lecture and its subject were discussed at 4 P.M., by Prof. George S. Fullerton, of the University of Pennsylvania, Prof. John J. Tigert, Vanderbilt University, Rev. Dr. Leech, of Albany, N. Y., Mr. Hempstreet, and Dr. Deems.

On Friday morning, July 27, Scripture was read and prayer offered by Rev. Dr. Leech, of Albany; after which Prof. Francis H. Smith, LL.D., of the University of Virginia, read a paper entitled, "The Scientific and Christian Ideals of Humanity." The discussion in the afternoon was conducted by Rev. Cyrus A. Johnson, Batavia, N. Y., President Kemp P. Battle, University of North Carolina, Prof. Tigert and Dr. Hovey.

The devotional exercises on Saturday morning, July 28, were led by Rev. A. B. Riggs, of Waterford, N. Y. The President appointed the following-named gentlemen a committee on nominations, to report Tuesday morning next: Pres. Henry A. Buttz, Rev. Dr. H. C. Hovey, Prof. J. J. Tigert, and Prof. F. H. Smith. The regular paper of the day was by Prof. George S. Fullerton, University of Pennsylvania, whose subject was, "Pagan and Christian Religious Sentiment." This was discussed at the afternoon meeting by Drs. Hovey and Deems, President Battle and Prof. Tigert.

Scripture was read and prayer offered, on Monday, July 30, by Rev. Dr. Horace C. Hovey, of Bridgeport, Ct. Kemp P. Battle, LL.D., President of the University of North Carolina, read a paper on "Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Mentioned in the New Testament." At the afternoon session the discussion was conducted by Pres. H. A. Buttz, and Professors Fullerton, Smith, Von Benschoten and Tigert.

The annual meeting of the Institute was held in the auditorium at Round Lake, N. Y., on Tuesday, July 31, 1888, at 11 A.M. After reading of Holy Scripture by the President, and singing by the choir, prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. Wm. Griffin.

THE TREASURER'S REPORT

was then presented and read by the Secretary, as follows :

Receipts :

Correspondence School, ...	\$ 1 00
Collections at Summer School, 1887, ...	36 68
Donations, ...	335 00
Membership Fees, ...	1,645 89
	\$2,018 57

Disbursements:

Clerical Service, ...	\$429 81
Correspondence School, ...	9 61
Monthly meetings, ...	79 95
Printing and advertising, ...	77 85
Postage and express, ...	67 82
Summer School, ...	404 40

Christian thought (for members), . . .	1,000 78
	\$2,070 22
Balance due Treasurer, ...	\$51 65

The report was indorsed as follows :

NEW YORK, July 23, 1888.

This is to certify that we have examined the books, accounts and vouchers of the Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, and find them correct and in accordance with attached report.

PHŒBUS W. LYON,
OWEN O. SCHIMMELL,
Auditing Committee.

THE SECRETARY'S REPORT

first called attention to the financial condition of the Institute.

The accounts are of three classes : (1) The *Endowment Fund*, of which Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt is Treasurer ; the *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT* account, of which Mr. Wm. Harman Brown is Treasurer ; and the *General Expenses*, of which the Secretary takes charge as Assistant Treasurer.

From Mr. Vanderbilt's report it appears that the Endowment Fund amounts to \$2,000. The Treasurer states that he has paid \$1,000 78 for furnishing *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT* to members of the Institute, and for circulation at home and abroad.

The expenses of the Summer School at Key East were \$404.40, which were paid by donations (amounting to \$335) and by membership fees. Monthly meetings cost \$79.95, clerical services \$429.81.

The officers receive no salaries. Office room, a place for our monthly meetings, fuel and lights have been freely contributed by the Trustees of the Church of the Strangers in New York.

There is a deficit of \$51.65, besides which there was a bill of \$204 due the publisher for the last issue of *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT* : although the treasury was already overdrawn, the bill was promptly paid by advances from the Treasurer, Mr. Wm. Harman Brown.

On the other hand the membership fees due up to June 30, 1888, amount to about \$700. How to collect this. and how

much of it will be collected are unsolved problems. Where no salaries are paid by an association, the collection of the fees must depend on the prompt attention of the members themselves. If the members of the Institute who are in arrears, realized how much anxiety and labor are caused by their forgetfulness or procrastination, there would be no deficit. It should be stated here in justice to the thoughtfulness of many others that they often anticipate their bills.

There are three *Classes of Members*, Endowment, Life and Annual. The first are those who contribute \$100 or more towards the endowment; their membership is for life. The Life members are those who contribute \$500 or more for the current expenses of the Institute. The Annual members are those now pay \$5 every year towards general expenses. There are who of

Endowment members,		11
Life	"	56
Annual	"	431
Total,		498
Of these there are in		
Canada,		4
England,		6
France,		2
Hindoostan,		2
Japan,		3

A *Summer School* was held at Key East, N. J., from August 16 to August 25, at which five papers were read. Eight *Monthly Meetings* were held in the rooms of the Institute, 4 Winthrop Place, N. Y.

The organ of the Institute, CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, has been sent to all the members, and, as far as the funds of the Institute would allow, to colleges, seminaries, universities and readers in this country and abroad. We constantly receive calls for the journal from quarters where it is greatly needed, and where it would do much good.

Obituary. The following members have departed this life since the Annual Meeting of last year: Patrick Hues Mell,

D.D., LL.D., Chancellor University of Georgia; Mrs. Harriet Dodge, New York; Daniel Curry, D.D., LL.D., Editor *Methodist Review*, New York; James Powell, D.D., Secretary of the American Missionary Association, Editor of the *American Missionary*. After the reading of the report, Dr. Deems spoke *in memoriam* of the character and work of Chancellor Mell and of Mrs. Dodge; Dr. Hovey, of Dr. Powell; and Dr. Buttz, of Dr. Curry.

Dr. Deems then delivered the Annual Address, as President of the Institute. He was followed by remarks from Drs. Griffin and Hovey.

The report of the Committee on nominations was then presented by President Buttz, its Chairman. Their report was accepted, and the gentlemen nominated by them as officers for the ensuing year were unanimously elected. They are as follows:

President, CHARLES F. DEEMS, D.D., LL.D.

Vice-Presidents.

Ala., GEORGE M. EVERHART, D.D.	Miss., RT. REV. HUGH MILLER THOMPSON, LL.D.
Cal., REV. F. M. DIMMICK.	Mo., REV. BISHOP EUGENE R. HENDRIX, D.D.
Conn., NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D.	N. B. (Can.), JAMES R. INCH, LL.D.
D. C., REV. BISHOP J. F. HURST, LL.D.	N. C., HON. KEMP P. BATTLE, LL.D.
Del., HON. THOMAS F. BAYARD, Sec. of State, U.S.	N. H., JAMES M. WILLIAMS, A.M., Ph.D.
Fla., E. WARREN CLARK, D.D.	N. J., FRANCIS L. PATTON, D.D., LL.D.
Ga., ISAAC S. HOPKINS, D.D., Ph.D.	N. S. (Can.), REV. WILLIAM AINLEY.
Ill., REV. BISHOP SAMUEL M. FALLOWS, LL.D.	N. Y., RANSOM B. WELCH, D.D., LL.D.
Iowa, THOMAS E. FLEMING, D.D.	Ohio, RT. REV. GREGORY T. BEDELL, D.D.
Ky., ORMUND BEATTY, LL.D.	Pa., WILLIAM C. CATTELL, D.D., LL.D.
Mass., REV. JOSEPH COOK.	R. I., HENRY C. WESTWOOD, D.D.
Me., THOMAS HILL, D.D., LL.D.	S. C., GILBERT R. BRACKETT, D.D.
Md., EDWARD J. DRINKHOUSE, M.D., D.D.	Tenn., REV. BISHOP HOLLAND N. MCTYEIRE, D.D.
Mich., RT. REV. SAMUEL S. HARRIS, D.D., LL.D.	Tex., ROBERT L. DABNEY, LL.D.
	Va., FRANCIS H. SMITH, LL.D.

Executive Committee.

AMORY H. BRADFORD, D.D.	REV. ARCHDEACON MACKAY-SMITH.
HOWARD CROSBY, D.D., LL.D.	WILLIAM O. McDOWELL, ESQ.
SAMUEL M. HAMILTON, D.D.	COL. ELLIOTT F. SHEPARD.
HOWARD HENDERSON, D.D.	ALBERT L. TURNER, M.D.

Trustees.

MR. ROBERT L. CRAWFORD.	MR. CHARLES M. DAVIS,
GEN. CLINTON B. FISK.	Secretary, 4 Winthrop Place, N. Y.
MR. JOHN S. KENNEDY.	
MR. JOHN H. OSBORNE.	MR. WM. HARMAN BROWN,
MR. CORNELIUS VANDERBILT.	Treasurer, 64 Broadway, N. Y.

On Wednesday, August 1, the last day of the School, the devotional exercises were conducted by President Deems. The paper of the day was by Prof. John J. Tigert, of Vanderbilt University, whose subject was "Philological Philosophy," a critical examination of Prof. Max Müller's latest volume.

As this was the closing day of the School, in order that mem-

bers might leave by an early train, the lecture was followed by the discussion, in which Dr. Hovey, President Battle, Dr. Farrar, Dr. Deems and others took part. On motion of Prof. Fullerton seconded by Dr. Farrar, a vote of thanks was presented to the President and Secretary of the Institute. Thanks were also voted to the authorities and officers of the Round Lake Assembly, who had done so much to entertain their guests and make their visit pleasant.

The President then declared the Eleventh Summer School of the Institute closed.

THE TWELFTH SUMMER SCHOOL.

The Twelfth Summer School of the Institute was opened in the auditorium of the Seaside Assembly at Key East, New Jersey, on Tuesday, August 7, at 11 o'clock A.M. The devotional exercises were conducted by the President. The regular paper of the day was by Prof. J. G. Lansing, of the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick, N. J. His subject was, "The Messianic Element in the Book of Job." At 3 P.M. the paper and subject were discussed by Mr. Phœbus W. Lyon, Dr. Robt. B. Fairbairn, of St. Stephen's College, Rev. Jesse F. Forbes, Mr. Davis and Dr. Deems.

On the second day of the School, Wednesday, August 8, Scripture was read and prayer offered by Rev. Dr. Robt. B. Fairbairn. The paper of the day was by Rev. Francis A. Henry, Rector of St. Stephen's, Ridgefield, Ct., whose subject was, "The Ethics of the Gospel." This was discussed in the afternoon by Mr. Forbes, Dr. Clyde, Dr. Deems and Dr. Fairbairn.

On Thursday, August 9, the third day of the School, Scripture was read and prayer offered by Rev. John C. Clyde, D.D., of Bloomsburg, N. J.

Prof. G. Stanley Hall, of Johns Hopkins University, recently elected President of Clarke University, from whom a lecture was expected, having been suddenly called to Europe on official business, his place was kindly supplied by Robt. B. Fairbairn, D.D., President of St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N. Y. His subject was, "Logical Definition of Christianity." This was discussed at the afternoon session by Mr. Stephen H. Wilder, of New York, Mr. Lyon and Dr. Clyde.

On Friday, the fourth day of the School, the devotional exercises were led by Rev. Dr. Thomas, of Toronto, Canada. Rev. Jesse F. Forbes, of New York, read a paper on "Final Causes," which was discussed at the afternoon's session by Mr. Wilder, Miss Sarah A. Stewart, of Philadelphia, and Dr. Clyde.

On the last day of the School, Saturday, August 11, the President conducted the devotional exercises. The regular paper of the day had been prepared by George A. Knox, D.D., of Tokio, Japan, who, however, was absent, having been called to Japan earlier than he had expected. His paper, entitled, "Philosophy in Japan, Past and Present," was read by Mr. Phœbus W. Lyon, of Summit, N. J. As the author was absent, discussion was omitted; and after prayer by Rev. Joseph H. McEl'Roy, of Philadelphia, the session was closed with the benediction by the President.

All these papers and lectures of both Schools are to be published in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

OUR LETTER BOOK.

The following were written to be read at the Anniversary of the Institute:

From Prof. R. B. Welch, London, England, July, 1888:

"The Victoria Institute of Philosophy" has recently held its anniversary meeting—one of the most successful and satisfactory in its history. "The Alliance of Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian Polity," numbering three hundred delegates, has had its daily sessions (morning and evening) in Exeter Hall for ten days—July 3-12. And "The General Missionary Conference," of 1,300 or 1,400 delegates from all parts of the world, has held its daily sessions (morning, afternoon and evening) in Exeter Hall, from June 9 to 20, inclusive. After participating in these great meetings, one is increasingly impressed with the importance and urgency of our life-problem, especially the moral, spiritual problem of life.

Christianity is ever confronted by the sinful tendency of the unrenewed heart, and the consequent evil which pursues and

pervades humanity. From this sinful tendency and its evil consequence, Christianity seeks to save men—the individual man and the whole race. Christ came to seek and save that which was lost. This is the key-note of Christianity, that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.

In this supreme issue, it seems but a truism to say, that all men are profoundly interested whether they will or no. The great practical difficulty is to awake men to a proper sense of their duty and danger. Hence, Jesus not only declared: "Ye believe in God, believe also in Me;" but said with solemn emphasis: "It is expedient for you that I go away . . . If I depart, I will send the Comforter unto you, even the Spirit of Truth. He will reprove the world of sin, and righteousness, and judgment."

Philosophy is confronted by the same great problem. She cannot, if she would, ignore or avoid it. Moral evil prevails, sin abounds, death reigns. The whole creation is travailing in pain together, waiting for help, longing for rescue.

As the love of wisdom, philosophy is bound to seek the true and the best; and here, the true is the best and the best is the true. She is morally bound to seek renewal of the carnal heart and redemption from sin. Hence philosophy should be not only theistic but Christian. Especially is this so under the light of revelation. By the very light of reason, philosophy sees the need of a higher light—the Light of the World—the light which has in it life—quickening, redeeming life.

Believing, it accepts the call of the Divine Teacher: "Ye believe in God; believe also in Me. I am the way, the truth, and the life."

But Christian philosophy, like Christianity, is at times, and especially in our time, assailed by errant or vain philosophy—materialistic, or pantheistic, or agnostic—which dismisses the supreme issue or resolves it into materialism or pantheism, or the unknowable, and busies itself with attacking the Bible and rejecting the Saviour, or contents itself with indifference.

Such false teachings not only contradict Christianity, but, in high places, resist its advance abroad and disturb its progress and its power at home. They are urged upon the public atten-

tion by the lecturer, or in the school, or through the press. They need to be met and answered and exposed on scientific and philosophic, on historical and ethical grounds. For the sake of the young as well as those that are older, and especially for the sake of the young, there should be no delay. Truth should be in the field, equipped and on the alert.

Hence Christian philosophy has responded to this high demand—loyal to Christ and Christianity it has organized in England and America for more prompt and vigorous action, defensive and progressive. The Victoria Institute has within the brief period of its existence reached a membership of 1,300, while the American Institute of Christian Philosophy has in one-third of the same period reached nearly half the same membership. The two Institutes are working in earnest accord, and with mutual encouragement. They are fortunate in having such enthusiastic and wise officers as President Stokes and President Deems to guide.

From Bishop McTyeire, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., May 28, 1888:

I thank you for your note of May 22, calling my attention to the Summer Schools, to be held under the auspices of the Institute in July and August.

It would be a rare treat to attend; a privilege to hear essays and discussions that read so well in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. But my time for July and August is already filled up. It is a gratification to us that we of this *campus*, will be represented by Prof. Tigert on one of your occasions. He will be closely questioned when he returns from the feast.

The Institute is arresting public attention at a distance from where its sessions are held. Its contributions to current and higher literature begin to be looked for. It is needless to say they are appreciated by an increasing circle of readers. They are our "Bampton" and "Fernley" lectures.

May every circumstance be propitious for the July and August meetings, speakings, and publications.

Very truly yours,

H. N. MCTYEIRE.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

PHILOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY.

[A paper read before the American Institute of
Christian Philosophy at Round Lake, N. Y.,
August 1st, 1888.]

BY JOHN J. TIGERT, D.D., Vanderbilt University.

THE immediate provocation to the composition of this paper has been the appearance of Max Müller's "Science of Thought";* though the doctrines here set forth are, in the main, such as the writer has taught to his classes in Vanderbilt University for some four or five years past. Professor Müller's book has, however, necessitated a thorough reconsideration of the grounds upon which these doctrines were held, both to ascertain their essential sufficiency and to effect their partial re-adjustment in view of the truths which this eminent philologist has been the first to bring to bear upon the fundamental problems of logic. If we sometimes find him tripping in his philosophy, we shall not on that account overlook the signal services which he renders in his own proper field as a philological specialist; though it might be a trifle presumptuous and dangerous to regard as other than a specialist in philosophy, also, the brilliant translator of Kant's "*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*," the pupil of Lotze, Weisse, Drobisch, and Schelling, and the *protégé* of Bunsen. No future logician can afford to ignore the new light which Müller has so abundantly shed on his work. Müller's unsurpassed linguistic attainments, coupled with his by no means scant philosophical knowledge, may be said to have given a deeper, if not an altogether new, ground-work, as well as a considerably modified frame-work, to the science of thought. And yet, to the present reviewer, he

* New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1887.

seems to have failed to establish his fundamental thesis. Like many another philosopher he has not recognized the worth of his real contribution to logical science, and with manifest pride has thrown the emphasis, in oft-repeated assertion and brilliant, paradoxical diction, on his chief defect and weakness. Some destructive work will, therefore, necessarily occupy us, before we shall be able to build into the structure of logic and metaphysics the materials which Müller has undoubtedly furnished.

The title-page motto, "No Reason without Language" and "No Language without Reason," would seem to be a somewhat prolix attempt to place reason and language unambiguously upon some common platform of mutual independence and perfect equality. Like the primary laws of thought, neither is to be regarded as prior, neither as secondary. But in truth, each of these phrases, which jointly compose the motto, is capable of a threefold interpretation, and the attempt to be unambiguous, or to place the two terms of the phrases in a common primacy of independence and equality, legitimately results in raising the question, Which of these three possible meanings did Müller design to convey? With regard to the first phrase, "No Reason without Language," does he mean (1) no reason without language for its cause, or (2) no reason without language for its effect, or (3) no reason without language for its joint effect, both proceeding from a common cause? Similarly, in the case of the second phrase, "No Language without Reason," does Müller mean (1) no language without reason for its ground, or (2) no language without reason for its effect, or (3) no language without reason, each being a uniform sign of the presence of the other because they are joint effects of a common cause. It is only fair to presume, that whatever interpretation is to be attached to one phrase is also to be attached to the other, since no notice is given to the contrary. But if we select the first interpretation in each series of three, the two are clearly contradictory and cannot coëxist; the same is true of the second pair of interpretations; and only the third pair remains with mutually consistent members. Language or reason would be a uniform sign of the presence of the other upon one other supposition than that they are the joint effects of a common cause,

namely, that either is the invariable and sole cause of the other. When a phenomenon has but a single cause, we may reason with infallible accuracy either from the presence of the cause to the presence of the effect, or from the presence of the effect to the presence of the cause. But even in this case, Professor Müller's motto does not inform us which is cause and which is effect, and if either language or reason be the cause the doctrine of a common primacy is sacrificed. The labored attempt at perspicuity has raised a great obscuring cloud of dust at the beginning.

No common fountain of man's rationality and loquaciousness has ever been supposed. The real question is, Is man rational because he is loquacious? or, Is he loquacious because he is rational? Ever since Aristotle defined man as a rational animal, philosophers of all schools have held that man talks because he thinks. It is true that mediæval nominalism taught that there is to general terms or common names no answering reality, either in nature (*Genera*) or in the human mind (Concepts). The naked, empty word, symbolical of the impotency or negation of thought, is all. General names have no more intelligible meaning for the mind, reduced to mere percipient and image-forming powers, than the arbitrary characters, x, y, z , which may be symbolically and mechanically used for the solution of the most diverse problems in algebra. The formula of nominalism, *universalia post rem*, might well be intensified to *universalia non sunt*. For there are no real or conceptual universals—only nominal ones. Nominalism, strictly interpreted, is really a denial of existence to thought, and consequently of a province to logic. Notwithstanding these obvious implications of the widely-taught nominalism of Roscellinus and Occam, Professor Müller probably enjoys the distinction of being the first man, eminent or obscure, to maintain that man thinks because he talks. This he does with ill-concealed jubilation, since he regards it as his own substantial contribution which is to revolutionize philosophy and start it with unprecedented impetus toward its final goal. There is no avoiding the conclusion that his contention resolves itself into the maintenance of this thesis. Just as reason and language do not occupy a common position of dependence, proceeding

from the same fount, so they cannot enjoy a common primacy and independence. One is cause, the other effect. One precedes, the other follows. Throughout his wonderfully lucid treatise, which, illustrated by an unrivalled wealth of philological learning, and adorned with all the graces of a style with which no other foreigner ever wrote the English language, Professor Müller seems never to have fairly faced this alternative. Striving in words to preserve the common primacy of reason and language—a primacy which is impossible—he inevitably sinks to the defence of the primacy of language and the dependency of reason. Either this, or his book means nothing, and the author has been betrayed by a few paradoxical penslips into the defence of a position which disappears under simple, sober statement. That Müller is not misinterpreted may be proved by a short citation. “Again,” says he,* “it would be very easy to call my system materialism, and to paint in dismal colors what may not unfairly be represented as its outcome, namely, that there is no such thing as intellect, understanding, mind, and reason, but that all these are only different aspects of language. I certainly hold that view, and I do so after having carefully weighed and tested every argument that has been or can be advanced against it.” This is dogmatic, sweeping, perspicuous. Yet Müller adds, in concluding the same paragraph, “If I say ‘No reason without language,’ I also say ‘No language without reason.’” What meaning worth expressing can this apparent concession have, when he has just explicitly asserted that “there is no such thing as reason,” but that it is only an “aspect of language?” If the two pet phrases are to have the same logical force, the terms simply changing place, but leaving the same formal relations established by either collocation, we must read, “No reason without language [for its cause],” and “No language without reason [for its cause],” likewise. But this would be a simultaneous sacrifice of logic, fact, and consistency. Yet this must be the meaning if the phrases set so ostentatiously side by side are to convey a real concession. To say “No reason without language [for its cause],” and then to add “No language without reason [for its effect],” is indeed

* Preface, Vol. I., pp. x., xi.

to save logic and to take up a consistent position. But surely the second phrase is not worth the trouble of writing, if this be all its meaning.

At several points in his work Müller seems to take refuge in a complete identification of language and thought. "I hope," he says,* "I have thus answered everything that has been or that can possibly be adduced against what I call the fundamental tenet of the Science of Language, and what ought to become the fundamental tenet of the Science of Thought, namely, that language and thought, though distinguishable, are inseparable, that no one truly thinks who does not speak, and that no one truly speaks who does not think." Again he remarks,† "Language is very thought, as much as thought is very language." Here we are not told whether language is absorbed in thought, or thought in language. We do not learn whether man is rational because he can talk, or whether he talks because he is rational. But since the existence of "intellect, understanding, mind and reason" has previously been distinctly denied, and all thought-functions declared to be "aspects of language," we must believe that Müller seriously means to maintain that man is rational in virtue of his loquacity. Yet he himself seems sometimes to suspect the sanity of such a proposition, as when, in one of his own powerful figures, he declares,‡ "Language, on the contrary, is not outside the mind, but is the outside of the mind." Now this figure, if completed, must concede that thought is the inside of the mind. And if we say thought is the inside and language is the outside of the mind, just as the Greek *λογ'ος* included the Latin *ratio* and *oratio*, we have only said thought is the soil and language is the fruit, or, speaking without a figure, thought is the cause and language is the effect. Man is orational because he is rational.

If now the issue which Professor Müller has joined with logicians and the philosophical world generally is defined with sufficient clearness, we may consider some of the fundamental problems of psychology, partially brought forward by Müller, and which have a vital relation to the question before us.

Having been told in the preface that there is no such thing

* Vol. I., p. 62.

† Vol. I., p. 211.

‡ Vol. I., p. 211.

as mind, we are prepared for this further elaboration.* "For do what we may, as soon as we speak of Mind, we cannot help thinking of an independent Something, whether we call it an instrument, or force, or a faculty, which does the work for which we want a name. We think of a mind dwelling in a body, and we soon find ourselves in the midst of psychological mythology. Let it be clearly understood, therefore, that by Mind I mean nothing but that working which is going on within, embracing sensation, perception, conception, and naming, as well as the various modes of combining and separating the results of these processes for the purpose of new discovery." Once more he declares,† "To say there are no such things as Mind, Memory, Reason, Understanding, etc., may sound very terrible to those philosophers who imagine that the dignity of man consists in his possessing a soul, a mind, a memory, an intellect, an understanding, a reason, and whatever other powers and faculties or instruments have been called into being by the fertile imagination of psychologists. I do not object to the use of any of these names, so long as they are understood to be no more than the names of certain modes of action on the part of a self-conscious Monon. But I certainly deny that there are any such things as soul, mind, memory, intellect, understanding, and reason, or that the conscious Monon can be said to be endowed with them, whether in the shape of separate faculties or useful instruments. I admit nothing but the self-conscious Monon, which must be conscious, if it is to exist at all; everything else can be shown to be the result of an inevitable development. If Mill explains matter as the permanent possibility of sensation, *i. e.*, of being perceived ('On Hamilton,' p. 198), we may, in the same manner, explain mind as the permanent possibility of sensation, *i. e.*, of perceiving. Or, to put it in a different form, if the *esse* of things is *percipi*, the *esse* of mind is *percipere*."

In view of his doctrine of the Monon, which he immediately proceeds to state,‡ and which is subsequently elaborated as the teaching of Noiré,§ who seems to have compounded the philosophies of Leibnitz and Herbart, and particularly in view of

* Vol. I., pp. 62, 63.

† Vol. I., pp. 67, 68.

‡ Vol. I., pp. 63-68.

§ Vol. II., pp. 268-286.

his cogent critique of Mill's well-known definitions of matter and mind,* quoted and, in apparent forgetfulness, cordially adopted above, it is somewhat difficult to determine whether Müller means to give one more sensational exhibition of that astonishing feat in intellectual gymnastics by which a psychology is constructed without a soul, or whether, under the new-fangled name of Monon he means to restore the Self or Ego, and to give back all he has taken away when he denies the existence of mind or soul. As he himself remarks with regard to Mill, in studying any philosopher it is a prime necessity to master his dialect. With respect to Müller's philosophical authorities, however, one point is very clear. Kant and Noiré are his gods before whom he has prostrated himself and by whom he swears throughout. When in the very conclusion of his work, therefore, Müller employs language, concerning Materialism and Spiritualism, which, on a cursory reading sounds very much like the ordinary Hamiltonian natural dualism and acknowledges a fundamental antithesis between matter and mind,† we must not be misled. "Spirit and Matter," he says, "are in fact correlative terms. As a subject cannot exist without an object, nor an object without a subject; spirit cannot act without matter, nor matter without spirit. But as little as an object can produce a subject, or a subject an object, can matter produce spirit, or spirit produce matter." That reminds the student of philosophy of Hamilton discussing Idealism and Materialism, and declaring Natural Realism to be the only tenable hypothesis. But when we read of spirit on the same page,‡ "It has been postulated behind the various manifestations of our intellect as matter has been postulated behind the various manifestations of objective nature," and again, "Matter in the usual sense of the word, as something outside and independent of us, does not exist; Spirit, in the usual sense of the word, as something inside and independent of the world without, does not exist," we clearly perceive that this is merely a Kantian phenomenal or subjectively necessary antithesis of matter and mind, and not at all a Hamiltonian real antithesis of opposed and immediately known existences. If reason then is the fountain of our human speech, and we are to defend the thesis that man is

* Vol. I., pp. 243-251.

† Vol. II., pp. 564-566.

‡ Vol. II., p. 566.

loquacious because he is rational, or if, speaking more generally, the mind is the fountain of all our activities, it becomes necessary to set aside this psychology without a soul, whether it be the coarser materialistic, which Mill and Bain advocate, or the finer Kantian, which Müller regards as impregnable.

Consciousness is the unique fact which makes mental science at once necessary and possible. It raises the demand for a peculiar science, and becomes the one indispensable source for satisfying the demand it has created. Material bodies—earths, rocks, metals, crystals—exist, and physical agents or forces produce changes in them. But these bodies cannot, with propriety, be said to be the subjects of experiences, because they are neither aware of their own existence nor of the changes produced in them. This piece of iron lying before me does not exist *for* itself—which statement is very different, be it observed, from stating that it does not exist *in* itself—but for my mind which is capable of knowing it, and does now actually cognize it. *Percipi* is rightly regarded as the *esse* of things, provided it be interpreted to mean that they never exist *for* themselves, *i. e.*, are always destitute of consciousness; but we have already passed the boundary between truth and error if we interpret it to mean that all existence is known existence, that the knowing subject gives being to the object of knowledge, that things do not exist *in* themselves. Consequently, we do not think of imputing a *self* to rocks or metals or crystals, but only to conscious beings who are capable of knowing the existence and, to some greater or lesser extent, the properties of rocks, metals, and crystals. Furthermore, if some of these physical agents, say electricity or heat, be directed upon the lower animals or upon men, in addition to their proper physical effects, we have this extraordinary new phenomenon, *experience* of those effects. Parallel to the external, material order is the internal, mental order. The facts of the material order are, in general, open to the inspection of the senses: the facts of the mental order appear in consciousness, which is the uniform condition of their existence. If one should thrust an iron poker and his own arm together into a bed of glowing coals, there is a sense, indeed, in which it might be said that both the poker and the arm became hot; but no one can

fail to understand that there is an eminent and most proper sense in which heat can be predicated only of the suffering arm, and neither of the poker nor of the glowing coals. In a word, animals and men are conscious, and just because they are conscious psychology must be accorded its altogether peculiar place in the circle of the sciences. The soul is conscious of its own existence together with its own experiences. Of mind alone it may be said, not simply that it exists *in* itself—which is true of a stone lying in the road or of the shrub growing by the path—but also that it exists *for* itself, and never for another.

We may succeed in isolating the mind or soul or self or ego, and set it off to itself in the peculiarities of its existence, if we regard it as that (1) which exists for itself, (2) which never exists for another mind, and (3) for which all other things (except minds), when brought within the range of its cognitive powers, are found to exist. It has just been sufficiently indicated what is meant by asserting that mind is that which exists for itself. It is aware of itself. It possesses conscious existence. It is conscious.

Let us attend to the second peculiarity of mind, namely, that it never exists for another mind. One mind is not open to the immediate inspection of another. One mind cannot directly subject another to its purpose of acquiring knowledge, reduce this second mind to the same class with material entities, and exercise the cognitive powers upon its actions and states. This is the great difficulty in studying the conscious life of the lower animals and of infants.

We cannot study a dog or a horse as we study a mineral or a metal. We cannot study a child as we study a plant. Of these difficulties Professor Müller is well aware, and ridicules the results obtained by many specialists in these lines as menagerie and nursery psychology. One person can communicate a knowledge of his mental states to another, only by using some natural or conventional instrument—an exclamation, a gesture, a spoken or written sign—which, existing as a fact of the external order for both, and possessing a common significance for both, shall afford the person addressed occasion for producing in himself, by a strictly personal and original act, the mental state

of the person who has made the communication.* This seems a roundabout way of describing the very familiar fact that one person may be made to apprehend the thought or feeling or desire of another. Yet it is doubtless as brief as scientific precision and perspicuity will allow. This quality, if it may be so designated, is so uniformly characteristic of all conscious existences that man may not violate it in the case of the lower animals, whose mental states we are able to study only through a careful interpretation of the few and uncertain signs they give.

Materialism is at this point guilty of a monstrous paralogism. Mind never *appears* to other minds, to submit itself for examination and dissection. To demand this is to demand the psychologically impossible. If mind exists only for itself, it can never become a phenomenon, or thing appearing, or object known, to another mind. On the contrary, mind is the necessary condition of a phenomenon or thing known. Its *esse* is *percipere* which in this case excludes *percipi*. There may be existence without minds, but never *known* existence. The knowing subject never becomes identical with a known object, and because the materialist fails to find minds among the objects of knowledge he concludes that they do not exist ! Thus, that which alone possesses conscious existence is denied existence altogether because it will not suffer itself to be divested of its peculiar excellency, drop down into the class of material entities—which exist not for themselves but only for minds capable of knowing them—and permit itself to be cognized after a manner which would at once destroy its claim to be considered mind.

It was said to be the third characteristic of minds that they are those existences for which the phenomenal world exists. By this it is not meant that all existence is *known* existence. There may be vast regions of the universe unknown to any finite intelligence. And it is possible to conceive of the whole universe's continuing just as it is after every intelligence capable of knowing it has become extinct. Of course the secondary properties of matter, which consist of the effects it produces in us, would

* For a most interesting account of this process, see Bowne's *Metaphysics*, pp. 403, *seq.* Professor Bowne says that "the parallelism of the resulting mental state in the hearer with that of the speaker is the sublimest instance of adaptation, or design, of which the known universe affords any example."

disappear, but the primary would abide. By the statement that the phenomenal world exists for minds is meant: (1) that so far as the universe becomes phenomenal, *i. e.*, so far as *actual* existence becomes *known* existence, it appears to, or is known by, some mind; (2) that so far as the *actual* is incapable of becoming the *phenomenal*, *i. e.*, so far as existence is incapable of becoming known, it is as if it were not; and (3) that the business of science, psychologically defined, is simply the continuous enlargement of the boundaries of the *known* until they become coincident with the *knowable*. This must be the theoretical goal toward which science runs, even though it should never attain.

Consciousness may be summarily defined as the mind's knowledge of itself together with what is now and here present to it. The comprehensive language "what is now and here present to it" is designedly chosen to include (1) immediate internal knowledge of the self or Subject, in all its states and acts, and (2) immediate external knowledge of the Object, or not-self, in its direct presentations to the subject. The true conception of the nature of consciousness is gained by separating the common cognitive element in all experiences. If an external object, as a lump of ice, affect the sensory, *I know* I am the subject of a sensation. If my faculty of cognition through sense-perception is in actual exercise, as in perceiving that the table before me is external and extended, *I know* that I know. If the soul put forth volitional energy, as in concentrating my attention upon the topic under discussion or in controlling the hand which controls the pen with which I write, *I know* that I will. If pure emotion, as grief upon the receipt of the news that a dear friend has died, takes possession of the soul, *I know* that I feel. This common element of knowledge, which, on the one hand, witnesses to the personality, and, with the help of memory to the personal identity of the Subject, and, on the other, attests sensation, perception, volition, and emotion as the personal acts or experiences of this Subject, is consciousness. This dual witnessing is indicated by the very etymology of the word (*con* and *scire*, to know together with) which indicates a double knowledge, a coupling together in one act of knowledge of both the experience and the subject of that experience.

When it is said that Self cognizes itself as the subject of experiences, it is not meant that it knows aught of the substance, structure, or ultimate nature of Self. So much must be conceded to Kantian phenomenalism. But it does know Self as an existent entity, as a Power and a Person. Whatever acts, is. *Cogito ergo sum*. Neither is it meant that there is any such thing as knowledge of the pure Ego existing destitute of a particular experience. Hume truly says,* "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception." And Calderwood conclusively retorts,† "It is enough to know oneself as exercising personal power."

This consciousness as internal may be denominated Self-consciousness; as external, Perception, or Object-consciousness. Knowledge of self and knowledge of the external world are immediately given in Self-consciousness and Perception, or they are not given at all. As Dr. McCosh, who has striven so persistently to free the doctrine of Natural Realism from all contradiction, reiterates over and over again,‡ unless these knowledges are given directly as prime deliverances of our faculties, we can never by any subsequent legerdemain interpolate them, and secure a veritable Subject and Object as grist ground out of a philosophical mill into which they have never been put. There are many familiar experiences which indicate that Subject-consciousness and Object-consciousness are but different directions of a common consciousness, and that if one seizes for its peculiar objects the whole available mental force there is nothing left for the other. If one is suffering from a violent tooth-ache, he cannot follow the demonstration of an intricate mathematical problem, though delivered in his hearing with all possible clearness, accuracy, and fulness. On the other hand, if he can master his attention, and succeed in fixing it upon the problem, he will cease to be conscious of the aching tooth, or, as we say, forget it. The soldier, intensely enlisted for the success of the charge in which he is engaged, is oblivious of the bullet, buried in his flesh, until a companion informs him, or his attention is attracted by the flowing blood. A ruffian commits

* Hum. Nat., I., iv., 6.

† Mor. Phil., p. 108.

‡ See particularly his *Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated*, *passim*.

a murder, and, leaving his victim, proceeds to some scene of intense excitement, *e. g.*, a race-course. The attention of all around him is fixed by the flying horses. Object-consciousness is in full play. Not so with the murderer. He is oblivious to the race. The image of the murdered man thrusts itself before his mental gaze, and he can see nothing else. All the details of his recent atrocious act continually recur. Subject-consciousness is at the maximum, and he does not even hear the voice of the friend at his side who addresses him.

But, queries some one, does not the associational psychology assert the identity of consciousness with sensation, the lowest form of human experience, and out of this primitive stuff build up the highest powers and products of the human mind?

In 1869 appeared a new edition of Mr. James Mill's "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," first published just forty years before. This edition was edited by the author's son, Mr. J. S. Mill, and enriched with notes by Professor Bain, Mr. Findlater and Mr. Grote. In such a book, we may well expect the last word of the associationalists to be said. James Mill held the identity of sensation and consciousness; but his son thinks it necessary to make "a slight correction" of his doctrine. After mentioning that many psychologists teach that we cannot have a sensation without a simultaneous knowledge of Self as the subject of the experience, he makes the following remarkable supposition: "But of this as a primordial fact of our nature, it is impossible to have direct evidence; and a supposition may be made which renders its truth at least questionable [notice the extreme caution of this statement]. Suppose a being, gifted with sensation, but devoid of memory, whose sensations follow one after another, but leave no trace of their existence when they cease. Could this being have any knowledge or notion of a Self? Would he ever say to himself, *I feel*; this sensation is *mine*? I think not. The notion of a Self is, I apprehend, a consequence of memory. There is no meaning in the word Ego or I, unless the I of to-day is also the I of yesterday."*

Here two entirely distinct things are confused. Personality

* "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," 2d ed., I., 229.

is one thing; Personal Identity is quite another. Unless consciousness, pure and simple, gives the immediate knowledge of Self in each successive moment of our experience as sentient beings, memory could never collect out of these momentary experiences that which they do not contain, and out of nothing construct the knowledge of Personal Identity, *i. e.*, the knowledge that the *I* of to-day is the *I* of yesterday. The given experience is not only my *sensation*, it is also *my* sensation, and just because in every conscious experience there is the omnipresent *I* may I compare these ever-recurring *I*'s one with another and arrive at the notion of Personal Identity.

Mr. J. S. Mill continues: "There is a mental process, over and above the mere having a feeling, to which the word consciousness is sometimes, and it can hardly be said improperly, applied, namely, the *reference* of the feeling to our self. But this process, though separable in thought from the actual feeling, and in all probability not accompanying it in the beginning, is, from a very early period, inseparably attendant on it." This brief passage contains three psychological absurdities: (1) a knowledge of pure Self; (2) a knowledge of an experience independent of self; (3) an intellectual process by which an independent experience is subsequently referred to the Self. As Calderwood well says: * "To know an experience as mine, I must obtain the knowledge in the act of experience itself. Later than this is too late. If I do not know the sensation as mine, I cannot refer it to Self; if I do know it as mine, I have a knowledge which is superior to that obtained by any process or reference."

Professor Bain is much troubled by the same difficulty. "We may be in a state of pleasure," he says, † "with *little or nothing* of thought accompanying; we are still properly said to be conscious, or under consciousness. But we may add to the mere fact of pleasure, the *cognition of the state*, as a state of pleasure, and a state belonging to us at the time. This is not the same thing as before; it is something new superposed upon the previous consciousness." Upon this passage, two criticisms, each fatal, are in place. (1) The language "with little or nothing of thought accompanying" is not an absolute denial of attendant

* Mor. Phil., p. 106. † Analysis, etc., I., p. 227.

consciousness: if a minimum be allowed, the position is surrendered. (2) Adding to the "fact of pleasure" the "cognition of the state" involves the same trinity of psychological absurdities noticed above.

Professor Müller cleverly exposes another of J. S. Mill's fallacies with a purely philological argument. After noticing Mill's celebrated definition of matter as "the permanent possibility of sensation," and of mind as "the permanent possibility of feeling," and criticising the awkwardness and ambiguity arising from the exclusively active sense of the former, which means the possibility of producing sensations in us, and the exclusively passive sense of the latter, which means the possibility of our being the subjects of sensations, Müller proceeds:

"But what is of much greater consequence is this, that Mill should have imagined he could eliminate, or at least sublimate, the idea of substance, both in the Ego and the non-Ego, by using an abstract noun, possibility, instead of a concrete noun, the possible, or, as we used to say in our own half-classical, half-mediaeval dialect, the cause, the substance, the subject. What is the nature of such words as possibility? They clearly express a quality, and therefore a quality of something. When we speak of a thing as feasible, we mean that it can be done; when we say it is destructible, we mean that it can be destroyed . . . We can imagine philosophers denying altogether the reality of any such thing as substance; we can understand why Mill looks upon that category simply as the result of custom, not as a *sine qua non* of human thought. But whatever the origin of our category of substance may be, it is through it and with it alone that we can conceive quality. A quality is inconceivable without reference to a substance, and however much the original coherence may be forgotten, we always find it is there, whenever we go back to the deepest foundation of our intellectual fabric. We may speak of possibilities, we may trust in possibilities, we may be even frightened by possibilities, but if we look more closely, what we trust in and what we are frightened by are always things possible. If therefore Mill and his followers imagine that by defining matter as the permanent possibility of sensation and mind as the permanent possibility of feeling, they

have removed the difficulty of Kant's *Ding an sich*, they are mistaken. Their possibility of sensation, if properly analyzed, means things or substances which can become objects of sensation; their possibility of feeling means things or substances which can become subjects of sensation." *

We are not now concerned with the maintenance of Müller's consistency. We have already seen that he quotes with approval these same definitions of Mill's, in connection with his own denial of the existence of mind. It may be that the reconciliation is found in Müller's annihilation of an empirical idealism or nihilism only that he may replace it with a Kantian, transcendental nihilism. But with this we shall not engage ourselves at present. If the transcendental Kantian will effectually dispose of the empirical Mill for us, we can afterwards inquire into the foundations of his own system and possibly as effectually dispose of his higher type of nihilism. He cites a long passage from Mill, embodying one of his most celebrated doctrines, of which the concluding and important part is this: "If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future: and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."

Let us now consider Müller's philological refutation. As we have seen, he has already unfolded the philosophical implication of abstract nouns like possibility, and he now proceeds to show that the import of the English termination *ty*, Latin, *tas* Greek *της*, Sanskrit, *tâti*, is not very different from "series, succession, thread."

"Language," says Müller, "as I have often said, always revenges herself whenever we do violence to her, or whenever we forget her antecedents. At first sight a series, a succession, a thread may seem a very different linguistic expedient from the termination *tas* which we found in *facultas*, and which is used to

*Science of Thought, Vol. I., pp. 224, 245. Reprinted from an article in *Mind*, for July, 1876.

form abstract nouns. Yet what was the original import of such words as *juven-tas*, if not a series, a succession, a class of *juvenes*, and of all things belonging to them? What was *posteritas* if not a series of *posteri*? What was *civitas*, if not a number of *cives*? The growth of meaning in the derivative *tas*, though long forgotten in Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit, can still be watched, if we have but eyes for the secret cunning of language. Taking *juventas* or *juventus* in its original meaning, succession, thread, class of young men, the Romans could well form such sentences, as *cum omnis juventas, omnes etiam gravioris aetatis eo convenerant*, when the whole youth and also all of maturer age were come together. *Princeps juventutis* would be the chief of their youth, *i. e.*, of all the young men. *Juventas pugnare debet* would mean the young men must fight; *juventas facile decipitur*, young men are easily deceived, or *credula juvenus*, credulous youth. Now in credulous youth, the numerical slowly glides into the more abstract meaning, and so we go on to *tempus juventutis*, the time of youth; *gaudia juventutis*, the pleasures of youth; *robur in juventate*, the strength in young men, or the strength of youth, till at length the abstract conception preponderates; *juventus* becomes all that belongs to youth, and is at last endowed with a new substantival form in the name of the goddess *Juventas*, to whom Lucullus dedicated a temple in the Circus Maximus . . . With regard to the suffix *tâti*, Latin *tas*, *tatis*, English *ty*, one of the oldest Aryan suffixes for forming collective, and afterwards abstract nouns, I shall not venture to speak positively as to its original purport. It has been explained by a very distinguished scholar as a combination of two suffixes, *tâ* and *ti*, which are used by themselves to form abstract nouns, and the origin of which would probably be referred to a demonstrative pronominal base. But it is curious, to say no more, that Indian grammarians should have derived their suffix *tâti*, from a root *tan*, to stretch, to extend, thus giving to this abstract suffix that very meaning, namely, stretching, succession, thread, series, which modern metaphysicians now wish to substitute for the collective and abstract nouns in *ty*. . . . Without, however, ascribing to that etymology more authority than it deserves, I thought it might be useful to mention it as likely to be of some interest to

logicians. If those who follow Mill and share with him his aversion to abstract nouns believe that by using such words as succession, or thread of sensations, they have escaped from the dangerous spell of words in *ty*, they will see that the step from thread, series, succession of sensations to sensibility, or from a collective to an abstract noun, is not so great as they imagine. These words require a peg, and not a painted peg, to hang them on. The expressions thread, series, succession of sensations hang as much in the air as sensibility. To say that the Ego is the permanent possibility of feeling, and that our Mind is but a series of feelings, are both but new translations, different ways of saying that our Mind possesses feeling, or, as we used to say, has the faculty of feeling. Nay, as long as we bear in mind the original purport of collective and abstract nouns in *ty*, it would seem more straightforward and more English to say that the Mind possesses the faculty of feeling than to say that what we formerly used to call Mind or Ego, is 'a series of feelings, aware of itself as a series of feelings.'"*

Thus does Müller effectually dispose of the empirical idealism, or rather nihilism, of Mill and the sensationalists; but he himself is well content to rest in the transcendental nihilism of Kant. When he first broaches his doctrine of the Monon, the new substitute for the Ego or Self, he declares that the purely subjective and regulative forms—the "inevitable conditions"—of sense-perception, Space and Time, together with the equally subjective category of causality, by which our experiences are objectified into things, are all the machinery we need for building up the fabric of the human mind and accounting for its loftiest and most complicated products. The vibrations caused by the resistance of a conscious Monon to the impact of other mona are sensations. "These sensations, however, would be mere states, or modifications of the Monon, unless the Monon postulated for them a cause without, and thus changed all sensations into objects, which objects, being subject to the *a priori* conditions of our sensuous intuition, must be in space and in time."† Here it may be hinted that an injustice is done Müller in describing him as a transcendental nihilist. Does he not speak of his

* Science of Thought, Vol. I., pp. 248, 250, 251.

† Vol. I., p. 64.

Monon as self-conscious, as resisting and possessing consequent vibrations and sensations? Certainly he does. But, proceeds the inquirer, how can these predicates be affirmed without bringing the Monon under the categories of substance and cause, without declaring that it exists and acts? This is the very weapon which Müller has just employed in decapitating Mill and annihilating empirical nihilism. But, as a true Kantian, he turns about with a smiling countenance, and declares that, after all, these categories are the mere subjective laws of our human thinking. We cannot better conduct ourselves than by acting "as if" there were a soul. This Monon is a regulative *datum*, "inevitable," that cannot be thought away, and that Mill must not be allowed to disregard, but still we know nothing of it in itself. Moreover the categories, even as regulative, are legitimately applicable only to that which is given by intuition, and we cannot fill the empty category with the non-empirically given Monon. If we attempt it we shall fall into the paralogisms of the pure reason, which must inevitably follow when we, in this manner, attempt to apply the categories beyond the materials afforded by intuition. In the same passage, Müller affirms that objects must be in Space and Time. But we know that for realism this means nothing. Space and Time are subjective and *a priori*. Likewise the application of the categories to the Monon is from a realistic standpoint *nil*.

Later, an entire chapter* is devoted to the exposition of Kant's philosophy, and Müller, turning prophet, unqualifiedly asserts of the "*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*" that it is "a work which in the onward stream of philosophic thought has stood, and will stand forever, like the rocks of Niagara." Finally, in his *résumé* of Noiré's philosophy, he accepts as his own doctrine this account of Kantianism: "Man can possess a knowledge of phenomena, of phenomena only; what lies beyond the phenomenal world is beyond his perception and conception. His own sensuous perception is determined by space and time, his mental conception by the categories. These forms of perception and conception are, according to Kant, neither innate nor cognate, but inherent, inevitable, irremovable. They cannot be thought

* Chapter iii., pp. 124-148.

away. They are that without which thought could not be conceived as possible in man. They cannot therefore be the result of thought, but must be antecedent to all thought. They are the laws of sense, the laws of thought, the *sine qua non* of all intellectual activity. Within this charmed circle described by Kant the human intellect is safe; outside it, it becomes embroiled in antinomies or inevitable contradictions. According to Kant we have on one side man, imprisoned within the walls of his senses and with no more freedom of movement than the categories or the chains of his intellect will allow him; on the other side we have a world of which we know nothing except that it is, and that by its passing shadows it disturbs the repose of our prison."*

Kant's "*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*" is divided into three chief sections, (1) the Transcendental Æsthetic, (2) the Transcendental Analytic, and (3) the Transcendental Dialectic. The first treats of Sense, the second of Intellect or Understanding, and the third of Reason. Sense presents us with intuitions, which are possible only under the *a priori* forms of space and time. Since these universal forms of space and time are not objective relations of things themselves, but are of subjective origin, we cannot know the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*), but only as it appears to us—the phenomenon. From this source Hamilton borrowed his doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, making those fatal admissions which Mill is so quick to seize upon in his "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy." Kant affirmed, as did Hamilton, that his doctrine included the empirical reality of the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself, notwithstanding his view of the transcendental and subjective nature of space and time, the conditions under which it was known; but just as Mill brought to light the contradictory elements which Hamilton had sought to bind up together in his philosophy, so Fichte, in his absolute idealism, effectually removed the inconsistencies of the Kantian doctrine. From the Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality of the judgment, as ordinarily treated in Logic, Kant derived the twelve categories or conceptions or—to use Müller's figure—chains of the Understanding,

* Vol. I., pp. 280, 281.

which bind fast all the objects of knowledge. These conceptions without sense-intuitions are empty—*Begriffe ohne Anschauungen sind leer*—intuitions without conceptions are blind—*Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind*. But now arises the problem how can these pure categories of the understanding be applied to the objects of sense? The transcendental schematism of the pure understanding solves this question. A medium must be found which is *a priori* on the one hand and sensible on the other,—a sort of *tertium quid*,—and this is found in the universal forms of sense, namely, space and time, particularly the latter. Quantity has for a *schema*, series in time; Quality, the content of time; Relation, the order of time; and Modality, the whole of time. But into these details it is unnecessary to enter further here. As sense has its universal forms, and the understanding its categories, so the reason has its ideas, three in number, the soul, the world, and God. But the objective invalidity of these ideas is shown in the Transcendental Dialectic by pointing out the paralogisms of the pure reason, with respect to the Ego, when it is made an object and brought under the categories; the cosmological antinomies, of which much use was afterward made by Hamilton; and the insufficiency of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological proofs for the existence of God. In the “Critique of the Practical Reason,” the will is shown to be determined by the reason, through the categorical imperative, which hence has practical reality; and freedom, immortality, and God are recovered as the necessary postulates of duty, perfection, and the union of happiness and holiness as the joint factors of the highest good. But still these ideas can never acquire theoretical validity; for the empty categories can never be filled except with the materials afforded by sense. If this new grist should be poured into the categorical mill, the mill itself would be burst into a thousand fragments.

Though we may be far from sharing Kant’s and Müller’s freely expressed confidence in the validity and finality of the results which Kant obtained, undoubtedly Kant is right in his general principle that philosophy is properly founded in criticism, *i. e.*, we must determine the province and powers of the human faculties, and the legitimacy of their exercise and product,

before we begin to philosophize. Whether we deal with the Object- or the Subject-world, the Ego and its powers are still the tools with which we work: and these must be tested. We must secure, if possible, a philosophical warrant of adequacy and accuracy. Since Kant's inquiry terminated in a transcendental idealism (or nihilism) which declared that a metaphysic valid for all intelligences is impossible, it may be doubted whether criticism could find really consistent employment in his hands. But, if a standing-place in objective truth is secured, criticism is not only a justifiable and consistent, but an obligatory, procedure. If results, not simply of a regulative, but also of a constitutive, character can be obtained, philosophy owes to herself the speedy establishment of these enduring foundations. From the Kantian standpoint metaphysics is correctly regarded as the science dealing with first principles, or the *a priori* forms of all knowledge, whether knowledge be considered as (1) immediate or intuitive, by simple perception through the senses, or (2) mediate, through concepts, or (3) transcendent, by means of the ideas of the pure reason. All of these *a priori* forms, whether pertaining to Sense, Understanding, or Reason, since they are the universal presuppositions and conditions of experience, transcend the limits of empirical or historical knowledge. Criticism, of which Kant considered himself both the author and the finisher, is a preliminary examination of the human intellect, and the laws of its operation, to determine whether a science of metaphysics is possible, and, if possible, whether it is a science of knowing simply, having only an arbitrary, subjective value, or whether it is a science of being also, having a universally necessary and objective value. Kant, therefore, regarded criticism merely as a propædæutic: "This investigation, which we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge *a priori*, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently as far as possible, a preparation for an organon."* There are synthetic judgments *a priori*. In these the mind,

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's trans., Intro., p. 16.

transcending the limits and proceeding beyond the supporting authority of experience, forms judgments, having the character of strict necessity, and consequent universality, in which predicates, neither based on experience, nor analytically derived from the subject, are unhesitatingly annexed to that subject, *e. g.*, every event must have a cause. Accordingly the problem which Kant proposes to solve in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" Since such judgments unquestionably exist, and experience is not at hand to allege the legitimate union of subject and predicate in such judgments, how can we be assured that the judgment is warranted, and that the predicate corresponds to objective truth and reality? Kant's answer has already been recited: we never reach objective truth and reality; we can form such judgments only because the Subject imposes its own forms, categories, and ideas, which are purely regulative, upon the objects of sense.

It has been alleged with much plausibility that any attempt at a critical philosophy rests upon a glaring paralogism, since the principle itself involves an unusually vicious example of circular reasoning. This counter-position has been thus stated by Ueberweg: "It has been objected that thought can only be scrutinized by thought, and that to seek to examine the nature of thought antecedently to all real thinking, is therefore to attempt to think before thinking, or like attempting to learn to swim without going into the water (Hegel)." *

Stated in this form the objection resolves itself into the older and wider question of the relative antecedency of theory and practice. Theory, indeed, must be founded upon some rough, general practice, or upon some initial experience. It

* Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.*, II., 159. Other figures have been employed to illustrate the absurdity of a critical philosophy. It has been likened to a bird's attempting to soar above the atmosphere in which it flies, in its failure to recognize that what it regards only as a resisting medium is the vehicle of its support. A bright member of the writer's class in Metaphysics, taking up a phrase of the rougher Western world said that it resembled "a man's trying to lift himself over a fence by his boot-straps." In another connection, Kant himself beautifully employs the figure of the bird: "The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space."

does not follow that perfected theory may not operate the justification or even the improvement of practice. Accordingly Ueberweg's rejoinder is at hand :

"But this objection is refuted by the distinction between pre-critical and critico-philosophic thinking. The former must undoubtedly precede the critique of the reason, but must finally be subjected to an examination, which is to it *what optics is to seeing*. But after that through critical reflection the origin and extent of knowledge, and the measure and kind of its validity, have been ascertained, it is then possible for philosophic thought on this basis to make further advances." *

Another objection, somewhat akin to the preceding, is urged more profoundly by Professor Caird, of Glasgow. Referring to Locke's *Essay*, he says :

"He proposes to provide against any undue application of the intellectual powers of man to problems which are too high for them, by first examining and measuring the powers themselves. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the proposal involves an absurdity; for we have nothing to measure, except the very powers that are to be measured. To see round our knowledge and find its boundary, we must stand outside of it, and where is such a standing-ground to be found? We cannot by knowing prescribe limits to knowledge, or, if we seem to be able to do so, it can only be because we compare our actual knowledge with some idea of knowledge which we presuppose. . . . In Kant there is undoubtedly some trace of the same fallacy, in so far as the idea by contrast with which he condemns the objects of experience as phenomenal is the idea of an abstract identity without any difference. . . . It appears, then, that the idea of measuring our powers before we employ them rests on a paralogism; for what is really meant is that we abstract one of the elements of the idea of knowledge, and then condemn knowledge for having other elements in it. It is possible to criticise and condemn special conceptions as not conforming to our idea of knowledge; but it is not possible to criticise the idea of knowledge itself; all we can do is to explain it. It is possible to see the limited and hypothetical character of certain of our ideas or

* Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.*, II., 160.

explanations of things, because we are conscious that in developing them we have left out of account certain elements necessary to the whole truth; *but this criticism itself implies a consciousness of truth and reality, a consciousness which we cannot further criticise.*"*

As against any legitimate employment of criticism in the hands of Kant, it will be obvious, if we are careful to keep his results before us, that this reasoning is conclusive. If we are shut up within the limits of the phenomenal and the subjective; if space and time as conditions of external and internal perception, the categories of the understanding, the ideas of the reason, and all synthetic judgments *a priori* whatsoever, do not conduct us out of mere relativity into the region of the objective and the actual; then, indeed, there is no standard of noumenal existence, "no consciousness of truth and reality," which can serve as a test or measure. But if we obtain as the results of criticism that the *a priori* conditions of perception, the categories, and the ideas, or any of these, are not subjective forms, true only for man and void of validity for universal intelligence as such; that synthetic *a priori* judgments, underived, necessary and universal, are possible, and possess their necessity, not on account of a negative powerlessness or subjective imbecility of the human mind which disqualifies it for conceiving the contrary, but on account of the mind's positive insight into the constitution, nature, and relation of truths and things; if in this way the intellect effects a lodgment in the realm of objective truth and reality, this becomes the Archimedean standing-ground upon which criticism may post itself, not only for testing, measuring, and justifying all the subordinate functions and processes of the human mind, but that reason may have a clear conception of its province and powers, and a deliberate and scientific confidence in its processes and results. The argument against Kant, however, is not simply that of an impossible precedence, *i. e.*, that criticism involves the attempt to think before thinking, which we have seen is easily refutable by a simple and common-place distinction; but, assuming a deeper turn, it is that reason is the instrument by which all the criticism of reason

* Professor Edward Caird, LL.D., *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. *Metaphysic*, xvi., 94.

is sought to be accomplished, and, since Kant concludes that the instrument is unreliable, failing to take hold upon truth and reality, all the results obtained by it are untrustworthy and *nil*. Not on account of the nature of the case, therefore, but because of the character of the conclusion reached, Kantian criticism involves the fallacy ordinarily designated in Logic as circular reasoning, or *petitio principii*. "There is nothing," says the author of "*Hudibras*," "that can pretend to judge of Reason but itself: and, therefore, they who suppose they can say aught against it, are forced (like jewellers, who beat true diamonds to powder to cut and polish false ones) to make use of it against itself. But in this they cheat themselves as well as others. *For if what they say against Reason be without Reason they deserve to be neglected; and if with Reason, they disprove themselves.* For they use it while they disdain it; and with as much contradiction, as if a man should *tell me that he cannot speak.*"*

When inconceivability of the truth of the negative is set forth as the test of a necessary truth, it is not meant that this inconceivability arises from subjective, but from objective, considerations; the reverse of these *a priori* truths is inconceivable, not because of the limitations, powerlessness, special constitution, or imbecility of the human mind, but because these principles, shining in their own light, are irresistibly and indisputably self-evident. A reasoned contradiction of them cannot be maintained. Nor can they acquire greater force through a

* On the point in hand, ex-President Porter argues conclusively as follows: All the positive ground for the suggestion . . . rests upon one of these first truths themselves, one of these very original relations, which Kant subjects to metaphysical doubt, as to whether it may not be merely contingent upon the human constitution. We cannot but observe that the question which he raises is whether knowledge by these relations as a subjective process, and the relations themselves as an objective fact, may not be and probably are, *an effect of which the human constitution is a cause.* . . . In this argument it will be obvious . . . that the assumptions which he contends are only *regulative* are used and applied by him as though they were *real*. He certainly applies with entire confidence, the relations of *cause* and *effect* as necessarily and really pertinent to the constitution of man as viewed by all beings, and wholly omits to notice that he has already suggested that these relations as necessarily employed in human thinking, are merely contingent upon the operation of that thinking, and may not belong to the constitution of the soul as viewed or known by any other being, whether creature or Creator. This is not all. Not only are they used as though they were real, but they are used as real in order to prove that they are only

reasoned maintenance. The mind is endowed with a positive insight into the very relations and constitution of these truths, and declares such judgments necessarily and universally consistent. All true thought conforms to the reality of things. The law of contradiction is not a mere subjective law of thought; it is an objective law of things, and becomes a law of thought because it is a law of things. All thought must be consistent. The principle, of course, rests back upon the law of things that all existence must be free from inherent inconsistency or contradiction. The inconceivable in thought is the impossible in fact. The "forms" of the senses and the "categories" of the understanding are not mere subjective moulds into which the facts of the external, or object, world are run, losing their own character and assuming the mind's. The human mind is endowed with an immediate knowledge of the canons of possibility and necessity. "Thought," says Lotze, "does not stand fronting the impressions as they arrive with a bundle of logical forms in its hand, uncertain which form can be fitted to which impression." This conceit of Kant's criticism must be relegated to the long catalogue of exploded philosophical theories.

Indeed, it must be forever impossible to show that there is any such thing as independent, subjective necessity, growing up within the human mind out of the soil of its own imbecility. On the contrary, all subjective necessity is, on the face of the returns, to be received as the resultant or consequent of an ob-regulative. He reasons thus: Upon the validity of the principles to which I must conform as the laws of my human thinking, do I conclude that it is more than probable that they are true of human thinking only. That is, in the very argument that they need apply only to the processes and objects of human thinking, he applies them to both processes and objects of thinking which are not human." (*Human Intellect*, pp. 522-3.) Similarly, Professor Bowne, speaking of the empiricist says: "If he should choose to play the skeptic, then his skepticism must be extended to his own system; for, as said, empiricism is not a self-evident system, and, therefore, it must be proved. But this proof can be on the basis only of those principles and faculties which it aims to discredit. It would thus be a system which could not become strictly true without becoming absolutely doubtful. Every system which discredits first principles is in this dilemma. If such a system were demonstrated to be true, it would at once become demonstrably doubtful. Hence, while the study of the genesis and history of our ideas has a psychological interest, and is also of great value in enabling us to understand the origin of discovered prejudices, it can never claim to decide the validity of first principles without destroying itself." (*Metaphysics*, p. 15.)

jective necessity. And the face of the returns can never be corrected, or even shown to need any correction. Kant failed. And all similar attempts must involve the same circular fallacy. Necessity of thought is rationally explained as following upon the necessities of things and their relations. Nobody can ever rationally show that if the nature of things were different, we should be incapacitated for thinking them differently. If two and two were five instead of four, there can be no rational demonstration why we should not be able to recognize this truth, just as we now recognize the truth that two and two are four and not five. So there may be a statement of the criterion of *a priori* truths either in terms of subjectivity or in those of objectivity; *but these two are one*. We may say either, "The negative of this truth is inconceivable," or "The existence of the opposite of this fact is impossible." But these propositions are the two sides of the same thing, and can never be divorced. The inconsistent, or self-contradictory, is inconceivable as actually existent, and that inconceivability arises, not out of the imbecility of mind, but out of the nature of things.

To conclude. Müller, with unrivalled learning, reduces Sanskrit to 121 original, verbal roots. He shows, I think conclusively, that the true *primum cognitum* is man's consciousness of his own actions, and that the first concepts are names of internal states and not of external objects. He effectually disposes of the onomatopoeic, or "bow-wow," theory of the origin of language. He presents, from a strictly philological standpoint, unanswerable objections to the Darwinian doctrine of the descent of man. Having thus brilliantly traced the beginnings of thought in the primitive formation of language, it is passing strange that he deludes himself with the absurdity, condemned no less by his own results than by the unanimous verdict of logicians and psychologists, that man is rational because he is loquacious, and that mind itself is only an aspect of language. The commonly received doctrine of the formation of concepts, by a process of comparison, abstraction, and generalization receives abundant confirmation and unprecedented illustration in Müller's purely philological account of the origin of language. He carries Logic for the first time into the basal *stratum* of human experience,

upon which all the subsequent *strata* of art, science, philosophy, and fully-developed language itself, rest; but instead of disproving the long-standing doctrines of the most general and fundamental of the sciences, he places the logician upon foundations, deeper seated, indeed, but of the same materials upon which he has ever stood. This philological philosopher has endeavored to shake heaven and earth, that his pet science of language may be shown to be the only abiding thing; but he has only given a fresh demonstration that man's rationality is among those things which cannot be shaken and must remain forever. It is singular, indeed, that one of Müller's sagacity and philosophical acumen fails to apprehend that, when one of those primitive men who aided in the formation of Sanskrit roots formed the concept "dig," he secured a common element present in his several acts of digging, performed under varying circumstances of time, place, bodily effort, implement used, etc., etc., by exactly the same rational processes which logicians commonly describe. He made a word because he was a rational animal. No other animal has ever made a word, because no other animal is rational. Professor Muller has brought philosophy under permanent obligations by this brilliant contribution to its primitive materials; but, in the interest of his special studies, he has been led to lay the emphasis from beginning to end upon his one fatal defect. He has but immovably established the systems of science which he sought to destroy.

THE ETHICS OF THE GOSPEL.

[A lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Key East, N. J., Aug. 8th, 1888.

BY REV. FRANCIS A. HENRY,

Rector of St. Stephen's, Ridgefield, Conn.

YOU will remember, perhaps, the learned writer whose exhaustive work on Ireland contained a chapter entitled, "Of Snakes," and which consisted of the simple statement: "There are no snakes in Ireland." It has seemed to me that a writer on Christian Ethics might do worse than follow this example, and limit himself to the observation: "There is no such thing as Christian Ethics." If, however, such a proposition should be found to give offence, I would willingly offer the following as a substitute: The Christian doctrine of Ethics is the only one that is thorough and complete. For there are more ways than one of phrasing the same thought; to take an instance, it does not really matter whether we say with Hegel that Christianity is the one and only religion, or say with Maurice that the Gospel of Christ is not a religion at all. There are persons on the other hand who would not accept the substitute proposed. There are persons who are deeply interested in Ethics while they care little for Christianity; who profess scant respect for the transcendental dogmas of the faith—which they take to be figments of imagination in the field of the unknowable—while they insist upon the somewhat vague thesis that "Conduct is three-fourths of life," and define religion as "morality touched with emotion"; and in the eyes of such persons Christian Ethics, so far as they pretend to substantial originality, are as Irish snakes—simply non-existent. They tell us that we might cull from earlier religions all the principal ethical doctrines of Christianity, and point out that the admirable and really helpful precept called the Golden Rule is in effect a quotation from

Hillel. They find the ethical teaching of Christ sometimes too loose and general to afford any real guidance; at other times so extravagant and one-sided as to be manifestly impracticable; while always it remains as incomplete and fragmentary as the life of the Master was limited in range. Of this latter it has been recently said: "The relation of Jesus toward the body politic appears simply passive. With trade He is not only unconcerned, but apparently averse to it. Everything relating to the arts, to the higher culture of life, is absolutely removed from His view; and even family life is left by the Teacher, Himself childless, in the background."

Such a criticism appears to be well founded. There are weighty interests untouched by the teaching of Christ, and vast tracts of our existence unmapped by His survey. It is true the politician, the merchant, the artist will search His discourses in vain for any special precepts applicable to the experience of their several callings. He set forth no code of moral practice; He gave no rules to govern men's conduct toward each other; and as to those questions of casuistry which often beset conscientious men and drive them to cast about anxiously for moral guidance, He left no directions whatever. When we have gone through all the recorded sayings of the Master, we cannot fail to see that His contributions to what we call Ethics are extremely slight and few; and even these, when looked at closely, seem to wear another aspect. For my part, then, I am willing to admit that Christianity has taught us nothing new in Ethics—that it scarcely concerns itself with Ethics. But to treat this as a defect, and not rather a sign of its enduring greatness, is simply blindness to what is deepest and most distinctive in Christ's religion. It is the glory of the Gospel that it is not in any sense a new Law, but that transcendence of Law which is at once its destruction and fulfilment.

Let me ask you to go with me to the truth of this matter, though it may seem to take us to the bottom of the well. We find that the ultimate conception in Ethics is the conception of Law. That there is a Moral Law to which we owe obedience makes Righteousness our Duty. This word Duty covers an antithesis between Law and Will. On the one hand is the

obligation of the Right; on the other is the volitional capacity, or power of choice. Thus the thing to be done appears as a constraint upon the doer. The course of action, as prescribed by law, appears in relation to the acting capacity an alien and arbitrary compulsion. The two elements of the antithesis are held apart in perpetual isolation. We can disobey the Law and do as we please; or if we obey the Law from a sense of duty, it is by surrendering or suspending the exercise of free volition.

One will say, perhaps, that there is a third course possible: to obey the Law of our own free will. But it ought to be plain that this takes us at one bound outside the realm of Law. If our action is not prompted by the sense of duty, obligation is eliminated. When we do right of our own choice and wish, Law disappears; it has nothing to do with us. For, as St. Paul says, "Law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and unruly."

And so I say that in the sphere of morality the antithesis between duty and volition persists. In other words, the moral sphere is precisely the sphere of this antithesis. Here stands the naked command of authority, and there the independent agent who passively submits, or else disregards and defies it. Thus Law cannot in any way affect the will itself. The righteousness *of the will*—the agent's *own* morality, Law cannot secure and does not seek. Its whole aim is to regulate conduct. It simply requires obedience. It does not allow the will to have a will of its own. It does not consult the inclinations, and does not care about them. For Law is the direct antithesis of spontaneity. It says: You must do right; it does not say, You must like to do it. It does not make the impossible demand: You must perform from inclination a duty which is against your inclination. So, then Law may subject the will, but cannot reform it. It may compel good deeds; it cannot make good men. It may control conduct; it cannot create character. No system which begins and ends with Duty, whose one principle is imperative obligation and its one virtue unquestioning obedience, can get farther than this.

This imperfection of legal righteousness shows the insufficiency of Law when taken for a principle. And this because

Law is evidently a pure abstraction. It declares that Right is right, and Right is the Law; but of this it makes no attempt at explanation. It claims sovereignty over the will, but gives no hint of the grounds on which it rests the claim. Now an abstraction, as the word imports, is a severance from something—it is a part of a whole. To find then what Right is, and why it is Law, we must find the whole of which it is a part; and to do that we must find the other part. But this latter is already found, for evidently it is the other abstraction of the moral antithesis, abstract will or self-will. And the whole, the concrete unity of this abstract dualism, is not far to seek. We have seen that in the antithesis abstract liberty and abstract law are opposed to each other as mutually exclusive; but a closer scrutiny discovers their essential correlation. Look at them: The first appears as an independent faculty of choice, or unlimited potentiality of action. At once the question arises, What is it to do? A capacity of choice must choose something; a power to act must act somehow. Therefore such a power implies an object, a motive to determine it, if it is ever to choose or act at all. So on the other hand, Law appears as the universal rule of action, and, therefore, implies an independent power to act. It imposes duty—prescribes what ought to be done, and that is to recognize a free agent. Thus each of the abstract elements is what it is only in reference to the other. If the antithetic statement presents them as separately independent, the underlying implication reveals their mutual dependence. On the surface appears a perpetual opposition which holds them apart, but under the surface lives an organic bond which continually draws them together. Each of these opposites requires the other to complete itself, and viewed in their correlation they are seen to be the complementary factors of one concrete principle—the Will.

In our synthetic method this concrete unity comes to light after the view of its elements in their separateness, but evidently it is in fact their *prius* and that in which alone they have reality. And, therefore, we may, as it were, prove the sum by working it backward and looking at the matter analytically. Will then appears, first, as bare capacity of willing; but as simply this it

betrays its own incompleteness. In its entire independence it is also entirely indeterminate. It is like the faculty of eating to an animal destitute of food. For want of specific direction of its activity, its power of willing everything in general remains an impotence to will anything in particular. Thus any usurper may seize the empty throne. Thus we see the wandering desires harness the will-power to their chariot and drive it hither and thither, the sport and slave of their caprice. And so, secondly, to be itself—to have real freedom to act, to exercise real power of choice—Will from simple unity falls into duality and apparent contradiction through relation to that which shall determine it, that which appears in this antithesis as an external obligation, the Moral Law. Lastly, the antithesis is resolved by this, that all along there is only one thing under consideration, namely, the Will. From within this unity the antithesis develops; it is not imported from without; and, therefore, into the unity it must return. The Law of Right is the determiner of Will; but Will is *e natura* self-determining; therefore, the the Law of Right is itself the Will. When it wills the Right it wills itself—wills Will; and hence then only it is free. When it wills what is not right, it wills what is foreign to itself; and that is to be subject to a foreign control. Thus righteousness is the freedom of the will; for freedom and autonomy are precise synonyms, and there is no liberty except liberty to be the law unto oneself. So then, on the moral plane righteousness appears as the law *for* will—a positive law; on the spiritual plane it is seen to be the law *for* will only because it is the law *of* will, the will's own law or nature—an organic law. One who is obedient to the Right—as to a moral fatality ignorantly worshipped—is *obedient* from unconsciousness of his essential nature; it is the “natural man” that obeys. Let him become conscious of his essential nature, let him see that righteousness is the very nature of spirit, and for him what was obedience becomes freedom. To say it once more in another way: abstractly, the Right is a necessity external to will; concretely, it is the necessity internal in will. Abstractly, there are two principles—subject and object, as the Germans say; concretely, there is one—a self-determining power. Will is that single

Energy whose subjectivity is volition and whose objectivity is righteousness ; and thus human will is made in the image of the Divine.

Let me offer here a brief suggestion : This view of Will is the one that must be taken of another aspect or faculty of spirit—of Mind. It is the same mistake to regard Will as merely a faculty of volition or to regard Mind as merely a faculty of intellection. For thus, as we have seen in the like case of Will, the object of thought is antithetically opposed to the thinking subject ; Mind is viewed as an abstraction in relation to Truth—the other abstraction—which of necessity lies beyond the bounds of knowledge. This doctrine of Agnosticism takes its rise from the so-called philosophy of sensation, confirmed by a singular misapprehension of Kant ; and, especially since its elaboration by Dean Mansel, is perhaps equally in vogue among Christians and unbelievers : the views, for instance, of Prof. John Fiske and the late Principal Tulloch on this point quite accurately coincide. The doctrine is the merest nightmare, and it disappears when we waken to the fact that Mind, like Will, is a universal ; that it is properly defined, not as a thinking faculty, but as a cognitive faculty, and as such is virtually in possession of truth. The “ great problem ” of metaphysics—to prove the existence of something without the range of experience—is one wholly created by a defective science of mind. Happily this difficult problem does not exist. We have not to give chase to an unreal abstraction called Thing-in-Itself, but simply to look the facts of experience in the face. There is no gulf to bridge between psychology and ontology. The *passing* from one to the other is in fact an illusion ; we are already there. To know implies an object *known*. Let it be true that knowledge is only of experience ; then the object is given in experience. It is *within* consciousness, and not without it, that subject and object are distinguished and unified in knowledge. “ All that we really know is mind,” remarks Prof. Fiske. What follows then ? Not that the object is unknowable, but that the object is mind. An unknowable object is evidently a gratuitous assumption. To stoutly affirm the existence of an object we cannot know is one of the curious inconsistencies of wanderers in the Spencerian fog.

It ought to be understood that Religion and Idealism stand or fall together. It is the fixed habit of much that passes for mental and moral philosophy to regard man as wholly constituted by his possession of intelligence and volition. It follows that truth and righteousness, at least in any absolute sense, are not for him. They are set far away beyond "limits" which his feeble reason and his sinful soul cannot hope to pass. Such a theory is in contradiction with the Gospel doctrine of perfectability. It is a necessity for Religion to show that Man is not this abstract or subjective being ; to show that human nature possesses a dual constitution, an activity of thought and will, and its complement, a principle of truth and right—elements distinct but inseparable in the mutual relation in which they have their being. It is in the unity of this essential distinction that Man is Spirit—the being that knows truth and does the right. In the freedom of this self-relation spirit or personality is the true infinite, and in the spiritual nature common to both is grounded man's organic relation to God.

That this nature is common to both, that our Saviour Christ is both God and man, and gives all who receive Him power to become what He is, sons of God—this all Christians believe. And yet I suspect my treatment of our subject may seem to have been growing somewhat visionary and unreal. To speak of human will as by the law of its own being essentially righteous, essentially free, is indeed to regard it in its ideal perfection. And it may be asked : Of what avail is the contemplation of such a mere ideal here in this wicked world? We who are striving against sin must use a more practical method in dealing with the depraved, perverted wills of men. I would answer : Just because of the actual depravity of human will a sense of its ideal nature has practical importance for it ; for so men learn that the perfect righteousness they are to seek is no dream of extravagant aspiration, but the fulfilment of a latent capacity. The world, we have much reason to believe, is no wickeder to-day than in the days of Christ and Paul, and it was their method to hold up constantly before men this elevating ideal of spiritual perfection. This, indeed, is all it concerns me now to say, that, visionary or not, to realize this ideal is the aim

that is set before us, explicitly in part and everywhere implicitly, by the Christianity of the New Testament.

It follows that the Gospel involves the abrogation of Law. It is true Christ said : " Think not I am come to destroy the Law and the Prophets ; I am not come to destroy but to fulfil." As all know, " the Law and the Prophets " was a common phrase among the Jews to signify religion, and our Lord's meaning may have been that while the Christian revolution, like every other, might seem merely destructive of the existing order, it had its true purpose in its ultimate issue, a higher reconstruction. If the saying refer to the moral law, its meaning is equally plain : We have seen that Law appears under two aspects, first, in the moral antithesis as the abstract limit of self-will ; secondly, in the unity of free-will as the medium of self-determination. As it changes from one aspect to the other, in the transition from moral to spiritual life, it is proper to say that Law is not destroyed but fulfilled. For it is not *what* the Law commands, but that it should *command* it, that is done away. The substance of the Law—righteousness—is eternal ; the form of Law—obligation imposed by external authority—is the yoke from which Christ sets us free. By the term law is sometimes understood a positive enactment, and sometimes an organic mode of action. Having regard to these two senses we may say that it is by the destruction of Law that the Law is fulfilled.

While Jesus undertook no direct polemic against the religion of His people, none the less His constant preaching of a higher truth was by implication subversive of Jewish Legalism. On one point at least He seems to have deliberately forced an issue with the rulers, and that was the observance of the Sabbath day. In this matter He laid down the universal principle which strikes at the root of all systems of abstract obligation : " The Sabbath "—and if the Sabbath, the Law—" was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." Man is the final cause of Law, not obedience to Law the final cause of man. It cannot surprise us that Jewish Christians were slow to learn this truth which should make them free. When Paul began to insist upon the merging of Law in Freedom as the heart of the Gospel, the persecution he encountered from false brethren shows how imperfectly they

who had known Him after the flesh had entered into the mind of Christ.

Let us glance at the Pauline doctrine of "Christian Ethics." The Apostle treats of the movement of the soul from the moral to the spiritual way of life under the term Resurrection. It is true this term covers a reference to our personal immortality—the indestructibility of our being—as well as to the spirit's entrance upon a higher life. The two thoughts, indeed, are closely allied, for "the spirit is life because of righteousness," and he who wins righteousness wins the power of an endless life. Still there cannot be a doubt as to which sense holds first importance for the deep-thinking Apostle. All through his writings the higher sense of resurrection appears as a rising from the death of servitude to carnal impulse to the life of harmony with the divine order. The resurrection Paul was striving after—"if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead"—was a resurrection *now*, to righteousness. (Cp. St. John: "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren.") That this is what St. Paul means by resurrection we may learn from his conception of life and death. It is plain that to his mind Life is not synonymous with animal existence, nor Death with bodily dissolution; these terms have their deeper significance in relation to the soul, the inward man. Now that inward man himself is a duality of opposing forces; in the ceaseless conflict of flesh with spirit the man is struggling against himself: "What I would I do not, but what I hate that I do." It is a mortal combat for supremacy—a duel to the death between the two men within us. In speaking of Death St. Paul sometimes has in view one combatant, sometimes the other; and so it may mean the death of the natural man *unto* sin, or the death of the spiritual man *in* sin. In this latter sense he writes: "God for His great love wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins quickened us together with Christ and raised us up with Him and made us sit with Him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus." And in this sense the Saviour had said: "If any man keep my sayings he shall never see death. . . . I am the Resurrection and the Life; he

that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth in Me shall never die."

It will be enough for us, however, to keep to the other reference, in which the natural man dies and rises in the spiritual man. A passage to this effect is found in the sixth chapter of Romans: "How shall we who died to sin live any longer therein? Know ye not that all we who were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into His death? Therefore we were buried with Him through baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with Him by the likeness of His death, we shall be also by the likeness of His resurrection. Knowing this, that our old man was crucified with Him that we should no longer be in bondage to sin; for he that hath died is freed from sin. Now if we died with Christ we believe that we shall also live with Him . . . For the death that He died He died unto sin once for all; but the life that He liveth He liveth unto God. Even so reckon ye yourselves also to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus." Alive "in Christ Jesus": St. Paul always looks upon the Christian as identified with Christ; so that "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus" becomes the law of His life also. To sin, the deviation from the perfect way, to every self-willed impulse that would divide the Son from the Father, Christ died. His disciples are to do the same. They die with Christ, and becoming transformed by the renewing of their mind, they rise with Him in the likeness of the Divine; and "reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, by the Spirit of the Lord." Such was the Apostle's own experience: "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me. And that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith—faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me."

This is what St. Paul means by Faith; these words tell us plainly that he means the risen life—life in Christ. To faith Christ is no mere object of belief, of knowledge after the flesh, nor an object of imitation. To copy, to imitate, that implies

perpetual separation: we *here* and Christ, the pattern, *there*. Faith makes us one with Him who is our Life and the breath of our being—merges our incompleteness in His divine humanity. What then can be the root and ground of faith but love? It is the Pauline teaching that faith lives only in organic unity with love: "Though I have all faith . . . and have not love, I am nothing." The Son of God who loves us awakens in us the answering love from which our faith is born; for, as St. John writes: "He that loveth not knoweth not God." So then when St. Paul tells us that love is the fulfilling of the law, we know what he means by the righteousness of faith.

And so it is an essential part of our Apostle's teaching that death unto sin is also death unto law. "By the works of the law shall no flesh be justified," because: "Law is not of faith." The subjection of behavior to mechanical control may produce a superficial rectitude, but the inward springs of character, the quality of the being that we are, remain untouched. Again, the Law is weak against the flesh—the multitudinous motions of self-will, the insistent claims of passion; for a mere moral imperative supplies no power to fulfil its behests. That is, it is but a spurious righteousness that Law aims at, and it fails even in that aim. The Apostle goes further: "Whosoever is not of faith is sin;" and Law, as outward ordinance, is really not related to righteousness, but to sin. "Law is not made for a righteous man . . . Against such there is no law." Its effect is to instigate to sin, and then to waken the sense of guilt. For Law presents itself as a check to the selfish desires of the lower nature, and makes their control a duty. But since it gives the natural man no new strength to help his effort for self-control, passion has its way with him as before. Now, however, yielding to passion is no longer the innocent, unconscious following of nature, but the known transgression of Law; it is now for the first time sin. "I had not known sin except through the Law; for I had not known lust except the Law had said, Thou shalt not lust." Since Law then is continually setting itself against the smooth current of natural inclination, only to be overborne by it, it is continually inciting to transgression and multiplying sins. The Apostle declares that "Law is the strength of sin,"

and calls it "the law of sin and death." Thus the real effect of Law is precisely opposite to its apparent aim. But Law is of God, and therefore cannot fail of its aim. And so St. Paul finds its real aim in the effect it works: "Law came in that the trespass might abound." . . . "It was added because of transgressions"—that is, as Lightfoot renders it: "to create transgressions," referring to the parallel passage: "where there is no law, there is no transgression." And this is in order to waken the moral consciousness: "That through the commandment sin might become exceeding sinful."

It follows that he who dies to sin dies to Law which creates it and the sense of it: "Now we are delivered from Law, having died to that wherein we were held; so that we serve in newness of spirit and not in the oldness of the letter." . . . "I through law died unto law that I might live unto God." We die to all that old merely moral life of antithesis between law and self-will—the old helpless struggle with sin which law provokes and maintains; and we rise to the new life in the Spirit of Christ. "Walk in the Spirit and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh . . . But if ye are led by the Spirit ye are not under the law." That is the pith and marrow of the powerful Letter to the Galatians. "If there had been a law which could have given life, verily righteousness would have been by the law. But before faith came we were kept in ward under law, shut up unto the faith which should afterward be revealed. So that Law has been our pedagogue unto Christ that we might be justified by faith.* But now that faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue. For we are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. . . . So that thou art no longer a servant but a son." Thus "Christ is the end of the Law unto righteousness." We may note a double thought in this happy phrase. Law is a means to an end which is not attained in the effect of its own action. That is, the true end of Law is outside of itself. This is the existence of the Finite, and hence Law comes to an end;

* I believe with Reuss that the whole tenor of the Apostle's thought shows that he means by pedagogue, not an educator "to bring us" to Christ—as our version supplies, apparently without authority; but a rigid disciplinarian from whose repressive rule Christ liberates us. Lightfoot takes about the same view.

it is in its own nature something transitory. Christ is the end of Law, because in Him is fulfilled the purpose and object which Law has sought ; and, therefore, also in Him is its abrogation.

Owing to its peculiarity of form, and still more to the depth and centrality of its point of view, the Gospel according to Paul has suffered from misapprehension and misrepresentation since Augustine's day ; but truly understood it is essentially the Gospel of Christ. In both Christ Himself is the power of God unto salvation. It is the Gospel teaching that above all Law stands its own deeper truth, the freedom of Spirit. This is much, but if this were all, it would be nothing. It is not only in theoretic truth,—it is above all in practical worth that the Gospel surpasses all ethical systems, and not the best of these can be described as God's unspeakable gift. Ethics may be called the science of life ; he who is instructed in ethics knows how he ought to live. But after all, such knowledge is neither very difficult nor very valuable. Ethical truth is the simplest of all, and the least helpful. It has been said : " The object of systems of morality is to take possession of human life, to save it from being abandoned to passion or allowed to drift at hazard, to give it happiness by establishing it in the practice of virtue ; and this object they seek to attain by prescribing to human life fixed principles of action, fixed rules of conduct. . . . Thus human life has always a clue to follow and may always be making way toward its goal." If only the matter were as simple as that ! Human life has scarcely justified this innocent confidence in rules and regulations. Portia is a better moralist : " If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches and poor men's cottages princes' palaces. I can easier tell twenty what were good to be done than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching." The truth is, life, as an affair of practice, is rather an art than a science, and in all art the first thing is power—power of soul. It is not careful adherence to fixed principles and rules, it is rather the energy of creative genius that produces the immortal art-work which becomes the heritage of the race. It is the same with the art of living. Even if prescribing a rule

were enough to secure its control of conduct, that would not mend the matter. There are many to whom the morality of custom is not grievous ; they find it not too difficult to live by the conventional rule. The trouble is, that is not really living at all. Life is the exercise of a personal power ; life means spontaneous initiative ; and it is this that distinguishes vitality from mechanism. And so Christ tells us : " I am come that ye may have life, and have it more abundantly." His object, too, like that of the systems of morality, was to take "possession of human life," but it was not by prescribing rules He sought to attain it. His way was to rouse, to inspire, to energize, to transform the individual soul. Therefore He held up to men an infinite ideal, "Be ye perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect." With this the motive of our life is no longer Duty, but Aspiration. Divine perfection we cannot fully reach, but we live by loving it, and striving towards it. It will forever transcend our achievement, and, therefore, it will secure our continual progress. When life means aspiration it cannot rest content in any finite completeness, any goodness it has attained. "This one thing I do," writes St. Paul, "reaching forth unto the things which are before, I press on toward the goal unto the prize of the heavenward calling of God in Christ Jesus." The Pauline doctrine of justification by faith is not far from saying that we are saved by aspiration ; for it is by believing in and following illimitable ideals that men grow great. They live before us as the image of that into which we are to grow forever. They rouse in us the more ardent longings, the deeper energies, which have no place in the world of the moralist. It was above all this temper and habit of aspiration which Christ sought to quicken in the soul. For He cared not so much for what we do as for that deeper thing, what we are. That was a hard saying to the legalist : "Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God."

Christ went direct to the heart of man, out of which are the issues of life. "Do men gather grapes of thorns," He asked, "or figs of thistles ? A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." That is, conduct is a result and an indication of a healthy or unhealthy state of soul. And

as he is but a quack who will treat the symptom as if it were the disease, so the great Physician knew that could He reach and influence the sources of action, action might safely be left to take care of itself. Again, to the old-time medicine all diseases were inflammatory and indicated a reducing and depleting treatment; our wiser therapeutic has ceased to bleed and starve, and brings tonics and stimulants to help nature work a cure. In like manner Christ sought, not to subdue the strength of lawless passion, but rather to brace and fortify the vital energy of the soul. "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armor wherein he trusted and divideth his spoils." It is a deep truth that the evil passions of men are only overcome by a more powerful passion that enters as a conqueror the palace of the soul. Passion—eager, ardent desire—is always the one great motive power. It has been said that without passion nothing great was ever done on earth. Therefore Christ laid hold of this elementary force and turned to His own ends its fire and strength. "In Christ" one became not a more moral man, but a new creature. When the Christians appeared in a heathen city, it was not as men of correct, well-regulated conduct; rather they appeared as fiery revolutionists, and it was said of them: "These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also."

Nowadays Christians are for the most part thoroughly respectable people who keep to the well-trodden path; or, one might be tempted to say, neutral, bloodless beings, alike incapable of great crimes and lofty virtues; but it is plain that the Christian life as taught by Christ and Paul, in deed as in word, is in every aspect an enthusiasm,—that always "the kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence and the violent take it by force." What one word better describes Jesus than the word Enthusiast—or Paul, Augustin, Bernard, Francis, Loyola, Luther, Calvin, Knox? There is no great name in Christian history but it stands above all for intense spiritual energy, and tells us that the thing essential in religion is the passionate devotion of the soul.

And "this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." According to the New Testament the world is the great adversary of the Christian; what then is the world? We may answer in one word, it is Conventionalism. If religion is enthusiasm, then irreligion is the incapacity of ardent, generous emotion; it is a dull subjection to the common and ignoble; it is the life without ideals or aspirations—the life which I have said is not really living. The world is always forming for itself certain customary standards of judgment by which all thought and action are measured and to which the world will have all men conform. This social opinion is the generalized reflection of the average man's sentiment and view of things. Naturally it is neither very lucid in perception nor very elevated in tone; still it is enough for the mass of men that such is the judgment of the mass. If the average man lack guidance in his way of life, he never thinks of seeking the absolutely true or good—for then he would not be the average man; he is content to find the prevalent opinion and the way of the world. Obviously, this rule of the collective average judgment tends to suppress in the individual all that is distinctively his own. The world is apt to outlaw genius and proscribe originality; for conventionalism tends to reduce all to uniformity; it will have no eccentric opinion, no erratic conduct, no strongly outlined character. As the wise Turgot said: "It is not error that opposes the progress of truth; it is indolence, obstinacy and the spirit of routine." The reformer who runs counter to the current prejudices that men take for principles is said to shock the opinion of the world,—as if that were not the best thing that could possibly happen to the opinion of the world. And then if he is strong and resists, he must be persecuted and put out of the way. In the world such men have tribulation. But that is not the worst: the worst is there are so few to resist; the worst is that worldly-mindedness is in a vast majority. The trouble with the world then is not its immorality; the average man is rather moral than immoral. The trouble with the world is that it has no soul. Its views are low, its aims are vulgar, for it minds earthly things; and caring only for appearances, it covers itself with hypocrisy as with a garment and delights itself with cant. If the world is to

be saved, it must be born anew. To redeem the world it needs to inspire it with an ardent faith, with an enthusiasm of aspiration for the ideal life. This was the Redeemer's way, and this the missionary labor of Apostolic Christianity. No less can be our aim and effort as followers of the Christ. It is ours to save the world from spiritual death and the bondage of corruption. "Ye are the salt of the earth," Christ is saying to us; "but if salt lose its savor, wherewith shall it be salted?" If religion itself fall under the deadening power of Conventionalism, and the ideal life degenerate into respectability; if the Church come to be fairly named by that apt phrase, the "religious world,"—then we can only pray for a new Reformation of Religion, which again will find the Church itself part of the thing to be reformed.

And now if one inquire more particularly as to the nature of this new passion or enthusiasm which I call the motive power of the Christian life, it is plain that Christ made it devotion to Himself. And ever since in every land and time the faith of His true followers has clung to Christ Himself, kept warm and living by His presence and growing feeble and fruitless as it wanders away from Him to theories about Him and the doctrines of divines. For He in His own person is the centre of His Gospel, and the kingdom of Christ is founded on Christ Himself. Priests and sages the world over were urging men to accept their systems; Christ said: "Ye believe in God, believe also in Me." Buddha taught, the way is by renunciation; Christ said: "I am the Way." Plato told his pupils to follow the Good; Christ said: "Follow Me." He steadily required the homage of men's deepest loyalty and love; they were to be faithful, not to abstract truth or duty, but faithful to Him. And nothing could be severer than this demand: "He that cometh to Me and hateth not father and mother and wife and children, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple." In this the Saviour was taking a new method. He was drawing the world away from its religious ideas—its dogma, its ritual, its ethics—and fixing its thought upon a Person. He made passionate affection for Himself the one thing needful, because He knew that no other power could be so strong to transform the hearts of His followers. "If a man love Me," He said, "he will keep My words."

His way of subduing the selfish passions of the heart was by appealing to the heart's unselfish passion and claiming it for Himself. It was a way that worked. At the outset the Christian faith was simply a binding of men's hearts to Christ. His entire following was due to the attraction of His person, drawing about Him the men and women whom He made His own forever. For the devotion He exacted He Himself had power to inspire. And that through the profoundly simple law which He announced : " Give, and it shall be given unto you." He gave to men His love, His trust, His utter self-devotion, and they could not but give Him back the same. It was love of Christ that gave His followers their inspiration and the conquering energy that carried the Gospel throughout the hostile heathen world. It was this that came in perils and persecutions like an angel to strengthen them, quenching the violence of martyr fires and irradiating the mystery of death with one bright certainty. " It doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." We shall be like Him ! For the whole nature follows love, and we must inevitably grow like the Being who owns our heart's supreme devotion. To love Christ is to be one with Him in spirit; it to love Love, and that is to be loving.

And so the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus becomes the principle of human action. In this organic law, and here alone, is the fulfilment of all positive commandments. Is not this evident ? " All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them ; for this is the Law and the Prophets." Our natural egotism writes the demand in large. We would have men consider our claims and care for our interests ; be quick to give their sympathy and help ; what an outsider would call their generosity we take almost as our due. This then is the rule and measure of our duty to them. Now what shall incline our hearts to keep this law ? We are kind without effort to those we love, because we love them. But if a man say, I will do to all as I would be done by because it is right—let him try it. If he do keep the law in deed and in truth, he will find it is love that is making him do it. For who that it governed by a sense of duty only, without love for

his brother man, dare be confident of even thus much, that never by word, look, tone or silence will he bear false witness against that brother? To fulfil the commonest law we must rise into a region above all law, the region of spirit and spontaneity and life. It needs love, it demands love to do our duty toward our neighbor. If that duty means utter carelessness of self and utter devotion to others, it may be thought a difficult service. But difficult it is not ; it is impossible, or else it is easy. You cannot have the deeds of love without the spirit of love ; but waken that spirit and all is done. Love can do easily the hardest things, for what the unloving count an irksome task love changes into joy. Therefore Christ left us no code of social morals, but only His new commandment, "that ye love one another as I have loved you." Dr. Edwin Abbott has put all this in a figure in some such words as these : Suppose a harbor difficult of access on account of the cross currents that beset the mariner. An unskilful pilot will head for the port and hold his course direct, beating against the opposing currents, yet spite of all drifting farther and farther away. The wise seaman who studies the channel will find the main current that sweeps into the harbor, and steering for that, though he must head some points off his course to reach it, will be carried smoothly and easily into the haven where he would be. And so Christ would not aim direct at men's right conduct, for that would be to beat in vain against the surface currents of selfishness and be stranded on the shoals of man's infirmity ; but He found the deep main current of human motive, hidden from all early law-givers, and making a circuit committed Himself to that, in full trust that here lay the true course to the port of righteousness.

There are many to whom distrust of humanity seems wisdom, who hesitate to accept Christ's method and abandon the policy of restraint ; but it would seem that a Christian ought to believe in Christ. He tells us : "The disciple is not above his Master ; but every one that is perfect shall be as his Master." We find that He assumes, spite of all we read about the world of Tiberius Cæsar, that the true nature of man is to love. And this we must believe if we believe that the Christ is Son of Man and the mirror of true humanity. Whether we regard man with

theology as fallen from his primitive godlikeness and now slowly rising again into the image in which he was created; or hold with the evolutionist that man was created in the image of the brute, but with the capacity of throwing off the brute inheritance and rising into the likeness of the Divine: in both views alike the life of man on earth—call it a process of Redemption or of Development—is one thing, the rising out of selfishness into love. And if that is the realization of the human ideal, the attainment of man's native potentiality, then to love is the organic law of our being. As such Christ appealed to it, and to Him the old law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," was more than a command, it was a prophecy; for He said: "The works that I do ye shall do also." It is the Gospel teaching that the life of love, the divine life, is that for which we are made; it is not the vain attempt to be something greater and nobler than we can be. It must always seem that to the world which believes only in self-interest, and to the moralist who trusts only to checks and curbs on the impulses of the lower nature. But though the Gospel seem to the Greek foolishness, and to the Jew a stumbling-block, to us who believe in the Human Son of God it reveals the deep truth of our being. And in the life it calls us to we see the fulfilment of the destiny which is linked with our origin, our growth unto a perfect man, the stature of the fulness of Christ.

THE CONCEPT OF LAW.

[Contributed to the American Institute
of Christian Philosophy.]

BY THE REV. J. Q. ADAMS,

Pastor Westminster Presbyterian Church, San Francisco, Cal.

THE word *law* is no longer applied chiefly to the sphere of human action. The celebrated definition of Hooker is not now the important one. The word itself comes from an old Anglo-Saxon word meaning that which it *laid, set, or fixed*, by one possessing the authority to do it. But natural science has given it a different meaning, and now we can scarcely use the term in morals or religion without danger of being misunderstood, unless it is accurately defined.

Has the word, then, in modern science a clear, sharply defined and uniform meaning? It is surely of some importance to inquire, and having found some definite meaning, to insist upon its right use,—or at least upon consistency in its use by the same writer. The study of a word is specially important when it stands for a concept that is making its influence felt everywhere, and affecting all our forms of thought. Every wrong use of the word leads to confusion in expression, if it does not also reveal confusion in thought. Mr. Austin's complaint in his "Province of Jurisprudence" that such is the misapplication of this word that "the field of jurisprudence and morals has been deluged with muddy speculations," may be lodged against much of what is called popular science. Its use seems, at times, to cause remarkable blindness. If anything can be referred to a "law of nature," many people seem to think that all difficulties are removed, the problem is solved, and mystery has vanished. And not only does popular thought so speak, but too often this is at least the impression made by scientific writers.

If we attempt to analyze and define the concept, dictionaries will give us but little help. Lucretius, from whom modern

science has borrowed some less worthy ideas, is said to be the first to use the expression, "Laws of Nature," in any thing like the modern sense. From his time a steady growth in its use and meaning is seen. Perhaps this growth is still going on, and much of the vagueness in its use may be due to it. There is then all the more need of careful definition. Surely it does not justify the mental intoxication which marks some writers on these laws, shown in their reckless use of the term. They violate their own definition of it,—where they give one,—and often use the term in the same paragraph with different meanings, yet with no hint of it to the reader. Possibly the writers themselves do not always know it. Certainly many of their readers do not.

If by a law of nature anything more is meant than an orderly succession of phenomena, it involves an act of the reasoning powers. It involves mind as well as matter, and is a law of mind as well as of matter. The statement of its concept is not reached by observation alone. It is not a product merely of experience,—of that which we have "sensed." The most important part of it is not that which is external.

Undoubtedly there is unity in the laws of nature and of mind. They are not arrayed against each other. As the Duke of Argyll says: "Mind has no 'moulds' which have not themselves been moulded on the realities of the universe—no 'forms' which it did not receive as a part and a consequence of its unity with the rest of Nature. . . . The order of thought under which the human mind renders intelligible to itself all the phenomena of the universe, is not an order which it invents, but an order which it simply feels and sees."* This unity is not denied, only the fact that mind and nature are both represented in the concept of law is affirmed.

Law is used by many with this simple meaning of orderly succession. At least it is so defined, and then used with such other meanings as theories may demand. It is applied "simply to empirically established connections of phenomena"—*e. g.*, the law of heredity. What a flood of light is thrown upon the subject by the use of this term! It is "a law of nature," and at once it is

* The Unity of Nature, p. 151.

implied that the law is the statement not only of a succession, but of a necessary and definitely ascertained succession. Now this simple idea of law can be presented only "as a matter of fact and not as something necessary. For be it remembered that the whole method of modern science is not something self-evident and exclusively true, but only one among other possible methods." *

But if it be claimed that we cannot stop with this simple idea of law, then it is not nature but mind that compels us, and whose laws we must follow. This brings us to the law of continuity, which has been called by Dr. Newman Smythe, "the Divine Veracity in Nature," and is thus stated by the authors of "The Unseen Universe" (edition of 1886, p. 88): "Assuming the existence of a Supreme Governor of the universe, the principle of Continuity may be said to be the definite expression in words of our trust that He will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion." This is a law of mind, not of nature as commonly understood. But they who have almost deified law are unwilling to admit it. Terms are borrowed from mind with which to describe matter, or from matter to describe mind,—and lo! the mystery is solved, and mind and matter are one, or two sides of the same substance. Punch it this side it is mind, punch the other side it is matter.

It is asserted that the term law is not adapted to express the concept of modern science for which it is used. It excludes what is merely arbitrary, but has too much of the idea of authority and government to suit many people. If those who propose to substitute "mode," or "method," or "rule," would use the new term correctly, there would be no objection. But changing the word does not deliver from the necessity of a personal Ordainer. The idea of necessity, I repeat, does not come from the outside. Law is not in that sense necessary. It "is valid only as the form of what actually happens, not as that of what should be."† It is not something over, and beyond, and before the world, but is immanent in it. And whether it is called law, or mode, or method, it *does* nothing. It is not a *doer* at all. Yet we hear it spoken

* Eucken's Fundamental Concepts, etc., p. 151.

† Eucken, *ibid.*, p. 142.

of as if it were something existing absolutely, and so personified and worshipped. Says Prof. Newcomb: "All we claim is that the laws which determine the motion of the air, the formation of the clouds," etc. The laws do not *determine* any thing. But, of course, it will not do to say so in view of such omniscience as the Professor possesses, for he adds: "We know it to be His [God's] will that the course of nature shall go on unchanged, no matter how it may affect human interests." The reported remark of the First Lord of the Admiralty concerning Prof. Lockyer, the editor of *Nature* finds an application in view of this statement: "The only trouble with Lockyer is that he does not comprehend the difference between the author and the editor of nature." Really we are old-fashioned enough to believe there is quite a difference.

Undoubtedly "physical law" is a vague phrase. By American law we mean law made by Americans, or designed for them. But by physical law we do not mean law made by physics nor by physical authorities. It is law discovered and enunciated by mind, working according to its own laws, in its investigations of nature; and so far as we are capable of affirming anything about the law when discovered, it originates in and is controlled by mind alone. We know of no other origin for it, and this alone accounts for what we do know. It was mind that first conceived and incarnated these laws, whether in things animate or inanimate, in rock, or solar ray, or living tissue. We affirm this with positiveness, and when so affirming it "we feel that every fact in recorded experience cheers us with its amen; for of things unknown there is in all the range of human experience nothing more perfectly unknown than the setting of rules of proportion and methods of procedure without a mind to measure magnitudes and to devise plans, or without a purpose to which those plans have tended."* It is "inconceivable," that the law had no ordainer, or the method no methodizer. The rule is not self-appointed and self-working, the mode is not its own moderator. Of the position thus taken we believe the average common sense of intelligent people is as good a judge as the best trained spe-

*Arthur's Difference between Physical and Moral Law, p. 24.

cialist. The latter knows more laws and more forces, and their various combinations, but as to the real nature of law and its relations to force his advantages over the unscientific are not so great.

The statements thus far made find abundant illustration in literature. Paley long since wisely said: "It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts: without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing." *

Reid says that "the law of gravity never moved a planet," yet there are plenty of people who seem to think that it does, and they make divinities of these laws of nature. Huxley says that "the laws of nature are not the causes of nature." Would that his echoes had always remembered this!

Whewell says: "The laws of matter are the laws which He [God] in His wisdom prescribes to His own acts; His universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of events; His universal agency, the only organ of any efficient force." †

Pres. Porter says: "Law is not a force, but it supposes a force already existing. It expresses a regular mode in which a force acts in producing an effect, either alone or with other forces." ‡

According to Mr. J. S. Mill, a certain fact invariably occurring in certain circumstances and never without them, constitutes a "uniformity." Other facts show the same constancy, and so constitute "uniformities." "These various uniformities, when ascertained by what is regarded as a sufficient induction, we call in common parlance laws of nature." || He would thus confine the term to mere uniform, mechanical sequences, as his illustrations show. But uniformity is no more a law of nature than "multi-formity." His illustrations are taken from a domain where volition is not manifested, and hence his definition excludes the work of mind.

* Natural Theology, chap. i.

† Quoted in Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy, Art. Law.

‡ Princeton Review, 1879. p. 474.

|| Logic, chap. iv.

At almost the other extreme is the definition given by the Rev. Dr. Bradford: "Laws in nature are known only as the result of processes of deduction. From the phenomena of nature and life something is inferred behind those phenomena regulating their appearance. That something in obedience to which similar phenomena result from similar conditions, in our ordinary speech we call laws."* Here the cause of phenomena is the law, yet the writer is hardly consistent with this definition in his address.

Mr. Drummond says, "The fundamental conception of Law is an ascertained working sequence or constant order among the Phenomena of Nature. . . . In its true sense Natural Law predicates nothing of causes. The Laws of Nature are simply statements of the orderly conditions of things in Nature, what is found in Nature by a sufficient number of competent observers. What these laws are in themselves is not agreed. That they have any absolute existence even is far from certain. They are relative to man in his many limitations, and represent for him the constant expression of what he may always expect to find in the world around him. But that they have any causal connection with the things around him is not to be conceived. The natural Laws originate nothing, sustain nothing; they are merely responsible for uniformity in sustaining what has been originated and what is being sustained. They are modes of operation, therefore, not operators; processes, not powers."†

What then does the title of his book mean? "Natural Law," *i. e.*, "a constant order among the phenomena of Nature," which "predicates nothing of causes," in regard to which there is no agreement as to what they "are in themselves," whether they "have any absolute existence being far from certain," which "originate nothing, sustain nothing," "are modes of operation, therefore, not operators; processes, not powers"—"Natural Law," so defined (and I am not now quarrelling with the definition), "in the Spiritual World." Not that "new and detailed analogies of Phenomena" are brought out, for "a profounder task" is undertaken,—to trace "Natural Law in the Spiritual World." "The position we have been led to take is not that the

* Christian Thought, I., 404.

† Natural Law in the Spiritual World, p. 5.

Spiritual Laws are analogous to the Natural Laws, but that *they are the same laws*. It is not a question of analogy, but of *Identity*. . . . The Laws of the invisible are the same Laws, projections of the natural, not supernatural." * What does this mean, unless it implies, what he does come near affirming (p. 22), the identity of matter and spirit, of the natural and supernatural? If this is done, pure materialism or pure idealism would be consistent. It is true he saves himself by emphasizing his method, and assures us that the distinctions between the two are not abolished (p. 21). He takes it for granted, however, that the present method and conclusions of science are final, and that the above statements embody necessary truth. Modern science cannot affirm this.

Notwithstanding Prof. Drummond's alleged discoveries, we are still inclined to believe that it is not only true now, but will continue to be true for some time to come, that "after all the Spiritual World as it appears at this moment, is outside Natural Law" (p. 17), if Natural Law be defined as he has defined it. Suggestive and helpful as his book is, it is not a final statement of the questions discussed.

But sufficient for our purpose has been said. A little modesty might well be asked of some "scientists" as long as there is so much confusion and even contradiction in regard to the concept of law. It illustrates what is needed in some other places as well as among theologians and metaphysicians—greater care in definitions, and greater consistency in the use of important technical terms. It is a scientific man who says, "Purely empirical data are announced as necessary truths, extreme complex events as simple primary forms, the average as something belonging in essence to each individual." † Let us be patient, then, over the alleged conflicts between the natural and the supernatural, the material and the spiritual, the laws of nature and our Father's written Word. We can afford sometimes to be silent and simply wait.

* *Ibid*, p. 8, 9 and 11.

† Eucken, *ibid*, p. 152.

THE RELATION OF BRAIN TO MIND, AS IT AFFECTS MAN'S PERSONALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND IM- MORTALITY.

[Contributed to the American Institute
of Christian Philosophy.]

BY WILLIAM TUCKER, D.D.

WHAT is the relation of Brain and Mind? How are the two related to each other in action? On this subject there are two theories, or to this question two answers are returned. The theory of the materialist is that the brain is the cause of mind. Thought is alone the result of brain action. There is no mind without brain organism. This is the theory of materialism.

In its modern form materialism does not hold that mind is an attribute or property of matter. It holds that thought is the result of the organization or action of matter. But organization is only the state or form in which matter exists; and how can the change of state or alteration of form give to matter properties and attributes it did not possess before? A change of state, or condition, is not a change of nature.

But if matter be changed to mind, there is a change of nature, substance and essence, and not simply a change of state, condition and form. By it matter assumes new attributes, takes on new properties, enters into new relations, and performs new functions. In other words it becomes a new thing. It is no longer matter. It has lost its identity, taken on a new nature, character, attributes, and functions, and should have a new name.

But if organization causes mind, what causes organization?

It is an effect and must have a cause, a change, and demands an adequate force or cause to account for it. Organization reveals intelligence or mind, hence the cause of organization must be mind. Mind then existed before organization, and as its cause. Then the organism is not the cause, but the effect of mind. The reasoning of the materialists is thus seen to be suicidal, and their

logic destroys itself. As a theory of the origin of mind, it is, therefore, untrue.

Mind is revealed as present and operating in nature in the absence of all brain organism. The adaptations and adjustments in the material universe reveal the presence and action of mind without a brain. This proves that the brain is not the cause of all mind. If the divine mind can and does exist apart from brain organism, why may not the human mind exist independent of the brain?

The theory of spiritual philosophy on the relations of brain and mind is this: The brain is the instrument of mind, not its cause. The relation is not causal but instrumental. The brain does not create mind, but serves it. It is the instrument and not the agent in thought and intelligence. It reveals the mind as acting on matter. The brain is the mechanism of intelligence and not its producing and efficient cause. A machine does not move itself. It requires a force from without to move it. So the brain as the mechanism of intelligence, does not move itself; it requires the force of the mind to move it. The relation of brain to thought is the relation of the instrument to the music, and not the relation of the musician to the music. It is the relation of the telegraph to the message, and not the relation of the operator. The first of these relations is instrumental, the second is causal. The one is the relation of the instrument to the phenomenon, the other is the relation of the cause which employs the instrument. The mind works through the brain organism as it sees with the eye, hears with the ear, speaks with the tongue, and works with the hands. All the senses are the instruments of sensation, and not its cause; so the brain is the instrument, and not the cause of thought. With man and animals in this life, and in this state, the brain organism appears to condition thought, but never to cause it.

The nervous, vital, muscular, and mechanical systems in man condition the action of mind and will on matter and the material universe. They are the instruments, the tools with which the mind works. Through these organs the mind comes in contact with material things, and uses, manipulates, and appropriates them. To operate on matter the mind must have a material

instrument; to reveal itself in matter, it must have material organs; to cognize matter it must have material senses.

It is thus seen that the brain as the material instrument of mind conditions its action, attainments, progress, and triumphs, in this world and in this life.

This theory is in harmony with all the activities and manifestations of mind. Morbid mental phenomena are caused by the morbid or diseased condition of the instrument of mind. Imperfect mental action is caused by an imperfectly developed mental instrument. Weak mental action is the result of a weak or small material instrument of mind.

The power of the mind depends very largely upon the quantity and quality of brain employed as the instrument of its activities. The effect of narcotics on mental action is caused by their action on the brain, the material instrument of mind in modifying its condition. Insanity is not a disease of the spiritual entity we call mind, but of the material organ through which it acts. This is evident from the fact that as a disease it can be reached and controlled by the same class of remedies that control other nervous diseases.

The doctrine that the brain is the instrument and not the cause of mind, is held and taught by the most able and learned physiologists in America, England, France and Germany. Dr. Carpenter says : * "The conscious life of every individual man essentially consists in action and reaction between his mind and all that is outside of it. But this action and reaction cannot take place without the intervention of a material instrument whose function is to bridge over the hiatus between the individual consciousness and the external world."

Says Dr. Winslow : "The brain being the material instrument of the intelligence, the physical medium through which the mind manifests its varied powers, it is rational to infer that no change in its structure or investing membranes can exist, without to some extent interfering with or modifying its psychical functions." †

Solly says : "If there is one point in the physiology of brain

* Carpenter's Mental Physiology, p. 12.

† Winslow on Brain and Mind, p. 32.

more unequivocally demonstrated than another, it is that these ganglia are the instruments of mind." *

Muller states : " The action of the mind is dependent on the integrity of the fibrous matter and composition of the brain. Still, this amounts to nothing more than that the brain by its organization is the instrument by which the mind operates and is active." †

Combe says : " We cannot reach the principles of mind to modify its qualities or manner of being. We can reach it only as acting through the medium of, and influenced by its material instrument." ‡

Dr. Ray states : " It can hardly be necessary at the present time to prove the fact of the dependence of the mind on the brain for its external manifestations—that, in short, the brain is the material organ of the intellectual and effective powers. Whatever opinion we may entertain of the nature of mind, it is generally admitted, at least by all enlightened physiologists, that it must of necessity be put in connection with matter, and the brain is the part of the body by means of which this connection is effected." §

" The brain co-operates with the mind and with the instinctive principle in acts of intellection or the instinctive functions. Although the soul be an immaterial and imperishable substance, it is so associated with the brain that a healthy state of this organ is generally necessary to the ordinary functions of mind." §

Dr. Paine also states : " The brain is especially subservient to the soul and the principle of instinct." ¶ This profound physiologist is very clear on this subject.

" If the brain is the organ or instrument of mind, as almost everyone admits, then it is easy to see how the latter can have influence on the circulation. For as the mind cannot act without a due degree of vital energy imparted to the brain, it follows that this energy may be so largely applied to this organ as to leave

* Solly on the Brain, p. 335.

† Muller's Physiology, pp. 817, 839.

‡ Combe on Insanity, p. 76.

§ Ray's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, p. 138.

§ Paine's Institutes of Medicine, p. 362.

¶ Paine on the Soul, p. 30.

insufficient stimulation to other organs."* The very common sense of prostration from over mental work is here shown to result from the drain which the brain makes upon the blood supply as the instrument of mind.

Upon this subject Dr. Hatch speaks with great clearness: "The soul and the body are two substances, distinct from each other, but reciprocally united. The former acts in and upon the latter, the soul acting upon the body, and the body acting from the soul. The communication of motion by thought, which we ascribe to the spirit, is as evident as that of impulse, which we ascribe to the body."† This action of the soul on the body as its instrument of motion and work is a fact of common experience.

The great German physiologist Blumenbach states "that the mind is closely connected with the brain as the material condition of mental phenomena."‡

According to Magendie, a celebrated French physiologist: "The brain is the material instrument of thought. This is proved by a multitude of facts and experiments."§ The language of this eminent specialist in the science of physiology is that the brain is the instrument of thought, not its cause or agent.

Dr. Calderwood says: "As, however, it is admitted that the brain is the organ of mind, and this is expressly maintained by those who hold the distinct nature and higher functions of mind—all disorder or disease of the brain must present facts of importance towards constituting a theory of the relations of mind and brain."§ Organ is used here in the sense of instrument. This is evident from the doctrine held by the persons referred to as using it.

Dr. Mason Good, speaking of intellect, sensation and muscular motion, says: "All these diversities of vital energy are now well known to be dependent on the organ of the brain as the instrument of the intellectual powers."¶

Dr. Neil Arnott, in his "Elements of Physics," writes: "The

* The Laws of Health. By A. Alcott, M.D. p. 214.

† The Constitution of Man. By B. F. Hatch, M.D. p. 35.

‡ Elliotson's Translation of Blumenbach's Physiology, p. 196.

§ Combe's Phrenology, p. 30.

§ The Relations of Mind and Brain. By Henry Calderwood, p. 362.

¶ Good's Study of Medicine, 2d ed., chap. iv., p. 34.

laws of mind which man can discover by reason, are not laws of independent mind, but of mind connected with body, and influenced by the bodily condition."* This presents the physiological side of mental action.

"Certain affections of particular portions of the medullary substance, generally occupying some central situation, are, in a way that is totally inexplicable, connected with affections of the sentient and intelligent principle—a principle which we cannot any otherwise conceive, than as being distinct from matter ; although we know it is capable of being affected by matter, operating through the medium of this nervous substance, and that it is capable of reacting upon matter through the same medium."†

This opinion of Dr. Roget, an eminent English physiologist, confirms the doctrine that the mind is distinct from matter, though being associated with it in the mental actions of life. This he makes very clear in his explanation of our sensations. He says : "Although the corporeal or physical change taking place in the sensorium and the mental affection we term sensation are linked together by some inscrutable bond of connection, they are in their nature as perfectly distinct as the subjects in which they occur, that is, as mind is distinct from matter. Our sensations, though purely mental affections, yet as they are dependent upon the use of physical instruments, are regulated by the physical laws of the living frame, whereas the perceptions derived from these sensations being the result of intellectual processes are subject to the laws that regulate the mental rather than the physical phenomena. It is certain from innumerable facts that in the present state of our existence the operations of the mind are conducted by the instrumentality of bodily organs. As the eye and the ear are the instruments by which we see and hear, so the brain is the instrument by which we retrace and combine ideas, and by which we reason, remember, and invent. To assert that thought can be a property of matter is to extend the meaning of the term matter to that with which we cannot perceive it has any relation. All that we know of mat-

* Arnott's Physics.

† Animal and Vegetable Physiology. By Peter Mark Roget, M.D. p. 260.

ter has regard to space ; nothing that we know of the properties and affections of mind has any relation whatever to space. A similar incongruity is contained in the proposition that thought is the function of the brain. It is not the brain which thinks any more than it is the eye which sees, though each of these material organs are used by the mind. That which sees and thinks is the mind."* In thought the brain is the instrument, the mind is the agent. We are conscious that the intelligent and efficient cause of all thought is the mind itself. This is a universal conviction. It is common to all men, and an element in all rational experience. If the mind is the cause and the brain the instrument of thought, feeling and volition, then is man a spiritual person, endowed with intellect, emotion, and will. In his nature there is unity, spirituality and liberty. He is a free, rational, responsible and moral cause. He is the conscious author of his own actions, and the responsible cause of his own conduct. He does not live under a law of necessity, but under a law of freedom. In man's own nature we find the essential elements of morals, religion, responsibility, and moral government.

These are all real and true if man's nature is reliable and trustworthy. If consciousness, reason, conscience, and experience are true, then are we free, personal, and responsible, and duty, obligation, righteousness, justice, equity, ethics and piety are based upon and grow out of man's nature and wants. Here we find the natural foundation of morals and religion. They belong to man as spiritual, personal, and free. They are necessary to his full development and perfect happiness.

The existence of a machine proves there is a machinist for whose use it was made ; the existence of a musical instrument proves the existence of a musician who can use it ; so the existence of the brain proves the existence of the rational person and agent who uses it in thought, feeling and action. This conclusion is rational, logical and true. The very use of the brain as a part of the nervous mechanism proves that there is a rational mind, and free will back of it. This proves the existence of

* *Animal and Vegetable Physiology.* By Peter Mark Roget. Vol. ii., pp. 358-9.

man's personal and free spiritual nature that is distinct from and independent of the body. The material instrument conditions the action of the soul on and through matter, but it does not condition its existence and purely spiritual activities. The mind or soul, as a spiritual entity and personality, is immortal, for no real entity and essential being is ever destroyed or annihilated. No atom of matter or pulsation of force is ever lost. All being is persistent and immortal. You may destroy the instrument of thought, but that does not destroy the rational agent and spiritual cause of thought. The destruction of the organ is not the destruction of the musician. The death of the physical organism through which the mind works, does not prove that the rational and free mind is not immortal. It is essential being and life, and must, therefore, live forever.

ONE CAUSE OF THE INCREASE OF CRIME.—Another important multiplier of crime is the exclusively intellectual character of our present system of education; to repeat a remark of Locke, which is as true to-day as when he made it, our "schools fit us for the university rather than for the world." Neglecting, not without an assumption of superior knowledge, the traditions which still surround us of an education which was perfect in its adaptation of means to the end, and in which our Puritan and Pilgrim fathers had anticipated Rousseau, that great apostle of educational reform, we have declared that, as the intellectual faculties are superior to and dominate all others, they alone shall be cultivated, to the exclusion of the body and in forgetfulness of their interdependence. With the same fatuity, want of foresight, and indifference to the true purpose of education,—the development of all the powers of body and mind,—we have decreed the exclusion of religious and manual training, and the neglect of those faculties which are most potent in the formation and determination of a broad, stable, and upright character.—*George R. Stetson in New Princeton Review.*

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

PROF. ORMAND'S ARTICLE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THEISTIC LOGIC.—Have you never read an argument that you could neither accept nor reject? You could not accept it because there remained an undefined misgiving as to its conclusions. You could not reject it because you could point out no fatal objection to it. And so you go forward with a sense of mental unrest as to the questions. Years ago I had just such an experience in studying Sir Wm. Hamilton's famous law of the conditioned. That great philosopher said from the Christian side what Herbert Spencer has said from the side of atheistic science; namely, that God could not be known. About the only difference being that Hamilton speaks of Him as the unknowable and Spencer as the Unknowable. Hamilton could not capitalize the word, as Spencer has done, for in spite of his law he found something back of the unknowable to be begun with a capital, even God. Yet his law seemed to be well founded. He held that God is infinite, that He is absolute, that He is not conditioned. That our minds being finite, limited, conditioned, we cannot reach to the conception of the infinite, for we cannot explore the infinite. If we stop short of an infinite conception we stop short of God, because God is infinite. That we must stop short of such a conception is evident from the postulate that the limited cannot cover in conception the unlimited. That is to say the Infinite is unknowable. If we speak of the Absolute we cannot know that. Because we do not know anything apart from its relationship to other things. In the mind of the author of this law a being could be absolute only when all relationship ceased. That indeed seemed to be true, for as long as there is anything related to such a being the being has at least one contingency, and is not, therefore, absolute. But if all related things are to be abstracted from a being before the being can become absolute, then there remains nothing by which you can describe the absolute even to your own consciousness. In other words, the absolute becomes the unknowable, the absolute God the unknown God, and the unknowable God.

Further, God being absolute in His nature He is uncondi-

tioned, because the absolute is unrelated to anything by which it is possible to condition it. We know other things because they are conditioned, we know ourselves by reason of the same fact. Apart from conditions we know nothing. God being unconditioned He is unknowable. All this is stating the same truth in different forms. Or rather let us call it the same proposition in different forms. We went through all this when we were at school, ten years ago. Dr. Granbery insisted that Sir William Hamilton himself, like other men, did conceive of the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, for he thought and wrote about it. How could he talk of a thing until he had conceived it as an idea more or less distinct? So his great law of the conditioned seemed based upon a fallacy. But then where was the fallacy? And so for these years we have wandered in search of rest, holding the faith despite the clouds and fogs of metaphysics. With certain great facts of experience definitely settled, faith's wings have flown upward beyond these clouds, and we have dwelt without doubt in the sunlight of God's presence. Somehow we have felt that we do know God. If we do not know Him all our highest instincts have become traitors. And if that be true we are not sure that we know anything whatever. We do not claim to have solved all the difficulties pertaining to this subject, nor to have solved anything, really, but we have seen the solution of something here discussed recently in an able article in "CHRISTIAN THOUGHT" by Prof. Alex. T. Ormand, Ph.D., "Some Aspects of Theistic Logic." Dr. Ormand very justly says that the absolute is a mere abstraction. The metaphysically absolute does not exist as a substantial entity. When we say of God that He is absolute we do not mean that He is non-related, we only mean that He is not dependent. We know that He is related. When we speak of God as Infinite we mean a person with boundless power, love, wisdom, and other attributes. The person we know, though we could never know the infinite, for that is another abstraction. However, both faith and reason must lead us to say that the person whom we know as God is infinite. The unconditioned is another abstraction, and has no objective existence.

I am well aware that the average reader takes but little

interest in questions of this sort. Yet let him be thankful that such men as Professor Ormand do take interest in them. They lay a rational foundation for faith. Faith confirmed by reason is the more restful for the confirmation. Faith illumined by reason is more intelligent, and it is satisfied and stable because it is intelligent. A faith that despises reason will almost surely degenerate into feebleness, or into credulity, or it will run off into fanatical delusion. For one I feel we ought to "be not children in understanding," and that we ought to be able to give a reason for the hope that is in us. Men do wrong when they refuse to lay hold of anything that gives strength and stability to their faith. The evidence which arises from communion with God can never be dispensed with. The heart may rest upon such evidence, when no other is attainable, and when unattacked by a "vain philosophy." But the ministry of this age ought to be able to grapple with such things. I know of no periodical in the world that will be so helpful in such matters as "CHRISTIAN THOUGHT." A minister who desires to be thoroughly furnished can hardly afford to be without it.—*Rev. James A. Anderson in South Western Methodist.*

THE LICK TELESCOPE.—The *San Francisco Examiner* publishes a letter written by Prof. Edward S. Holden of the Lick Observatory, dated July 22, in which he says: "Our brief experience with the large telescope has already taught us that our duty is to prove all things anew—not to take anything for granted. We have hardly looked at any object without finding something new and interesting and important. It may be worth while to give a few examples of what I mean by this. There is no object in the heavens which is better known to possessors of both large and small telescopes than the ring nebula in Lyra. It is the brightest of the nebulae, and its wonderful shape makes it an interesting link between a planet with rings, like Saturn, and the primitive formless nebula which La Place assumes as the starting-point of his nebular hypothesis. It has important analogies to rings of stars and to star clusters also. This bright nebula has been looked at by every amateur and professional astronomer, by every large and small telescope, in the world. Sir

John Herschel describes it as a ring and figures a small star following it. Lord Rosse, with his 6-foot reflector, gave five small stars outside of it and none inside. Mr. Lassell, with his 4-foot reflector, figures it with thirteen faint stars in an oval outside and one inside the ring. So I saw it with the Washington refractor of 26 inches aperture in 1875. Our first look at this nebula with the 36-inch telescope showed a great variety of new detail, and a careful examination has disclosed to us not only the single star inside, but likewise eleven others inside the inner oval or projected on the bright nebulosity between the outer and the inner ovals. Not only this, but it is obvious that the plan on which this nebula is built is that of a series of ellipses or ovals. There is first the ring of faint stars outside the nebula ; then the outer and inner bounding ovals of the nebulosity ; next a ring of faint stars around the edges of the interior ring, and finally a number of stars critically situated on the various parts of the nebulosity and outer oval. The object is entirely a new one in its appearance and in its suggestions as seen here. It is so with other objects likewise. For example, a transit of the shadow of one of Jupiter's satellites recently observed has given us quite new ideas on the subject of the refraction and density of the atmosphere of this planet, and so on with other objects. Our final conclusion is, therefore, that we have to use the large telescope in a new way. There is absolutely nothing to be taken for granted, and there is no object in the whole heavens which we must not observe as if viewed for the first time. Our duty is to prove all things—at the same time recollecting all things that have gone before. In this respect the position of the Lick Observatory is quite unique."

THE American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, has received \$6,000 from Miss Emily Phillips, to establish the Henry M. Phillips endowment fund for essays on general jurisprudence. The annual income is to be awarded for the best essay on general jurisprudence. When will some judicious and liberal person endow a lectureship in the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, to promote the discussion of some special topic ? The Institute is ripe for it.

MEMBERS of the Institute, who have any paper to submit to be read at some monthly meeting, will please correspond with the Secretary, Mr. Charles M. Davis, 4 Winthrop Place, N. Y.

IN the absence of the editor this number has been mainly prepared by another hand.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE regular monthly meeting of the Institute was held in its rooms, No. 4 Winthrop Place, Oct. 4, 1888, at 8 P.M. The President not being able to be present, Rev. Edward M. Deems was called to the chair. The devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. Jesse F. Forbes, of New York. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. The Secretary also read the names of those who had become members since the meeting held in June, as follows :

J. O. A. Clark, D.D., LL.D., Macon, Ga.; Mr. Horace P. Gates, New York ; Rev. C. E. Walker, Twin Brooks, Dakota ; Mr. Maurice Minton, New York ; Mr. F. Babcock Miller, New York ; Rev. B. B. Loomis, Ph.D., West Troy, N. Y.; Rev. David N. Lewis, A.B., Valley Falls, N. Y.; Mrs. William Griffin, West Troy, N. Y.; Prof. John J. Tigert, M.A., D.D., Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.; Rev. Cyrus A. Johnson, Batavia, N. Y.; J. Allen Osmun, D.S., Newark, N. J.; Mrs. Leander Stickney, Albany, N. Y.; Mr. Charles E. Rhineland, A.B., New York ; Hon. A. Herr Smith, Lancaster, Pa.; Horace C. Hovey, D.D., Bridgeport, Conn.; Mr. Edmund O. Hovey, M.A., Waterbury, Conn.; Rev. J. H. Robinson, A.M., Troy, N. Y.; Prof. James C. VanBenschoten, LL.D., Middletown, Conn.; Mrs. Catherine S. Smith, Albany, N. Y.; Mrs. J. W. Hutt, Slingerland, N. Y.; Mrs. E. C. Henderer, Castleton, N. Y.; Prof. Geo. M. Powell, Philadelphia, Pa.; Mrs. C. C. Bishop, Morristown, N. J.; Mr. Aaron E. Carpenter, Philadelphia, Pa.; Mr. Augustus D. Shepard, Plainfield, N. J.; Rev. Samuel W. Clark, Paterson, N. J.; Rev. George W. Knox, D.D., Tokio, Japan ; Miss Sarah

F. Davis, Bloomfield, N. J.; Rev. John Faville, M.S., Appleton, Wis.; Mr. Mark P. Emery, Portland, Me.; Prof. Charles F. Himes, A.M., Ph.D., Carlisle, Pa.; Rev. John Y. Dobbins, M.A., Trenton, N. J.; Andrew J. Ingersoll, M.D., Corning, N. Y.; Rev. H. D. Groves, Fayette, Mo.; Rev. Charles W. Millard, A.M., New York; Rev. Henry E. Cooke, A.M., Manchester, N. H.; Mr. Newland T. DePauw, A.M., New Albany, Ind.; Rev. J. M. Carvell, A.M., Ph.D., Harrisburg, Pa.; Hon. Thos. B. Redding, Ph.D., F.R., M.S., New Castle, Ind.; John D. Hammond, D.D., President Central College, Fayette, Mo.

The paper of the evening was by John C. Clyde, D.D., of Bloomsburg, New Jersey, whose subject was, "The Christian Temper and Scientific Thought." The paper and subject were discussed by Rev. Jesse F. Forbes and Mr. Stephen N. Wilder. On motion of Mr. Phœbus W. Lyon seconded by Rev. Henry A. Dows, it was resolved that the thanks of the Institute are due and are hereby tendered Dr. Clyde for his able and instructive paper, and that a copy be requested for publication in *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT*. On motion adjourned.

At the monthly meeting held Nov. 1st, the President being absent on account of continued illness, Mr. Phœbus W. Lyon, of Summit, New Jersey, was called to the chair. The devotional exercises were led by the Rev. Edward M. Deems, of New York. After the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting, the Secretary announced the following names of new members:

Rev. John D. Hammond, Fayette, Missouri; Prof. George L. Curtiss, M.D., D.D., De Pauw Univ., Ind.; Prof. John B. De Motte, Ph.D., De Pauw Univ., Ind.; Prof. S. L. Bowman, D.D., S.T.D., Dean, Theological School, De Pauw Univ., Ind.; Donald G. Sutherland, A.M., LL.B., Toronto, Canada; James H. Jackson, M.D., Dansville, New York.

The regular paper of the evening was by Prof. I. Ferris Lockwood, of New York, whose subject was "Force in its Relation to Theism." The subject and paper were discussed by Mr. S. H. Wilder, Rev. E. M. Deems, and Franklin Burdge, Esq.

A vote of thanks was offered to the Lecturer for his interesting and valuable paper, and a copy was requested for publication in *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT*.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, Publisher and Bookseller, 71 Bible House, New York.]

JESUS HIS OWN PROOF.—Rev. Dr. D. C. Kelley has issued a small book of 185 pages (Nashville, Tenn., Publishing House of the M. E. Church South: paper 25 cents, cloth 50 cents) containing much acute and some profound thinking. Its title is "A Short Method with Modern Doubt." It is in three parts: I. Jesus His own Proof; II. The Laws of Nature; III. Correspondence with "Spinoza." The Doctor's correspondent who takes the name of "Spinoza" is represented as a very acute and learned lawyer, whose training is unsurpassed by that of any man in the State of Tennessee. When Part. II. was published it was criticised by "Spinoza." He challenged Dr. Kelley's position that outside of the visible universe and its action, there is a personal will putting in motion and continuously controlling all things. On that issue the correspondence was made and maintained on both sides with great ability and courtesy. It would be difficult to find the argument against theism more ingeniously put than by Dr. Kelley's correspondent, who seems to have given special attention to the literature against Christianity, and yet even he seemed to feel at last that the Doctor's position was impregnable.

As a specimen of Dr. Kelley's style, we give a few paragraphs, from the second part of his book. He is showing that if we give human limitations to the work of the four Evangelists, the indications that they have achieved the impossible are overwhelming:

"If we assume Jesus of Nazareth to have been a creation of these writers, aided never so much by traditional, mythical, and rationalistic contributions to His life, it is still to be remembered that this creation is far more than a portrayal of the ideal man. He is man, and yet more than man. The attempt to give a

place to the supernatural in fictitious literature has been again and again repeated. Let us look to the success which has been attained. We take a few only of the very best examples. Shakespeare, in his ghosts and witches, attempts a portrayal of the supernatural—his ghosts strut and witches mumble on a plane greatly below his men and women; they neither please nor impress; they are obviously the weakest of his creations. The greatest known genius falters in the effort to give us the more than man.

“Milton makes perhaps the most ambitious attempt to be found in literature in his Satan—the real hero of *Paradise Lost*—to give us an ideal creation in the supernatural world. Satan is well-known to be a failure in ideal unity—a more complete failure in the designed effect of the creation in its entirety. Milton, of course, purposes Satan to be repulsive at every stage of his fallen career. Often he becomes the more attractive of the actors in the terrible drama. But more than these defects—the creation is doomed as a failure by the exaggeration of the physical machinery of the drama at the expense of its moral elements. In other words, the grand genius of a Milton, furnished with its imperial and almost sublime imagination, breaks down in the attempt to transcend the bounds of the natural world and give us pictures of the supernatural. Bulwer, to whom we are accustomed to award the highest place in modern fiction, has more than once essayed the same ambitious feat. In ‘*Strange Story*’ he brings the concentrated powers of his genius to give the unique character of Margrave—who is man and yet less than man. For this creation he gained so little the interest of his readers that all critics have set down the book a failure—this notwithstanding it has in it some of the finest chapters Bulwer has ever written.

“Looking through the books in a store at a railroad crossing in Texas, while waiting for a train some months ago, nothing could be found in the mass of trash except ‘*The Wondrous Tale of Alroy*,’ by Disraeli. In this book the scholar, the man of genius, the statesman of our own day, brings the passionate blood of the Jew to portray the character and achievements of a modern Jewish Messiah; yet no one can read this effort of a man holding the highest

place among successful men, and compare the most nearly inspired scene in it—Alroy's call to his work, which came to him in the cavern in the mountain—with Jesus' temptations in the wilderness, without instinctively and painfully seeing in Disraeli's creation the poverty of human genius attempting the supernatural; while to every healthful mind the picture drawn by Matthew thrills with the presence of a power above and beyond all human genius. Was the Jewish peasant in better condition to create than the English statesman? The contrast we seek to portray is seen nowhere in modern literature so vividly as in comparing Edwin Arnold's 'Light of Asia' with the Gospels of the New Testament. Arnold has chosen from the religions of the past, outside of the Christian, the brightest character to be found in the multiform list of religious heroes and deities. To his work he has brought the genius of the past, hereditary and individual scholarship of a high order; the whole wealth of Christian culture baptizes his theme with a new light, and gives to his history of Buddha new and higher meanings, never dreamed of by his most devoted followers. In other words, Arnold has not only brought from the East all the facts of a most attractive and wonderful life, but has read into those facts by the light of Christianity a meaning having the effulgence of a culture nowhere to be found in Buddhist regions. The religious tenets of Asia, the mythical growth of centuries, are taken in hand by the European poet, scholar, genius, and enthusiast—the best imaginable combination to secure success, if success be possible. Perhaps the finest picture in the poem is the dead infant in the arms of the young mother brought to Buddha. To recover the child she is sent by Gautama to procure black mustard-seed at a house into which death or sorrow has never come. Wearied with her unavailing search, she returns to tell Buddha, in tones of deep pathos, of the kindness of the people in offering everywhere the seed, but the constant failure to find a place where the shadow had not gone before. Compare this with Jesus at the grave of Lazarus. With unhesitating instinct the mind settles down to the conviction that the chasm which divides the characters of Jesus and Buddha is one that no human genius can bridge. In the words of the one is the wail of oppressed human helplessness;

in the other, the calm majesty of one who touches humanity from above. Every instinct of brain and heart cries of the one, 'This is man, and only man;' of the other, 'Never man spake like this man.' Of all the attempts to produce a character of this unique pattern—man, yet more than man—the most ambitious in literature is this of Jesus of Nazareth. Others have given us glimpses of gods who have appeared for a brief hour in human history; again we have, as in the case of Buddha and others, human beings who are aspiring toward the divine; but Jesus has come from the Father—is one with Him, has come to show us the Father, lives among men in continuous daily converse and action until the picture of His life has had time to be viewed in every desirable light. All other writers have failed in their lower attempts. How does it occur that these four plain men have succeeded in this higher and infinitely more difficult sphere? They say their recital is of the world of historic fact, and not an ideal creation; that the success is not their creation but is in His life. Does not the critical reason adopt this as the only legitimate solution?"

MESSIANIC PROPHECY.—By Prof. Charles A. Briggs (C. Scribner's Sons, crown, octavo, \$2.50). The title of this book is too narrow to give one an adequate idea of its contents; for the author deals not only with Old Testament prophecies concerning the Messiah Himself, but also treats of prophecy in general, and Hebrew prophecy in particular, and Old Testament prophecies concerning the Holy Land, the Kingdom of God, the Holy Priesthood, and so on. The author himself feels the narrowness of the title, and speaks of it, but points out how difficult it would be to improve on it.

The secondary title is a help, and also indicates in a few words the design of the book: "Messianic Prophecy: the Prediction of the Fulfilment of Redemption through the Messiah."

In his preface the author claims that "Messianic Prophecy is the most important of all themes; for it is the ideal of redemption given by the Creator to our race at the beginning of its history, and it ever abides as the goal of humanity until the divine plan has been accomplished." He claims that but few of the many who

have written on this subject have shown any real interest in the theme for itself; and that it has never been grasped as a whole and treated by a comprehensive method.

Prof. Briggs contends that Messianic Prophecy does not end with the Old Testament, but is continued in the New Testament. "Hence," says he (p. viii.), "it divides itself into three great sections: the Messianic Prophecy of the Old Testament; the Messianic Idea of the New Testament; and the Messianic Ideal in the history of Christian doctrine." The volume before us is the first of a series of three by the author intended to cover the three sections of the subject. And so he warns his readers against surprise at the slight reference made in the work to the *fulfilment* of the prophecies. That subject belongs in a separate succeeding volume.

The first chapter is devoted to the subject of Hebrew Prophecy. It opens with a definition of prophecy in general, stating that, "Prophecy is religious instruction"—a definition which is too broad and vague. This definition is followed by a description of the three phases of prophecy common to all the religions of the world: the dream, the vision, and enlightened spiritual discernment. Then narrowing the discussion to Hebrew Prophecy, the author deals a ringing blow on the one side to the Montanistic theory that the Hebrew prophet was a passive instrument of the Divine Spirit; and on the other side to the naturalistic theory that the Hebrew prophet was merely a man of the wondrous insight and foresight of a genius.

The author next declares that the distinguishing features of the prophet of Jahveh are that he is "personally called and endowed by Jahveh with the prophetic spirit. He speaks in the name of Jahveh and in His name alone. He is one of a series of prophets who guide in the development of the Hebrew religion. He absorbs and reproduces previous prophecy. He transmits prophecy with confidence to his successors. Hebrew prophecy is an organism of redemption." On this last point Prof. Briggs insists enthusiastically all through his book. "Hebrew prophecy," he next claims, "originates in a personal revelation of God to man in theophany. It is communicated to successive prophets by the influence of the Spirit of God." The Hebrew prophet knows

that he is called to be a prophet just as a Christian knows that he is a child of God, even as the Apostle writes, "The Spirit also beareth witness with our spirits that we are sons of God." The test of prophecy says Prof. Briggs, and he says it is infallible, "is its entire conformity to truth and fact." (Deut. xviii., 14-22.) Then he contends for the development of prophecy saying that "The prophets as an order of preachers and teachers constitute a grand stairway, advancing prophet after prophet in linked succession until the organism of prophecy is completed and the revelation of the Messiah is at hand." In the next section the Prophetic Ideal is set forth as being the redemption of mankind. In this connection the author pays the following fine and orthodox tribute to Hebrew Prophecy. "Hebrew Prophecy presents us a system of instruction which cannot be explained from the reflections of the human mind. It gives us a view of redemption as the final goal of the world's history, which is heaven-born, and not a human invention. Demanding the most searching criticism from the start, it has endured that criticism in all ages—such a criticism as no other prophecy has been able to endure—such as has, in fact, beaten into ruins all other prophecy."

The second chapter of the work before us treats of Predictive Prophecy, showing that it is a comparatively small section of Hebrew Prophecy, but exceedingly important because of "its content, the central nucleus of the prophetic ideal, the completion of redemption through the Messiah." The sources of prediction have been necromancy, divination, astrology, and the sacred lot. The Hebrew prophets were forbidden to go to any of these sources excepting the last, whose decision was the expression of the divine will. "Jahveh was the sole source of prediction." The forms of Hebrew predictive prophecy, the author next urges, are "not real and literal representations of the future, but ideal and symbolical." In this connection he uses this unsymbolical language: "The efforts of interpreters to determine from the numbers of Daniel the interval to the first advent have ignominiously failed. The efforts of interpreters to measure the times of the Apocalypse and indicate the times of the second advent are worse than ridiculous. Those who indulge in such follies are blindly laboring to undermine and destroy Hebrew Prophecy and

the Bible itself, of which it is an essential part." The limits of prediction are then defined to be the psychological and physical features of human nature. The predictive prophet sees only the final goal, his prophecy rises above temporal measurements, and has in it an uncertain factor "depending on the ever varying relations of God and man in the interplay of human freedom and divine law."

Messianic Prophecy is now taken up and declared to be the "central theme and the culmination of Hebrew Prophecy. Messianic Prophecy is the prediction of the completion of redemption through the Messiah. It is an advancing organism expressing in ever richer and fuller representations the ideal of redemption through the Messiah." Prof. Briggs here states, that the key to Old Testament prophecy is the first advent of the Messiah, which unlocks a large number of its chambers. But the key of the entire system will not be given until the second advent.

The third chapter of Messianic Prophecy is devoted to an account of Primitive Messianic Ideas: the Protevangelism, the Blessing of Shem, the Blessing of Abraham and the Blessing of Judah. Here Prof. Briggs accepts the work of the divisive critics, who make the Pentateuch to consist of four distinct narratives (a theory never proven), and says in a foot-note that "the few objectors to this division among Hebrew scholars display their own unfamiliarity with the practical work of criticism" (!) In this and other parts of his work the author speaks of the "poem of creation," and the "poem of the fall," and finds most of the Messianic predictions to be in poetry, many passages appearing in his work in poetical form which do not so appear in the A. V. or the R. V. In justice to Prof. Briggs, however, it should be remembered that the poetic form of a piece of writing does not mean that it is fiction.

The fourth chapter traces the Messianic Idea through the Mosaic age, showing the progress made. The primitive ideas concerned the ideal of mankind, the conflict with evil and the divine advent. The Messianic ideas of the Mosaic age rise to a consideration of the universal inheritance of mankind as mediated by the central inheritance of Israel, and to a consideration of the second Moses, whose prophetic ministry will complete the revelation of God.

In the succeeding chapters of the work the author traces the Messianic ideas through the Davidic period, the times of the earlier prophets: Joel, Amos and Hosea; the period of Isaiah and his contemporaries, Zechariah (I.) and Micah; the period of Jeremiah and his contemporaries, Zephaniah, Habakkuk, Ps. l. (*et al.*); the prophecy of Ezekiel; the prophetic voices out of the exile (one of which is that of "the great unknown," claimed to be the writer of a large part of what is called usually the prophecy of Isaiah); the prophets of the restoration of Zion; Daniel's prophecies; and those of the prophets of the restoration, viz., Ps. xciii. (*et al.*), Haggai, Zechariah (II.) and Malachi.

Numerous quotations and original translations of high merit appear in this part of the book. The translations often throw a flood of light on hitherto dark passages. The least satisfactory part of the book is in the section of it where his efforts to arrange the Scriptures in chronological order by means of the apparatus and methods of higher criticism, although manifesting tremendous industry on the part of Prof. Briggs, are far from arriving at unquestionable results.

The last chapter is a summing up of the contents of the whole of Messianic Prophecy, and is entitled "The Messianic Ideal." This ideal, as unfolded in the Old Testament, contains these elements: the ideal of mankind; the conflict with evil; the Divine Advent; the Holy Land; Jahveh, the Father and Husband; the Kingdom of God; the Day of Jahveh; the holy priesthood; the Faithful Prophet and the new covenant.

The author closes his book with this language, which in its unction, its orthodoxy and its beauty, must be satisfactory to many Bible students who are bound to protest against Prof. Briggs' leaning toward the rationalistic school of "Higher Critics":

"Hebrew prophecy vindicates its reality, its accuracy, its comprehensive ideality as a conception of the Divine mind, as a deliverance of the Divine energy, as a system constructed by holy men who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit. The Messiah of prophecy and the Messiah of history, the redemption of Hebrew prediction and the redemption of Christian possession, are not diverse, but entirely harmonious in the Lamb, who was foreordained before the foundation of the

world, but was manifest in these last times of its history, who accomplished it in time and eternity. Hebrew prophecy springs from Divinity as its source and ever-flowing inspiration, and it points to Divinity as its fruition and complete realization. None but God could give such prophecy; none but God can fulfil such prophecy. The ideal of prophecy and the real of history correspond in Him, who is above the limits of time and space and circumstance, who is the Creator, Ruler and Saviour of the world, and who alone has the wisdom, the grace and the power to conceive the idea of redemption, and then accomplish it in reality through the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, and second advent of His only begotten and well-beloved Son, very God of very God, the Light and Life and Saviour of the world."

EDWARD M. DEEMS.

A. D. F. RANDOLPH & CO., New York, publish a very excellent volume which we have used for Sunday reading in our family, and found it instructive. Its title is "*The I Ams of Christ.*" It is a valuable "Contribution to Christological Thought" as its secondary title calls it. The name describes the plan of the book. "*I am*" is a phrase which Christ often employed. "*Before Abraham was I am;*" "*I am the way;*" "*I am the truth;*" and others, familiar to all Bible readers. On these phrases, the Rev. Dr. Samuel H. Gilsy has founded fourteen essays full of good thinking and very edifying. The arguments in the first essay on "*Christ's Self-Consciousness True God-Consciousness*" seem very strong and convincing.

ANOTHER good work comes from the Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, in Nashville. (\$1). It is from the pen of Rev. W. C. Black, D.D. The title is "*Christian Womanhood.*" It is the best thesaurus of facts concerning womanhood with which we are acquainted. The author has evidently given painstaking thought and care to the preparation of this volume. After showing the degraded condition of woman under the highest pagan civilizations, he demonstrates that it was Christianity that began to raise her to higher levels, and that since the Reformation the good work has been going forward.

Dr. Black's style is clear and manly. We mention this last because women like a manly style and we wish thousands of women to read this excellent volume.

EACH head of a Christian family should pay attention to the formation of a Christian Family Library in his own household. It should be formed very slowly, perhaps not more than three volumes being added each month. It should have good and entertaining reading for Sundays and for winter nights, and each member of the family should have a voice in its selection. If made too fast, the books will not be read : if selected by any one member of the family, some may not be interested.

IN every Christian family talk about books, the views presented in didactic books and the characters described in stories, would have a tendency to divert conversation from gossip about neighbors.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Round Lake, N. Y.; July 28th, 1888.]

BY PROF. GEORGE S. FULLERTON,

Of the University of Pennsylvania.

WHETHER the attitude of a thoughtful man of our time towards Christianity be one of assent or dissent, it is yet hardly conceivable that he should not feel a deep interest in it both as a visible force playing no mean part in the course of the world's history, and as a way of looking at the world which addresses itself as reasonable to a very large number of reasonable people around him, and in which they find comfort and consolation. He will surely be anxious to really understand its teachings and to do them no injustice, if only that he may judge them fairly. There is nothing to gain by misconception, and it may well be there is something to lose.

If he is wise, he will bear in mind that in passing judgment upon so large a matter as Christianity,—born in the ancient world, incorporated into the life and the institutions of the mediæval and the modern worlds, varying somewhat in form and formulæ with the varying conditions of successive ages, and with the mental characteristics of different peoples,—he will bear in mind that in passing judgment upon such a matter there is no little danger of confounding the accidental with the essential, the phase of Christianity of any particular time or people with Christianity itself. And should one who has fallen into this error happen to light upon a phase peculiarly unattractive, or, if I may so speak, peculiarly unchristian, and accept it as the type of Christian thought and life, it would be only natural if he were

repelled and led to condemn. To judge of Christianity after viewing the forms it is made to take in this place or that, is as nice a matter as to discover the real meaning of the Old and New Testaments after a copious reading of the commentators. But Christianity itself is none the worse because men understand it imperfectly, and do not distinguish between the permanent and the passing.

That justice is sometimes not done to the Christian way of looking at things, even by sympathetic critics, has impressed me lately in re-reading one of Mr. Matthew Arnold's charming little essays, the one on "Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment." I wish to bring forward some thoughts which arose in my mind on this reading, and which I hope may interest you. I will make my subject a little broader than Mr. Arnold's title—not, however, broader than his essay—and call it "Pagan and Christian Religious Sentiment."

Mr. Arnold has written, not as a theologian, but as a litterateur; he has said much that is true, much that is suggestive; and he has said it, as he usually says things, gracefully. But, in treating of the two phases of thought, he has passed over without mention what seems to me to be the fundamental difference between them, and a chief cause of their other differences; and one which we, as Christians, would be sorry to have overlooked. It is this oversight which prevents him from assigning a just value to each.

To bring before us the two ways of thinking, Mr. Arnold takes a representative Greek poem of the third century before Christ—the fifteenth Idyl of Theocritus—and, translating it, compares it with a representative poem of the later Middle Age, the "Canticle of the Sun" by St. Francis, produced in the early part of the thirteenth century. These two poems, he thinks, indicate widely different ideals of life and modes of thought, the one pagan, and the other Mediæval-Christian, though from his treatment of this latter, it is evident that he does not regard it as belonging exclusively to the Middle Ages, but characteristic of Christianity, as opposed to paganism, in all time.

In the fifteenth Idyl, Theocritus represents two Syracusan women, staying at Alexandria, as having agreed to go together

to the palace of King Ptolemy on occasion of the feast of Adonis, to see the image of Adonis, and to hear the hymn annually recited over the image. The dialogue begins with Gorgo calling to get Praxinoe, and chatting while she makes ready to go out. It is delightfully natural and easy :

"Gorgo.—Is Praxinoe at home ?

"Praxinoe.—My dear Gorgo, at last ! Yes, here I am. Eunoe, find a chair,—get a cushion for it.

"Gorgo.—It will do beautifully as it is.

"Praxinoe.—Do sit down.

"Gorgo.—Oh, this gad-about spirit ! I could hardly get to you, Praxinoe, through all the crowd and all the carriages. Nothing but heavy boots, nothing but men in uniform. And what a journey it is ! My dear child, you really live *too* far off.

"Praxinoe.—It is all that insane husband of mine. He has chosen to come out here to the end of the world, and take a hole of a place,—for a house it is not,—on purpose that you and I might not be neighbors. He is always just the same ; anything to quarrel with one ! anything for spite !

"Gorgo.—My dear, don't talk so of your husband before the little fellow. Just see how astonished he looks at you. Never mind, Zopyrio, my pet, she is not talking about papa.

"Praxinoe.—Good heavens ! the child does really understand.

"Gorgo.—Pretty papa !

"Praxinoe.—That pretty papa of his, the other day (though I told him beforehand to mind what he was about), when I sent him to a shop to buy soap and rouge, brought me home salt instead—stupid, great, big, interminable animal !

"Gorgo.—Mine is just the fellow to him. . . . But never mind now, get on your things and let us be off to the palace to see the Adonis. I hear the queen's decorations are something splendid."

So off they go to the palace, "chattering like turtles" as a cross stranger in the crowd remarks, and listen to the beautiful hymn—beautiful, but as Mr. Arnold points out, with no spark of what we would call religion in it,—and after the famous singer has closed with the farewell to Adonis, Gorgo resumes her chatter with : "Praxinoe, certainly women are wonderful things.

That lucky woman to know all that ! and luckier still to have such a splendid voice ! And now we must see about getting home. My husband has not had his dinner. That man is all vinegar, and nothing else ; and if you keep him waiting for his dinner, he is dangerous to go near. Adieu, precious Adonis, and may you find us all well when you come next year ! ”

With this they pass out of our sight, thoughtless, careless, unreflective as the birds, and quite as irreligious. I wish that space would allow me to quote the whole of Mr. Arnold's version of this poem, for Gorgo and Praxinoë are more entertaining than many wiser women, and seem quite natural in the easy and colloquial English ; but the scraps which I have quoted fairly represent the rest. Mr. Arnold rightly says that one would suppose from the glimpse Theocritus has given us of the Greek life, that no one ever was or could be sick or sorry, that the characters were never intended to be serious, but to be cheerfully and sensuously happy.

And now turning to the “Canticle of the Sun” by St. Francis, I will quote again to show how different the whole atmosphere of the poem :

“O most high, Almighty, good Lord God, to Thee belong praise, glory, honor, and all blessings !

“Praised be my Lord God with all His creatures ; and specially our brother the sun, who brings us the day, and who brings us the light ; fair is he, and shining with a very great splendor : O Lord he signifies to us Thee !

“Praised be my Lord for our sister the moon, and for the stars, the which He has set clear and lovely in heaven.

“Praised be my Lord for our brother the wind, and for air and cloud, calms and all weather, by the which Thou upholdest in life all creatures.

“Praised be my Lord for our sister water, who is very serviceable unto us, and humble and precious and clean.

“Praised be my Lord for our brother fire, through whom Thou givest us light in the darkness ; and he is bright, and pleasant, and very mighty, and strong.

“Praised by my Lord for our mother the earth, the which

doth sustain us and keep us, and bringeth forth divers fruits, and flowers of many colors, and grass.

"Praised be my Lord for all those who pardon one another for His love's sake, and who endure weakness and tribulation; blessed are they who peaceably shall endure, for Thou, O most highest, shalt give them a crown!

"Praised be my Lord for our sister, the death of the body, from whom no man escapeth. Woe to him who dieth in mortal sin! Blessed are they who are found walking by Thy most holy will, for the second death shall have no power to do them harm.

"Praise ye, and bless ye the Lord, and give thanks unto Him, and serve Him with great humility."

How different from Theocritus! With him the world is a happy, thoughtless, sensuous world; and in the world of St. Francis it is good to endure weakness and tribulation, and natural to give thanks "for our sister, the death of the body, from whom no man escapeth." Even after mention of the second death—to the mediæval saint the greatest of conceivable terrors—he can say from his heart, "Praise ye, and bless the Lord, and give thanks unto Him, and serve Him with great humility."

Now the way of looking at things shown us by the Greek, Mr. Arnold calls the religion of the senses and the understanding; and St. Francis' way he calls the religion of the heart and the imagination; declaring the difference between them to be, that the former selects out of life what is agreeable, refusing to consider the rest; and the latter, filling out with heart and imagination the deficiencies of sense, accepts all of human life, its light and its shade, its pleasure and its pain, its bright beginning and its darker end. He intimates that the Greek way of thinking was a good one for the Greek—that a religion of the senses and the understanding might be sufficient, where the senses had so much to satisfy them, and where the conditions of life were simpler and less complicated than they became later. "But in the new, real, immense, post-pagan world,—in the barbarian world,—the shock of accident," says Mr. Arnold, "is unceasing, the serenity of existence is perpetually troubled, not even a Greek like Heine can get across the mortal stage without bitter

calamity. How does the sentiment of the religion of pleasure serve then? Does it help, does it console? Can a man live by it?" And he concludes that the sentiment of a religion of sorrow has "a vast advantage over the sentiment of a religion of pleasure; in its power to be a general, popular, religious sentiment, a stay for the mass of mankind, whose lives are full of hardship."

So Mr Arnold acknowledges that, for the post-pagan world at least, St. Francis' way of thinking is a better one, and a happier one, than that of Theocritus. And yet it is evident that he has not touched upon the real and fundamental difference between the two, nor pointed out the source of the comfort which the Christian takes in a world like this, giving thanks, it may be, even for the death of the body. And the names which he has adopted—"Religion of Sorrow," "Religion of the Heart and the Imagination,"—do, in my opinion, no little injustice to the way of thinking he is characterizing. A religion of sorrow, properly so called, could scarcely be a cheerful cult for any one. Its adoption, by a man in distress, would be little short of suicide. If the phrase is merely used to indicate that sorrowful persons find comfort in Christianity, it is surely as misleading as it would be to call opium a "painful remedy" because persons in pain turn to opium. If, on the other hand, it is intended to point out that one of St. Francis' way of thinking may find even sorrow not wholly sorrowful, but containing in itself a promise of future joy; still the name is misleading. "Religion of the Heart and the Imagination" sounds somewhat better, but is inadequate and indefinite. The heart cannot be satisfied with what is quite unlovable, nor will exercise of the imagination upon what is believed to be bad, give the content and satisfaction which arise from believing it to be good. The difference between the two ways of thinking lies deeper, and the names applied to each do not make it evident.

It is not necessary to go to centuries widely sundered to find good examples of the antithesis: the pagan and the Christian exist side by side; each way of thinking has its adherents in life, and its representatives in literature. And that I may bring out with clearness the real difference between them, I will also

take two poems, which I think will serve my purpose rather better than those chosen by Mr. Arnold, and place parts of them side by side. Both of those that I shall take were written by men of modern times: the one by a man of the nineteenth century after Christ, who tried to live and think as though he belonged to the third century before Christ: and the other by a Spanish soldier of the latter half of the fifteenth century, who represents the Christian sentiment.

Perhaps no poet of modern times has more earnestly longed to realize the Greek ideal of life than John Keats. Exquisitely sensitive to beauty in all her material forms, keenly alive to the harmonies of nature merely as nature, and repelled by that tendency to the abstract and reflective which seems to set man over against nature as her judge; Keats revelled in warmth and light and coloring; he delighted, as did Theocritus, in the murmur of bees, the scent of flowers, the song of the bird from the thicket, and the sound of the ripe fruit dropping into the grass from the loaded tree. He would like to lie on his back in a pleasant place, and listen, without thought or care for the morrow, to the song which Nature, when in her sunny moods, is always ready to sing to those who have ears to catch her melody. Sometimes there is, it is true, a false note in his poetry, for the more complex man of a later age cannot force himself to live the life of his simpler and more childlike predecessor; but, on the whole, I think there is no English poet, at least, who has come so near to the pagan ideal as Keats, when at his best. And one of the most perfect of his poems—to my mind the most perfect,—his “Ode to a Nightingale” will excellently illustrate the ideal at which he aimed, and his failure to reach it; and this failure, better than success would have done, will show us just what this distinctively pagan way of thinking, which marks Keats, really is at bottom. The ode begins:

“ My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains
My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains
One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk.
'Tis not through envy of thy happy lot,
But being too happy in thy happiness,—
That thou, light-winged Dryad of the trees,

In some melodious plot
Of beechen green, and shadows numberless,
Singest of summer in full-throated ease.

“O for a draught of vintage, that hath been
Cool’d a long age in the deep-delved earth,
Tasting of Flora and the country-green,
Dance and Provençal song and sun-burnt mirth !
O for a beaker full of the warm South,
Full of the true, the blushful Hippocrene,
With beaded bubbles winking at the brim,
And purple-stained mouth ;
That I might drink, and leave the world unseen,
And with thee fade away into the forest dim.”

And then comes that significant third stanza:

“Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget,
What thou among the leaves hast never known,
The weariness, the fever, and the fret,
Here, where men sit and hear each other groan ;
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last grey hairs,
Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies ;
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow
And leaden-eyed despairs.
Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,
Or new love pine at them beyond to-morrow.”

Here thrusts itself in the darker side of human existence —“the weariness, the fever, and the fret,”—of which Keats had his full share during his short life, and from which he so wished to turn away his face. And here appears, too, the pagan impulse to escape from all this by ignoring it. It is useless, he thinks, to explain away the gloom of what is so black: he does not hope to have any light thrown upon it; he does not want to understand it: he only wants to fade away with the bird into the beechen green, and forget all that gives pain. This third stanza is, from Keats, the passionate lover of beauty and life and happiness, the direst confession of hopelessness. The most significant fact is not that he merely singles out what is pleasant, but that he gives up all the rest as irretrievably bad. There is something unmistakably pessimistic about the modern pagan. Pain is a fact; old age is a fact; death is a fact; he cannot deny them; he will simply refuse to consider them. He will thrust them out of sight for the moment, and revel in the fancy that he

has escaped from the ills of human life to a shelter among the leaves. Now he is with the bird :

“ Already with thee ! tender is the night,
And haply the Queen-Moon is on her throne,
Clustered around by all her starry Fays;
But here there is no light,
Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown
Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways.

“ I cannot see what flowers are at my feet,
Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs,
But, in embalmed darkness, guess each sweet
Wherewith the seasonable month endows
The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild;
While hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine ;
Fast fading violets covered up in leaves ;
And mid-May’s eldest child,
The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine,
The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves.”

Could any one more perfectly sympathize with this aspect of nature than Keats ? But there comes before us the less ideal picture of Keats, sleepless with pain, his body burning with fever, and his soul quivering under the lash of the unfriendly critic : of Keats, debating whether, since existence has become intolerable, he will not take his own life. Alas, for him ! refusing to acknowledge pain could not make pain non-existent. Few things are more pathetic than his short life and the manner of his death.

And now to turn to the second poem, a dirge for a dead soldier, which, I think, the hasty reader would unhesitatingly set down as sadder than the poem by Keats, although, to him who can read between the lines, it is immeasurably more cheerful. The poem of which I speak is a great favorite in Spain. It is an ode, in which the younger Manrique, a Spanish soldier of the latter half of the fifteenth century, mourns the death of his father, Count Rodrigo Manrique, a man of note in the history of the time. The subject is surely a less cheerful one than that chosen by Keats, and the poem is full of melancholy reflections upon the vanity of all things terrestrial,—it has the sombre light of the mediæval age upon it,—but it is distinctly Christian, and

not, I maintain, at bottom gloomy nor despairing, but hopeful
I quote from Mr. Longfellow's translation :

" O let the soul her slumbers break,
Let thought be quickened and awake;
Awake to see
How soon this life is past and gone,
And death comes softly stealing on,
How silently !

" Swiftly our pleasures glide away,
Our hearts recall the distant day
With many sighs ;
The moments that are speeding fast
We heed not, but the past,—the past,
More highly prize."

And again:

" Let no one fondly dream again,
That Hope and all her shadowy train
Will not decay ;
Fleeting as were the dreams of old,
Remembered like a tale that's told,
They pass away."

And sadder are these stanzas, found in the author's pocket
after his death on the battle-field:

" Our days are covered o'er with grief,
And sorrows neither few nor brief
Veil all in gloom ;
Left desolate of real good,
Within this cheerless solitude
No pleasures bloom.

" Thy pilgrimage begins in tears,
And ends in bitter doubts and fears,
Or dark despair ;
Midway so many toils appear,
That he who lingers longest here
Knows most of care."

This is sad enough, and at first reading must seem much worse than Keats. How is a man to relish the taste of any pleasure, if he is always exhorted to reflect upon its evanescence ? What pleasure in living if life is to be regarded as but the road to death ? Yet with all this, notwithstanding that the poem is a dirge, written in a less cheerful century than our own, and that

there is a fashion in mourning for relatives which makes us put on garments much blacker than our grief, is it really worse than Keats? or as bad? Notice that Manrique never falls into the pagan cynicism which desires to abandon thought and forget. His opening line does not express a desire to live in a dream but to awake—not a desire to think less, but to think more:

“O let the soul her slumbers break,
Let thought be quickened and awake.”

But if the system of things is hopelessly and irretrievably bad, why not blind oneself to the fact as far as possible, and be happy where one can and as one can? So the pagan spirit prompted, and so the pagan poet seems to have thought. But Manrique, looking at a world which he believes to be hard and bitter, still cries: “Awake! know the truth!” and thereby intimates that he believes the truth to be worth knowing. Looking a little further in the poem we can readily see why he is not thrown into despair:

“This world is but the rugged road
Which leads us to the bright abode
Of peace above;
So let us choose that narrow way,
Which leads no traveller’s foot astray
From realms of love.

“Our cradle is the starting place,
Life is the running of the race,
We reach the goal
When, in the mansions of the blest,
Death leaves to its eternal rest
The weary soul.”

Had Manrique lived later, we should probably not have had from him so dark a picture of the present life. He was at one with the religious thought of his time in having too much of a tendency to give over “the material world to the devil.” Most of us now think it is by no means so bad a world as a whole, and some parts of it quite desirable in themselves considered. Probably Manrique would have himself confessed on a little cross-examination, that he had not found all parts of this “rugged road” equally rough: that there were shady spots and smooth, easy stretches when walking became a pleasure; and that now and

then one fell in with very pleasant company. It certainly does not seem very manly in him to dwell so upon the minor disagreeables of the journey in view of the termination which he believes it to have, and which ought to have made him cheerful throughout. But his feeling was one common enough among Christians ancient and modern,—the feeling that we relatively magnify the pleasures of the world to come by belittling the pleasures of the world that is; an attempt, in the interests of religion and ethics, to reverse the usual procedure of moral and physical vision, which enlarges the near and the actual, and diminishes the far and the prospective. It frequently leads to an over-driven hyperbole, and degenerates into a disagreeable and untruthful cant, the man knowing quite well that he values earthly qualifications more highly than his words would lead us to suppose. Another reason which may help to account for this undervaluation of the present world, common enough among poetical and religious writers, but repellent and seeming unnatural to the mass of mankind, is found in the fact that objects do seem to shrink when brought into the presence of other objects much larger. The round world is small to one who is contemplating the magnitudes of the stellar spaces. In the presence of Death and of Eternity most things which we regard as sufficiently important dwindle and disappear. It is as natural for the man whose eyes are filled with the solar light to underrate the shadows of the den, as for the dwellers in the den to overrate them. In so far as Christianity leads to reflection on the whole of things, it may well prevent that absorption in the immediate, which makes to-day blot out the future and the past; and in so far as the contemplative and unpractical type of Christian may be unduly given to dwelling upon the distant and the vast to the detriment of the small pleasures and duties of the present, he may give color to the accusation that his view of life is depressing. It should be remembered, however, that his view of life is not that taken by Christianity proper, which does not undervalue the trifles of to-day, but on the contrary gives significance to them by making them parts of a Divine Plan, in relation to which nothing is insignificant. Nor is it any part of Christianity to carry religious contemplation to such a pitch that one loses

interest and efficiency in the present. It has been done again and again (it is still done all about us, though fortunately the hurtful tendency is growing less), and has been not seldom encouraged by the theologians, who have sometimes overlaid Christianity with so much of their own invention as quite to reverse its ideals. Still it is no part of Christianity to mourn constantly over the evils of life, and to suppress the cheerfulness natural to happy people; and when Manrique does this he is mediæval, and not Christian.

But, notwithstanding this somewhat morbid tendency, we find in this poem, as we always find in Christian literature, a conviction that, however dark some things may be, yet the system of things as a whole is good and not bad; something for which one may be thankful, and to which he should not shut his eyes. The sadness of Christian literature is sadness, not despair; it is never without hope: while the sadness, which underlies the surface cheerfulness of what Mr. Arnold has characterized as pagan literature, is most hopeless and despairing. It is the expression of a conviction that the system of things is too bad even to think about; too inexplicable even to attempt to understand; and that, consequently, an unreflective life is the most desirable.

Now this difference seems to me to be the fundamental one between the Christian way and the pagan way of looking at things. And this difference, clearly discerned, puts us in a position to criticise in an important particular Mr. Arnold's judgment upon the relative merits of the two ways. After comparing the fifteenth Idyl with the "Canticle of the Sun," and remarking upon the cheerfulness of the former, he accepts this cheerfulness as a fair indication of the happiness of the people from among whom such a literature came. One must have more religion in the modern world, he thinks, but the ancient world was happy without it. But is it fair to make the poem by Theocritus and the poem by St. Francis equally representative of the whole life and thought of the writer of each, when the ideal held before each was so different? If we know that a man has resolved to thrust out of his life all thought of what is painful, and to confine his attention only to what is agreeable, can we look upon his writing

as representative of anything more than the agreeable in his life? Can we, for the purpose of comparison, simply lay his verse by the side of that of the man who refuses to consider nothing, who accepts pain and death as facts demanding explanation, and tries to fit his way of thinking to the whole of things, and not to a selected part? Surely this is not just. Who can believe that in a time when social conditions were so much more imperfect than they are even now; when the duties of man to man were so dimly comprehended; when the right of the strongest was so much more generally allowed; when no inconsiderable portion of the world was not admitted to have any rights at all; who can believe that at this time the average of human happiness was higher than at present, and the need of consolation less? Was the life of the slave filled with the poetry of the senses and the understanding? Was there no disease? Did not men die in Greece?

Mr. Arnold has singled out Heine as the most notable representative of the pagan spirit in our century, and has given us a glimpse of him in his early life in Paris, when the "religion of pleasure" seemed sufficient for him. He has also brought before us Heine in his misery twenty years later, stricken with a dire disease, and railing at fate in bitterness of spirit. Gorgo and Praxinoë probably died of something, as they are not still alive. The religion of pleasure, which, Mr. Arnold admits, was inadequate to the needs of the suffering Heine, they, too, probably found wanting. We only see them on a gala day and in high spirits, but it would be very instructive if we could follow them to the time when Praxinoë holds little Zopyrio dead in her arms, or when Gorgo, like Heine, spends years upon her back, suffering everything from some disease of the spinal marrow. The sun sets sometimes in Greece, as well as in Paris; and the art of medicine as practised in Plato's "Republic" would cause a veritable massacre of the innocents. No; as there is one end of the wise man and the fool, so there is one end of ancient and modern. King Ptolemy and Queen Arsinoë and the Argive woman's daughter, Gorgo and Praxinoë and little Zopyrio, Eunoe and Eutychis, the cross stranger and the old woman,—all are dead, and nobody knows how disagreeable the death they may have

died, or how much they may have suffered living. Any view of the Greek life which fails to include these shadows is not a just one.

But one may argue that the lack of reflection which leads to an adoption of this religion of pleasure in itself gives immunity from suffering, and that to such minds there is small need of consolation. That Praxinoe would, long before the next feast of Adonis, have forgotten the death of Zopyrio, and gotten out again the dress that Gorgo so admired; or perhaps teased her husband, that "stupid, great, big, interminable animal," as she calls him, into buying her another. Undoubtedly Praxinoe was not one to borrow trouble, nor to ponder much over the problems of life, but if we think she could not suffer, we wrong her, for she was a woman, though a thoughtless one, and had the heart of a mother. She leaves the child at home because she is not going to have him lamed for life, as she says; and when the crowd presses, she is thankful for the fact that he is safe in the house. She was by no means so simple and unreflective that trouble could not reach her by way of the heart. And the man of her time, however much he might desire to shut his eyes, could not entirely blind himself to the fact that the religion of pleasure does not well fit the world as it actually exists. The Greek poets contain many melancholy reflections on the sadness of human life. Even in an earlier and simpler age the Father of gods and men is made to say :

" The race of mortal men,
Of all that breathe and move upon the earth,
Is the most wretched."

There was pain and sickness and sorrow of all sorts in Greece, and there was but little consolation to be drawn either from the national religion or from the poetry of Theocritus. A child is unreflective, but the suffering of a child, while it lasts, is complete and unmitigated. Even for Gorgo and Praxinoe, I think, Christianity might have been a boon.

But if we should grant that a few here and there, peculiarly favored of fortune, were able to lead the ideal pagan life, without pain or the thought of pain, how would that affect the many around? Mr. Arnold admits that the mass of mankind have lives

full of hardship. The few who could succeed in banishing the disagreeable out of life, would have to thrust out of sight the pain of other people, and could not afford to be sympathizing. So the religion of pleasure for the few, would turn out to be the veritable religion of sorrow for the many. It is certainly to the interest of Zopyrio and the "interminable animal" that Praxinoë should not carry out the pagan ideal, which is, after all, the ideal of a child, and of an untrained child at that—shortsighted, anti-social, in no respect admirable. Persons who have robust health, and some coarseness of moral fibre, with sufficiently feelingless hearts, do not find it hard to live after this ideal. Falstaff would make a pretty good pagan, though not so æsthetic a picture as the ancient world could furnish us.

And this brings me to a thought of no little significance; that the religion of pleasure in the sense in which the words have been used all along, is only possible to the child or the savage, to the impulsive and unreflective; and that mental development, the awaking of the reflective nature must ultimately cast it aside. A dog or a horse may live without thought of the future or the past, and in great enjoyment of the mere present, but as we ascend the scale of intelligence we find memory and hope playing a more and more important part in the psychical life. The unfolding of the capabilities of the race, as civilization advances must make man more completely at one with his environment, more adapted to the system of things as a whole, more given to forethought and calculation. The savage of to-day is hasty and passionate and inconsiderate, incapable of adjusting himself to what is complex or distant. The civilized man is moved by impulses which have their roots in the time to come, and he sweeps with his glance a far wider horizon. He must consider pain, if only that he may learn to avoid pain. He must think of death and lay his plans with regard to it, if only because these plans reach out beyond the term of his own mortal life. He must suffer with the suffering of his friend, or mourn the death of wife or child, if only because he is a product of a social development which has made it impossible for him to be so brutally selfish and feelingless as his predecessor. He lives a broad life, and if he is to lay aside reflection and become

a child, this life becomes impossible. Moreover, it is not a matter of choice, for minds must unfold whether they will or no; and a progressing civilization will furnish more and more thoughtful men. The problems of life must be faced unless man is to live as the brutes; and unless all civilization is a mistake, unless ignorance is better than knowledge, and thoughtlessness than thought, it is better for man that they should be faced.

And it is not Christianity that in the first instance brings these problems before us. It is the nature of things and our own souls. Whether he is a Christian or not, the developed man must reflect. He is not a child or a fool that he should be blind to what surrounds him. If, after reflection, he concludes that the system of things is so bad that there is no use adjusting oneself to it, he may hopelessly shut his eyes as well as he can, and try to become less than a man. His condition is not an enviable one, nor is there anything beautiful in his philosophy or his life. The "Return to Nature" must be passed through the fervid imagination of a Rousseau before it gains the colors that charm us.

Yet Christianity does encourage reflection, in that it gives hope and consolation to the reflective man. Teaching as it does the Fatherhood of God, and the existence of a Divine Providence which embraces the whole of things; insisting that the course of the world's history is the unfolding of a wise purpose, a revelation of reason; it is naturally an antidote to that cynical despondency which would result in voluntary self-stultification, a wilful blindness to supposed irremediable evils. And furnishing as it does powerful motives for the building up of character and for strenuous effort in the performance of duty, it is strongly opposed to the "after us the deluge" philosophy which is so attractive to the myopic mind of Mr. Arnold's pagan. If a man is inclined to be thoughtful, Christianity will not turn him from it, but foster the tendency; but it will also keep his thoughtfulness from becoming a source of despair.

And if this is what is distinctive in Christianity, its faith in the system of things, and its hope in the presence of pain and death, with what color of justice is it called the "Religion of Sorrow"? It is the religion of the man, as opposed to that of

the child. It is the religion of civilization as opposed to that of the savage. It is sober, but it is not sad. It is only as misunderstood and perverted that it forbids gayety or merriment to the happy, and it does give consolation in distress. Whereas the "Religion of Pleasure," if it is utterly without thought and purely instinctive, is no religion at all; and if it is embraced with "*malice prepense*" is a pessimism of the deepest dye.

Now, I have said nothing of the truth or falsity of the teachings of Christianity, as I have been concerned only with the attempt to represent justly its way of looking at things. Whether its consolations are drawn from the region of mists, where dwell the creations of the poetic fancy, or whether they are founded upon truth and reality, a substantial part of the system of things, is a question by itself. It is hardly conceivable that one who has seen Christianity as it is, not as it is sometimes represented, should not seriously go on to an examination of this question. In such matters feeling goes for much, and a little prejudice at the outset may prevent anything like fairness in looking at evidence or justice in estimating results. That it is easy to misapprehend what Christianity is in itself, I have said at the outset; and that it is made to take some very offensive forms is matter of daily observation. But if one will take pains to clear away all that is due to the faults and idiosyncrasies of the Christian from the central idea of Christianity itself, he cannot but be attracted by it. He at least will not feel undue prejudice against the "Religion of Sorrow," which teaches one

"To feel, altho' no tongue can prove,
That every cloud, that spreads above
And veileth love, itself is love."

THE CHRISTIAN TEMPER AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT.

[A paper read before the Institute of Christian Philosophy, October 4th, 1888.]

BY JOHN C. CLYDE, D.D., BLOOMSBURY, N. J.

Member of the Victoria Institute of Great Britain.

IN our day it is pertinent to ask the question—Does the possession of a Christian faith unfit men for rendering an impartial judgment in scientific and philosophical matters? The question is not propounded upon the assumption that Christian men are more disposed than others to put a forced interpretation upon given testimony in order to substantiate a cherished theory; but it is raised for the purpose of considering the point assumed by some non-Christian scientists, that Christian men are so biased by their belief as to be rendered unfit to give an impartial judgment upon such questions.

This assumption is found to be most prominent in connection with those scientific questions which impinge upon or run counter to the Christian faith. It is claimed that when science promulgates a theory which may, as a whole or in part, contravene some doctrine or tenet long held by the Christian Church, claimed to be taught in the sacred Scriptures, Christian men are disposed to blindly raise the cry, "heresy," "sacrilege," and so on, without stopping to calmly consider the testimony upon which the theory advanced is based.

Whilst this charge may be true to a limited extent with reference to some individuals in the class called Christian men, we claim it is not true with reference to the class as such. As well might Christian men say that because the great majority of men, and very many if not the majority of scientific men, fail to accept the Christian faith, that they, as a class, are not competent to give an unbiased judgment thereon, from the testimony given in its favor, as a purely scientific or philosophical ques-

tion. Scientific men do assume their competency in this regard, and do pass judgment in the most positive terms, and often in the most offensive manner.

Christian men, as a class, are to be judged by the highest and best types of the class, just as scientists are to be judged, not by those of their number who may be ill-informed, or mis-informed, or unfitted by nature or circumstances to judge wisely; but by those who are best fitted by circumstances, native ability, and education to give a correct judgment with reference to the subject matter treated of.

Scientific men are thus judged. Those who are the acknowledged leaders of scientific thought, the authorities, are the ones who have to bear the brunt of the controversy.

The question then resolves itself into an inquiry whether non-Christian scientific thought has any advantage over Christian scientific thought when considering scientific questions. In other words, reasoning from given evidence, Is the non-Christian or Christian judgment more likely to be correct? The first point which claims our attention in the discussion is :

THE NATURAL ADVANTAGES POSSESSED BY THE TWO CLASSES IN COMMON.

In any investigation there are certain postulates which must be accepted as a basis of procedure. An investigation in the science of mathematics presupposes the acceptance of certain truths or facts as axiomatic; such as, things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other; two straight lines cannot inclose a space, and the like. All minds accept these truths because they are self-evident. So in the investigation of the question before us.

There are certain things which are self-evident, which all must admit, the denial of which would be not only unphilosophical but irrational. These things are such as the following: The consciousness of self-existence; that man is a rational creature; a consciousness of a world external to self; that we gain a knowledge of that world by means of the senses, by processes of reasoning, or by intuition.

With such postulates as these all philosophers, Christian or

non-Christian, must start out in their investigations. Here neither class has any advantage over the other. But there are certain things beyond this in which all have an equal proprietary right. One of these is a free field of investigation in the world of mind and matter outside of ourselves.

The pictures in the gallery and the problems in mathematics are ever the same, no matter how those may differ mentally, morally, and physically who view or study them. So in the world of mind and matter. The phenomena remain ever the same, no matter how philosophers who contemplate them may differ in capacity mentally, or differ as to influences which operate around them. It is into this field all must go in philosophical investigations of whatever kind. It is with the material universe as spread out before the eye that the astronomer must deal. It is with the solid earth beneath our feet that the geologist must deal. This field comprehends the whole realm of biology, the science of life. Here the botanist, the zoologist, the ornithologist and all who in any way deal with the problem of life, in any of its manifestations, high or low, must pursue their investigations.

Here in the immaterial or spiritual world must the mental and moral philosopher pursue his studies. In contemplating the material world we may all philosophize upon the phenomena without raising the question as to the origin or cause of what is spread out before us. So in the immaterial or spiritual world we may philosophize about the evidences of mind or design there revealed without raising the question as to whether that intelligence is to be accredited to any existing form of religious belief. So we may study the phenomena of the guidance of great masses of men, in the capacity of nationalities, as seen in history and which may be clearly apprehended as having been carried on above and in spite of human power, without inquiring whether that intelligence has been appropriated by any existing form of religion. We may study the phenomena of sociology; how men are permitted, under certain conditions, to pursue a course which brings about degradation and threatened destruction; and how on the other hand they are restrained, against their inclinations, from bringing about the universal wreck and

extinction of the race, and like questions, without assigning that moral government, or unseen spiritual influence, to any accepted form of religious belief among men. In fact, we must stop short here, that we may not lay ourselves open to the charge that is made that the Christian mind is so biased as to lead it to claim that all phenomena must be in harmony with Christian faith.

In the field thus presented outside of self, it will readily be perceived, must be found the arena for mental activity or investigation so far as it applies to the philosophy of the natural or material world, and also much that falls under the head of mental and moral philosophy; for, as we have seen, there are many phenomena connected with the human race to be found in the world apart from any particular individuals of the race. This we see in the part which nations are made to play in the general affairs of humanity.

But there is another thing which is common to all classes of philosophers and that has reference to self. All are alike, so far as natural capabilities are concerned, as instruments of observation and philosophizing.

We may now pick out specimens of the highest type, both of non-Christian and Christian philosophers, and set them side by side for comparison. We say the highest type of each class, for anything short of this would not yield a fair or satisfactory result in a comparison. One astronomer may have the largest telescope and best equipment known. Another may have a smaller instrument and a poorer equipment. By comparing the work done by the two, under these circumstances, we would not arrive at a just judgment as to which was the better astronomer. We must give to each an equally good instrument and equipment if we are to judge of each one's capacity by the work which he does. So in philosophy, we must take the highest type from each class in order to gain a just conclusion by comparison of the work done, as to which is the more likely to give a correct judgment in any given case.

Viewing the two classes, then, in this light, there are some things in which they are manifestly practically upon a par. These are with reference to the physical senses by which we

observe phenomena and obtain a knowledge of the external physical world. Beyond this point, however, when we come to consider them in the light of the part which the mental nature of man plays in philosophical investigations, we must proceed with great caution. We cannot now contemplate them as two perfect telescopes which are turned upon the great field of truth lying outside of self; but rather we must regard them as instruments which have been shattered, and neither of which has been perfectly repaired. The question is, Which has been brought back nearest to perfection? Which has been so manipulated in the repairing as to render it more likely to reveal the truth to us? This brings us to a second point in the discussion, viz :

HOW FAR DO SPECIAL ADVANTAGES INFLUENCE ONE CLASS OR THE OTHER TO SECURE FOR IT A SUPERIORITY IN THE MATTER OF PASSING A JUDGMENT?

Here we enter upon the question of education. We are now brought face to face with some stubborn facts which both classes of philosophers must recognize. In the individuals of the human race we find the mental part in all stages of development from a condition little above the brute, grovelling in sensuality and ignorance, to that of the refined philosopher and sage who offers incense at the shrine of learning or listens to the music of the spheres. We find the suicide, the monomaniac, the idiot, and the madman all thrown in to make up the sum total of humanity. The appalling reality is forced home to the consciousness of the philosopher, be he Christian or non-Christian, that some great calamity has befallen the race. The Christian philosopher need not here offer any explanation of this sad state of affairs. That would be allowing his Christian belief to bias his philosophy, a thing fatal, at this point, in a discussion of this nature. He only needs to insist that his brother shall stand side by side with him and recognize this indisputable fact. Now if this calamity has befallen us as a race, what is its extent, and how are our philosophical perceptions influenced by it?

It is difficult to form a conception of what the human mind was, in its powers and possibilities, before any misfortune overtook it. But one thing can be safely predicated of it and that

is, it was finite. It could not have comprehended all things in the universe. This is a prerogative which mankind assigns to the infinite mind of a divinity. Then comes the humiliating consciousness that if no calamity had ever befallen mankind, his sphere of knowledge would have been circumscribed. We are forced then to the truth that if the human mind were entirely freed from any blight which may have befallen it, still there would be problems in the vast field of truth which it could not comprehend, and which it might not be able to master after long ages of advancement in a state of existence more favorable than that in which we now live. Some faint conception of these things dawns upon the mind when we contemplate the wonders revealed with reference to the universe, by the telescope and science of astronomy on the one hand, and the microscope in connection with the natural sciences on the other.

If honest philosophy then is made to pause and do homage thus, under the most favorable circumstances, what must be the prospect when she is called upon for a service under the present most unfavorable circumstances? Now we are made to inquire what has been the extent of the calamity which has befallen the mental part of humanity? How far has it been degraded from its original normal condition? How near to the original condition have the best types of humanity ascended? What influences have been most conducive to the advancement of the race mentally? Under the influences brought to bear what class is more likely to give a judgment, in philosophical questions, nearest to what would have been given by the human mind had no calamity fallen upon it?

The extent of the calamity which has befallen the human mind is best manifested by the consciousness of ignorance as to the operations of many of the laws of the natural world, and the increasing efforts put forth to make nature yield up her secrets. This sentiment was voiced by the great philosopher, who declared that we stood upon the shore and picked up the pebbles whilst the great ocean of truth lay undiscovered beyond.

This, as it will be seen, brings us to the consideration of the influence of Christianity as a factor in helping the human mind to, or preventing it from, rendering a correct judgment in philo-

sophical questions. Inseparable from Christianity is the question of modern education and advancement as manifested in the highest and best types of science and philosophy of the present day. Unpalatable as it may be, the non-Christian philosopher must recognize with his Christian brother that there has been throughout the history of the race an educating and elevating influence connected with those principles which have been found ever active, and which are embodied in the modern term Christianity. It is true a wide field of investigation here opens with reference to man's advancement in some of the arts. We see remnants of ancient Assyrian and Egyptian civilizations, and naturally inquire if there is not evidence here that man is not as far advanced in some things under our Christian civilization as these peoples were in the ages long past and forgotten. Are there not lost arts? At the same time the counter question arises, May not these lost arts have been the direct outgrowth of the influences which we now call Christianity?

Be this as it may, when we pass from material things to those which are mental, or from matter to mind, it at once becomes apparent that the principles now called Christian have ever accomplished more for man than any others. Associated with these is the only credible historical record which assumes to go back and give an authoritative statement of the origin of things, and how and why they exist, as we contemplate them in philosophical speculation. This is the only record, among the so-called sacred writings of the world, which challenges the respectful or disrespectful consideration of the highest and best forms of non-Christian philosophy of our day. Whilst the most powerful of non-Christian philosophical artillery may be seen to be turned against this record, the sacred writings of heathen peoples are not regarded as worthy of consideration. This is testimony most unwillingly and unintentionally given to the fact that that record, or the principles inseparably connected with it now embodied in the term Christianity, have a powerful influence upon the minds, if not the hearts, of men. This can doubtless be proved to be true by the history of philosophy and ethics.

Whilst in the realm of thought the ancients may have been

well-nigh as far advanced as we are in some things, in others we have far outstripped them. It is true Euclid had such clear mathematical conceptions that his successors for more than two thousand years down to our own day have not been able to improve much upon them, and so we accept them and use them now. Plato in his philosophizing, drew out his theory and attempted to fill it in with observed facts. Aristotle ridiculed him for promulgating a theory before he had sufficient facts to substantiate it in all particulars. On the other hand Aristotle observed his facts and then drew his theory to correspond with them. The human mind has gotten little beyond this mode of philosophizing in the more than two thousand years which have intervened since their day. In our day the non-Christian philosopher promulgates his theory of evolution or development, and proclaims "the promise and potency" of wonderful things yet to be revealed. The Christian philosopher ridicules him for rendering a decision before the evidence is all in. "We admit," says he, "that what you have drawn out in your theory looks like a serpent; but the dis severed parts are too remote from each other. They may belong to the same serpent, or they may be but pieces of different serpents. There are missing links which you must supply before we will accept your theory that this is one and only one gigantic serpent." So the Christian philosopher insists upon having all the evidence in before he renders his decision or passes his judgment.

In such things as these, it is admitted, the influence of Christianity may not be very apparent in expanding the mental powers, but there are things in which it is apparent. This is seen in such things as the wonderful development in steam engineering, electrical discoveries and appliances, and the like. But aside from this: under the influence of pagan civilizations and so-called pagan sacred writings, what nation or people ever produced a lawgiver like Moses? What code of laws framed by heathen sages can compare with the religio-civil code of the Jews, in adaptation to the perceived civil and moral needs of the people. Solon and Lycurgus with their laws would not bear comparison with Moses and the law, as seen in connection with the principles now called Christian. The fact is that in this age

of Christian civilization, those peoples who are most free, most happy, and most prosperous, have their laws framed with a greater or less degree of exactness, in accordance with the Mosaic code. This is true in great questions of State, as well as in the field of economics. Under the influence of Christian principles the mind has made great advancement upon the perceptions of heathen philosophers ancient or modern. What economist would in this day risk his reputation by announcing that he regarded Plato's "Republic," or Aristotle's "Politics," as authority in matters pertaining to social and political life? Who in our day would appeal to the sages of existing pagan nations in matters of this kind? Nay, the fact is seen to be that the highest type of pagan learning is turning toward Christian civilization for light. It is a fact, then, that Christian principles have done more for the education and elevation of the human mind than any others. We will not allow the force of the testimony adduced in support of this declaration to be broken by the claim that might be made that this is because of a revelation from the Christian's God. We simply insist that the non-Christian philosopher shall recognize the historical fact that there is this superiority, and that the superiority is associated with the principles now called Christian. There is then this general influence which is seen to be exerted in Christian lands, and which may bear upon all mankind indiscriminately, and by which they may be benefited. In considering further this general influence, we must inquire whether under it the non-Christian philosopher gains any advantage over his Christian brother in the development, or fitting of the mind for making a correct judgment in a philosophical matter.

Just here the honest non-Christian philosopher must perceive that he will have to borrow ammunition from his Christian brother with which to fight him. The non-Christian philosopher is what he is by virtue of the influence of those principles embodied in the term Christian. Say what we will of the ignorance, superstition, cruelty and treachery that may have characterized some periods of what has been known as the Christian Church, it still remains a historical fact that through its influence the now so-called Christian nations were brought out of pagan

superstition and ignorance, and brought to their present high civilization and advancement in learning. We shall perhaps seek in vain for an adequate cause, other than this, upon which to base an explanation of the manifest difference between pagan and Christian nations of our day.

Now this same Christianity has been the patron of the schools or institutions of learning by which philosophical thought has been brought to its present high state of advancement. The petulant child may smite the mother who has given it birth and nourished it into its present powers and capabilities ; but that smiting does not destroy the fact of maternity. Educated men and educational institutions may petulantly smite the principles of Christianity, but that smiting does not destroy the historical fact that they have been born and nourished by her into their present power and capabilities. All through the Dark Ages, when the principles of Christianity were battling for the mastery over the powers of paganism, learning as a jewel, in the rough, or very imperfectly cut or polished, was preserved in connection with these principles. Though the casket, as we look at it now, may call forth our contempt and denunciation, it nevertheless contained the jewel. When we go back in the history of those ancient seats of learning found upon the continent of Europe and in Great Britain, we find they had their origin in things pertaining to the principles of Christianity, notwithstanding some of them may to-day present a non-Christian or anti-Christian aspect. So in our own country we find that our oldest institutions of learning had their origin in those needs felt by the people with reference to their Christian or religious natures. The force of this is not broken by the tendency seen in our day to banish Christian principles from the common school education, and from some higher institutions fostered by the State. This latter move is only born of the unphilosophical or stupid assumption that the man may be educated whilst the fact is ignored that he has a moral nature as well as a mental. By this process you may educate him into a monster for evil, the very thing you do not want. To avoid such consequences you must give him the education which comes from the principles of Christianity, outside of the institution of learning if you do not give it to him

therein. We have our schools, then, in which minds are developed and brought up to what may be called the standard of philosophers.

Taking then two men, a non-Christian and a Christian philosopher, who have had equal native abilities, has the non-Christian philosopher gained any advantage over his brother under the influence of the schools? If he has come out of a recognized non-Christian or anti-Christian institution he finds himself immediately at a disadvantage, for any one worthy the name of philosopher must admit that human nature has a moral characteristic ; and if this is wholly or partially neglected, the man is not developed into symmetrical proportions. To assume that this is not important is to eliminate from the field of learning the whole subject of ethics, or moral philosophy ; a thing no philosopher can afford to do and retain his reputation.

Let the two, then, come out of an institution in which those principles called Christian have had their due proportion of influence in the development of the mind, can the non-Christian philosopher claim that he has had any advantages over his brother? Certainly not. The two are assumed to have by nature equal abilities. They have had the same educational advantages. They have the same field of investigation in the world of truth outside of self. It cannot be claimed that the Christian philosopher is less honest in his investigations, for the very fact of his being a Christian creates a presumption in his favor in this regard. The influence of Christian principles is recognized as tending to secure honesty and fair dealing. They are employed in reformatory institutions for this very purpose. Nor is the truth of this vitiated by cases of dishonesty among so-called Christian men. These cases are not the outgrowth of the principles, but are in spite of them. They are condemned by the principles themselves.

It must be apparent, then, that the Christian philosopher is not a whit behind his non-Christian brother in capabilities for rendering a correct judgment in a philosophical matter, so far as the influence of the schools is concerned in fitting them for the task. On general principles the non-Christian philosopher must defer very much to his brother for the great advantages he has

enjoyed through Christian influences brought to bear upon him through the schools ; whilst the Christian philosopher has no favors to acknowledge from any source.

This, then, brings us to a third point in the discussion, and that is :

THE SPECIAL INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY WHICH OPERATES
UPON A PARTICULAR CLASS, AND WHICH MAKES THE
INDIVIDUALS OF THAT CLASS WHAT THEY
ARE, CHRISTIANS.

This is the crucial point in the discussion. The inquiry here must be whether or not those influences which have operated upon the Christian philosopher to make him a Christian, have so affected his powers of judgment as to render him a less reliable philosopher than his non-Christian brother who has not been subject to these special influences.

In the outset it may be assumed there is often, in a general sense, a difference between the conclusions arrived at by Christian and non-Christian philosophers on some scientific subjects. The result arrived at by the non-Christian philosopher is conclusive to his judgment. The result arrived at by the Christian philosopher is equally conclusive to his judgment, though differing from the other. Which is more likely to be correct ? Here emerges an interesting subject which might be discussed under some such caption as :

The unconscious fallacy in philosophy.

In considering which of the two judgments is more likely to be correct, we must contemplate the special influences of Christianity in two aspects, viz.: Do they tend to unfit the understanding for the work of making a correct judgment ; or do they serve as an assistant in qualifying it for the work ? In taking up the first of these we must consider the question of the actual influencing of the human understanding by outside forces. That this can be done must be admitted by the non-Christian philosopher. Take two children as near alike as possible in disposition and circumstances. Subject the one to adverse physical surroundings and corrupt moral influences and you will most likely reap a most undesirable result. Subject the other to the most favorable surroundings and best moral influences, and the

result will in all probability be the very reverse of the former. It is seen the outside forces have determined the result in each case. At the same time the material in each case upon which the influences commenced to operate at the outset was substantially the same.

So with humanity in its present state of existence. Whilst the material of human nature in two cases of the highest type taken from the Christian and non-Christian classes may be essentially the same, the influence called Christian brought to bear upon the one class, and the absence of it, or positively adverse influences brought to bear on the other may produce very different results. Here then are the states, practically, of the Christian and non-Christian philosopher, so far as philosophical investigation is concerned.

We have in a former part of this discussion called attention to the operation of influences from without by which certain results were seen to take place, and this in spite of man's influence to the contrary. Such results we see in the disposal of nationalities; opening up of lines of intercourse between peoples, and the like. Christianity in the shape of foreign missions has been seen to open the way for commerce. Commerce in turn has been seen to carry instruments of degradation and destruction to pagan peoples, which course has ever been condemned by Christianity. At the same time wider fields for Christian effort have been opened up by the persistency and push of nefarious traffic. A higher than human power is thus seen to be operating in human affairs. We have also called attention to the fact, which must be admitted by all, that some great calamity has fallen upon the human race. By looking into this matter more closely it will be apparent that there are two kinds of influence operating upon the race, the one tending to degrade it, the other to elevate it. Here the Christian philosopher need not stop to give names to these influences, he needs only to call attention to the fact. But it follows that the elevating influences are recognized as that which goes by the name of Christianity. We need not claim, then, that, whilst we as yet stay outside of the pale of specific tenets, the Christian philosopher has gained any advantage, but it is claimed that he has not been put at any

disadvantage. Here a fact already pointed out again emerges, and that is if the non-Christian philosopher had been deprived of Christian influences and allowed to move along under the adverse influences at work among men, would he not have found himself far behind his brother, so far as philosophical advancement is concerned? The Christian man of science, then, cannot be looked upon as a poorer philosopher on account of his upright life and Christian belief. The philosophical reputation of such men as Prof. Joseph Henry, of the Smithsonian Institution, is a standing protest against any such assumption.

But now we step over into the field of that direct influence which brings the Christian philosopher to hold his peculiar views or tenets, and ask if the exercising of that influence and the holding of these tenets unfit him for a correct philosophical judgment? If, as we have seen, outside influences can determine largely human capacities, is it unreasonable to hold that the influences called Christian may give to the Christian philosopher a breadth of understanding and an insight into matters material and spiritual not possessed by others? If this is not unreasonable, is it not further reasonable to assume that this, instead of unfitting him for a philosophical judgment, is directly in favor of qualifying him the better to perform the task? This, then, is what is claimed for the Christian philosopher. It is claimed that Christian men have received a special influence from without by which they become what they are as a class.

Note then, the non-Christian philosopher cannot deny the evidence of intelligence or design in the universe. To do so would be to break faith and accord with all astronomical and biological science. Nay! he attempts to explain this phenomenon upon some theory of evolution or development, it may be. Is the Christian philosopher to be set down as incompetent to pass judgment here, because he says: I recognize in the operations of this Great First Cause a Living God? The non-Christian philosopher must recognize that a calamity has befallen the human race, and he may project some theory to account for it. Is the Christian philosopher to be set down as incompetent to pass judgment here because he says: In this I see the punishment of a righteous Creator and Preserver for the

transgression of the race in a federal head and representative? The non-Christian philosopher must recognize the desire of humanity to rise to a higher and better state of existence, and also his uniform failure when left to his own resources.

Is the Christian philosopher to be set down as incompetent to judge here because he says: I believe a wise and compassionate God has sent an all-sufficient Saviour into the world in the person of one individual of the race, and that by faith in Him mankind may attain the aspirations of his soul? Shall he be belittled by a non-Christian science, when he can show that that science itself is the offspring of his Christian principles?

The Christian philosopher has an impregnable stronghold in the history of ethics, so far as the question of right judgment is concerned. From a number of moral systems promulgated for right living he has had the perception granted to him to choose that called Christian, and which has been found to be the only system which secures the highest, best, most symmetrical development of the human heart and mind.

But when we take the Christian philosopher into the field of material things, be they biological or non-biological, we find he has the same advantage. We all see in the mechanism of the universe the necessity for a great first cause possessed of infinite wisdom and power. The Christian is no less a correct philosopher because he is enabled by an outside influence to see that a Living God of infinite wisdom and power has constructed the universe for His glory. Why should he not philosophize correctly and yet believe (Ps. xix., 1) "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth His handy-work." The Christian looks out upon space and sees world upon world and system upon system, whose constituents he can but imperfectly divine, and whose motions he cannot comprehend, and in reverence for an All-wise and Almighty God, exclaims: "He is wise in heart, and mighty in strength: who hath hardened himself against Him, and hath prospered? Which removeth the mountains, and they know not; which overturneth them in His anger; which shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble; which commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and sealeth up the stars; which alone spreadeth

out the heavens, and treadeth upon the waves of the sea; which maketh Arcturus, Orion, and Pleiades, and the chambers of the south; which doeth great things past finding out; yea, and wonders without number." (Job ix, 4-10.)

Because he thus exclaims is he rendered unfit to pass a judgment with reference to phenomena connected with the solid earth beneath his feet? The Christian examines that solar system with which his planet is connected. He is impressed with the magnitude of the bodies composing it, and with the mighty forces at work in their movements. He sees that they move with the utmost precision, so that he calculates with exactness the period of a transit or an eclipse. He exclaims in admiration of divine wisdom and power (Ps. xix., 2-6): "Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world. In them hath He set a tabernacle for the sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race. His going forth is from the end of the heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it: and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof."

Because he does so is he to be set down as unfit to pass a judgment upon phenomena in biological science on the planet where he lives?

No! That special influence which makes the Christian what he is, does not unfit him for rendering an impartial judgment in scientific matters. By his perceptions with reference to a Divine First Cause; a Righteous Moral Governor; a Merciful Judge and Provider of a plan of redemption, he has found that school and that Teacher in and through whom he will be led into all truth. When we see that he has been thereby led to such correct judgments relative to moral and spiritual things, may we not assume that he is in the most favorable position to discern the truth with reference to material things which have had their origin in the same Divine Mind, and which are dealt with by science?

To the unprejudiced mind the raising of the question as to

the unfitness of the Christian mind to judge impartially in scientific matters, creates a presumption of the unfitness of the one raising it, to judge. It seems to reveal a lack of information as to the facts in the case. The Christian philosopher can stand side by side with his non-Christian brother, in the field of science, and exclaim with all the dignity and assurance of superiority (Ps. xiv., 1): "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." As he has an insight into spiritual things of which his non-Christian brother has no comprehension, can he not with great assurance ask if it is not true with material as well as with spiritual things that (I. Cor. ii., 14) "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned"?

Can he not with peculiar force reiterate in the hearing of Christian people the warning of a great Christian philosopher of the past (Col. ii., 8): "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ;" (I. Tim. vi., 20): "Keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called."

Can he not with emphasis say to his brother non-Christian philosopher, Would it not be well to ponder the words of another wise Christian philosopher who has said (Is. xliv., 20): "He feedeth on ashes: a deceived heart hath turned him aside, that he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand"?

FORCE, IN ITS RELATION TO THEISM.

[A paper read before the American Institute of Christian
Philosophy, Nov. 1st, 1888.]

BY MR. I. FERRIS LOCKWOOD, NEW YORK.

IF the current literature of a period furnishes an indication of any peculiar phase of mental activity belonging to it, we shall certainly expect that an examination of the periodicals of our own day will show that they have given an important place to the discussion of theism and of questions bearing more or less directly upon it. For, the religious controversy which has been so marked a characteristic of our time has involved something far more radical than any particular doctrine of Christianity; it has struck in to the very idea of God that underlies all religion.

A glance at the contents of the reviews and magazines issued within, let us say, the last fifteen years quite realizes this expectation.

During the last two or three years the philosophy of theism has been carefully and completely treated in a number of noticeable books, one of the most important of which ("A Study of Religion," by Dr. James Martineau, 2 Vols., 1888) is now but a few months old. In reading these later presentations of the argument for a theistic belief one is struck by their confident tone in regard to the position of theism to-day.

A thoughtful and able English writer claims that theism is emerging from its conflict with scientific empiricism "not victorious only, but purified"; and an American scholar, who has quite lately made an important contribution to the literature of the subject ("Philosophy of Theism," by Borden P. Bowne, 1888), says in the preface to his book that "Atheism is dead as a philosophy, and remains chiefly as a disposition," and insists that "the critic must allow that the theistic outlook was never more encouraging."

As a destruction of the basis of all religious belief is sup-

posed to be one of the most striking results of modern thinking, one is interested to follow the course which recent theistic thought has pursued in attaining its renewed confidence and more resolute bearing. To do this we shall have to look for a moment at the intellectual conditions and tendencies with which theism has had to deal during the last quarter of a century.

To say that there is much in our life as human beings to dispose men to a belief in the importance and the completeness of the material and the sensible, is to record a fact so obvious that even the bare statement of it seems unnecessary. As human beings we find ourselves born into this unavoidable and irresistible environment of the outside world; its facts and phenomena continually and of necessity force themselves upon us as being real, and the knowledge of them, derived through the senses, is, seemingly, very direct.

In modern times, particularly, has the importance of this sense-knowledge been emphasized. The triumphal progress of the sciences dealing with matter, *i. e.*, with *the outward*, has naturally resulted in making the outward of importance in all departments of thought and life.

The facts that are forever flowing into the mind through the channel of the senses constitute the material which the intellect elaborates into sciences of inestimable usefulness and of absorbing interest.

To one thus living and working continually in the realm of the sensible the knowledge belonging to it, and its truths, would seem not only very real, but perhaps, even, all-sufficient; and it is easy to understand that the student of physical science, absorbed in the observation of physical phenomena, might be tempted to deny the reality of anything that cannot be submitted to his technical tests. Even his most far-reaching induction might be held by him as more substantial and of more consequence than, for example, reasonings, mostly of the *a priori* kind, about ideas of space, time, causation, the infinite, the unconditioned, the absolute, etc., which leave the inference of some necessary Being or Substance as the ultimate result of thought. And so men were prompted to demand that any evi-

dence of the existence of God must be discovered by looking—not inward into the consciousness, but—outward upon external nature.

Nay, further than this even : is not the view of the universe obtained from a purely scientific stand-point and by purely scientific methods complete and self-sufficient ? If so, the necessity for the idea of a God is done away with.

The universe, it was said, was to be explained by *facts*—scientific facts. If this meant the facts furnished by the senses, and a sense-view of the world was found to be intellectually satisfactory, it would evidently not be needful, or perhaps even profitable for men to give their attention to any knowledge that might be gained by super-sensuous methods.

It is to be noted that the phrase “sense-view of the universe” evidently signifies something more than a mere reception of impressions from the senses. Kant long ago pointed out that the senses can give us only a succession of isolated phenomena, and that any grouping of them together by a bond of connection is the work of the understanding. The senses supply the material which the intellect assimilates and elaborates according to its own laws ; sensation is followed by the familiar mental processes of perception, conception, judgment, and reasoning.

There is, however, a physical view of the world which may involve the exercise of all these mental operations, and remain, nevertheless, a sense-view. It relies upon and is advanced by means of the observation of facts that can be made evident, either directly or indirectly, to the senses. However ingenious and interesting and useful its thinking concerning the outer world is, it may still be only an application of certain logical processes to the material furnished to the mind by the senses, and may never really penetrate beyond the plane of sensation. If we demand of the physical scientist what answer he brings back to us from his examination of the universe—whether his science provides a view of it that is intellectually satisfactory—it is only just to him that, at the start, we humbly take our place beside him, on his own stand-point, and consent to use his regulations and tests. Certainly of late science cannot complain that men have not been willing to thus fully submit themselves to its teachings.

At the outset the physicist anticipated the very first question, which as ordinary men we were tempted to put to him, concerning the absolute beginning of things. He reminded us that science has nothing to do with that question, that it never ascends to the origin of things, and has nothing to say about creation. He very properly impressed upon us—perhaps in words quite similar to those recently employed by Mr. John Fiske—the fact that “the business of science is simply to ascertain in what manner phenomena coexist with each other, and the only kind of explanation with which it can properly deal is that which refers one set of phenomena to another set.” (“The Idea of God,” p. 101, 1886.)

And so, having put ourselves under the guidance and constraint of the scientist, the question of origin was more or less unwillingly waived. Ignoring or assuming a beginning, then, it was necessary, at least, to go back to a period when there existed particles of star-dust, in a certain condition of motion and with a hypothetical arrangement. These being given, everything else followed, and science has simply to record what came to pass.

There results from this complex flow of all atoms and all things, first, an aggregation into perceptible magnitudes, the formation—throughout the celestial spaces—of revolving rings and spheres which became consolidated into the rolling worlds known to our astronomy; finally, “the massing of the earth in all its phases, its revolutions, the formation of clouds, the generation of light and heat, the consolidation of the melting rocks, the melting and cooling and transformations of the same, the separation of land and water, the generation of plants and animals.”

Now it is possible to look upon the successive steps in all this long and wonderful operation as resulting simply from the combination of matter in motion.

For to pure science all these phenomena need have no other connection than one of time; to a sense-view, such as we have spoken of above, “matter in motion is all there is in the universe.”

“Science is content when it has registered the molar and

molecular phenomena at which analysis arrives, and from which constructive chemistry sets out. It is held to explain everything because it makes visible to the eye or the imagination how the new comes out of the old. . . . Grant the law of gravitation, and, according to Physicus, 'the final mystery of things is abolished.' There is nothing left to explain: if we feel dissatisfied the reason must lie in us. 'How,' it is asked, 'can you get beyond an ultimate fact?' An ultimate fact—in other words, a phenomenon of which you can render no account—is your only *Q. E. D.* I call this bold and clear; if science be the application of physical methods, where they stop science stops; nor can *they* transcend an ultimate sensible fact." ("Science and Religion," by Wm. Barry, D.D., *Contemp. Review*, September, 1884.)

The mental attitude to be assumed in taking this sense-view of the universe is concisely described by Dr. Martineau: "To make it (the Agnostic case) good, you must be careful not to look beyond phenomena, as empirical facts: you must abjure the inquiry into *causes*, and the attempt to trace invisible *issues*: never lift the veil that bounds experience, and you will need nothing and know nothing of a transcendental world." (Preface, VIII.)

Now, as has been said, the "ultimate sensible facts" of the outer world are matter and motion, and if these are the only facts that can be recognized in our comprehension of external nature, it is evident that we might as well abandon any idea of finding the slightest hint of God in that direction. At the same time it is manifest that our cognitive activities will at once make us restive under such limitation of knowledge, and any serious attempt to insist upon this mental attitude must in the end fall back upon a proof of the impossibility of the human mind to pass beyond phenomena.

"This doctrine of Nescience," to quote Dr. Martineau again, "professes to be the result of an exhaustive scrutiny of the cognitive faculties, and an exact measurement of their resources against the objects to which they may address themselves." (Vol. I., p. 37.)

In view of this we shall be quite prepared to find at the

beginning of these later volumes in support of a theistic belief a vindication of the mental processes by which we reach that conception of things which is furnished by thought. Metaphysics again! Yes, but a kind of metaphysics that certainly must be tolerated, at least, until it has the opportunity to justify itself.

"The business of the metaphysician is to assemble, to discriminate, to interpret, these transcendental contents of thought, and show how they deal with its phenomenal material, and organize the relations which form the contents of human knowledge. . . . By this kind of *critical* metaphysics alone, interpreting the text of the law of Reason, have I endeavored to save such constants of human thought as are essential to religious belief, and have suffered of late from sceptical disparagement." (Martineau, Preface, IX., X.)

This preliminary investigation cannot, of course, be followed in detail within the limits of the present article. Its nature, however, may be indicated by a moment's inspection of Book I. of Dr. Martineau's "Study." The book itself deals with "The Limits of Human Intelligence"; Chap. I., is on "Form and Conditions of Knowledge," Chap. II., on "Kant's Doctrine," Chap. III., on "Absolute and Empirical Idealism," and Chap. IV., on the "Relativity of Knowledge." "I am aware," says Dr. Martineau, "of the tediousness of these metaphysical tribunals; especially when the whole process wins at last, through all its dizzying circuits, only the very position which common sense had assumed at first."

To defend the principle that the soul *does* gain a knowledge of realities by means of its thought-processes is certainly important to the philosophy that must underlie theism. Nevertheless, although one can see the signs of new influences and new tendencies, the problem just here is, in its essence, the same that has so long occupied human thinking, and the discussion is really along the old lines.

Partly for this reason there would probably have been little chance of theism gaining for itself a new bearing, or of forcing its claims upon men's attention at present simply by an abstract consideration of psychical performances, or by a legitimatizing of

the intellectual abstractions resulting therefrom. Men's faces and thoughts were set too resolutely natureward, and they were little inclined toward the old introspective style of demonstration.

The mind must not retire within itself and there elaborate its proof of God's existence. What it would accept as a manifestation of God must be found *outside* of itself. Men stood with the scientist looking out upon nature ; could any gate-way leading from the seen into the unseen be found *there* ? Matter is there ; at any rate men are satisfied to believe it is there, and the old way of escape by means of philosophic idealism apparently offers little attraction to modern seekers. Indeed, as *empirical* idealism it is not a way of escape at all ; and as *absolute* idealism it is found to be full of dangers, and " its end destruction."

It was seen, therefore, that it would be to the advantage of the thought that lies at the basis of theism if there could be found in nature evidence of something with which the senses alone are impotent to deal and to grasp which we must break through the phenomenal surface that nature presents to those dependent upon the senses only, and enter the hyper-physical region.

So might be discovered the possibility of physics passing into metaphysics, and it might become apparent that the cosmological argument from the outward, and the argument from the inner consciousness are not really entirely separate.

Prof. Huxley long since pointed out that physical science slips into metaphysics in dealing with the theoretical problems which present themselves for its consideration. And the physicist carries himself beyond phenomena by the sole force of his reason. Going out from them he conceives of " atoms " and " ethers," for instance, which can have no place in a purely empirical or sense-view of nature.

But there is something else that plays a very important part in all the dealings of science with nature, which has a peculiar claim upon the attention of the theistic thinker ; namely, *force*.

Whatever we may discover the true nature of force to be, there can be no doubt that the word is continually used by scientists.

Science is full of this notion of force—mechanical, crystalline, electric, and chemical force ; and the correlation and equivalence of force.

“ All the varied phenomena of the physical world are attributed to motions of the masses, or the particles of matter ; motions which are themselves due to the action of certain impelling forces.” Force is conceived as something lying back of phenomena, to which the latter are to be referred as their ground or cause. The necessity for the presence of force is apparent at the very commencement of the scientific account of the course of nature. If we return to that condition of affairs which science assumes in order to make a beginning, that is, to the homogeneous dust, we are compelled to meditate on the source of its activity ; for unless there is somehow an exercise of energy no start can be made. “ That prime event must be a movement ; and yet no conscious motion of inert matter has ever occurred in all human experience. Unless we can go back of the moveless atoms, and get the persistent absolute to lift up and let fall some one atom in its gravity, our evolution is as motionless as the inert mass about us. There must be some outside help for *the beginning*.” (“ Evolution from Mechanical Force,” Prof. L. P. Hickok, *Princeton Review*, March, 1878.)

Does force, then, manifest itself to a sense-view, is it something that can be detected by the senses ? How is it, for example, in the case of the force upon which the scientist so much relies in giving his account of the universe, viz., gravity ? To the sense-perception what we call gravity means simply one kind of motion, which may be expected to recur and vary according to certain attendant circumstances. To the senses alone only the motion is cognizable or measurable. If the word force has any other more real significance than that resulting from motion, we become acquainted with its deeper meaning not from the idea of motion simply, but because of the resistance which, in this case, it offers to our attempts to uphold an unsupported body ; that is, to our own voluntary effort.

What, then, is the true nature of the idea of force ? Many thinkers have come to realize the bearing of this question upon natural theology, and the most important results that recent

theistic philosophy has achieved for the cosmological argument are involved in the answer.

American thinkers were among those who saw most plainly the significance of the issue which this inquiry raises, and by none has the subject been more intelligently treated. The direction taken by the theistic argument at this point is clearly indicated in the following quotation :

"The conception of *force* is one of those universal ideas which belong of necessity to the intellectual furniture of every human mind. . . . But force is not an object of the senses, and no examination through any organ of sense, or through any instrument of observation, can detect its presence. It is not phenomenal ; does not reveal itself through any manifestation. . . . Hence, though all physical science supposes it, and all scientific reasonings assert or assume its existence, science can give no account of it by any physical characters. It has no form or color for the eye, and no sound for the ear ; it has no odor, nor feel, nor taste. Physical science, therefore, has no means of defining it. The definition must be looked for in quite another direction. . . . The conception of force is metaphysical rather than physical, and is derived from mind and not from matter. . . . We become acquainted with force as an element of our own personal experience. We are conscious of the exercise of something which we call energy, force, or power, in our own mental states. Throughout that sphere we are familiar with the great conception of *action* ; and action is the exercise of force. The mind is constitutionally endowed with a power of action ; and this power of our spiritual nature is what we mean by force. It is originally known to us as a quality of the mind. It is that by which we can act. *Here* we know something about it, as in physics proper we do not. . . . Now with this knowledge of force, psychologically gained, we are able to understand ourselves when we speak of force in the world without us. When asked, What is force ? we cannot, indeed, reply in terms of physical science, or physical quality, but in the language of our mental experience, we can give a ready and decisive answer. It is the capacity of acting, the power of exertion, which we ourselves possess, and which we exercise in all our

actions. . . . It denotes a fact of deeper meaning than the mere phenomena of our observation. It describes that profound and productive energy which underlies all the phenomena of the universe. Force is the energy of a cause ; and the universal force, to which all specific forces and movements are to be referred, is the power, ever present, and everywhere active, of one comprehensive and universal cause."* (Prof. B. N. Martin, "Natural Theology of the Doctrine of Forces," Proceedings, University Convocation, 1871.)

Striving, under the pressure of scientific influence, to 'fix its attention upon the outward, rather than insisting at once on the acceptance of abstract ideas which result from "pure thought," the mind is thus carried beyond a strict scientific empiricism. Following in the direction which the impulse of science itself gives, we are driven to ask if phenomena are their own explanation, or whether they arise out of that which lies beyond its experience.

The physicist, *as such*, may still assert with Mr. Mill that "we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena"; that "the laws of phenomena are all that we know respecting them." As a *thinker*, he cannot refuse to consider and discuss the nature of force by retreating behind the statement that he will have nothing to do with the results of pure metaphysical speculation, as he might possibly do in the case of such abstractions as the "Absolute," or the "Unconditioned." He is under the necessity of at least proving that the idea of force held by theism is philosophically unsound. Inevitably the discussion of the sub-phenomenal entity force takes us at once into the very heart of the old controversy concerning the idea of Cause.

Force is treated of by Dr. Martineau in that part of his "Study" which discusses "The Meaning of the Causal Relation." The strict empiricist can, of course, make nothing of the relation of cause and effect beyond that of invariable antecedence and consequence, because he never, from sense-perception alone, can acquire any idea of a real *nexus* between the cause and

* See also, "The Force Behind Nature," by Prof. W. B. Carpenter, *Modern Rev.*, Vol. I., p. 34 ; and "The Idea of Cause," by Prof. F. Bowen, *Princeton Rev.*, May, 1879.

the effect by means of force or power. The idea of cause upon which theism must insist is that "not of prophecy, but of production."

"Is our belief in causation," Dr. Martineau asks, "identical with our belief in *Law*? or with belief in *Power*? . . . does it mean belief in the uniformity of nature? or in the derivative origin of phenomena? The reasons for preferring the latter explanation appear decisive." (Vol. I., p. 156.) "*Power*, we conclude, is postulated by the understanding as the operative condition of any and all change." (Vol. I., p. 177.) "From a position of mere receptivity or of contemplative intelligence, in which we simply register what we observe, we could never attain our idea of causality; for the essence of that idea is present neither in synchronous visual images nor in the procession of ideal trains marching past our inward eye. Were the world a panorama and man an intellectual eye stationary before it, he would have no insight into this relation. Not till he throws himself into the field as agent, can he find the problem and try to solve it. Its very rudiments spring from the activity of the Ego, and are absent from its receptivity." (Vol. I., p. 178.) The further development of the theistic argument along this line is beyond the scope of my article, the purpose of which is simply to point out the path by which theistic philosophy, standing like science face to face with the outer world, seeks to push through the self-imposed limits of empiricism.

Dr. Martineau thus sums up the results which are yielded by the principle of Causality: "There is One universal Cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all power, an omniscient Mind, ordering all things for ends selected with perfect wisdom. Further advance we cannot securely make upon this line of thought." (Vol. I., p. 417.) Nor can we follow our author in his study of the other intuition of *Right*, which is considered as an independent source of religious truth in his second volume.

To some, I take it, there are not wanting evidences that the strictly empirical philosophy has been losing ground of late years. Mr. Spencer makes a significant advance upon pure empiricism in his agnosticism; so much so that Mr. Frederic Harrison, the guardian of later positivism, has felt it necessary to protest.

Mr. Spencer himself leaves us as a basis of religious belief a Something which, though unknowable, he can define as "The Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," and as "The Inscrutable Existence, which Science, in the last resort, is compelled to recognize as unreached by its deepest analysis of matter, motion, thought, and feeling"; and of which he can say, "Though the attributes of personality, as we know it, cannot be conceived by us as attributes of the Unknown Cause of things, yet duty requires us neither to affirm or deny personality, but to submit ourselves . . . in the conviction that the choice is not between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality and something higher."

DR. GUSTAV CARUS, Superintendent General of the State Church of Eastern Prussia, who is a high authority on such a subject, says: "The course of intellectual development in Germany has long since taken this direction [belief in a personal God], and really cultured minds have long since discarded the threadbare remnants of Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, or of whatever else the forms of God-renunciation may be called. Thence the present youthful revival among our people. The quibbling sophistries that delight in renouncing God, the Freedom of the Will, and the Immortality of the Soul, are long since recognized as the marks of a degenerate and imperfect culture that can only stifle the vigor and energy of life, and which must stunt in a people the sense of the true worth of human life, should these irreligious and unethical principles ever assume a serious front and no longer remain the mere mental freaks of literary adepts. For irreligious and unethical they certainly are, even though by a misuse of language they be called religious and ethical. There is no religion without a personal God; and without free will, without accountability for acts and omissions, there is likewise no morality."

ROBERT ELSMERE, OR CHRISTIANITY ELIMINATED OF ITS AUTHOR.

[Contributed to the American Institute of Christian Philosophy.]

BY J. E. RANKIN, D.D., ORANGE, N. J.

DR. HOLMES has a theory that it takes three generations to evolve the man of culture from the man standing at the plowtail ; that what he terms the Brahmin class, have to get rid of a certain coarseness of grain, if not of a certain sturdiness of purpose and downrightness of aim, before they can exhibit the alertness and grace of true genius ; and that this is a process which usually requires about three generations.

There is something very plausible in the theory, and there are some facts that seem to sustain it. For example, the New England Brahmin class ; that is, the class of culture, the class producing books, making original divergences in thought, have, many of them, been just three generations from their strong-minded, but not so facile and accomplished progenitors, who dug their living out of mother earth, and gave their children and their children's children a culture denied themselves. Though in the case of Ralph Waldo Emerson, it was a process which had been going on more than double that time, it being affirmed of him that for eight generations previous there had not been wanting either on the side of father or mother, some representative of the name who had occupied the Christian pulpit.

There is something very pathetic in the manner in which Thomas Carlyle speaks of his immediate ancestor : "I feel toward my father, so great though so neglected, so generous also toward me, a strange tenderness, and mingled pity and reverence peculiar to the case, infinitely soft and near my heart. Was he not a sacrifice to me ? Had I stood in his place, could he not have stood in mine and more ?" And when we recall what Carlyle says of his father's character—a man "religious with the consent of his whole faculties" ; a man "whose voice

would thicken and his lips curve while reading the Bible"; a man who wept at home-sorrows as if "a rock of granite melted and was thawing into water"; a man over whose world hung an atmosphere of higher greatness than that of any poet, namely, "the ever-present greatness of the Infinite itself"—and then turn to what his intellectually greater son was religiously; a creature of Titanic upheavings and inward unrest of soul; like that of internal fires in the bosom of the earth; writhing like a serpent in ineffectual coils, as he struggled with the philosophy of his destiny; fixing fierce fangs upon all that is weak and sinful in life, and voiding the venom of his satire upon a race of which he was part and in whose weakness and sin he had his full share; it seems more than doubtful whether the step in evolution from James Carlyle to Thomas was not morally and spiritually a step backward. Might not this be said of the author of this book?

The writer of "*Robert Elsmere*"—a work which has caught the very image and body of the religious unrest of the period, which has attempted for rationalism what George Eliot's "*Middlemarch*" accomplished for the passion of love; to trace its every bone and muscle, its nerve and fibre, as with the dissector's knife; which has given such an almost exhaustive study of the morbid anatomy of a soul, whose barque cuts loose from the firmament of revealed and experimental truth, and goes out upon an unknown sea in search of other worlds—is the granddaughter of Thomas Arnold, of Rugby. She may have read in one of the Rugby sermons of her illustrious progenitor the following words: "The evidence of our Lord's life and death and resurrection is of the same sort as we rest on in human matters. Thousands and tens of thousands of persons have gone through it, piece by piece, as carefully as ever judge summed up in a most important case. I have myself done it many times over, not to persuade others, but to satisfy myself. I have been used for many years to study the history of other times and to examine and weigh the evidence of those who have written about them, and I know of no one fact in the history of mankind which is proved by better and fuller evidence of every sort to the understanding of a fair inquirer, than the great sign that God has given us, that Christ died and rose again from the dead."

There probably never was a more historic mind than that of Thomas Arnold, of Rugby. He was distinguished for studiousness, candor, and for the power of accurate analysis, while he was pre-eminent for his union of remarkable intellectual, moral and spiritual gifts. Three generations elapse, and his granddaughter, in this book, makes her hero exclaim : " Do I believe in Christ ? In the Man-God, the Word from Eternity ; in a wonder-working Christ ; in a risen and ascended Jesus, in the living Intercessor and Mediator for the lives of His doomed brethren ? Every human soul in which the voice of God makes itself felt enjoys equally with Jesus of Nazareth, the divine sonship ; and miracles do not happen ! "

The writer of " Robert Elsmere " is the niece of Matthew Arnold, who has indulged in severe strictures on the body of orthodox theology, who gave up the belief in the supernatural, as exhibited in the Bible, who has been regarded one of the worst enemies of the Established Church, and yet, who says, in his address to the London Clergy at Sion College, " I regard the Church of England as, in fact, a great national society for the promotion of what is called goodness, and for promoting it through the most effectual means possible, the only means which are really and truly effectual for the object ; through the means of the Christian religion and the Bible." Adding elsewhere, " Biblical criticism is not presented as something salutary and indispensable, far less as any substitute for a practical hold upon Christianity and the Bible, or of at all comparable value with it." And, yet, Mrs. Ward makes her hero, who is in this great national society for the promotion of goodness ; who has all its machinery at his command ; who has all its hoary antiquity and majestic impulse behind his back ; and who is working its forces to the top of his bent, in preaching, in talking, in efforts to relieve the suffering of the sick, the neglected and the dying ; and who is conscious of the highest degree of success in all these directions, abandon it all, cut loose from the ties of the Church, kindred, family, and go and bury himself in London to start among those who are out of sympathy with all organic efforts to make men into new creatures, a Christian brotherhood, on the basis of the remnants left to the historic Christ, after modern

criticism has done with them, and as he thus discredited and alone can set them forth.

That "Robert Elsmere" has a polemic intent, was intended to carry a verdict against what is termed traditional Christianity, there can be no doubt. The intellectual contrast between the hero and heroine—the one the representative of thought and the other of feeling—is always to the depreciation of the latter. Catherine Leyburn, brought up very strictly by a deceased father, who has entrusted to her as a guardian, the care of an invalid mother and two younger sisters, takes this sacred heritage of service upon herself, and is faithfully discharging it in the fear of God, when Robert Elsmere, fresh from a University life, in which he has accepted, without much examination, the Christianity of the Church of England, appears as a stranger in the quiet parish where her mother resides, and after persistent futile attempts succeeds in making her his wife. Her character is a beautiful one; rigid and cold, as Mrs. Ward delineates it. She is pure, loyal to duty, strict in her religious observances, and the decision to become the wife of a Christian minister has been made not without many a struggle. Her husband, a man of vivid imagination and quick sensibilities and vast, persistent energy, is morally and spiritually her inferior. Much of his inspiration as a preacher is confessedly derived from her, while to ministrations of charity and Christian love to the needy she is already consecrated, long before she becomes Mrs. Robert Elsmere.

There is a constant attempt, in this book, to convey the idea that evangelical religion represses the innocent natural instincts and tastes. And so, Catherine Leyburn is represented as having a holy horror for the predilection for playing the violin exhibited by her impressible and passionate sister Rose; and her willingness to marry a man, not a Christian; an infidel rather. But when we come to see that Rose's ideal of a *danseuse* does not include moral character; that her pursuit of her favorite study brings her into association with one man, Langham, whose life-long seclusion and cynicism unfit him to be her husband, though in the pursuit of art they are strangely *en rapport*, and she virtually lays her unsolicited affection at his feet twice; and that the atmosphere of the artistic circle, in which

she moves, as a temporary attraction, has not one ennobling or elevating moral ingredient, we see that Catherine's solicitude for her sister was neither unpardonable nor unnatural. Rose pursued music, just as a pagan girl might. It is only as art is laid at the foot of the Cross, is used as a good thing of God to make people really happier, better, holier, that it deserves the patronage of any of God's creatures. That it is not always so employed ; that its votaries often become corrupt and the corrupters of others, cannot be left out of the inquiry how far any Christian shall pursue it ; how far it shall become a part of true Christian culture. This is not Puritanism, but common sense, applied to the religious life.

The hinge on which Robert Elsmere's exit from the Established Church turns is, the reality or non-reality to him of experimental religion. The author of the book treats it as though it were the Christian Evidences. In his parish work, the hero encounters a Mr. Wendover, the Squire, a coarse, ungentlemanly man, who leaves his tenants to die of malaria and all sorts of ills, fostered by neglected tenements ; who insults his rector the first interview ; a passionate, profane, godless man, who is yet represented to be master of all the arts of destructive criticism ; indeed, to have written a masterly book himself ; in whose munificently furnished library, in his absence, Robert had been allowed to forage, until his mind becomes unsettled, and he goes on speculating and playing the vagabond to the bitter end ; landing, even to the disappointment and almost horror and disgust of the Squire himself, in the bog of unbelief, which is the Squire's more peculiar domain.

Christian Evidences have two departments, the outward, which is purely critical and historical, and the inward, which is historical and experimental. One is quite as legitimate as the other. Catherine Leyburn, as Robert Elsmere found her, and knew her Christian life, even if he had no experience of the truth of Christianity in his own soul, was a more irrefragable argument in behalf of the supernatural in Christianity than could be brought by destructive criticism against it. She was herself a Christian evidence. During all that period, when Robert Elsmere was reading and writing in seclusion, was breathing in the poison of

the Squire's society, Catherine, his wife, always up to this time his true co-partner in Christian thought and Christian work, in her fidelity and patience and love, was the one monumental proof of the supernatural, in his own home; bearing with him, praying for him, following him—though not with her sympathy—yet in her person, according to God's covenant, though with a broken heart. Mrs. Ward, the author of *Robert Elsmere*, shows the defect in her own Christian experience, as well as her ignorance of what is true spiritual religion, in this fact: that neither in Catherine's case, nor that of Robert, does she seem to appreciate the fact that the truth of the supernatural is something that is verified in human experience; that a Christian may have the witness in himself. Giving up connection with a system of Church government, with a parish in which a young minister has had success to his heart's content, abandoning the doctrinal statements of the Thirty-nine Articles; tearing away from the leaning trust of a Christian woman whom he has taught to love him, even though the change to her involve the sacrifice of all her earthly hopes; this, with *him*, is the great struggle. But, if there is any truth in evangelical religion, the change involved abandoning the practice of communion with the Father in prayer; the sense of forgiven sin, through the blood of Christ, and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; all of which, though they are historically a part of Christianity and are to be proved experimentally, are here entirely ignored. In "Adam Bede" George Eliot describes the preaching of the Methodist "Dinah Morris" just as though she herself knew experimentally what is the truth as it is in Jesus. But Mrs. Ward has but two classes in her book, namely: those that receive Christianity through the intellect, and those that receive it through the feeling. Of spiritual life like the life of God she seems to have no conception.

What is called by those who believe in it, experimental religion, is in this book treated as mere feeling. It is intellect against feeling; it is the historic sense against feeling. The author says: "During those three miserable months, it can not be said—poor Elsmere—that he attempted any systematic study of Christian evidence. His mind was too much torn, his heart too sore.

He pounced feverishly on one test-point after the other ; on the Pentateuch, the Prophets, the relation to the New Testament of the thoughts and beliefs of its time ; the Gospel of St. John, the evidence as to the Resurrection, the intellectual and moral conditions surrounding the formation of the Canon. His mind swayed hither and thither, driven from each resting place, in turn, by the pressure of some new difficulty. And let it be said again : all through, the only constant element in the dismal process was his trained historical sense."

It might be submitted, whether this is the description of a man who is applying intellectual tests to purported facts. And it might be asked, What has become of that other highest test, which the Saviour gives, " If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine " ? After reading Colenso on the Pentateuch Charles Kingsley wrote to Frederick Denison Maurice, " All this talk about the Pentateuch is making me feel its unique value and divineness more than ever I did, so that I burn to say something worth hearing about it. There is, without doubt, something in the Old Testament as well as the New, quite different in kind, as well as degree, from the sacred books of any other people ; an unique element, which has a unique effect on the human heart, life and civilization. After all the possible deductions, for ' ignorance of physical science,' ' errors in numbers and chronology,' ' interpolations,' ' mistakes of transcribers,' there remains that unique element, beside which all these accidents are but as spots upon the sun, compared to the great glory of his life-giving light, and I cannot but still believe, after much thought, that *it*—the powerful and working element, which has converted, and still converts millions of souls—is just that which Christendom in all ages has held it to be: the account of certain ' noble acts ' of God's, and not of certain noble thoughts of man; in a word, not merely the moral, but, the historic element; and that, therefore, the value of the Bible teaching depends upon the truth of the Bible story. That is my belief. If all that a man wants is a ' religion,' he ought to be able to make a very pretty one for himself, and a fresh one as often as he is tired of the old. But the heart and soul of man wants more than that ; as it is written, ' My heart and flesh crieth out for God, even the living

God !' Those whom I have to teach want a living God ; who cares for men, forgives men, saves them from their sins ; and Him I have found in the Bible, and nowhere else, save in the facts of life, which the Bible alone interprets. The hearts and minds of the sick, the poor, the sorrowing, the truly human, all demand a living God, who has revealed Himself in living acts ; a God who has taught mankind by facts, not left them to discover Him by theories and sentiments ; a Judge, a Father, a Saviour, an Inspirer. In a word, their hearts and minds demand the historic truth of the Bible ; of the Old Testament, no less than the New."

But Robert Elsmere seems to be ignorant that here is something to be considered ; that a book, which has done what the Bible does for every Christian ; what it has done so persistently and unflinchingly for so many centuries, cannot be dismissed so cavalierly without doing violence to a spirit, which is quite as much the part of a man to respect as the historic spirit ; valuable in its place, as that may be.

The flippancy with which Mrs. Ward treats all internal tests, as applied to Christianity, may be gathered from her allusion to the Apostle Paul. Here is a man, as much within the domain of ancient history, as the modern world knows and acknowledges it, as Socrates and Plato, Seneca or Marcus Aurelius. Even the historic spirit cannot explode him, or make him down. His work in the Republic of God is just as pronounced and eternal as was that of Moses in the Hebrew Republic ; as that of Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Lincoln in the American Republic. And there is no inconsistency between his record, first, in Judaism, then in Christianity, for which the historic facts do not account. He is the great human teacher, at whose feet have sat Augustine and Calvin and Tholuck and Edwards and all the greater thinkers in the ancient and modern Church. And now, at this late period in the world's history, he, the man who, in his lifetime, knocked with his gospel message at the gates of the most flourishing, the most civilized, the most philosophic cities the world had then produced, namely : of Rome, the metropolis of the political world ; of Athens, of the intellectual ; of Tarsus, Pergamos, Alexandria, so celebrated for their schools and their

libraries ; Philippi, Corinth, Thessalonica, cities famous for their commercial enterprise, and even of Ephesus, the metropolis of paganism, whose temple of Diana was accounted one of the seven wonders of the world, and drew to its worship strangers from every portion of the world ; knocked at the gates of these cities, initiating work there, lived knowing nothing but Jesus Christ and Him crucified, and making conquests to his Master everywhere ; I say this man, such in his life, and who, since his death, has been accounted the great logician and philosopher of the Christian Church, is spoken of by Mrs. Ward as " the fiery, fallible man of genius ; so weak logically, so strong in poetry, in rhetoric, in moral passion."

In a word, the whole phenomena of the day of Pentecost, and all such similar displays of spiritual power in the Christian Church are ignored ; and the career of this one man and his associates under commission of Jesus of Nazareth, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, whose single history constitutes one of the strongest historical arguments for the truth of Christianity, is not even discussed.

Robert Elsmere's supposed work among the artisans of London is founded upon his skill in reproducing the Christ of reality as contrasted with the Christ of the Gospels. Stripping the narratives of all recognition of the supernatural, depending upon no aid from the Spirit of God, it is represented that he went into the most discouraging of London districts, and founded his brotherhood ; and that men who had been alienated from the Churches and the ecclesiastical Christ were drawn to him and made Christians by him ; so that some of them died in peace and others resumed the work after his death. And this brotherhood Mrs. Ward presents to her readers as the new religion, now that Christianity has been tried by Squire Wendover and Robert Elsmere, and found wanting.

Robert Elsmere professes to abandon the supernatural in Christianity, when he has looked at Christianity in the historic spirit, that is, in the light of its original surroundings. And belief in the presence of the supernatural, as experienced by living men and women, is termed mysticism by this author. But what is this which he introduces into the ritual of his new

brotherhood? "The opening prayer is recited by everybody present standing. It is rather an act of adoration and faith, than a prayer, properly so called. It represents, in fact, the placing of the soul in the presence of God. The mortal turns to the eternal; the ignorant and imperfect look away from themselves to the knowledge and perfection of the All-Holy. It is Elsmere's drawing up; essentially modern, expressing the modern spirit, answering the modern need, as I imagine the first Christian prayers expressed the spirit, and answered the need of an earlier day." Does not prayer imply the belief in the supernatural? To place the soul—which is on the supernatural side of our nature—in the presence of the Being, with whom as our Creator and Judge we surely have to do, even if we are only Deists; is not this a supernatural act? Does it not imply stepping over the line which divides the seen from the unseen? And what is there in this description of the prayer which Robert Elsmere phrased for his disciples which is not far better anticipated in the classic phraseology of the Lord's Prayer?

The basis of this book is purely sensuous; it is what is natural in man under discipline of the ordering of God as He is in nature. This is Robert Elsmere's true religion. And this is what is meant by experience. Any finding out of God, by face-to-face cognition; any personal communion with Him as Creator-spirit with creature-spirit, is denied as impossible; is the result of mysticism; which, with this author, seems to mean a kind of spiritual delusion that some people practise upon themselves, as other people believe in ghosts.

The vitality of Christianity consists in this fact: that the same power by which Saul of Tarsus was converted, is in it to-day; that the same Being, who met Saul of Tarsus without the gates of Damascus, may meet even such a man as Squire Wendover, though he have rejected the historic Christ as mythical, and bring him to ask the question, "Lord, what wilt Thou have me to do?" Mrs. Ward makes Catherine Elsmere's security consist in her ignorance: "She had sheltered herself, all her life, from those deadly forces of unbelief, which exist in English society, by a steady refusal to know what, however, any University educated man must perforce know." What first links a man's

intellect to Christ, may be the original facts of the Gospel respecting Him. But having once found Him, of whom the prophets speak, and whom the Gospels record, that experience has become a part of the history of his own soul; so that, though you could take away from him what you call the myths of the Saviour's life, Christ has met him, as really as He met Saul of Tarsus, or Mary, Martha and Lazarus of Bethany. And henceforth he speaks of what he knows and testifies of what he has seen.

As a book "Robert Elsmere" had to be written, just as "Uncle Tom's Cabin" had to be written; the time-spirit has been crying out for an utterance : some vehicle in which to express itself. Its language is, "There is no God, such as the Bible reveals. Let us break His bonds asunder, and cast away His cords from us. The religion of the Bible, so far as it consists in the practice of good deeds ; of the example and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth—the Hebrew Buddha, the Jewish Socrates—let us retain. It shall form the basis of the eclectic religion of the future, in which all the great ethnic religious teachers shall have honorable recognition." That it will do mischief there can be no doubt. It will injure the weak and benefit the strong. It is a subtle and insidious attack upon true Christianity, as the Lord Jesus Christ and His Apostles taught it, mainly in the line of historic criticism; which may be stated as an effort to recreate the past from one's inward consciousness and his critical studies, instead of taking it from the testimony of those who wrote in that period and were part of it. So far as it might be intended to awaken the enthusiasm of young ministers to go and do as Robert Elsmere did, it must be regarded a dismal failure. There is not a memory or association of unmixed pleasure, which the reader takes away from the book ; unless it be from the ephemeral period, in which the hero is trying to do the work of a Christian minister, in the old-fashioned Christian way. Despite the acute analysis of character; despite the beautiful descriptions of scenery; despite the emphatic and picturesque naturalism of the whole book, it is a book that leaves a melancholy impression. Its hero shows himself a religious Don Quixote, and dies with his lance caught in the wind-mill which unhorses him. He breaks away from his

parish, breaks up his Christian home, undertakes a hopeless task with hopeless materials and on a hopeless basis, and dies prematurely ; dies disappointed ; dies as a fool dieth ! That he could have seriously undertaken it ; that the author of the book could seriously propose it to her readers, as the crowning work of his life, shows the melancholy alternative to which those who try to follow in his steps must be reduced. But Robert Elsmere not only wrecks his own life, but also that of Catherine, his wife. Notwithstanding the apparent effort of the author to present her in a disagreeable way, Catherine Elsmere to the end remains the best character in the book. What it cost Robert to break up his home, the home which she had helped him to constitute, only after the greatest urgency on his part ; tearing her first, as he did, from her conception of what she owed her dead father, and from an inheritance of service to which he had consecrated her, and then from the Christian work to which marriage had called her, is here again and again depicted by the author. Little is said of what it cost her to follow him to London ; urged by him to go into that conglomerate social mixture of unbelief, blasphemy and sin, over which Madame de Netteville presided, and of which Robert himself seems to have had no true sense until shocked into it by an open temptation to forget his marital vows ; then, to see him engage in the forlorn hope of his humanitarian scheme, based on saving men by reading and telling them stories ; at last to see him die engaged in an empty crusade against poverty, prejudice, ignorance, vice and depravity ; die without making a sign of return to the Christian faith ; of this very little is said. Robert Elsmere and not Catherine, is the central figure in the book ; though if there is martyrdom anywhere, it is with her.

The chimerical and frantic nature of Robert's scheme appears from what he sacrifices, as appliances and helps in his work. He gives up the Bible, which, as history, biography, poetry, ay, as simple literature, is unequalled in its power over men. He gives up the Church of Christ, "that living and continual personification of the whole body of believers," which is behind every individual believer, and of which he forms a vital part ; which, instructed by the Holy Ghost, has kept the Bible's Christ for

humanity through so many generations, and which has sent so many witnesses to the truth through blood and flame, through peril and sword, to stand before God. He gives up the Book of the ages, and takes the literature of his own time ; he gives up the grand movement of the army of believers, whom no man can number, and essays to make men keep step with him, poor Robert Elsmere, as he begins there in the worst precincts of London, marking time in his solitary way to a heaven of which he says to Catherine, that he "knows nothing." And he does it as the pupil of a man whose death-bed is a shock to his own sensibilities, and who asks him, dying, how he could do it, so unaccountable seems to him in its consummation his own awful work.

The following will give some idea of what Robert Elsmere's thoughts and conclusions were. They are extracts from the book :

The world has grown since Jesus preached in Galilee and Judea. We cannot learn the whole of God's lesson from Him now,—nay, we could not then ! But all that is most essential to man,—all that saves the soul, all that purifies the heart,—that He has still for you and me, as He had it for the men and women of His own time. (p. 497.)

I see God's purposes in quite other proportions as it were. Christianity seems to me something small and local. Behind it, around it, including it, I see the great drama of the world, sweeping on—led by God—from change to change, from act to act. It is not that Christianity is false, but that it is only an imperfect human reflection of a part of truth. Truth has never been, can never be, contained in any one creed or system ! (p. 365.)

In the days and weeks that followed, the devout and passionate fancy of a few mourning Galileans begat the exquisite fable of the Resurrection. How natural—and, amid all its falseness, how true—is that *naïve* and contradictory story ! The rapidity with which it spread is a measure of many things. It is, above all, a measure of the greatness of Jesus,—of the force with which He had drawn to Himself the hearts and imaginations of men. (p. 498.)

You think—because it is becoming plain to the modern eye that the ignorant love of His first followers wreathed His life in legend—that therefore you can escape from Jesus of Nazareth, you can put Him aside as though He had never been? Folly! Do what you will, you cannot escape Him. His life and death underlie our institutions as the alphabet underlies our literature. Just as the lives of Buddha and of Mohammed are wrought ineffaceably into the civilization of Africa and Asia, so the life of Jesus is wrought ineffaceably into the higher civilization, the nobler social conceptions of Europe. It is wrought into your being and into mine. (p. 495.)

I know, oh, I know very well the man of the world scoffs; but to him who has once been a Christian of the old sort the parting with the Christian mythology is the rending asunder of bones and marrow. It means parting with half the confidence, half the joy of life! But take heart: it is the education of God. Do not imagine it will put you farther from Him. He is in criticism, in science, in doubt, so long as the doubt is a pure and honest doubt, as yours is. He is in all life, in all thought. The thought of man, as it has shaped itself in institutions, in philosophies, in science, in patient critical work, or in the life of charity, is the one continuous revelation of God. Look for Him in it all. See how, little by little, the divine indwelling force, using as its tools—but merely as its tools—man's physical appetites and conditions, has built up conscience and the moral life. Think how every faculty of the mind has been trained in turn to take its part in the great work of faith upon the visible world! Love and imagination built up religion. Shall reason destroy it? No! Reason is God's, like the rest. Trust it, trust Him. The leading strings of the past are dropping from you. They are dropping from the world, not wantonly or by chance, but in the providence of God. Learn the lesson of your own pain,—learn to seek God, not in any single event of past history but in your own soul, in the constant verifications of experience, in the life of Christian love. . . . You being what you are, nothing can cut this ground from under your feet. Whatever may have been the forms of human belief, faith—the faith which saves—has always been rooted here! All things change, creeds and philosophies and outward systems; but God remains! (p. 355.)

When you ask what wrought this change in Robert Elsmere, it seems more like a drift than a progress. You get some hints of it in one of his talks with Squire Wendover: Real miracles could not have happened, because false miracles were in the air. The historic spirit rejects them all. There was no genuine Messiah, because the period was peopled with false Messiahs. Columbus never could have discovered America, because there were so many fruitless expeditions, about that period. The presence of the false indicates the truth of the genuine. Every counterfeit coin is tribute-money to the kingdom of truth; minted by the father of lies; but possible only because of the genuine. Turning the tables on this logic, we find that the miracles of the Lord Jesus were among a people accustomed from their earliest day to believe in miracles, and to test between the true and the false. And that with the strongest disposition to deny the genuineness of Christ's miracles, they never denied them; they always admitted them; in fact, they put Him to death on the heels of a miracle which proved Him to have power to raise the dead. It was His miracles which confounded them. Admit that the time-spirit of the Saviour's period made the idea of a miraculous work to substantiate a doctrine, or a mission, a familiar thing; with this we must also bear in mind, that as between the Jews and the Saviour, this made it all the more difficult to impose upon the period as genuine, what was really only imaginary. The Jews challenged the Saviour to show His credentials. He said, "If I had not done among you works which none other man did, ye had not had sin. But now have ye no cloak for your sin." Coming to the Jews, the presumption was, the necessity was, that the Saviour should come with miracles, works of the Father, to attest His errand, His words. It is claimed that there can never be any historic proof of the reality of miracles. It certainly may with greater justice be claimed that if Christ's miracles withstood the test, which men, thirsting for the Saviour's blood, were sure to apply to them, no historic test to which they may be subjected in modern times, can overthrow them.

The branch of the alternative to which historic criticism drives those who accept its conclusions, concerning the limited

knowledge of the Saviour, is openly accepted in this book. The honor which He gave to the Old Testament Scriptures was only that which belonged to His period. The book of Daniel, according to this author, is a modern production; and the Saviour's allusion to it as though it were inspired and contained prophetic utterances, shows the limitation of His knowledge; in other words, His historic ignorance. But, if the Lord Jesus thought Himself informed on these subjects and was mistaken, why not on subjects of doctrine; why not as to His relation to the Father, as to His errand into the world? Doubtless a necessary conclusion which none of those who believe His limitations as to historic facts, would hesitate to admit. A conclusion, however, which shows us where the defenders of the truth must make their stand.

As an incidental illustration of how largely the author of Robert Elsmere is directly or indirectly indebted to her uncle, Matthew Arnold, take this passage from the preface to "*Last Essays on Church and Religion*," and compare it with what Mrs. Ward puts into the mouth of Robert Elsmere:

"Eternal life? Yes, in the higher and undying self of man. Judgment? Yes, the trying in conscience of the claims and instigations of the two lives, and the decision between them. Resurrection? Yes, the rising from bondage and transience with the lower life to victory and permanence with the higher. The Kingdom of God? Yes, the reign amongst mankind of the higher life. The Christ the Son of God? Yes, the bringer-in and founder of this reign of the higher life, this true kingdom of God." This from Matthew Arnold.

"I can believe no longer in an Incarnation and Resurrection," he said slowly, but with a resolute plainness. "Christ is risen in our hearts, in the Christian life of charity. Miracle is a natural product of human feeling and imagination; and God was in Jesus pre-eminently, as He is in all great souls, but not otherwise—not otherwise in kind, than He is in you and me." Again,—"We, too, shall have an Easter; we, too, shall be able to say, 'He is not here, He is risen!' Not here—in legend, in miracle, in the beautiful outward forms and crystallizations of older thought. He is risen, in a wiser reverence and a more

reasonable love ; risen in new forms of social help inspired by His memory, called afresh by His name ! ” This from Matthew Arnold’s niece.

What is treated as mysticism in Robert Elsmere is nothing other than what the Saviour taught His disciples when He said, “ I am the Vine, ye are the branches ” ; than what He promised, when He said, “ Abide in Me, and I in you,” and, “ If ye abide in Me and My words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you.” Spiritual processes and experiences are just as much matter of fact as intellectual—Nathanael before the throne of God as much as Nathanael under the fig-tree. When the astronomer goes to his observatory, and makes his observations ; when he sits down with his diagrams and tables, and enters into arithmetical calculations that are so intricate that a common mind cannot follow him, it does not follow that these observations and calculations are not legitimate. And it is begging the very question under discussion, to assume that the supernatural is impossible, because the objector has not himself experienced it. Besides the true historic spirit must account for results which are explicable, only on the supposition of the supernatural. The planting of the Apostolic Churches is a historic fact. It was done by men who derived their ideas of the Saviour and His errand here, from His own lips. If Robert Elsmere’s theory of Him is the correct one, then it should account for the early prevalence of Christianity, against the odds against it, in Judaism entrenched in a history full of the supernatural, and in a paganism full of the wisdom of this world, in which philosophy and art were at their highest. There is no such “ Brotherhood of Jesus,” as the author describes on the face of the earth. Given, it would not outlast the life of its founder. Hopeless as the class are, for whom Robert Elsmere is supposed to sacrifice his life, all the renovating influence which has ever affected them has come from the kingdom of God. London Christian charities are among the most wonderful works of the modern Christian Church.

We are all familiar with Dr. Chalmers’ work in connection with St. John’s Church, Glasgow ; a church set down in the midst of 2,000 families, more than 800 of which never attended

worship. They were laborers, weavers, factory hands. The parish was divided into districts, embracing from 60 to 100 families each, over each of which two church officers were placed, one to care for their temporal, the other for their spiritual wants. Day-schools and Sunday-schools were established. In four years the provision for the poor in that parish, which had cost the city £1,400, was reduced to £280 a year; many families became permanently identified with the Church and many individuals savingly affected by the truth. The contrast between this real effort to reach the masses who neglect the sanctuary, and the imaginary one of Robert Elsmere, makes one wonder that Mrs. Ward could so count upon human credulity as to give the latter a serious record in her story.

A work of similar character but of vaster dimensions, now in progress, originated from the attempt to supply the temporal necessities of the poor of London, East End, in 1879. This is the East London Tabernacle, under charge of Rev. Archibald G. Brown. His audiences are, next to Mr. Spurgeon's and those in the Cathedrals, the largest in London. It is from this region that came that "Bitter Cry of Outcast London" some five years ago. Here are houses where, in 340 rooms, congregate 260 families, or 1,244 human beings; and where, when a stranger comes to the door, the children ask, "Have you brought mother any bread?" The work began here by distributing bread from house to house. This introduced Mr. Brown and his two missionaries to 1,000 families. Now nine missionaries are employed, and during the year 1885, 26,340 pastoral visits were made, 8,428 families or individuals were supplied with food, 3,938 sick persons cared for, 35,000 loaves of bread were distributed, 80 cwt. of rice, 35,000 pounds of potatoes, 1,000 pounds of tea, and 5,600 garments. No communion service passes without accessions, and the accessions are largely from new and unreached classes of people. This work is not advertised, and its conductors never go in debt. The support of it comes to a great extent from thank-offerings given to the Lord by those redeemed.

The McAll Mission, reaching more than 1,000,000 persons annually, many of whom never heard of the Bible before, having its more than one hundred stations scattered over the great city

of Paris, evangelical in the simplicity and directness of its methods, shows, too, what can be done apart from direct Church organizations. And this, too, is work contemporaneous with Mrs. Ward's story.

It was a scene of the saddest and most impressive interest to me the other night, to hear a man, to whom I once gave the right hand of Christian fellowship, in an evangelical pulpit, but who has, by his vagaries, gone beyond the reach of all accepted Christian views, give an analysis of this book. It was a clear, able, fair treatment of the subject, given with grace of speech and manner characteristic of a man of culture. The speaker professed to have passed through an experience like Robert Elsmere's; to have been broken up in his faith and his life-long Christian fellowships, by the failure of the Christian documents to endure the test of historic criticism. But he said that if Robert Elsmere's solution of the question were the only one, it was a melancholy failure, and rather than adopt it, a man would do well to take his own life as the old pagans did, or to go into the endless mazes of the Roman Catholic Church. For himself, it had saved him from such a catastrophe that just at this juncture, he had become acquainted with the gospel according to Henry George, an advance on the books of the New Testament, though, doubtless, had Jesus of Nazareth thought so far, He would have been in sympathy with his views. It was all unspeakably sad to me. Here was a large audience of young people and married people in middle life on the evening of the Lord's Day, apparently *en rapport* with the speaker; a bank of beautiful flowers by the table; orchestral music, exquisitely sweet; no sacred song, no prayer, no benediction; and these husks! During the hour came wafted from the audience room, where this speaker once stood and might still be standing to-day, the triumphant tones of

"How firm a foundation, ye saints of the Lord,

"Is laid for your faith in His excellent Word."

And here is the battle-field: the Word of the Living God! Is it God's Word?

The phenomenon of such books as Robert Elsmere we may not be able to explain, except on the ground that God knows how to use them for His own glory; that He lets the devil go un

chained and unmuzzled. Says Frederick Denison Maurice: "Such men as Strauss and Feuerbach do not seem to me exactly in the light in which they once did; but rather as appointed or permitted destroyers of philosophical and religious systems, that in the utter atheism of men's hearts, they may be driven to prayers and tears for a Prince and Deliverer, who will be the very same they fancied they had rid the world of. That every wish and panting of the heart and reason is fulfilled, or on the way to be fulfilled, when we acknowledge the Crucified Man to be, indeed, Lord of all; when our thoughts and desires are brought to revolve around Him, and not around ourselves, I feel more deeply and assuredly every day."

"Robert Elsmere" has reminded some people of Froude's "Nemesis of Faith," whose hero was first a follower of Cardinal Newman, then plunged into Carlyleism, then took orders and began to preach a God whom he believed the Bible to misrepresent, and finally came to doubt everything. Of "Robert Elsmere," we may say in closing what Frederick Denison Maurice—who is quoted so frequently, because he represents the Broad Church, and not because of his general orthodoxy—said of "The Nemesis of Faith." It is in a letter to Charles Kingsley, another representative of the same Broad Church party: "I have done your bidding and read Froude's book, with what depth of interest I need not tell you. It is a very awful, and I think a very profitable book. Yes, God would not have permitted it to go forth if He did not mean good to come out of it. For myself, I have felt more than ever since I read it, how impossible it is to find any substitute for the old faith. If, after all that experience, a man cannot ask the God of Truth to give him His Spirit of Truth to guide him into all truth, what is left but just what he describes—doubt—not merely of existence, but of doubt itself; doubt whether every superstition may not be real, every lie a fact? It is undoubted that such a state of mind may be possible, yes, is near all of us. Froude is no false witness. But, if it be possible, there must be some One to bring us out of it; clearly the deliverance is not in ourselves. And what is the Bible after all, but the history of a deliverer—of God proclaiming Himself man's deliverer from the state into which he is ever ready to sink; a state of slavery to systems,

superstitions, the world, himself—atheism? The book is good for this: it brings us to the root of things. And there is nothing, or there is God. . . . Do not suppose I do not know what it must be to any young man to have these difficulties about the character of God in the Old Testament set before him. But, then, consider this: Where did he get the feeling about God being a Righteous Being; one in whom he might absolutely trust; which, he says, gave him his horror of such representations? Surely, from the very Book in which he seemed to find these representations. That Book bore witness to his heart that there is such a Being and that such a Being revealed Himself to Abraham, Moses, the Prophets. If there is such a One; if he is *sure* there is, could not such a young man have cast himself up on Him and said: "Show me whether I am really seeing these things right or not, whether these dark views which I seem to receive from this Book are there, or are brought there by me." I am quite certain about such a trust as this. I am quite certain that we do not become reconciled to any confused or Manichæan views of God; but that the Bible helps us out of them; and that, not by suggesting cunning explanations and apologies for the acts it speaks of, but by leading us to look at them more simply, more according to the letter."

My personal judgment is that this book, making popular—bringing to our own doors—the actual issues which have been for some time withheld from the mass of thinking people in our Churches; from young people in our schools, will precipitate the inevitable conflict between what is called the higher, but what is really the lower criticism, and Christianity. It is sure to come, and the more open it is, the better. There will then be no hiding the irreverence, the godless arrogance and claims of this criticism, nor the nature of the insidious work it is undertaking to do.

Few people appreciate the perils of pure speculation. Carlyle said of his father: "The thing he had nothing to do with, he did nothing with." Again, "As a man of speculation—had culture ever unfolded him—he must have gone wild and desperate as Burns. But he was a man of conduct; and work keeps all right." If a man ceases to pray to God, as his Heavenly Father, and to

trust in the Lord Jesus Christ as his Elder Brother and Saviour, and to accept the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter ; if, having put his hands to the plow, he turn back to speculate, there is only one termination for such a course. It will end where John Sterling ended: John Sterling, who was no man of straw like Robert Elsmere ; but, a man, who had the friendship and admiration of Charles Kingsley and Frederick Denison Maurice; around whose death-bed the latter lingered in vain for some expression of faith in Christ, such as Mrs. Elsmere sought at her husband's. I remember the case of a lawyer in Washington, who had once preached the Gospel, who had been the partner of Senator Foote, of Vermont, who had been acting Commissioner of Patents, and who at that time was deacon in the First Congregational Church. He acknowledged in one of our prayer-meetings that he had been giving himself to such a degree to speculations and inquiries such as are common in these days, that he could not right himself; could not recover his spiritual equilibrium without resorting to the daily prayer-meetings of the Young Men's Christian Association. And this set him right, and settled all his perplexities. The Lord Jesus Christ is the end of the intellect for truth, as well as the end of the law for righteousness.

In one of Robert Browning's poems are these lines, verified in Wendover's case—surely, in Robert Elsmere's, had he lived. Two men have agreed to give up all beliefs :

“ And, now, what are we ? Unbelievers both,
 Calm and complete, determinatively fixed,
 To-day, to-morrow, and forever, pray ?
 You'll guarantee me that ? Not so, I think !
 In no wise. All we've gained is that belief,
 As unbelief before, shakes us by fits,
 Confounds us like its predecessor. Where's
 The gain ? How can we guard our unbelief,
 Make it bear fruit to us ?—the problem here :
 Just when we're safest there's a sunset-touch,
 A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
 A chorus-ending from Euripides :
 And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears,
 As old and new at once as Nature's self,
 To rap, and knock, and enter in our soul,

Take hands and dance there a fantastic ring,
 Round the ancient idol, on his base again,
 The grand Perhaps ! We look on helplessly.
 There the old misgivings, crooked questions are—
 This good God, what He could do if He would,
 Would, if He could—then, must have done long since;
 If so, when, where and how ? Some way must be !
 Once feel about, and soon or late you hit
 Some sense in which it might be after all.
 Why not ' The Way, the Truth, the Life ? ' ”

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

INSPIRATION.—On this subject, Rev. Joseph Cook has had a “symposium,” at which he collected the views of a number of thinkers. The question submitted was “In what sense and why do you believe the Bible to be the Word of God?” From *Our Day*, Mr. Cook’s able organ, we copy the contribution of the editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, which is as follows :

To me the Bible is the Word of God in the sense that it is God’s representation to me of such relations between Himself and myself as are necessary to be known in this world, for spiritual and ethical purposes. It is a revelation of such knowledge in these departments as could not be obtained by any human effort. It includes much that mankind perhaps might discover in a long experience by cultivated powers skilfully and industriously employed. And it contains much beyond, much that could never have been ascertained if God had not revealed it. It is this which renders it the Word of God to me.

The question *why* I believe the Bible to be the Word of God is personal, and calls for no argument in the “Evidences” which I should here present to any other man’s intellect, further than personal testimony is necessarily some argument.

Personally, then, my persuasion is that, if there be a God, the moral probability that He would make all needful revelation to mankind is overwhelming. I find that what can be discovered by man’s unaided reason, in regard to spiritual salvation and duty, is at best so little that both individual men and communities

could have no satisfactory existence and no hopeful outlook and make almost no progress if that were all that we could obtain. The Bible includes all that and supplements it with an exhibition of the character and will and ways of God, consistent therewith, but abundantly ampler. Its representation of my own nature is to my consciousness so accurate, so complete, so profound, so far beyond anything and everything I find in all human literature to which I have access, that it wins my entire confidence to its representations of God. It is the production of some one who knows me more thoroughly than I know any other man or any other man could know me. The Book, or something behind the Book, knows me and addresses me as some one's child, as my consciousness assures me that I am, and then introduces me to One as its Author and my Father, and my responsive consciousness reads the Book as the production of my Father's mind and heart. It seems to know God as it knows me. A book that does this for me is, *for me*, the Word of God.

However it may be with other men, to me it is a paramount question how I can be saved. By that I mean how my personality can be so preserved as to its integrity that no destructive agency can destroy it, or impair its powers or impede its progress; and how it can be stimulated and helped in its efforts towards reaching its completest perfection, both in itself and in harmonizing itself with all its relations.

God must want me saved. My reason and my heart reject any supposition adverse to that. My Father must somehow, somewhere, have made provision for my salvation, and have furnished the requisite information how to secure that provision. No other book, indeed, no other thing, performs that service for me. The Bible does. In so far forth as I have obeyed it as the voice of God, it has fulfilled its own promises and met all my wants. Experimental science in physics is the science regarded as trustworthy. So I regard experimental religion as worth more than any other thing called religion. Now, I have experimented with the religion of the Bible; I have experienced it, in some measure: and so far as my experience has gone that religion is saving. That religion I find only in the Bible. Therefore I accept and reverence the Bible as the Word of God: and I do so

on grounds surer than any that can be laid in my logical understanding, namely, those laid in my own consciousness.

CHARLES F. DEEMS.

In the same series and to the same question the venerable Dr. Hamlin makes the following reply :

I believe the Bible to be the Word of God not only as containing but as being the revelation of His will to man. It having been given in human language, and much of it in relation to current and local affairs, it of necessity bears certain marks of human limitation and imperfection but not so as to invalidate the divine authority of a single truth.

I believe the Bible to be from God because it presents sin, and salvation from sin, and the character and government of God, in a manner to prove it all divine.

It is sustained by miracle and prophecy and the history of the Church through all the ages.

It comes to my own soul with authority and power which I cannot resist.

Jesus of Nazareth is in it from Genesis to Revelation, and He was declared to be the Son of God with power *by the resurrection from the dead.*

CYRUS HAMLIN.

THE Thirteenth Summer School of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy will open at Key East, N. J., on the 18th day of July next. The programme will probably be published in our next number. All we do now is to call the attention of our members and friends to that fact and ask them to make their preparations to spend at least one week of the next summer with us. Key East is one of the most charming places on the Atlantic coast, nearly midway between Philadelphia and New York. Going from either city to the other, stop a few days at Key East. There are fine hotels and a number of boarding-houses. The bathing facilities have been excellent and we presume will be improved. Already Hon. W. C. P. Breckinridge, Right Rev. Bishop Fallows, President McGill of Swarthmore College, Prof. Himes of Dickinson College, and others, have engaged to deliver lectures.

AN UNCONSCIOUS PROPHET.—We have at last discovered a moral significance and value in Positivism. The article which has enabled us to make this discovery is one in the *Fortnightly Review* by Frederic Harrison, entitled "Apologia Pro Fide Nostra." Mr. Harrison is the ablest representative in England of Positivism, which as a philosophy is a doctrine that we can know nothing beyond the realm of our senses, and as a religion is the worship of Humanity, spelled with a capital H. On the face of it Positivism is the worship of the majority. We look in the looking-glass, see ourselves, and offer ourselves homage. But no one man is divine enough to satisfy the demands of awe, reverence, love. We therefore group all men together, call the group Humanity, and worship it. This, according to Mr. Harrison, is to be the religion of the future, and is to restore that worship which philosophic and scientific skepticism has taken away from us:

"The blessed saints, the noble army of martyrs, the ministering angels, the demons and supernatural forces in nature, which stood by every thought and act of life, are gone, and man stands alone, shivering in the presence of the Ineffable Majesty which fills the universe. The conception of Humanity can restore, as nothing can, to the religious consciousness the variety and compass of which it has been robbed. It is no negative, lifeless, inhuman, unthinkable being. It is represented to us hour by hour in a thousand ways and by countless organs. Our parents, our wives, our children, our friends, are each some rudiment or expression of it; the comrades we work with are but an image of it; its voice speaks to us in every worthy book we read, in every beautiful work we see; every noble deed is the manifestation of it, every solemn act of life forms its sacraments, every honorable feeling and every loving word make its worship. The whole range of human life is transfigured by its glow; and all worthy men and women are its ministers for good."

We have long been of the conviction that no great intellectual movement ever existed that had not some elemental truth in it; truth which its votaries saw, but which its critics and assailants failed to see; truth which perhaps its votaries could not see except as it was veiled in error, as the eye cannot see

the sun except through smoked glass. Founders, especially of religions, are never liars. "A false man," cries Carlyle, "found a religion! Why, a false man cannot build a brick house! If he do not know and follow *truly* the properties of mortar, burnt clay, and what else he works in, it is no house that he makes, but a rubbish heap." We must frankly confess that we have hitherto been inclined to look on Positivism as "a rubbish heap," and we are indebted to Mr. Harrison for showing us that there is a truth hidden in it; that it is a real and needed reaction against a sublimated theology, with no small measure of truth in its corollaries and applications, and false only, or at least chiefly, in its premises; in what it takes for granted as though agreed to by all modern thinkers. What this assumption is we can best state in Mr. Harrison's own words, though we select the sentences from two paragraphs separated by an interval of five pages.

"The old anthropomorphic God of Abraham and Moses, of St. Bernard and St. Louis, of Calvin and Bossuet, was a very real, intelligible, active, moral ruler of this earth, with most of the attributes, feelings and passions of man idealized. All this shocks the moralist and the philosopher of to-day. . . . Now, the religion of Humanity is a frank return upon the healthy, instructive, anthropomorphic view of religion. *No object of religion can be a source of moral power over man unless it be anthropomorphic in the fullest sense—that is, sympathetic, akin to man, familiar to man.*"

We have italicized this last sentence, because it represents a truth which we believe ought to be italicized by every religious teacher and in every Christian experience. The Bible does unquestionably represent God as a Being with most of the attributes, feelings, and passions of man idealized. If this shocks the moralist and the philosopher of to-day, so much the worse for his morals and his philosophy. No other view of God will ever appeal to human love, or secure human allegiance, or win human service. We cannot worship an Eternal and Infinite Energy, nor love a Stream-of-Tendency, nor swear allegiance to a Power-not-ourselves-that-makes-for-righteousness, nor rejoice in the benignant providence and saving grace of the

Absolute and the Unconditioned “defecated to a pure transparency.” Mr. Harrison assures us that these are the gods whom the modern philosopher and the modern moralist, shocked at the anthropomorphism of the Bible, offer us in place of the Jehovah of the Old Testament and the Christ of the New Testament ; and that the offer is indorsed by some dignitaries high in the Church of England. As to the last statement we do not know ; but if it is true to any great extent, we no longer wonder at Positivism in England. Human companions are better than divine companions carved out of the fog. To worship such gods is as impossible as to warm one’s self in the Arctic regions by the Aurora Borealis.

The doctrine that God has a body like a man undoubtedly belongs to a very crude state of mind and to a very primitive or a very degraded form of religion. But the doctrine that God has the attributes, feelings, and passions of man idealized was the doctrine of the prophets and apostles, and, however it may shock Mr. Harrison’s imagined philosophers and moralists, is the doctrine of Christian thinkers to-day. That doctrine is that God made man in His own image ; that by various trope and figure He told men to look in their own hearts and lives for the reflection of Him ; that He was King, Governor, Judge, Shepherd, Husband, Father ; that to make this revelation clearer He came and dwelt for a while in a purely human life, making manifestation of Himself in the earthly life of one perfect and ideal man ; that He promised then that He would thereafter dwell with men, abide in men, guide and inspire men, fill men with His own attributes, feelings, and passions, and so make their attributes, feelings, and passions a reflection and interpretation of Himself. Ever since Pentecost He has done this. He is always and forever Immanuel—God with us. The Incarnation is a forever accomplishing and a never fully accomplished fact ; nor to be fully accomplished until that day in which God is all in all, and His children are one with Him as His best beloved Son was and ever is one with Him. What Mr. Harrison has said of his impersonal Humanity we may say of our personal God ; substituting only for his unloved and therefore unloving It our everloving and ever-loved Him.

He is no negative, lifeless, inhuman, unthinking Being. He is represented to us hour by hour in a thousand ways and by countless organs. Our parents, our wives, our children, our friends, are each some rudiment or expression of Him, the comrades we work with are but an image of Him; His voice speaks to us in every worthy book we read, in every beautiful work we see; every noble deed is a manifestation of Him; every solemn act of life forms His sacraments, every honorable feeling and every loving word make His worship. The whole range of human life is transfigured by His glow; and all worthy men and women are His ministers for good.

This doctrine of the Incarnation, this faith in a God whom the Heaven of heavens cannot contain, but who dwells in the hearts of those that love and revere Him, is the best, and indeed the only, antidote to the Positivism which gives us no God but Man, and to the Agnosticism which gives us no God but Force. If from the pulseless, bloodless Theism which for a Personal Father substitutes an Energy or a Tendency, Positivism shall, however unconsciously, lead mankind back to a sympathetic faith, and, by inculcating reverence for humanity, shall develop anew reverence for Him who dwells in humanity, the fact will afford a new illustration of the patience and skill with which our God uses strange prophets to recover to Himself His children when they have strayed away from Him into the wilderness, whether of immoral life or of vain speculation.—*Christian Union*.

PROF. SCHURMAN says that it is worse than idle for mechanical evolutionists to talk of the reason, or end, or ground of morality.

WHILE Hackel unites with Darwin in arguing that we should not believe in "special creation," because such a creation has never been seen by us, he forgets that that argument is good against "natural selection," and *a fortiori*, because, although we have seen neither, it would be more probable that we should see exhibitions of natural selection than of creation.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE regular monthly meeting of the Institute was held in its rooms, No. 4 Winthrop Place, New York, Thursday, Dec. 6, 1888, at 8 P.M. The President being still unable to attend, Rev. Jesse F. Forbes, of New York, was called to the chair. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. Dr. Robert Fairbairn, President of St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N. Y. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. The Secretary announced the following names of new members :

Rev. Benjamin F. Cabell, Pres. Cedar Bluff Female College, Woodburn, Ky.; James E. Rhoads, M.D., Pres. Bryn Mawr College, Pa.; Mr. R. Fulton Cutting, M.A., New York; Mr. James Talcott, New York.

The regular paper of the evening was by Mr. George May Powell, of Philadelphia, whose subject was, "The Cash Value of Conscience." The discussion of the subject and paper was conducted by Revs. E. M. Deems and Jesse F. Forbes, Sec. Davis, and Dr. Fairbairn.

A vote of thanks was presented to the lecturer for his able and valuable paper, and a copy requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. On motion, adjourned.

At the monthly meeting held in its rooms, Thursday, Jan. 3, 1889, at 8 P.M., the President, Rev. Dr. Deems, was again in the chair, after an enforced absence of four months. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. Dr. F. F. Ellinwood, of New York. The minutes of the last meeting were approved. The following names of new members were announced :

Hon. Albert K. Smiley, A.M., Lake Mohonk, N. Y.; Rev. Anson P. Atterbury, New York; Rev. Sherman M. Williams, Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Henry J. Talbott, A.M., Indianapolis, Ind., Rev. Elam Marsh, Fort Ann, N. Y.; Rev. William H. Groat,

Johnsonville, N. Y.; Rev. C. E. Pattillo, Cove Spring, Ga.; Mr. W. J. Ballantyne Patterson, San Antonio, Texas; John Z. Armstrong, Ph.D., Nashua, N. H.; and Thomas B. Neely, D.D. Ph.D., Philadelphia, Pa.

The paper of the evening was by Rev. Martyn Summerbell, of Lewiston, Maine, whose subject was, "Does the Nirvana of Buddhism Imply Immortality?" Rev. Dr. F. F. Ellinwood, Rev. D. C. Hughes, Mr. S. N. Wilder, Dr. Deems and Franklin Burdge, Esq., took part in the discussion.

After a vote of thanks to Prof. Summerbell for his very interesting and able address, and requesting a copy for publication in *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT*, the Institute adjourned.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, Publisher and Bookseller, 71 Bible House, New York.]

PROFESSOR MARCIUS WILLSON, the author of many valuable text-books, has recently issued, in two stately volumes, "THE WONDERFUL STORY OF OLD." (Large 8vo. Two volumes. Pub. by R. P. Willson, 714 Filbert Street, Philadelphia, Pa.) We have examined this work with care and great interest. It contains a record of the scenes, incidents and events recorded in the Bible, with a brief account of the prophecies, the poetical books and the epistles. To all this is added important testimony from traditions, ancient inscriptions and other sources, many of which were not open to earlier authors of books of this kind. The work is enriched with poetic gems and well selected thoughts of the best Biblical scholars and critics. By harmonizing, and omitting genealogical tables, repetitions, and other similar matters, the Bible narrative is here shortened and made in some respects more attractive to certain readers. A complete table of contents at the beginning of each volume is an aid to ready reference to any subject. Rare taste has been dis-

played in the selection of the many pictures which adorn "The Wonderful Story of Old," and so fine is their mechanical execution that they delight the old as well as the young in the home. It is, upon the whole, the best book of the kind for the household that we know of, and must promote interest in Bible reading, and Bible study, too ; for, without being written in the technical language of criticism, it gives evidence of long, earnest and scholarly research. We heartily wish for "The Wonderful Story of Old" the wide circulation among the homes of our land which it so richly deserves.

"A BRIEF HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY" is by B. C. Burt, M.A., formerly Fellow and Fellow by Courtesy in the Johns Hopkins University. (296 pp., 8vo. Ginn & Co., Boston.) This work aims to give a brief yet comprehensive account and interpretation of the Greek solution of the problems of philosophy. The author has analyzed and treated his subject well, and has made accessible in a convenient form much of the noble wealth of Greek thought in philosophy. The volume contains, as every such volume should, a full topical table of contents, a brief bibliography of the subject it treats, and numerous foot-notes, embracing references to original authorities and assisting the student towards a real contact with the Greek thinkers themselves.

One of the signs of the times is the large number of volumes of sermons which are printed *and sold*. Of recent volumes of this kind one of the most interesting and stimulating is "SPIRIT AND LIFE: THOUGHTS FOR TO-DAY," by Amory H. Bradford, D.D., pastor of the First Congregational Church, Montclair, N. J. (265 pp., 12mo., vellum cloth, \$1. Fords, Howard & Hulbert, New York.) These sermons by Dr. Bradford revolve around two thoughts: (1) In the Incarnation God has manifested Himself in a form which can be understood by men. (2) The Deity is never far from humanity. Every candid reader of "Spirit and Life" must be helped to more satisfying conceptions of God, and to constant reliance on His Spirit.

"THE ONLY WAY OUT," by L. S. Keyser, is published by A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York. (16mo., 325 pp., \$1.)

It is the story of an honest young doubter. The author aims to give a true picture of the honest doubter; to describe his experiences, perplexities and mental phases and to point out the *only way* of escape from doubt, viz., through repentance and faith in Jesus Christ. The author proposes also to show in his book that culture and evangelical religion are entirely consistent. "The Only Way Out" is worthy of a place in the Sabbath-school, the school, the college and the home.

Rev. A. S. Billingsley, late Chaplain U. S. A., and author of "From the Flag to the Cross," has written "THE LIFE OF THE GREAT PREACHER, REV. GEORGE WHITEFIELD." (8vo., 437 pp., \$2. P. W. Ziegler & Co., Philadelphia.) A number of engravings embellish the book and help the reader to understand the work done by the "Prince of Pulpit Orators." Born of the Methodist movement, by his zeal and matchless eloquence Whitefield did much to give to it life and permanency. All denominations of Christians owe an immense debt of gratitude to this strong and flaming herald of truth. Mr. Billingsley makes this evident in his volume, which is clear and entertaining, and gives evidence of earnest, honest toil. Not overwhelming in size, it is yet more than a mere sketch, and gives the reader a most satisfactory acquaintance with the life, character and preaching of its subject. It would truly be a good thing if persons of means would put this volume in the hands of every minister and theological student in the land.

Wilbur B. Ketcham, 71 Bible House, New York, has just issued an attractive little volume entitled "SUNSHINE FOR DARK HOURS," by the editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. It is a book for invalids. The articles were contributed by many hands, consequently the matter of this book is drawn from a wide range of reading, observation and experience, and is a genuine aid to contentment, comfort and relief. Its tone is indicative of strength gained by submission, an entire and hearty acquiescence in the will of God. It will brighten dark hours. It is printed in large type and clear page, and is particularly adapted to the invalid. Price 30 cents, by mail.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

A DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THE TRIALS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS MENTIONED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

[Delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 30th, 1888.]

BY KEMP P. BATTLE, LL.D.,

President of the University of North Carolina.

WHEN we closely study the secular history of the time covered by the writings of the New Testament, we are surprised, and as Christians deeply gratified, to observe how minutely it harmonizes with the sacred narrative. If we could understand thoroughly the character and motives of the various actors therein and the conditions surrounding them, the Holy Word would be illumined with meanings new and more clear. With much diffidence I ask you to listen to a brief discussion of some of the judicial proceedings in which appeared as accused Jesus the Christ, the God-man, John the Baptist, His forerunner, and Paul, His specially ordained Apostle. I do not flatter myself that all my views will meet with your concurrence, but I hope that on account of the transcending importance of the subject you will find them interesting, if not valuable.

It must be kept continually in mind that the sacred writers were not acquainted with legal forms, nor were they practised literary men. They were dominated by one controlling idea, which hard-headed men, like Festus, called monomania—that of showing to readers, Christ, His teachings, His suffering, His rising from the dead. They cared not to explain points of history or theories of science or philosophy. Apparent inconsistencies were nothing to them. The sharp eyes of critics

so dreaded by modern authors had no terrors for them. They have given word-pictures accurate as photographs, but like all other pictures, to be clearly understood, things not on the canvas must be known. It is the absurdity of hypercriticism to endeavor to throw discredit on their writings because the Evangelist, correct as to substance, did not describe actions in such a technical manner as we have a right to expect of Roman, Jew or Greek officials. For example, when finding Archelaus and Herod Antipas exercising the authority of their father, King Herod, they call them "kings," sneers are out of place because those rulers officially were designated as "tetrarchs." Even if it could be shown that they misunderstood the secret motives of wily procurators and proud proconsuls, it detracts nothing from their authority as historians.

Of all the nations whom the Romans conquered, the Jews were the most difficult to be understood and to be satisfactorily governed. The early emperors, including the great Julius, faithfully endeavored to conform to their political and religious views and usages. The internal local government was given to the Sanhedrin. The men were exempt from military conscription. Augustus even made a daily gift of animals for sacrifice in the temple. The strict rules about the temple courts were enforced by imperial authority. One of the tablets set up by Roman order warning Gentiles not to go into the inner courts of the temple, recently discovered and now in the public museum of Constantinople, is a vivid proof of the careful respect shown to the religious prejudices of the conquered race. The ensigns of the legions were excluded from the Holy City. Roman officers with their armies took other routes in order not to profane it. But notwithstanding all care, the unyielding obstinacy of the people about matters utterly unintelligible to the Romans, occasioned friction between races so utterly different in habits and thought and eventually kindled flames only to be extinguished by blood.

The men of the West were careful of the substance of obedience to law. If any executive power was able to prevent, or repress disorder, to protect their borders from hostile incursions and promptly comply with the demands of Rome, the emperors

were satisfied; whether such executive authority was a senate or a demos, a client-king, or a high priest. Because Hyrcanus, the Maccabean prince, was weak, they gave the dominion to the sagacious, strong, active, vigilant warrior and statesman, Herod the Great, who crushed with ruthless severity all opponents not conciliated by ostentatious generosity, and magnificent public works, and drove back from his frontiers the robber hordes of the South East, and daring Parthians of the North East. Because Archelaus, his son, was found unable to control the turbulent Jews, the emperor took Judea into his own hands with Samaria added in order to have an outlet to the sea, as a province of the second rank, and governed it by procurators, or stewards, responsible, according to the latest authorities, directly to himself; the best known to us being Pontius Pilatus, Antonius Felix, and Porcius Festus.

Originally only collectors of the imperial revenues, the procurators of Judea and some other provinces, had the *jus gladii*, the supreme executive and judicial power. They exercised their functions under the forms of the Roman law, with assessors appointed by the emperor, sitting with them as judges, and while they carried out strictly the law involving rights of Roman citizens, they were more arbitrary in matters purely provincial.

THE JUDICIAL MURDER OF JOHN THE BAPTIST.

The first incident to which I call your attention is the execution of John the Baptist by order of Herod Antipas, at the instigation of his wife Herodias.

John's offence was his denunciation of the marriage of Herod Antipas and Herodias as unlawful. Who were these persons and what position did they occupy?

Herod Antipas (called Herod in the Gospels—sometimes called Herod and sometimes Antipas by Josephus), the full brother of Archelaus, was son of Herod the Great by Malthake, his Samaritan wife. He was allowed by the emperor, in accordance with his father's will, to rule over Galilee and Perea. After the banishment of Archelaus he eagerly coveted Judea and Samaria.

In order to gratify this ambition it was necessary for him to

obtain the good will of the Jews. Tiberius was a wise ruler of the provinces, always ready to gratify their reasonable wishes. To gain the favor of the Jews was most difficult because above all nations they most hated the treacherous descendants of Edom, or Esau, and the mongrel inhabitants of Samaria, and the tetrarch had in his veins the blood of both.

In this extremity he followed the policy which his father with such unfortunate results had inaugurated. He sought an alliance with the royal line of the Maccabees to which the Jews looked with reverence and love. The females of this house were distinguished for their beauty, talents and towering ambition.

There happened at this time to be eligible for the ambitious purposes of Antipas only one female, his niece Herodias. She was the wife of his brother Herod Philip, whom she had married when he was the destined heir of his father's kingdom, but who now, disinherited, was living in Rome. Divorces were easy in those days and the disappointed woman abandoned him for his more favored brother. She was a Jewess with all the devotion of her people to the Holy City and it was not unreasonable for her to expect that they would gladly receive as their queen the majestic representative of the greatly loved Aramean family.

The scheme seemed plausible but was thwarted from an unexpected source. After a long interval there appeared a prophet in the land, commissioned by God Himself to denounce sin in palace and hovel, and to announce the coming of the Messiah. The utterances of all prophets were regarded by true Jews as the utterances of Jehovah, specially given, and hence to them was accorded an authority which no Christian preacher of modern times has, with the exception perhaps of the Pope over the ultramontanes. When John, with the boldness of Elijah before Ahab and Jezebel, refused to recognize the divorce under the Roman law, and boldly proclaimed the invalidity of the marriage under the Jewish law, it was accepted by the people as the ordinance of God, and a formidable barrier between her and her husband and the throne of David, of the Maccabees, and, of Herod, was erected.

The offence of John, under the Roman law, was undoubtedly

high treason. For much smaller offences blood constantly flowed at Rome under Tiberius, Caius, and other emperors; at London during the war of the Roses and under Henry VIII.; in fact under most monarchical governments. We have no reason to suppose that John did not have a trial as fair as was accorded political prisoners of that day. The Herods all copied the methods of Rome. Josephus narrates how Herod the Great presided at the trial of his wife Mariamne, and procured her condemnation, though her execution, on account of the greatness of his love, drove him to temporary insanity. He presided also at the trials of their sons, Alexander and Aristobulus.

The sentence of death of the holy prophet having been pronounced, he was imprisoned in the fortress of Machærus, just as Sir Walter Raleigh was held in the Tower, to be executed whenever the policy, or the whim of the ruler should dictate.

While so imprisoned what was the true interest of Herod? Evidently not to put John to death. This would make his denunciation of the marriage irrevocable. By the terrors of confinement of one accustomed to the free air of the desert, by alternate threatenings and flattering cajolements, he hoped to obtain from the crushed spirit of the prisoner a recantation of his charge. Hence he listened to him with apparent gladness, did him many acts of respect and kindly attention as we learn from Mark. He gave the order for the execution with unfeigned sorrow. It was a judicial murder.

Why did not Herodias carry out the policy of her husband?

The answer is first because she was a woman, and secondly because she was a Maccabean princess.

Few women could, from any views of state-craft, pardon such an offence as that of John the Baptist. Their emotional nature renders it impossible for them to reason coldly and act prudently under great insults. The daring presumption of John in holding her up to the world as a vile paramour instead of an honored queen, rankled in her mind until the desire of revenge dominated her being. But Herodias was a Jewess and a Maccabean princess. As a Jewess she knew the iron inflexibility of such a character as John and was sure that all the cajoling efforts to change his course would be futile. As a Maccabean,

Josephus shows that she inherited a full share of the domineering temper of her race, a temper not improved by her savage Herodian blood. Her grandmother, Mariamne, with such beauty and majestic grace and intellectual power as made the great Herod her slave, filled a bloody grave because of her proud and unyielding character. Her great grandmother, Alexandra, shared the same fate. Her father Aristobulus and Alexander, his brother, proud of their royal blood, by their lofty airs and scornful criticisms, provoked the brutal hatred of their ignobly born father. And we find Herodias herself soon afterwards forcing her husband, contrary to his views of expediency, to bring charges against her brother Herod Agrippa I., the favorite of Caligula, and demand the coveted kingdom of Judea. When Caligula deprived him of his tetrarchy and decreed his banishment, she, not hesitating to show her arrogance in presence of the emperor, who offered to allow her to retain her private property as the gift of her brother, rejected with lofty disdain the proffered bounty, and, to her credit be it spoken, followed the husband she had ruined into banishment. Life in Judea had no charms for her if deprived of her crown.

The story of the Evangelists is in strictest harmony with her character and that of her beautiful, graceful but cruel-natured daughter.

The mode by which Herodias accomplished her desire for John's execution is thoroughly in accord with the manners of the age. Those gorgeous feasts were then customary, and so was the taking advantage of the boastful promise of the drunken tetrarch. Soon after this event Herod Agrippa I. with noble courage used the gratification of Caligula at the peculiar grandeur of a feast given in his honor, for saving Judea from threatened ruin.

The subsequent history of Herod Antipas shows that he was right as to his views of policy. We find him trembling for fear that the prophet had returned to life. We find him seeking the favor of the Jews by visiting Jerusalem during the Passover, and having become satisfied that the wonder-working Nazarene is not the risen John, with Herodian cruelty, mocking the defenceless prisoner in the vain endeavor to win popularity. We find him beaten in battle by the forces of Aretas, whose daughter he

repudiated, a disaster attributed to his execution of the prophet. And his subjection to the stronger nature of Herodias as well as his aspiring to the kingdom of Judea, were, as I have said, the cause of his downfall, the punishment, as Josephus ungallantly says, "given by God for listening to the vain counsels of a woman."

JESUS BEFORE PILATE.

The trial and condemnation of the Saviour next engage our attention.

The emperors, as I have said, allowed to Jerusalem almost complete home-rule. The Sanhedrin described in the Evangelists is essentially the body described by the Jewish writers. It was one of the most august courts of the world. The greatest dignitaries of the Church, and doctors of the law were its members. They had not only judicial, but legislative and executive functions. They had the power of inflicting all but capital punishment on those of their own race.

The procurator, Pilate, was a soldier of equestrian rank. His holding office for years under Tiberius is proof of his ability and force. His natural temper was bold, arrogant, with contempt in his heart for the people he ruled. Thrice he had angry quarrels with them. In defiance of their frantic opposition he had brought the Roman Eagles to Jerusalem. He had impiously, against the protest of its guardians, seized the sacred treasury (*corban*) for building a new aqueduct. He sought to please the emperor by hanging gilt votive shields on the temple walls. Thousands had been slain for resisting these innovations. As Tiberius valued peace above empty compliments, the acts of Pilate were disapproved. The obstinate fanaticism of the Jews triumphed.

The procurator had the powers of a supreme court. Death could only be inflicted by his approval. The Jewish authorities of the Sanhedrin brought before him a prisoner of their own race, convicted by them of blasphemy, but falsely charged before Pilate with treason. I do not enter into the question, so ably argued by Dr. Salvador, whether, according to the Jewish law, the Sanhedrin under their laws gave a right judgment; certainly he was convicted, and Pilate was asked to carry the judgment into

effect. By their blunt, if not impudent answer, to his proper question as to the offence charged—"if he had not been a malefactor we would not have delivered him up to thee," they evidently expect the order to issue as a matter of course.

Why did not Pilate issue the order without hesitation? Was this rough, cruel soldier, this Jew-hating Roman, shaken from the hard scepticism as to all gods, almost universal among the upper classes of Rome? There is no evidence that he ever heard the doctrine of Christ. The contrary is probable, as his usual residence was Cæsarea and he visited Jerusalem only on extraordinary occasions, which imposed on him unusual cares and duties. Did he have pity for this convicted prisoner of a hated race? It is not probable. He was accustomed to slaughter in battles, and had seen thousands die for sport in gladiatorial shows. Cæsar argued against the capital punishment of Catiline, because it was too merciful, being only an eternal sleep. Death was not considered a great evil in Rome. Suicide was often thought honorable, as the examples of Cato, Brutus and Cassius and many other leading men, good according to the standard of their age, sufficiently show. A woman's dream could not affect greatly the judicial conduct of an officer of his ability and rank, gained by active military service in a cruel age. If his heart was troubled he would hardly have offered so coolly to subject the innocent sufferer to the terrible Roman scourging, and he would have found means to substitute the merciful punishment of the sword for the lingering torture of the cross, both being military modes of execution under his unchecked control.

The conduct of Pilate is easily explainable on grounds entirely in harmony with his character and history.

Although possessed of large arbitrary powers while in actual war or insurrection, he was acting in a judicial character as prætor, or judge, in the case of the Saviour. The laws of the Romans were the best in the ancient world, so equitable that they still rule the majority of modern civilized nations and are permeating our common law. Assessors, ready to report to the emperor, if he should act in a manner unworthy of his office, were about him. His professional pride, his desire to keep high the reputation of his tribunal, inclined him to save a prisoner

not guilty of offending against Roman law, if it could be safely done. Moreover there was in his hands a criminal of a notable character, guilty of an offence of the utmost gravity in Roman eyes : namely, armed insurrection against his authority. It was an aggravation that murder and robbery had been committed in its progress. His name Bar-Rabbas—"Son of a father," or "son of a great Rabbi"—implies that he was a leader of influence. It was of prime importance for the prevention of other insurrections that an example should be made of him. The procurator had agreed to pardon during the great festival such criminal as the people might elect. He naturally bent his energies to induce them to ask for the release of the least guilty, and especially labored to prevent the escape of a traitor.

Besides his professional duty as judge, Pilate had another more important function as charged with preserving order. He was in a critical situation. His forces amounted in the total to only about 3,000 men in all the province. A part of these were of course left at Cæsarea and at Sebaste. It was the time of the Passover and there were probably in the city a hundred thousand or more of a most excitable and fanatical people. Three times had he experienced their fury, and twice had he been rebuked by the Argus-eyed Tiberius, for not yielding to their idiosyncrasies. Shortly before an assault had been made on the garrison under Archelaus. A false step might lead to a bloody riot, possibly to the massacre of his forces, as afterwards occurred at the hands of insurgents under Manahem to the troops of Gessius Florus.

The words and manner of Pilate were what might be expected of a Roman officer in his circumstances. As is to this day usual in all criminal courts derived from Rome, he questioned the prisoner as to his guilt of the charge of treason. When he learned that a Spiritual Kingship only was claimed he was satisfied. When the divine sufferer went farther than his question and talked of "truth," Pilate abruptly silenced Him with the contemptuous sneer, "What is truth?" He then emphatically pronounced the accused not guilty of the charge. He saw clearly that the accusation was only colorable, and that the real offence was against the Jewish Church for which he cares noth-

ing. In his eyes the prisoner was only a harmless enthusiast or a lunatic. Knowing that the Jews were inclined to ask for the release of the traitor Bar-Abbas, whose popularity was an additional offence, with ability and perseverance he endeavored to induce them to choose Jesus instead. It is a striking confirmation of this view that Peter soon afterwards bitterly reproached the Jews for giving the preference to Bar-Abbas, notwithstanding the request of Pilate, and pointedly asserted that they, not Pilate, crucified the Saviour. It is evident that he, an eye-witness of the highest authority, regarded the procurator as having little, if any, agency in the condemnation and execution.

The tetrarch of Galilee being in attendance on the Passover, Pilate then, hoping that he will be interested in saving one of his subjects, or at any rate will share his responsibility, sent the prisoner to Herod, but Herod properly refused to take jurisdiction of an offence proved to have been committed in Judea. Finding the authorities implacable, Pilate appealed from them to the populace. He sought to gain their sympathy by declaring the prisoner's innocence and then pointing out to them the chained and bleeding and fainting form, with the memorable exclamation, "*Ecce Homo*," Behold the man!

When all his efforts proved vain, and the angry voices threatened a riot, he concluded to run no further risk. He ordered the terrible execution with as little pity as he would have felt in giving the signal for two gladiators to engage in mortal combat; while Bar-Abbas, the man of blood, in Jewish eyes a patriot, in Roman eyes a traitor, was received with shouts of joy into the arms of his comrades, and in person, or by example, thirty years afterwards stirred up new seditions leading to hundreds of thousands of murders, a desolated city and a ruined people. The wording of the accusation affixed to the cross and the contemptuous refusal to change it at the request of the priests, is an expression of the anger of the prosecutor at being baffled. His report to the emperor was probably in the usual brief form: "Jesus, a Jew, was brought before me by the Sanhedrin, convicted of treason against the emperor, and crucifixion asked for. Execution ordered."

The view I take is in accord with the divine Plan of Redemp-

tion. The cup of human suffering must be drained to the dregs. A sympathetic word or look would not have been in harmony with the horrors of the Passion. No comforting look could be seen in the hard face of the haughty judge. When all the disciples of the God-man forsook Him and fled, and the bravest denied Him, He found no friend in the stern Roman. All around Him was cruel hate. Not a word does He utter showing any hope of mercy. With divine resignation forgiving His enemies, and praying for all mankind, He submits to His Father's will, and with extremest mental and physical torture He died that we might live. All the millions of millions of Christians, who have joined the Church triumphant, and those now in the ranks of the Church militant, acknowledge this lonely sufferer as their Lord and Master, while the proud officers of the Sanhedrin have faded into nothingness, many of them doubtless perishing in the horrors of their city's destruction. The haughty Pilate was recalled in disgrace, and banished to a distant land in direst poverty. Legend has it that in extreme misery and despair, seeking death, he cast himself from an Alpine peak into a mountain lake. The mountain is still called by his name, Pilatus, and a glittering lake which reflects its dark shadow, bears the shape of the glorious cross, to Pilate an unmeaning instrument of torture, but unto us the emblem of the wisdom and the power of God.

PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS.

Turning to the Acts of the Apostles, we are amazed to find this same Sanhedrin, so subservient to Pilate, carrying out in the light of day their sentence of Stephen, dragging him through the streets, beyond the city gate, and stoning him under the formalities of the Levitical law. The righteous Stephen and the obstinate Naboth met the same fate after being similarly convicted on perjured testimony. That this was not an isolated exertion of Lynch law is proved by subsequent events. An active, extensive and public persecution of the new faith is inaugurated. Jewish officers invade the homes of the accused and fill the prisons with men and women charged with heresy. They apply the torture and compel the weak to blaspheme the Son of God. They send their writs to distant Damascus under the

jurisdiction of the Gentile king with orders to bring offenders in chains to Jerusalem for trial. A short time elapses and we find that the Christian Church is at rest, free from persecution and rapidly increasing. And then soon as Herod has replaced at Jerusalem the Roman procurator, persecution is resumed, an Apostle is slain by the sword, a Roman mode of execution, and others are imprisoned. No explanation of these great changes is given, because, as I have said, the Evangelists cared not to teach history.

Secular history makes all this plain. The governor, or legate, of Syria, Vitellius, either by order of the emperor, or assuming the responsibility, disapproved the slaughter of the Samaritans on Mt. Gerizim by Pilate and ordered him to Rome for trial. Repairing to Jerusalem, he ostentatiously confirmed the autonomous powers of the Sanhedrin. The same year the great Tiberius died and Caius Caligula succeeded. Herod Agrippa I., grandson of Herod the Great and Mariamne, who, it appears to me, notwithstanding the estimate of Farrar and others, had much of the eminent ability and pliant dexterity of his grandfather, and amid all his gay profligacy among the nobles of the palace, retained the lofty ambition and Jewish heart of the Maccabean line, was placed over the rich tetrarchy of Philip, and other territory, with the title of king. He at once began to intrigue for the rest of the dominions of his grandfather. He soon, as has been said, by artful accusations replaced Herod Antipas in the tetrarchy of Galilee and Perea. In a short while opportunity offered for winning the unbounded gratitude of his countrymen. The mad emperor ordered Petronius, the governor of Syria, with a strong force to compel the worship of his image set up for the purpose in the Holy Temple. Herod had the address and the courage, as I have stated, by a feast artfully and strangely magnificent, to secure the suspension of this order. Like so many of his race, gifted with political acumen, he discerned clearly that the real king-makers of Rome were the prætorian guards, and after the death of Caligula he sided with them in giving his allegiance to Claudius. As ambassador of Claudius to the Senate he rendered him services most important, and was rewarded with the coveted province of Judea. He spent the three years of his reign in

courting popularity in all possible ways, by costly buildings, by beginning new fortifications of Jerusalem, by the most careful observance of the religious laws and practices of the Jews, and by active efforts to suppress the Nazarene heresy.

All the statements in the Acts of the Apostles are in harmony with this abstract of the history of the times. The manner of the condemnation and execution of Stephen, the indecent and abrupt cutting short his defence, the hurrying him to his doom with brutal violence, the striking contrast between the calm judicial dignity in the beginning of the trial and the disorderly termination, are not only characteristic of the Jews of that day, but suggest that powers long unused had been unexpectedly and joyfully resumed. Their hatred, which had been held in check by Roman authority, was allowed full play, not only in Jerusalem, but in distant lands. It was through their extraordinary political organization that the Sanhedrin had jurisdiction over those of their faith wherever among all the nations they resided, or according to the technical expression, throughout the Diaspora (or Dispersion). Aretas, king of Arabia, seeing the favor in which they were held at Rome, and being himself under the imperial displeasure, allowed this claim of jurisdiction, surrendered his Jewish subjects of Damascus to officers of Jerusalem and was ready to aid Saul the persecutor, and to punish Saul, the Christian convert.

This self-rule of the Jews was only short-lived. Their vindictive hatred of the New Faith was soon replaced by terrified apprehension as to their own fate, when Caligula threatened to set up another Abomination of Desolation in the Holy Temple. Josephus tells of their leaving lands untilled and seeds unsowed and flocking to the legate Petronius, with appeals for delay so frantic that, at the risk of his life, he paused to send a special officer to show the emperor how the execution of his order will utterly destroy a nation. Pending the direful question the Church had rest and was multiplied.

Then Caligula was slain, and the exaltation of Herod Agrippa I. to the throne of the Great Herod, not only relieved the Jews of their fears, but gave them the active aid of the new king in their persecutions. When he died and was succeeded by a

Roman procurator, the moderating control, and, as history shows, repeated hostile action of the latter in restraint or punishment of their turbulent conduct, gave the Christians comparative security.

PAUL BEFORE AGRIPPA.

The desire on the one hand of the Roman officials to give the Jews the full effect of their home-rule and on the other at all hazards to protect a Roman citizen explains their conduct to Paul. They did not dare to be as indifferent to one under the special protection of the imperial city as was Pilate to the alien Jew. The plain common sense of the chiliarch, Lysias, commanding at Jerusalem in the absence of the procurator, the crafty acuteness of Felix, the blunt honesty of Festus, decided at once that the charges against him were of a doctrinal character only, and belonged to an ecclesiastical rather than a civil court. So far as Roman law extended he should have been set at liberty, but as this would have provoked the wrath of the Jewish authorities who had powerful friends at Rome, they temporized and kept him in a species of honorable bondage.

It is clear, I think, that Paul had no trial at all before Felix or Festus. It was the Roman practice for the prætor (and the procurators had the functions of a prætor) to have a preliminary investigation analogous to the enquiry by our grand jury. Where both accuser and accused were present, as here, the former took an oath that he did not act from malice and stated the charge. If guilt was denied he asked that the name of the accused should be entered on the roll of criminals, or as we say, criminal docket. The prætor, as Gallio did, could refuse, if in his judgment there was not probable cause of guilt, or if the offence imputed was not against Roman law. If he granted the application, a day of trial was fixed, usually the tenth day afterwards. At this trial, judices, or jurymen, were chosen, evidence offered on both sides and argument had as with us. It is evident there was no such trial.

Felix was a bad man and a corrupt officer. "The judgment to come," at which he trembled, was probably the judgment of the emperor, or the Senate. If he should decide against law in the case of a Roman citizen he might be reported to the emperor. On the other hand he was afraid of prosecution by the

Jews for his evil government. Hence he was willing to do the Jews a favor by deferring the decision of the case, and left Paul a prisoner for the disposition of Festus. Notwithstanding his care the dreaded prosecution followed, and it required all the exertions of Pallas, his brother, and Agrippa, his wife's brother, to save him.

Festus was evidently a conscientious and intelligent officer. He lost no time in enquiring into the prisoner's case. Whether he would finally have had the nerve to set him at liberty we can only conjecture, because Paul, weary of the long imprisonment, distrusting the firmness of Festus, and fearing treachery, if remanded to Jerusalem, cut the matter short by appealing to the emperor. He concluded that the time for the fulfilment of the promise made to him by the Lord in the dungeon of Antonia had arrived.

I am inclined to the opinion that Festus had still power to release the prisoner. In truth, Paul did not take an appeal, as understood by us. He only asked for a transfer of the case from the provincial to the prætor's court at Rome, the emperor in his capacity of perpetual prætor in theory presiding, as in theory the king presided over the king's bench of England. It is analogous to an accused person, under a recent act of our Congress, in certain cases in which national questions are involved, on affidavit that he cannot get justice in a State court, having his case transferred to a Federal court. Festus had difficulty in making up a record. His Roman mind could hardly understand questions of Jewish heresy. He called in the aid of Herod Agrippa II., who, although brought up in the imperial city, was versed in Jewish usages—in fact was himself a Jew.

Agrippa was a very able man. Josephus gives a speech by him to his countrymen, dissuading them from rebellion, which shows a strong mind, eloquence and sagacity. Its description of the Roman power and extensive domain cannot be excelled. On account of his youth, Claudius declined to let him rule over the turbulent province of Judea, but assigned him a more tranquil government. He aspired, however, to regain the dominion of his father, and would probably have succeeded but for the madness which precipitated the national ruin. He was now intent on mak-

ing himself agreeable to Romans and Jews by a visit to the procurator, accompanied by his beautiful sister, Bernice, or Berenike, whose queenly courage afterwards in resisting the fanatics at Jerusalem deserved a better fate than to be the paramour of Titus. The income of Agrippa, about \$2,000,000, enabled him to surround himself with congenial splendor.

Agrippa and Bernice and Festus were accompanied by a brilliant array of officers and courtiers. A rare opportunity it was for the king to exalt his reputation by his royal pomp, his majestic bearing, his familiarity with the Hebrew Scriptures and rabbinical lore.

The notable prisoner was led in, pale from long confinement, his chains clanking as he moved. His rare ability and burning enthusiasm had won for him the distinction of being most hated and feared of all the advocates of the new religion. The fierce and continued persecution by the chief authorities of the Sanhedrin proves that he was regarded as a man of uncommon powers, and that his success in spreading the doctrines so fatal to Jewish supremacy had been most alarming.

The conduct and words of Agrippa and Festus are in strict accord with their character and probable motives. Festus was newly come into his province and most naturally desired to have the opinion of one educated in the manners and learning of the Jews as well as the Romans, known, too, to be in high favor with the emperor and by his kingly rank entitled to special consideration. In this investigation, had merely for formulating the charges against the prisoner so as to be cognizable by a new tribunal, Agrippa is what is called *amicus curiæ*, and is made by the real judge, honorary president of the assembly. Paul therefore makes his address exclusively to him and founds it on Jewish history, prophecy, religious ideas, using arguments and illustrations intelligible only to Jews. Even in the meagre form preserved by Luke we can see that it must have been of intense interest, especially to the auditors of Jewish descent. A man of the purest Hebrew blood and truest Hebrew faith is the speaker. He has been thoroughly educated at Jerusalem by one of their most eminent teachers of the law. He has held high official positions under the Sanhedrin. He has evidently

great intellectual powers. His sincerity is proved by his readiness to suffer imprisonment, torture and death. With vivid eloquence and intense earnestness he declares that the Messiah expected has actually appeared, not, as had been erroneously anticipated, as a triumphant king, but, as prophets predicted, a lonely sufferer. He affirms that this Messiah had risen from a bloody grave, ascended to Heaven and afterwards appeared to him in supernatural brilliancy and commissioned him to carry the glorious news not only to the peculiar people, but to the Gentiles as well. He affirms that he had been a bitter opponent of this doctrine but was changed into an ardent advocate by the miraculous sight and voice of the risen Christ.

They must be wrong who suppose that the speaker was suddenly interrupted. The abstract given by Luke shows that the defence was complete and full. The speaker made his address to Agrippa, who was presiding at the request of Festus, and for the latter to have cut him off before concluding would have been insulting rudeness to the king. The defence was doubtless heard with respectful attention; Agrippa naturally, on account of his knowledge of the Holy Scriptures and of Messianic prophecies, being most impressed. The Roman, not understanding much of what had been said and deeming what he understood to be incredible, yet impressed with the fact that the speaker has a passionate conviction of the truth of his utterances, bursts into the declaration that Paul is beside himself, adding in order to soften the harshness of the statement that his hallucination had been caused by his much learning. Paul courteously but firmly denies the charge and asserts the soberness and truth of his words. In his deep earnestness, forgetting the etiquette hedging a king, he boldly declares that Agrippa knows the truth of all he has stated and begins to question him as to his faith in the Jewish prophecies. Agrippa is not disposed to deny his belief in the prophets, but is by no means willing to admit that Paul is right in claiming that Jesus is the Messiah predicted by them, or that the story of the resurrection, and the miraculous conversions are true. He therefore cuts short the discussion with the mild rebuke, "with but little persuasion thou wouldest fain make me a Christian." That the rebuke was gently uttered

is shown by the Apostle's noble and dignified reply, and by the king's subsequent words to Festus. Agrippa then gave by rising the signal for dissolving the assembly and remanding the prisoner.

It is clear that the old version mistranslates the words of Agrippa. Some Greek scholars think that they cannot have the meaning there given. All agree that they may properly import a denial by way of interrogatory or a sneer. That this aspiring young king, of eminent ability, a practised courtier, accustomed from birth to concealing his thoughts, ambitiously seeking popularity, in the presence of a grand assembly of officials and so in presence as it were of the Roman and Jewish world, on the words of only one witness, an utter stranger, unsupported by any miraculous manifestation such as was vouchsafed at the Gate Beautiful, at Damascus, at Paphos, at Lystra, at Ephesus, should throw away all hope of future preferment and endanger his present kingdom by publicly declaring his sympathy for a sect so obscure and so hated, is extremely improbable. Everything in his former history and everything in his subsequent career, is inconsistent with such an impulsive and compromising outburst. It is out of harmony with the stately courtesy shown by him to the procurator, who had provided this opportunity for displaying his pomp and learning. That Festus, who knew nothing and cared nothing for Jewish prophecies and Messianic hopes, should declare that Paul's head had been turned by pondering over the many old writings, of which he spoke, was most natural. That the king should promptly assert that the same words pronounced insane were so very sound as to bring him almost to the point of adopting the religion of the prisoner would have been in the highest degree rude and offensive to Festus.

Agrippa's advice to Festus is characteristic. He does not, as requested, aid him in making up the record of the case. He is non-committal. He assents to the view already expressed by Festus, that under the Roman law the prisoner appears to have done nothing for which he should be tried, but will not offend the Jews by advising his release. It is politic to send him to the tribunal at Rome. The Jews dare not complain at this and the accused asks it.

PAUL BEFORE GALLIO.

The disposal of the prosecution before Gallio is in striking contrast to the disposal of that before Felix and Festus. The place is not Cæsarea, the capital of Judea, but Corinth, the capital of Achaia. The prosecutors are officers of a petty synagogue, not of the powerful Sanhedrin. We are now in a Greek city, possessed of great autonomous powers by the favor of the emperor. Corinth, utterly destroyed by Mummius, has been rebuilt by Cæsar, and repopled, not only with Greeks but with merchants and seamen of every land. There are Jews, of course, for they are found everywhere, where keen wits can be coined into gold, but they are an inferior and hated body. Their refusal to have social intercourse with other races, their standing aloof from their games and religious ceremonies, their horror of statues and paintings of the gods, their success in accumulation of money, made them as odious to the *οἱ πολλοί* of Greek cities as the Chinese of our day are to the lower classes of San Francisco. The allegiance of all the Diaspora to the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem, an *imperium in imperio*, renders them odious to the ruling classes. Even Tiberius, so carefully respectful of their privileges in the East, treats them with cruelty in the West. Claudius in the main followed his example and had shortly before expelled them from Rome as a dangerous element.

The officers of the synagogue at Corinth were at the first preaching of St. Paul, cowed by the recent action of Claudius. They vented their rage in curses. Such was the causticity of their anathemas as to break down the patience of the Apostle. He indignantly left them and set up a Christian congregation in the house of a Greek adjacent to the synagogue. For eighteen months the worshippers in the synagogue are forced to witness in impotent wrath the rapid growth of a schism, which threatens the destruction of the worship of Zion. Their hopes of relief are revived by the coming of a new proconsul. Achaia was then a senatorial province. The proconsul is surrounded by his lictors, with their *fascæ*. He is seated on his *sella curulis*, a peculiar chair, which, placed in city, camp or country, and occupied by a judicial officer, is the centre of a Roman court. He is sitting

for the purpose of hearing accusations. The Jews, in a tumultuous manner, arraign Paul for violation of their law. Through Sosthenes, the chief ruler of the synagogue, they ask that the name of the accused shall be entered on the criminal docket and a day be fixed for trial.

Gallio is not troubled by the necessity which made it politic for Pilate, Felix and Festus to refrain from angering the accusers. He patiently hears the accusation, painted doubtless in the strong colors of hate. He decides at once that there is no charge of breach of the criminal law of Rome but only of a schism in the Jewish Church. The prosecutor has brought a groundless charge. The accused offers to make his defence but the judge thinks the point too plain for argument. He dismisses the case. An eminent lawyer once made in Raleigh a labored speech two hours long before Chief Justice Chase. The Chief Justice said, "I do not care to hear from the other side. The plaintiff's position is clearly untenable. Let the bill be dismissed with costs." Gallio made a similar ruling here. He went further. The prosecution was evidently malicious. The Roman law required the prosecutor to take an oath that it was not from malice. Perjuries were punishable in such a manner as the judge should elect. Formerly the perjurer was thrown from the Tarpeian Rock; in the army he was beaten to death with sticks. Judge Chase decreed that the false claimant pay the cost of the suit in money. Gallio decreed that the perjured ring-leaders should be whipped. The whipping is done apparently by friends of the prisoner. The old version says "all the Greeks," but the better reading is that, "they all took Sosthenes and beat him before the judgment seat."

There are varying opinions as to Gallio's conduct. Gallio is often censured, first, because of his indifference to Christianity; second, because he allowed Sosthenes to be unlawfully beaten before his tribunal. As to the first, it is overlooked that Gallio did not hear St. Paul at all, and surely he should not be expected to embrace a religion of which he had no knowledge. Certainly Christians should not be surprised that he was not attracted to our religion by the slanderous description of it given by an angry enemy. As to the second point, it must be admitted that

it seems contrary to Roman judicial dignity for Lynch law to be perpetrated in open court, without objection, by a judge of so great dignity, in the populous city of Corinth, almost at the doors of Rome—this judge, the brother of the great Seneca, and pronounced by him one of the best men in all the world.

The following explanation seems to me reasonable. Luke writes from the standpoint of Paul and his friends. It was an extreme surprise to him that the proconsul declined to hear from his great leader, his eloquent exposition of the doctrine transcending in importance all other questions of earth. The cold technical language of the judge, the abrupt, to his mind insulting, cutting off the defendant's argument, the extraordinary ending of the case by the prosecutor being suddenly turned into the punished criminal, combined to make the impression on a mind little familiar with judicial proceedings, that the judge was lacking in proper attention to the rights of suitors. All lawyers have clients so full of their cases as to be disappointed by a sudden favorable termination, and can appreciate the artless complaint implied in the statement, "Gallio cared for none of these things." They will also realize that it was probably fortunate that Paul did not make his answer, because goaded as he was by the virulent abuse of his enemies, he would have been in danger of showing to the sharp eye of the proconsul, that the Roman religion, as well as the Jewish, was in danger. I prefer to think that Gallio gave the order for the punishment of Sosthenes.

The ordinary interpretation, however, is quite in accordance with the spirit of the times. The beating of Sosthenes was only another proof of the general hatred and oppression of this strange people, which has lasted through the ages; like the Jew hunt of Alexandria a few years before in Caligula's reign, Avilius Flaccus, an able and just officer under Tiberius, being an actor, wherein, among other outrages, thirty-eight of the ruling council of the Jews were publicly whipped in the circus; and like the scourging of Paul and Silas by the duumviri of Philippi, at the time ignorant of their Roman citizenship. In this view Gallio shared the hatred which it was the fashion of Greeks and Romans to feel, and commanded his lictors to keep quiet, while

the spicy joke of beating the prosecutor was being enacted to his grim amusement.

PHILIPPI AND THESSALONICA.

I will hasten over the beating of Paul and Silas at Philippi. This city was a Roman colony and the magistrates governed under Roman laws. Thinking that the prisoners were only Jews, and frightened by the angry mob, they acted with extreme injustice. Their abject terror, when informed that their victims were Roman citizens, was well grounded because they not only incurred risk of personal punishment but of having the much valued colonial privileges taken away from the city.

Thessalonica was a free Greek city under Roman supremacy, allowed to carry on its local government. The chief rulers here did not have Paul before them. Those prosecuted were citizens of Thessalonica. It will be noticed how adroitly the magistrates protected their own citizens, by deferring the trial, satisfying the rioters by taking security from the accused for their good behavior. The news of Paul and Silas being Roman citizens had doubtless been learned from Philippi, and hence there appears to have been no active effort on the part of the officers to apprehend them.

PAUL AT ATHENS.

Paul at Athens has filled the imagination of all thinking people as one of the most sublime incidents of history. This shall be my last topic.

Athens was treated by the emperors with peculiar honor, as a federate or allied city. Revering its past and not fearing its rivalry, they flattered the vanity of its citizens by allowing them the free management of their institutions, reserving to Rome the control of its foreign policy. They retained archons, boule ecclesia, courts, in fact all civil and religious functions. The great Germanicus dismissed his lictors when he went through the city and the emperor Hadrian accepted the honorary office of archon. Although terribly punished by Sylla, it was still full of magnificent temples and works of art, and its universities were the resort of the aspiring youth of all the empire. The people were bright and versatile, fond of flattery, lovers of all forms of beauty,

courteous and volatile. And above all passions was their unbounded love of Athens.

Their religion was a system of festivals and ceremonies closely interwoven with the lives and habits of the people, and with the administration of the State. It was not intolerant. A new deity was welcomed, if he would rule amicably with other deities and would add to the adornment of their glorious city. Any religion inconsistent with their system was ruthlessly crushed. The philosophers of the various schools indulged in the most daring freedom of thought and speech, but as long as their views were speculations only, they met with no hostility. The poet, Aristophanes, in his dramas, lashed with merciless ridicule the failings of the gods. If Paul had proposed to build a statue to Jesus and another to Anastasis, or the Resurrection, they would have donated him a site. The speculations of Socrates were not objected to except on the ground that he taught what was incompatible with the religion of the State. Alcibiades could corrupt half the women of Athens with impunity but was ruined by the charge of breaking the statues of Hermes. Paul must be silenced if he should teach a new God, who would banish all others from Athens.

The court of the Areopagus among its other great duties had a censorship over the conduct of citizens. It punished impiety and immorality. It was the grand inquisition of the State. It exercised the functions of our grand juries, as well as those of the supreme tribunal for trial and punishment. It was analogous to the star chamber and court of high commission which once wielded such formidable powers in England.

The teachers, or as we call them, professors, in the schools of philosophy, which then dominated the world, had handsome receipts for their work of instruction. We know that the price of tuition was sometimes as high of \$150 per annum, about the charge of Harvard University.

The Athenians had to an eminent degree a lofty intellectual pride, looking on Athens as the light-house of the world. An Athenian beggar imagining himself descended from the heroes of Marathon, talking glibly of Pantheism and the Atomic Theory, looked down with contempt on emperors and philos-

ophers, literature and art of the barbarous world beyond the confines of Attica. Our comic papers are fond of ascribing some of this intellectual arrogance to our neighbor Boston and the philosophers of the school of Concord.

Some say Paul had a regular trial before the great court. Others say that he was taken by the bystanders to a convenient place where they could have seats and gratify their idle curiosity by listening to a speech on a new topic. There are insuperable objections to both these views.

As to the first it is contrary to all we know of trials before the Areopagus. Regular charges were made. The prosecutor spoke first. The accused replied. Then the judges voted. The accused was never put upon his trial without due notice. None of these formalities was complied with.

The second view is equally untenable. After Paul had been discoursing generally with all whom he chanced to meet, certain of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers encountered him. The original of the word "encounter" implies a hostile purpose. They sought him out in order to catechise him as to his views. The word "philosophers" then meant teachers in one of the schools, professors in the universities. It is significant that professors of two rival schools were together. They were probably a committee sent for investigation and report. The contemptuous epithet, "this babbler," from people as polite as the Athenians, proves that his teaching was considered offensive, while others took still harsher views and intimated that he was probably guilty of a capital crime against the state religion, the crime for which Socrates suffered, expressed in similar words, setting forth "strange gods." One of the evidences of the charge against Socrates was his claim of having a peculiar divinity, who gave him special revelations. The teaching of Paul was startlingly analogous. He talked of a divinity who had appeared to him from the heavens, and given him a peculiar charge and guidance. He spoke also of "Anastasis" (the Resurrection), and the Athenians conjectured that this was another deity. The stranger so eager to win converts to his new religion, they thought a dangerous character and must be investigated. They "seized," technically, arrested him and led

him to the court-room of the tribunal, whose duty it was to guard the state religion. The word "led" in the original implies force. It is the same word used for the dragging of the Saviour in chains to Pilate. The word "standing," in the original, *σταθεῖς*, properly means "being made to stand." He was stationed in the middle of the area in which the court of the Areopagus held its meetings for the purpose of having an inquisition as to his views. His statement was not satisfactory, though evidence of guilt was not strong enough to justify imprisonment. He was set at liberty but was threatened with a new examination.

Why was he led to the sacred court-room of the Areopagus? This venerable tribunal would hardly have allowed their place of meeting to be used for frivolous purposes. They rather sought to impress the imagination by awful associations. The locality was in the highest degree inconvenient for casual assemblies. It was only reached by a toilsome steep ascent. Then again the Athenians were accustomed to hold their public meetings, in old times in the Pnyx, but in later times in the temple of Dionysus (Bacchus), on nearly the same level with the agora. The worship of Bacchus took the dramatic form, and his temple was a theatre as well. The workmen of Ephesus did not rush into the holy temple of Artemis (Diana), or to a court-house, but to the theatre, where in all Greek cities public meetings were held. An idle talk for the general amusement would probably have been in one of the *stoæ*, or porches, around the agora, or if not, certainly in the temple of Dionysus. The words of Luke that the residents of Athens had leisure for nothing else except hearing or seeing some novelty, have probably led to the unfounded notion under discussion, but I submit that they only show that the frivolous curiosity and thirst for amusement of the idle crowd left the most vivid impression on the mind of the Apostle, so intensely earnest for their welfare, and that this impression was communicated by him to the Evangelist.

What was the true nature of the hearing accorded to Paul? It appears to me clearly that the inquisitorial function of the Areopagus was invoked and that he was undergoing a preliminary judicial investigation before the court, or a portion of it, to

be followed by formal accusation and trial, if his admission should show probable guilt.

Why were these university professors suspicious of the teachings of the stranger Jew? A little reflection ~~make~~ clear that they showed the sagacity to be expected of the wonderfully astute philosophers of Athens.

The doctrines of Paul struck at the very root of the prosperity of Athens, as the centre of education and art. The great paintings and sculptures and buildings in honor of Christ and His mother and the Apostles, had no existence in the early history of the Church. Christ was crucified because His teachings led to the neglect of and contempt for temple ritual and authority of the rabbis. The teachings of His disciples led to a similar neglect of and contempt for heathen temples and images and sacrifices. Moreover, they rendered naught the elaborate philosophy of Epicurus, of Zeno, of Plato, of Aristotle, and their learned followers. Christianity brooked no rival, recognized no divided allegiance, countenanced no associated ritual. Its success would lead to the downfall of all other religions, and, as religion and the state were associated, a reorganization of the state government as well. All officers, legislative, executive, judicial and religious, and men of all callings connected with the state and public worship, had in regard to it a feeling of insecurity akin to that held by the Czar of Russia and his courtiers, when dynamite bombs were searched for under every palace. Rulers dreaded the rise of the proletariat and the spread of communism, and the tramp of barbarian hordes over a rich but disarmed empire. Teachers in universities and schools foresaw that the swarms of students would cease to crowd their lecture-halls if this unlearned religion should prevail in the land.

Looking back from the stand-point of our day and seeing that Christianity is not inconsistent with science and art and armies and navies and institutions of learning, with cathedrals rivalling the Parthenon and Temple of Diana, with works of art worthy to stand by those of Apelles and Phidias, with a harmonious social organization, with strong governments, whether monarchies despotic or constitutional, or republics, enforcing

law and securing happiness among more civilized countries than the most learned ancient geographers ever knew of, we are apt to forget that Christianity at first appeared revolutionary, hostile to most of the established interests of the day. It was not for amusement or caprice, or hatred of novelties merely, that persecutions arose. The persecutors as a rule honestly believed that they were acting in self-defence. Our divine Master gave us an eternal lesson of charity, when He looked on the mob and its leaders, howling for his blood, and prayed, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!" And the first martyr followed His blessed example.

The artisans of Ephesus saw their coming ruin, as plainly as the hand-loom weavers of England, when they burnt the power looms of Cartwright, saw that the new machinery would reduce them to starvation, however it might benefit the world. Like all other ignorant men they could not realize the danger until the loss of trade began to pinch them. They had not the foresight of the acute Athenian officials nor of the sagacious officers of the Sanhedrin. The manufacturers of Ephesus might have carried their point but for fear of the alien and unsympathizing Roman over-lords. The Jewish leaders, when relieved of the pressure of the procurator's power, quickly drove into banishment the adherents of the new faith. The officials of the self-ruling Athens had discernment to protect the city of the violet crown by prompt judicial investigation.

Their action was eminently successful. The mention of two converts by name and "others with them" is a plaintive confession of defeat. No congregation was established. The great Apostle, in dread of his usefulness being ended by imprisonment or death, reading danger in scowling faces of inquisitors, carefully framed his speech so as not to subject himself to prosecution, and avoided a second investigation by a speedy departure to the more safe field of Corinth.

It is not the usual opinion that Paul left Athens abruptly, but the statements of Scripture, it seems to me, are clear on this point. We read that "after these things" he went to Corinth. The unfortunate division into chapters seems to suggest an indefinite interval of time, but it is not so in the original. In the second

place it was the custom of this zealous Apostle to avail himself of all opportunities for preaching his doctrine. Here an opportunity is offered which it is clear he declined. Then again Silas and Timotheus, whom he requested to join him at Athens "with the utmost speed," did not obey the injunction, but rejoined him at Corinth, as is expressly said in Acts xviii., 5. The statement in First Thess. iii., 2, which some regard as conflicting, is easily reconciled with the positive statement in the Acts. Communication was frequent between the cities of the empire. Indeed, Augustus established a regular postal system. Clearly, Paul, after determining to leave Athens, requested, by letter, or special messenger, Silas to proceed directly to Corinth, and Timotheus to go to Thessalonica to "establish and comfort" the Church, and thence to Corinth. Both had warning to avoid the dangerous city of Athens.

The speech of Paul is strikingly in harmony with the view that he was undergoing a judicial investigation. While not in the slightest degree deviating from the truth, it is most skilfully framed to avoid giving ground of accusation. This appears both from what he does not as well as what he does say. 1st. We find no mention of Jehovah, the God of the Jews. He does not call the name of Jesus, and in speaking of Him as a Judge of the world makes no mention of His divine attributes. It is noticeable that the story of Paul's conversion on the Damascus road, so much dwelt on elsewhere, is omitted. Was it because it showed his interview with a new deity? Perhaps stress should not be laid on this, as it does not appear that he gave the wondrous narrative for any but Jewish auditors. But it is a strong point that at Lystra, in his sudden and deep excitement, he calls idols and sacrifices "those foolish things," for resentment of which the heathen joined the Jews of Antioch in his stoning. He uses no such abusive epithets here, but is courteous and even complimentary, the words translated in the authorized version, "too superstitious," evidently being a mistranslation. In the whole speech there is a conspicuous absence of statement of detailed facts of Christianity except at the close a general assertion of the future judgment and the resurrection from the dead of Him who is to be the Judge.

When we examine what Paul said, the evidence becomes stronger. If we concede that he was suddenly and threateningly called for his defence and that sharp ears of inquisitorial Areopagites were listening for grounds of accusation, that he was allowed no time of preparation except that occupied in a hurried walk up the steep ascent of the Hill of Justice, we must admire his singular ability in speaking so much of the truth without giving his enemies power to ruin him.

He begins with a compliment to his hearers on their reverential temperament. As he was charged with setting forth strange divinities, he calls their attention to their own public recognition of a God whom they knew not, and declares that he was making known to them this unknown deity. He then proceeds to state the divine attributes in terms familiar in their schools of philosophy. This great God created the world and all things therein, and is supreme above all the powers of heaven and earth. His dwelling, being the universe, cannot be houses made by men. The worship of the all-creating God cannot consist in the offerings of the petty articles made by His creatures. All the nations were originally of one blood, and their separation into different nations, inhabiting diverse territories, was decreed by Him. These nations were inspired with the instinct to seek for this God and find Him, though in truth He pervades the universe, and is always in reality touching us, so that we live in Him, we move in Him, we have our being in Him. As said by the poets Cleanthes and Aratus we are God's children and it is absurd to say that His children can manufacture their own Father. The images in the temples can neither be God themselves, nor in the likeness of this being of such mighty power and supreme greatness. The false notions of God had been by Him allowed to prevail heretofore. But He now calls on all men everywhere to change their views of Him and their mode of living. He has appointed a day for the judgment of all as to righteous conduct by the man whom He had ordained and given assurance that the man so chosen is the true judge, by raising from the dead.

It is thought by some that the Apostle was not allowed to finish his speech, but there is no evidence of this.

It has the appearance of completeness, and it is hardly possible that he should have been stopped at the moment of reaching the most novel and interesting part of his statement. What is there in the discourse which could sustain a charge of impiety? The doctrine of the oneness of the God-head is implied, but that could not be objected to by the pantheistic Stoics. The Epicureans did not believe in the creation of the world by the divine fiat, but Paul's teaching on this point was more in accordance with the general belief than theirs. The descent of all nations from common ancestors was sustained by the story of Deucalion and Pyrrha. That the images of the gods were not resemblances of those gods must have seemed reasonable to those who had seen scores of diverse images of the same god. If the speaker had affirmed the non-divinity of the Olympian and other deities he would have been in danger, but Athenians might well understand by his doctrine of the one God, Lord of Heaven and earth, either that he was endorsing the pantheism of the Stoics, or that the gods of their mythology occupied ranks subordinate to Paul's God and co-existed with Him. That the Deity would, by the agency of a man of extraordinary attributes, judge the world, was an idea familiar from the legends of Minos and Rhadamanthus. The only statement which shocked their credulity was that of the resurrection of this Judge from the dead. This sounded to them strange and absurd, but was not impiety. The idea was familiar in various of their mythological legends, for example those of Glaucus, Eurydice, and others.

Thus in imitation of his great Master, when the crafty Pharisees endeavored to entangle Him in His talk, did the wise and clear-sighted Apostle, on the awful summit of the Hill of Mars, the Parthenon and all the glory of the Acropolis towering over him, and the Temple of the Furies frowning below him, alone in the midst of the imposing splendor of Grecian mythology, alone in presence of learned and venerable judges and astute philosophers and a volatile, but keen-witted populace, with serene courage, under guidance of the Holy Spirit, declare the fundamental truths of our holy religion with such prudence, that some of his baffled enemies could only jest while others

could only nurse their sullen suspicions for future inquisitions. Paul seems never to have revisited Athens. No church is built there. Their cool contempt and suspicion rankle in his mind. He writes to the Corinthians soon afterwards: "The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." "The preaching of the Cross is to them that perish foolishness." He doubtless has in mind the scowling faces and mocking sneers on the summit of the Hill of Mars, and speaks more in sorrow than anger.

Let it not be said that I have degraded the character of the great Apostle of the Gentiles by impeaching his courage while lauding his sagacity. When his mission on earth shall be accomplished, he will joyfully lay down the burden of life and triumphantly claim his reward. But for him now to be thrown into an Athenian dungeon and gain a martyr's crown would stay the progress of the true faith. To rush on sudden death is suicide. He showed similar prudence when let down from the Damascus walls, when hiding in Arabia from Aretas, when he left Jerusalem for Tarsus, when he lay concealed at Thessalonica and escaped in the stillness of the night, when he was hurried from Berea to the sea, when he was persuaded not to enter the angry mob at Ephesus and then departed for Macedonia, when he avoided assassination by calling for the transfer of his trial to Cæsar's tribunal. He is a model for all missionaries to come after him. Paul was no less brave than Stephen. He showed on many occasions the most serene contempt for danger. It was not for himself but for his cause that he desired life and liberty. To have been called to his Master's side in early manhood, like Stephen, would have been a glorious privilege. All the mental and physical suffering and trials, so pathetically enumerated by him, after his long years of labor had passed, would have been avoided. But the foundation of the Church would not have been laid by him in the cities of Syria and Asia and Greece and Italy. This wise and heroic man, by what he said and did at Athens and at all times and

places after the flash from heaven on the Damascus hill, counsels the workers for Christ in all the ages, by wise prudence to keep their bodies, souls and minds so that their labors may be most abundant in good results.

The preacher, who does not win a respectful hearing from infidels and sinners by kindly courtesy, the missionary, who, with rash courage, rushes on the bludgeons and poisoned arrows of savages, Christians in all situations, who carelessly subject their bodies to the chains of evil habits and the dungeons of disease, are not followers of Paul.

My subject like all other Bible subjects is a vast one. I must close. I have kept you too long already.

It is wonderful, when the sole object of the Evangelists is followed out with such unvarying singleness of purpose, that incidentally so much information about the history and geography of the country, and the government and occupation of the people, is given. We not only know Christ and His Apostles but we see through their eyes the nature of the flora and fauna of the land, the clouds and mountains and hills and vales and waters, cities and villages and people and institutions. Before our view pass emperors and their ministers, sub-kings and tetrarchs, proconsuls, procurators and duumvirs, high priests, with their strange combination of temporal and spiritual power, Sanhedrin and boules, Jewish, Roman and Greek courts, cities great in power and renown, representatives of the chief European and Asiatic races, mobs and lawful assemblies, judges and sheriffs, prosecutors and prisoners, officers and soldiers, nobles and commonalty, tax-payers and tax-gatherers, palaces and dungeons, priests of Jewry and heathendom, religious sects and political parties, philosophers and rabbis, royal courts and happy households, the various pursuits of busy people of diverse races, in city and country and on the seas, with the conquering Romans over all. These and much more appear in their narrative by undesigned glimpses and all are in strict harmony with the facts, known from all other sources, of the history of this era, the most interesting and momentous of all the ages, the era when moved on the earth the wonderful Being, whose teachings, purifying the heart, the fountain of all actions, have raised its

inhabitants higher towards Heaven, and will raise them ever upwards, slowly but never receding, each generation eliminating some of the evils of the preceding, until mankind shall be raised to the level of the angels.

A LOGICAL DEFINITION OF CHRISTIANITY.

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BY ROBERT B. FAIRBAIRN, D.D., LL.D.,

Warden of St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N. Y.

THE study of comparative religions has become a favorite one in our day. This, in a large measure, is due to the influence of rapid and easy communication by means of steamships and telegraphs. The ends of the world have been brought into communication with each other. The Englishman, by the direct passage by the Suez Canal, is brought within a few days of the East India Possessions, and he is in momentary communication by means of the telegraph. It is not strange, therefore, that the study of Indian philosophy and the Brahmanical religion should occupy his attention. And the same is true in regard to Japan and China. We have, within the last forty years, been brought into remarkable communication with these two countries. We are daily growing more familiar with the manner of their daily life, with their mode of thought, and with their religious belief.

The interest has been greatly increased by the translation and publication of the Sacred Books of the East. These books, consisting of fifty or more volumes, will put us into possession of the philosophy and religion of India, Japan and China. This study was first begun under the auspices of Sir William Jones, an English judge of Bengal, about one hundred years ago. He first translated and published the "Statutes of Menu," and brought to the attention of English scholars other books of interest. The study of the Sanskrit has received great encouragement by the labors of Professor Max Muller, Professor Monier Williams and of Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids.

The study, which is thus encouraged, has been extended to the philosophy and religion of other people—of the Egyptians, and of the Mexicans and Peruvians. And for a further encouragement of this study the Hibbert Lectures have been instituted, which are delivered in the Chapter House of Westminster Abbey. Already there have been delivered on this foundation several courses of lectures by distinguished Englishmen and by French and German scholars. The leader in this study in England is undoubtedly Professor Max Muller. It is under his editorship that the Sacred Books of the East are translated and published.

The Hibbert Lectures have enabled us to make a comparison of the chief religions of the world. The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge has also furnished assistance in this study by publishing a short and popular account of some of the religions of the East. Thus Professor Monier Williams, who passed many years in India, has given us an account of Buddhism; and Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids has given us a brief account of Hinduism. We have, therefore, the opportunity of comparing these religions, and so also of attaining a more clear and accurate knowledge of the Christian religion. These Hibbert Lectures and the Sacred Books of the East should show us the necessity of studying what logicians call the *differentia* of Christianity, that is, the essential characteristics of Christianity, those qualities which make it to be what it is, and which are therefore required to give us a correct definition of our religion.

No doubt in the study of comparative religions the first point which will attract our attention is their agreements—what doctrines they have in common. It is very obvious that the likeness of one of these religions to another, and their likeness to the Christian religion has attracted attention. And there has in consequence been an attempt made to identify them—to show that essentially they have a common origin. Edwin Arnold has celebrated the religion of the East in a poem—the “Light of Asia”—and presented it in such a way that it appears to have a place with the Christian religion. Professor Max Muller has also encountered persons, who have been so struck with the points of agreement between Christianity and Buddhism that they were startled. He says that “people who have carefully read the

sacred books of other religions, and have found there almost every doctrine which they had considered as peculiarly Christian, have sometimes asked me, What then distinguishes Christianity from other religions ?" *

This is certainly a natural result of dwelling on the points of likeness and laying them side by side. It is obvious, unless the real difference is kept in view and brought out prominently, that there is danger to some minds of falling into the error into which many persons have fallen; and of seeing a common origin, and a departure only on lines which may not be supposed to indicate any real difference. Of course that will depend in a large measure on the previous instruction of the persons in Christian doctrine, and also on the tendency of their minds towards certain doctrines and practices. Persons who have not a very clear view and a firm hold of the Nicene doctrines would be apt to see only likenesses and not to perceive differences. It was such persons probably who came into contact with Professor Max Muller. He has written a biographical account of several distinguished natives of India who certainly cannot be accurately called Christians. The Professor took one of these persons to see Dr. Pusey, and while the Oxford Doctor treated his visitors with remarkable dignity and courtesy, it is yet clear that he thought that Keshub Chunder Sen had not yet reached what St. Paul called the "doctrine of perfection" (Hebrews vi., 1). The tendencies of the German professor's mind are very visibly towards what has for more than a century been called in New England, "liberal Christianity."

The tendencies of the Hibbert Lectures are also to keep before the mind very clearly the points of agreement, and to make the reader wonder at the similar views and expressions which are to be found in the various religions, and especially in those of the East. Whether it will be supposed to be necessary to devote one of the course to the differences of the Christian religion from the other religions of the world, remains yet to be seen. There is certainly the opportunity for a lecturer to bring forward and to dwell on the characteristics of Christianity, such as are to be found in no other religion, and which separate it

* "Biographical Essays." By Professor Max Muller. p. 115.

from other religions, and which make it to be the religion that it is. This has been done in a lucid manner by Dr. Kellogg in "The Light of Asia and the Light of the World," the reply which he makes to Edwin Arnold.*

Certainly of late some very startling things have been said and also some very careless things in relation to missions to the heathen. No doubt the missionary should clearly understand the philosophy and the religion of those to whom he is sent to carry the Gospel of Jesus Christ. He ought to know just what the religion of the heathen nation, to whom he is sent, teaches; what it proposes to do for man; and what prospects it holds out to him. And he ought to know the characteristics of the Christian religion, which constitute its essence and make it to be what it is; which demand what other religions do not demand; and which give what they cannot give because they have it not to give; and which inspire hope for the future which they are not capable of inspiring. It was once our good fortune to spend a Sunday at a public institution in the company of a missionary from India. He was certainly a lovely example of Christian graces, and a man who could not but inspire one with a deeper appreciation of Christian devotion. But he had very little knowledge of the religion and philosophy of the people to whom he was sent. On being questioned on their religion he could give no satisfactory information. To relieve him of his embarrassment the president of the institution suggested that probably they had no religious doctrine or philosophy. Their religion was Brahmanism and Buddhism which were sufficiently clear and coherent so that they could be understood by one who was sent to replace their error by a faith which is clear and distinct and is different from every other religion of the world. This is brought out clearly by Dr. Kellogg in "The Light of Asia and the Light of the World."

The Hibbert Lectures have done much to show what are the different religions of the world. They have brought out very clearly their characteristics so that we can give a logical

*"The Light of Asia and the Light of the World: A Comparison of the Legend, the Doctrine and the Ethics of the Buddha with the Story, the Doctrine and the Ethics of Christ." Macmillan & Co. 1885.

definition of them, and separate one from the other and be in no danger of confounding them. But can the same be said of Christianity? Can such persons as those who asked the question of Professor Max Muller, "What then distinguishes Christianity from other religions?" give a clear conception of it, so that it will not be identified or confounded with Buddhism or Brahmanism, or Confucianism, or Mohammedanism, or Peruvianism?

Dr. Kellogg has certainly done very much to show the want of identity of Christianity with Buddhism—certainly very much more than Professor Max Muller when he said * that "historically the distinguishing feature of Christianity lies in the new conception of the relation between God and man," and in explanation of this he says that "Christianity is Christianity by this one fundamental truth, that as God is the Father of man, so truly and not poetically and metaphorically only, man is the son of God,† participating in God's very essence and nature, though separated from God by self and sin. This oneness of nature (*ὁμοουσία*) between the divine and human does not lower the concept of God by bringing it nearer to the level of humanity; on the contrary it raises the old concept of man and brings it nearer to its true ideal."

This does not carry us far enough, for we must still ask, why then is this new relation of God and man, and by what means man becomes a partaker of divine nature even in this sense. We here see the illogical nature of the answer, for properties are given instead of essential characteristics. The new and regenerate nature of man arises out of the qualities and characteristics of Christianity—of those qualities and characteristics which make it to be what it is. The renewed nature of man is not its essence but only the generic property.

The language which is used to describe the results and effects of Christianity is often taken to describe Christianity itself.

* "Biographical Essay." By F. Max Muller. P. 115.

† This same conception Mrs. Ward has in her late novel put thus: "Every human soul in which the voice of God makes itself felt enjoys equally with Jesus of Nazareth the divine Sonship."—"Robert Elsmere." By Mrs. Humphrey Ward, author of "Miss Bretherton." Vol. ii., page 241.

Thus we hear now, in language similar to that which Professor Max Muller uses, much concerning the Fatherhood of God, which may mean the Father of Christ in the redemption of the world; or it may be, as it very often is, used only to describe that pious sentiment which sees beauty and divinity in the moral and religious character. We hear of the Universal Father; of the Father of Humanity; of the union of His children in submission to His government and providence. But there does not enter into this conception the belief and statement of the cause of that relationship; how the fatherhood is brought about; why we have become the children of God; why we can say "Abba, Father;" why "Our Father, who art in Heaven" of the Lord's Prayer is of peculiar significancy to the Christian believer.

But the principal reason why many, and such persons as those to whom Professor Max Muller referred, do not see wherein the Christian religion differs from Buddhism and other such religions is that their minds are fixed only on the moral character. Buddhism is in fact only a moral system and is not really a religion at all.* It does not hold up a Deity, a Creator, a Governor, a Providence. The religion of Cicero and Virgil did. There was some conception of a divine person with a divine character, who performed divine works. There was a service which bound the human soul to this person. Whatever imperfections and unreality there were in this religion, it nevertheless had a deity and one with many attributes worthy of his divine character. But Buddhism has nothing of the sort. It has no worship, no responsibility, no God. It is the merest system of atheism. It falls below the deism of Collins and Tindal of the days of Bishop Butler. But it is only a system of moral duty and moral virtue. And the system arose out of the life of Gautama. Overcome by the vexations and distractions of the world he did not seek peace and satisfaction in God, but simply in the performance of moral duty. It is this, the moral duty, the precepts and declarations of virtue, and the high moral standard which attract the readers of The Sacred Books of the East

* "Buddhism is no religion at all, and certainly no theology, but rather a system of duty, morality and benevolence, without real deity, prayer or priest — "Hinduism." By Monier Williams, M.A., D.C.L. p. 74.

to-day.* They say, this is like the Sermon on the Mount; this is equal to Christian morality. They say, this makes a character equal to that which Christianity makes. This is the whole of Buddhism. It is morality and meditation on the vanity and vexations of human life; and it is nothing more. It sees in the human mind the power of self-government and self-discipline; but it looks out of itself for no light and no help. Here is the real error. It is morality mistaken for religion.

And it is well to say here a word on the expression which is so often used—Christian ethics and Christian morality. Morality expresses the virtues which arise from the relations of men to each other—of men in society. Morality is the offspring of our nature. Our nature and constitution require this course of life. We could not live in society unless we had some of the qualities of the moral character. We should be what Hobbes supposes us to be, mere brutes with intelligence enough to see that it was best to give up something in order to attain a greater good. Honesty then was honesty only because it was the best policy. The Ten Commandments are a republication of the natural and moral law. The Ten Commandments did not make lying and stealing and murder to be sins. They had been sins from the very beginning, because God had given us such a constitution that the virtues, which were opposed to these sins, were a necessity of society. It was not Christianity which revealed or established morality. It gives us light to see our relations and obligations so that we can in a more effective manner develop the virtues and graces. Bishop Temple in his "Bampton Lectures"† seems to maintain that there is a Christian morality; but at the same time he allows that one of the virtues which may be especially due to Christianity, or which may especially be developed by it, which is humility, is found among the virtues described by Aristotle in the Ethics‡ under the name of *μεγαλοψυχία*. If one should pick out from the most full list of virtues those which had the beginning of their existence from

* "Buddha's Dhammapada, or Path of Virtue." Translated from Pale. By F. Max Muller, M.A.

† "Bampton Lectures." By F. Temple, D.D. Lect. v., pp. 144-147.

‡ "Ethics of Aristotle." Bk. IV., chap. iii.

Christianity the list would certainly be a very short one. All the great virtues which stand out as cardinal—and it is only the cardinal virtues which are involved in the commandments—had their existence from the very beginning. They come out of the constitution which God gave to man.* They developed down through all the ages, and are developing to-day as those relations are more fully recognized in society. No doubt Christianity gives to us a great power in their development; but they are part of the constitution of man, and of the relations which his nature requires. They are not the result of Christianity. Christianity found the cardinal virtues and graces in existence. It recognized them, and acknowledged them as part of the human character. The expression, therefore, is not a fair one. It implies that the system of moral life is the offspring of Christianity, and by many it is mistaken for Christianity itself. It is not the characteristic of Christianity, or its essence, but in a logical definition it is only a property, but certainly an inseparable or generic property.

No doubt the moral system of Buddhism is very remarkable. It is a delineation of the moral life which is certainly astonishing, but not unaccountable. It can be seen to be the result of human speculation, of self-discipline, and of self-control. But persons who to-day are captivated with the moral precepts of that system, and of other systems, such as Confucianism and Peruvianism, think they see a likeness to Christianity in the essential qualities—in those qualities which make those systems to be what they are, while the likeness and especially the identity may be only in some of the properties or accidents.

Here lies one of the great mistakes, and possibly in the case of Buddhism the only real mistake. Persons have mistaken the properties and accidents for the essential characteristics of Christianity, and they in consequence begin to set up the Ark of God in the temple of Dagon (I. Samuel v., 2).

The moral system of the human race is certainly very wonderful. It shows that God has not left Himself without witness. He has the witness in the constitution which He has given to every man. Man is a moral being. God has made him

* See Bishop Butler's "Three Sermons on Human Nature."

such. Morality is no calculation of profit or of utility. It is no human choice. But the recognition of right and wrong is part of man. It is the essential characteristic which separates him from every other animal.* It is the definition of man, not that he laughs, not that he looks up, not that he is intelligent and has reason, but that he is a moral being. And we see this moral nature therefore everywhere, in Peru, in Africa, in Asia, and in all the tribes of men. They universally exhibit this characteristic. None is destitute of a conception that some acts he ought to do, and that other acts he ought not to do. We shall see more particularly the relation of Christianity to the moral life, but at present it is sufficient to see that morality is not Christianity—that it exists independently of it.

When Prescott's "Peru" was first published persons were startled by the pure and lofty morality which was ascribed to this people. And again in our day the same surprise is expressed to find the moral virtues and graces which are inculcated by Buddhism. The comparative study of religions ought to reveal the nature of morality, at least to such a degree that we should cease to be surprised that religions of all sorts and kinds professed it and taught it. And it would not impair our faith in the Christian religion if we saw clearly what the logical definition of that religion is, and the relation which it bore to all morality, and to the moral character of man.

We must now look at the nature of a logical definition. Such a definition must state the essential characteristics of the matter defined, and exhibit those characteristics which make it to be what it is, and at the same time show wherein it differs from all other matter. That several objects have common qualities does not show that they are the same, for there may still be an essential quality which belongs to each and which is not common to all. So again we may state a quality which is not an essential characteristic, that is, it does not give the real character of the thing defined. This the logicians call a property. Thus, man laughs. It may be that he is the only animal that laughs, but this quality does not exhibit man as the animal separated from all other animals. So he has also been defined as the animal

* See the beginning of Bishop Butler's "Essay on Virtue."

that looks up, and stands erect. This quality again may belong to man only, but still it is not the essential quality of man—that which exhibits his character. That which is the essence of man—that which makes him to be what he is, is, as Bishop Butler says in his “Essay on Virtue,” that “we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object of our thoughts.” This is what no other animal can do. This action is the essential character of man; it at once separates him from all other beings. Logicians, therefore, call this the *differentia*; while the capacity to laugh and the capacity to look up are properties which may or may not belong to other animals. Just as that he is a biped is a property, but not an essential characteristic, and that he is an American and not an Ethiopian is neither a *differentia* nor a property, but an accident. In giving a logical definition of man we should say that he is a species of the genus animal whose *differentia* is an intellectual and moral nature, his property to laugh and to stand erect, and his birth in any particular country an accident. When we exhibit man under these five predicables we at once get definite and precise knowledge.

Now if we do the same for the Christian religion, we shall, in like manner, get such a conception of it as will enable us to separate it from other religions which are not Christian; and we shall be prevented from confounding it with any religion which may have only common properties and common accidents. Religion is a generic quality. Religion is the binding man to God, or the supposed means of binding man to God. The various means by which man attempts to come into union with his Maker we call religion. If we look at the actions of man in this respect we should see such common acts and purposes and qualities that we should bring them all under one name. We should in scientific language generalize them—that is, create a genus. That genus would be religion. Besides the Christian, the Mohammedan has a mode of bringing man into relations to God; and so has the Brahman; and so had the Peruvians and Mexicans; and so had the Africans. We say, therefore, that binding men to God, or bringing them into relations to Him, or reconciling them to Him, is religion. This probably

was the original meaning of the word. And we say that religion is a generic operation—that it is a genus, and that each of these modes is a species, that is, they belong to the same genus, but are separated from each other by their own differentia, which makes the species. We may find a common property belonging to all the species, and we may find the same accidents in each species. But the differentia is, as the word indicates, the difference, and this difference is the essential character of the species—one is Christianity, another is Mohammedanism, and another is Fetishism. And when we have, as in the case of man, determined what this difference is, then we have determined how one species of religion is separated from another species—how one is Christian, another Mohammedan, and another Fetish, no matter whether each species has the same properties and the same accidents with the others. Now Christianity is a species of the genus religion with this differentia, that it exhibits Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, redeeming the world by the sacrifice of the cross, and ever living at the right hand of God as the source of grace. These three qualities make up the essential characteristics of the Christian religion, viz., that Jesus Christ is the incarnate Son of God, the Redeemer of man, and the source of grace. These qualities separate it from Brahmanism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism, Fetishism, Peruvianism and all other kinds of religion. It may have various things in common with those religions, but those qualities which are common to Christianity and to them are not essential qualities, but only properties and accidents. We should then define Christianity as a species of the genus religion with the differentia that Jesus Christ is the incarnate Son of God, the Redeemer of the world, and the source of grace, with the property that it presents a perfect morality, and the manner of its rendering homage to God an accident.

The Christian Church has ever preached such a Christianity as this. She has ever presented these characteristics as making the religion which she preached and ministered to man. We see no such characteristics in Buddhism, or Brahmanism, or Confucianism, or Mohammedanism, or Fetishism. These characteristics stand forth in the Christian religion, and in the Christian

religion only, of all the religions of the world. Professor Max Muller, it appears to me, ought to have said to those who asked him, "What then distinguishes the Christian religion from other religions?" that Christianity had in the Son of God a Mediator and Redeemer; and that He was the fulness of grace. His talk about the Fatherhood of God and the oneness even to the *ὁμοουσία* of the sons of God with the Father could not have given any clear conception to those who questioned him. But his answer would have been clear and definite if he had replied that the Christian religion put forward the Son of God with His valuable and prevailing intercession in behalf of man, and that it ever presented this Person as the one who could give grace—regenerating and renewing grace. What Buddhist ever said anything of this sort of Gautama? What Chinese ever spoke of Confucius as having redeemed the race, and standing ready to minister grace to the sin-sick soul of man? What Fetish worshipper of Africa ever brought forward a person at all, and did not confine himself to some charm, which was only an influence on the human soul? What follower of the False Prophet ever looked on Mohammed as more than a teacher proclaiming the divine unity?

St. Augustine seized on this as the characteristic of the Christian religion. When he was commenting on the text, "Come unto Me all ye that labor and are heavy laden and I will give you rest," he showed the acuteness of his mind and the power with which he grasped a truth. He immediately said, Who is this person? No philosopher ever used language like this. Plato never said, Come unto me. Here to his mind lay the characteristic of the Christian religion. It was Christ the source of divine and spiritual power. It was Christ the Redeemer of man and the Fountain of Grace. Suppose Professor Max Muller had presented the comment of the great African Doctor as his answer to these inquirers, what a clear conception would they at once have had. Instead of this his answer enveloped them in a cloud of religious mysticism which might describe the life of the believer in Christ, or simply the effect of pious meditation.

This is the conception which the Christian Church has ever entertained of her Great Head. The early Councils set forth

that conception, and hedged it around with every conceivable expression; and her holy rites have never failed to refer to Christ in this twofold relation in which He stood to the human soul. Thus the Nicene Council set forth the divine nature of the Son, and His oneness in that nature with the Father. The Council of Constantinople set forth the perfection of His human nature. The Council of Ephesus declared the union of the two natures in one Person; and the Council of Chalcedon defined its belief that the two natures in the one Person should not be confounded. This Person, uniting the divine and the human, uniting Heaven and earth, the Christian Church has ever set forth as the Saviour of men and the source of grace. What false religion ever did anything of the kind for its founder? Gautama was a man like ourselves; so was Confucius; and so was Mohammed. Suppose that there are circumstances in the life of each which are alike; suppose that in an Eastern country they deliver similar discourses and parables and inculcate the same line of moral duty; suppose they attend a similar marriage feast; it will at once appear in the difference of their characters and in the difference of their missions, how little these can tend to identify their religion, or to prevent us from seeing that they stood on very different foundations.

Look also at the teaching of the Eucharist. The holy rite certainly sets forth one doctrine which was never misunderstood, and that is that it is a commemoration of the shedding of Christ's blood on Calvary for the sins of the world. The Christian Church always celebrates this so as to exhibit her faith in Christ as the all-meritorious offering in our behalf. We may philosophize on the Atonement, we may say that it is "a ransom paid to Satan";* or that it was addressed to the justice of God to appease His wrath, and to exhibit Him to the world as "just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus" (Romans iii., 26); or it may have been addressed to the holiness of God to

* "The theory of a ransom paid to Satan by the death of Christ, which had prevailed for nearly a thousand years in the Church, and on which the fathers had grounded the necessity for the Atonement, is here [in Anselm's "*Cur Deus Homo*"] for the first time expressly and unreservedly rejected."—"Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement." By Henry N. Oxenham, M.A., p. 181.

vindicate that perfection in the sight of the universe. Whatever we may think of the philosophy, there is no doubt of the fact.

Take the other sacrament—baptism. It was supposed to bring the recipient into relations to God—to bring the person into the flock of Christ; and to bring him into such relations that he might be a partaker of grace, of divine aid and help, that he might have the divine power to do what he had not the power in himself to do. This is the peculiarity of Christian grace—that it is a supernatural power and help. It is not only a moral influence, but it is a help which is above nature. This is what the Christian Church has ever been claiming, that Christianity enabled man—the believer in Christ—to do, namely, that which he had not the natural power to do.

And when we go into the Holy Scriptures we find that this Person is ever in view from Genesis to Revelation. The Bible begins with Christ, the seed promised; and it ends with Christ that He shall come again. And the two leading thoughts concerning this Person is that He is the Redeemer, and then that He is the perpetual source of grace. It does not dwell on Fatherhood, except as being the redeemed and regenerated children of God—co-heirs with Christ—one with Him in being made “partakers of the divine nature” (II. Pet. i., 4) in His redeemed family, that family for which He was “contented to be betrayed and given up into the hands of sinful men.”

There is no such doctrine as this taught in any of the false systems of religion—in Buddhism, in Brahmanism, in Confucianism, in Mohammedanism. It is taught in Christianity alone. The sacrificial worship of the false religions did not symbolize and point to any such person as Christ, or to an all-meritorious sacrifice which was to be made, or which had been made. That was the sacrificial system of the patriarchal and Jewish Church as shown in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It all pointed forward to Christ, as the worship of the Christian Church points back to that one offering on Calvary. There is no such person and no such work in any of the false religions of the world. The comparative study of these religions shows the great difference, that the Christ of this religion redeems us and gives us life. It is in this religion only that a divine Person, Christ, is “made of God

unto us wisdom and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption" (I. Cor. i., 30).

If we come across in The Sacred Books of the East tales and incidents, and parables, and discourses which are very much like those which are recorded in the Gospels; if we hear Gautama preaching a moral life, such as Christ preached in the Sermon on the Mount; if the founder of Buddhism inculcated a high morality as our Lord and His apostles inculcated it; if he viewed human life as Christ viewed it; if he alleviated human suffering as the founder of Christianity alleviated it, does that identify the one with the other? Does that set forth the founder of Buddhism as equal in his nature and in his work to the founder of Christianity? The very acts which make the Christian religion, and for which the Christian Church was always so jealous and which it hedged round with every imaginable safeguard, are not known to the false religions. They do not enter into their system. They have nothing which answers to them in the remotest degree.

If then we find any one dwelling on the beautiful morality of Buddhism, or Confucianism, or Peruvianism; if they are so captivated with it that they ask, "What then distinguishes Christianity from other religions?" let us say that the difference is this, that our Founder is God—that He has redeemed us and that He ever lives to sanctify us; that it is these two acts of Christ which make our religion, and of which all the other religions of the world know nothing. And these two acts are redemption and grace—that Christ is our Redeemer and source of spiritual life.

When we grasp these two acts we understand what Christianity is. All the Christian Church's system is to set forth these acts, and to be the medium in communicating this grace. The organization of the Church, her worship, her prayers, her sacraments, her order, are instituted to bring you to a redeeming Christ and to a life-giving Christ.

And this ought to teach us in what manner and in what spirit we should approach the heathen with our religion. We ought not to see in their religion an equality, or a likeness, or a life like the Christian life. But we should approach the heathen in

the spirit in which David Livingstone approached them. Dean Stanley said that Livingstone "never tired of repeating that he found among the native races of Africa that same feeling of right and wrong that he found in his own conscience, and that it needed only to be developed and enlightened to make a perfect character." If the heathen had no moral nature, if they could not see this moral system, which has been worked out in their religion, then we should have nothing in common with them. But their religious aspirations show that they are men such as we are, responsible beings, with conceptions of right and wrong, but that like us they need a Redeemer and a Giver of Life. Their system has not power over the conscience. They require redemption, reconciliation to God, so that they can go to the Redeemer for grace—for the divine power which will enable them to live the life which we recognize as beautiful and wonderful, but in itself weak and powerless. This moral system is the very reason and the great encouragement for us to go to them and preach to them the Gospel of Jesus Christ as the only "power of God unto salvation."

DOES THE NIRVANA OF BUDDHA IMPLY IMMORTALITY?

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Christian Philosophy, Jan. 3d, 1889.]

BY PROF. MARTYN SUMMERBELL, M.A., LEWISTON, ME.

BUDDHISM, which in the number* of its adherents surpasses every other religious cultus, despite all its ethical precepts and its profession of universal charity, is essentially atheistic, materialistic and pessimistic, and is so known and acknowledged by scholars who have given its tenets careful scrutiny. The outcome of its teachings has not been beneficial, but rather the reverse. The ignorance† of its priesthood, the cruelty and immorality of its devotees goes without dispute, and its influence where it has had longest sway rests on the nations like a withering blight.

Whatever the beliefs prevailing here and there, such as the theistic opinions of the Shinshiu sect in Japan, or the views current among the Singhalese,‡ who hold to a kind of immortality, Buddhism itself, as a system, recognizes no God, to whom worship and obedience are due; no sin against God which requires an expiation to remove guilt and the dread of it; no sacrifice for sin to justify divine law and redeem the sinner; no soul capable of committing sin or incurring moral responsibility.

As Mr. Hardy, the veteran missionary, remarks: § “The

* 450,000,000, Müller, *Chips* i., 214. 500,000,000, Rhys Davids.

† “Cruelty and immorality, the two vices against which primitive Buddhism most emphatically declared itself, are here (Mongolia) common and unopposed. The Buddhist, who, before sitting down, will brush his seat lest he crush an insect, will slaughter his prisoner in cold blood; and the religion which originally laid such stress upon meditation and wisdom, is now represented, if we except Burmah, by a priesthood that is disgracefully ignorant.”—Marcus Dods; Mohammed, Buddha and Christ, p. 176.

‡ “The belief in a soul is perhaps general among the Singhalese, though so contrary to the teachings of Buddha.”—Hardy, *Legends and Theories of Buddhism*, p. 220.

§ *Idem*, p. 217.

system of Buddha is humiliating, cheerless, man-crushing, soul-crushing. It tells me that I am not a reality. I have no soul. It tells me that there is no unalloyed happiness, no plenitude of enjoyment, no perfect unbroken peace, in the possession of any being whatever from the highest to the lowest in any world."

Surely nothing drearier than its jaundiced aspect of the misery of the present life, nothing more utterly barren than its outlook for the future has ever been devised by the human mind. In this indictment, framed by the consensus of learned authorities competent to speak on the case, Prof. Max Muller in the main agrees. He acknowledges that the system as such is a departure from truth. "In no religion," he remarks,* "are we so constantly reminded of our own as in Buddhism, and yet in no religion has man been drawn away so far from the truth as in the religion of Buddha."

He perceives that it denies the existence of a Personal Creator, and that it is merciless in the denial, and attributes the origin of the idea to an ancient myth. Thus he says,† "There is only one idea, the idea of a Personal Creator, in regard to which Buddha seems merciless. It is not only denied, but even its origin, like that of some ancient myth, is carefully explained by him with the minutest detail." Prof. Muller is so assured on this point that he enlarges upon it with evident satisfaction, and says with confidence not to be disturbed,‡ "As regards the denial of a Creator, or atheism in the ordinary acceptance of the word, I do not think that any passage from the books of the canon known to us can be quoted which contravenes it, or which in any way presupposes the belief in a Personal God or Creator."

Prof. Muller is equally certain that Buddhism denies the existence of the ego, the soul, the essential man, and that it represents the I myself as not myself at all, but rather an abstraction, a transient traveller. Thus he remarks,§ "According to the metaphysical doctrine of Buddhism, the soul cannot dissolve itself in a higher being, or be absorbed in the absolute substance,

* Science of Religion, p. 113.

† *Idem*, p. 171.

‡ Science of Religion, p. 177.

§ Science of Religion, p. 140.

as was taught by the Brahmans and other mystics of ancient and modern times. For Buddhism knew not the Divine, the Eternal, the Absolute, and the soul, even as the I, or the mere self, the At-man, as called by the Brahmans, was represented in the orthodox metaphysics of Buddhism as transient, as futile, as a mere phantom."

And to just what all this amounts, if such be the teaching of Buddhism as a whole, and of Gautama Buddha, its founder, no one sees more clearly, or speaks more to the purpose than our erudite Oxford professor, when he expresses himself in terms like these: * "But if, as Buddhism teaches, the soul, after having passed through all the phases of existence, all the worlds of the gods, and of the higher spirits, attains finally *Nirvana* as its highest aim and last reward, *i. e.*, becomes utterly extinct, then religion is no more what it was meant to be, a bridge from the finite to the infinite, but a trap bridge, hurling man into the abyss, at the very moment when he thought he had arrived at the stronghold of the Eternal."

But Prof. Muller is too ardent a champion of Buddha's reputation to leave him in the hopeless plight of the canonical Buddhist teaching; and so on *a priori* grounds, because religion ought not to be a trap bridge hurling man into the abyss, he sets about to discover a way of escape for the illustrious founder of the Buddhist faith.

This he presently announces in the hypothesis that a contradiction exists between Buddhism as it is known to the ages, and the personal teaching of Buddha. Quoting Asoka, the Constantine of India, who reminded the priests assembled at the great council, "What had been said by Buddha, that alone was well said," he proceeds to create a theory of mutually hostile doctrines in the canon, and asserts respecting these a right of choice, saying: † "In such a case, therefore, I believe we have a right to choose, and I believe we shall be justified in accepting that view as the original one, the one peculiar to Buddha himself, which harmonizes least with the later system of orthodox Buddhism."

* Science of Religion, p. 178.

† Science of Religion, p. 177.

The particular doctrine for rescue of which Prof. Muller advances so courageously to Buddha's defence is that of personal immortality, the life of the soul hereafter. He freely admits that the later writings of the canon teach as the highest good of Buddhism the attainment of absolute extinction of personal existence. Thus he says,* "No person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the *Nirvana* contained in the third part of the Buddhist canon, can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, namely, that *Nirvana*, the highest aim, the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, is the absolute nothing."

But over against this he places the first and second parts of the canon, the *Sutras*, or sermons, and the *Vinaya*, or ethics, which together constitute the *Dharma* or law, in which this crude form of the doctrine is not so plainly taught, and he agrees with Burnouf of all three of the parts that they were not pronounced by Buddha. To these two limitations, which he regards important, he adds a third, maintaining that sayings of Buddha occur in the *Dharmapada*, which are in open contradiction to this metaphysical nihilism.†

The argument constructed to sustain this theory falls into three divisions.

1. That Buddha contradicts the orthodox metaphysical view of the soul or self as purely phenomenal.

2. That *Nirvana*, while it means extinction, may mean extinction of selfishness, desire and sin, without going so far as the extinction of subjective consciousness; and this the more, as Buddha himself, after he had already attained *Nirvana*, remains on earth till his body falls a prey to death.

3. That no passage of the *Dharmapada* mentioning *Nirvana* requires that its meaning should be annihilation, while most, if not all, would become perfectly unintelligible, if we assigned to the word *Nirvana* the meaning which it has in the *Abhidharma*, or metaphysical portions of the canon.

* Science of Religion, p. 179.

† "These are at once two important limitations. I add a third, and maintain that sayings of Buddha occur in the *Dharmapada*, which are in open contradiction to this metaphysical nihilism."—Science of Religion, p. 179.

Following this line of thought, Prof. Muller examining the passages of the *Dharmapada*, which bear upon the doctrine of *Nirvana*, points out that they suggest "the quiet place," v. 183; "the changeless place," v. 183; "the immortal place," v. 183; "quietness," *passim*; "the other shore," v. 183; "Heaven," v. 182; "the end of births," v. 182; "immortality," v. 181; and on these remarks: * "On considering such sayings, to which many more might be added, one recognizes in them a conception of *Nirvana*, altogether irreconcilable with the nihilism of the third part of the Buddhist canon. It is not a question of more or less, but of *aut, aut*. . . . What Bishop Bigandet and others represent as the popular view of *Nirvana* in contradistinction to that of the Buddhist divines, was, in my opinion, the conception of Buddha and his disciples. It represented the entrance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to joy and pain, to good and evil, an absorption of the soul in itself, and a freedom from the circle of existences from birth to death, and from death to a new birth."

Summing up the whole matter he concludes, as he introduces the critical discussion of the *Dharmapada* itself,† "Either we must bring ourselves to believe that Buddha taught his disciples two diametrically opposed doctrines on *Nirvana*, say an exoteric, and an esoteric one, or we must allow that view of *Nirvana* to have been the original view of the founder of this marvellous religion, which we find recorded in the verses of the *Dharmapada*, and which corresponds with the simple, clear and practical character of Buddha."

But is it so clear in our survey of these teachings that we are to be absolutely imprisoned, and helplessly, between Prof. Muller's alternatives, his *aut, aut*? May there not be an aspect of *Nirvana*, which does not require this ingenious theory of contradiction, under which all the passages of the *Dharmapada* may harmonize, each with the other, and each with those of the *Dharma* and *Abhidharma*, and which will also remain consistent with the general philosophy of Buddhism?

When we remember that Buddhism as a system is under-

* Science of Religion, p. 184.

† Science of Religion, p. 185.

stood to deny the possibility of immortality, it must be seen how violent and revolutionary is the effort to represent it as a revealer of immortality. That *Nirvana* does not represent immortality, in any sense in which the idea is familiar to the Western mind, that the passages of the *Dharmapada* cited by Prof. Muller do not indicate immortality, and that immortality is contrary to the fundamental thought of Buddhism are the views to be supported by this paper.

Following the lines of Prof. Muller's argument these views will be sustained,

1. By the Buddhist doctrine of the non-existence of soul.
2. By the fact mentioned by Prof. Muller, and whose bearing he seems not to have observed, that after Buddha had attained *Nirvana* he continued for a time in life, and presently died.
3. By the passages of the *Dharmapada* cited by Prof. Muller, which, on examination are open to a view of *Nirvana*, which will not require a theory of contradictions between the Buddhism of the later canon, and the Buddhism of Buddha.

Approaching Buddhism, the religion of five hundred millions of the human family, it must be borne in mind that our Western mode of thought, which postulates reality in the visible universe, is wholly opposed to this system, which declares all life unreal, and all appearance a delusion. We are accustomed to recognize, through all the changes of life, from its inception on through all experiences, even through death into the future life, a personal identity, a changeless *ego*, the existence of which Buddhism denies, and denies with abundant illustration and emphasis.

But according to the sages of the *Sangha*, or Buddhist congregation, nothing is what it seems to be.

"Buddhism," so remarks Rhys Davids,* "claims to have looked through the word 'soul' for the fact, which it purports to cover; and to have found no fact at all, but only one or other of the twenty different delusions, which blind the eyes of men."

"All forms are unreal," † so says Buddha himself in the *Dharmapada*, and again, in another place, "All created things perish." ‡ Nothing is fixed or enduring, not even the rocks, or

* Buddhism, p. 103.

† Verse 279.

‡ Verse 277.

mountains, or worlds. "The whole Kosmos," so says Mr. Davids,* "earth and heaven and hells, is always tending to renovation and destruction; is always in a course of change, a series of revolutions, or of cycles, of which the beginning and the end alike are unknowable and unknown."

Even the gods are changing. Everything is in flux, dying, never being, always becoming. A reality in things,—the instructed Buddhist scoffs at the notion. He derides the idea of an entity in a chariot, apart from the elements which enter its structure, in terms which irresistibly remind us of Mr. Huxley's thrust at the "aquosity" of water. So far as the chariot is concerned, we may agree with him; but the contest begins when he turns his chariot into an analogue of human existence for the sake of eliminating the idea of soul. His more favorite simile, however, is the flame of a lamp or candle. The flame holds its shape while combustion goes on. It can kindle other flames. But, every moment, the particles which constitute it are changing, passing transiently through it, and when the wind strikes it, it is gone. How complete the work of death, according to the Buddhist philosophy, when the flame of life is extinguished, appears in this sentence from the *Sutta Nipata*,† "Only the name appears of the person who has passed away."

But, following the analogy of the flame, the person while living is not the same from day to day, or hour to hour. He is not *he*, but only a shifting appearance of certain elements, which as they come and go incidentally retain the same outward form. So Buddha teaches,‡ "The things that I see and know, are not myself, nor from myself, nor to myself. What seems to be myself is in reality neither myself nor belongs to myself." What seems a sentient being is merely a "fortuitous concourse of atoms," to borrow Lucretius' phrase; and it is simply from failure to perceive this that men fall into the crass error of supposing that they possess personality, and exist as conscious beings.

Not only does Buddhism teach materialism of this radical stamp as a fundamental doctrine; but also regards it as of

* Buddhism, p. 88.

† Quoted by Kellogg. *Light of Asia and the Light of the World*, p. 190.

‡ *Life of Gautama Buddha*. Brigander.

sufficient importance to stigmatize with the brand of schism any who maintain the contrary.

Immortality in the teaching of Buddha! Rhys Davids recalls a passage of *Digha Nikaya* of the *Sutta Pitaka*, in which Gautama recounts sixteen heresies which teach a conscious existence after death; eight an unconscious existence, and eight more of neither conscious nor unconscious existence after death: in all thirty-two heresies, covering all possibilities of the hereafter.

"Mendicants,"* so the sermon comes to its conclusion, "that which binds the teacher (*Gautama*) to existence (viz., *tanha*, thirst) is cut off; but his body still remains. While his body shall remain, he will be seen by gods and men, but after the termination of life, upon the dissolution of the body, neither gods nor men will see him."

And yet, notwithstanding this blank and absolute denial of soul, Buddhism teaches a kind of survival after death. The mind of India, under the philosophies of the Brahmans, was saturated with a belief in transmigrations, partly, no doubt, grounded as Davids suggests,† "on that curious trick of the memory by which we sometimes feel so sure that sensations we are experiencing have been experienced by us before, and yet we do not know how or when"; but, most of all probably, on the effort to explain the inequalities and miseries of life.

Buddha, while striking out all notion of personality and conscious soul-existence, accepted a transfer upon each fresh existence of the consequences of former existences. His doctrine is transmigration in a new phase, not a transmigration of soul, but a transmigration of *Karma*. In his teaching life is merely the union of certain elements of being—*skandhas*,—and *karma* under the influence thirst—*trishna*,—and grasping—*upa-dana*,—organizes with each new life a new set of *skandhas*. What remains consequently when life ceases is not soul, not a personal entity, not the man himself, but simply this *karma*, the sum of good and evil rising from a certain sequence of existences, the stream beginning with the first of that series, and carried forward in the latest member of the sequence.

* Buddhism: Davids, pp. 98, 99.

† Buddhism, p. 100.

So Rhys Davids puts the question, to which he supplies the answer : * “ Where then is the identity between him who sows, and him who reaps ? In that which alone remains when a man dies, and the constituent parts of his being are dissolved ; in the result, namely, of his action, speech and thought, in his good or evil *karma*, literally his doing, which does not die.”

This doctrine of *karma*, mysterious to us, is an acknowledged mystery among Buddhists. Mr. Davids properly characterizes it as a † “ mere word,” a “ wonderful hypothesis,” “ an imaginary cause beyond the reach of reason.”

It is so vague and shadowy, so unreal, that the unsophisticated mind instantly rejects it, while as Mr. Hardy states : ‡ “ Even the *Sramana* priests at one time denied it,” and continued to deny it as a tenet of their faith, until the “ passages teaching it were pointed out to them in their own sacred books.”

So illusory is this notion of an I that is not I, and of a continued influence that is something less than an existence, that even Mr. Hardy, who has information as to its unsubstantialness, slips into the inaccuracy of saying : § “ I am now under the influence of all that I have ever done in all the ages. This is my *karma*, the arbiter of my destiny. Until I attain *Nirvana* I must still continue to exist ; but the states of being into which I shall pass, as duration rolls on I cannot tell. The future is enshrouded in impenetrable blackness.”

By a similar transfer of Western thought into this mysterious doctrine of the East, Prof. Muller is betrayed into citing two passages from the *Dharmapada* in support of the existence of soul. He remarks : || “ Now first, as regards the soul, or the self, the existence of which, according to the orthodox metaphysics, is purely phenomenal, a sentence attributed to the Buddha says, ‘ Self is the Lord of self ; who else could be the Lord ? ’ and again, ‘ A man who controls himself enters the untrodden land through his own self-controlled self.’ ” These two passages,

* Buddhism, p. 103.

† Buddhism, p. 106.

‡ Manual of Buddhism, p. 397.

§ *Idem*, p. 395.

| Science of Religion, p. 179.

and no others, Prof. Muller brings forward as sufficient to break up the foundation and utterly demolish the whole structure of the doctrine of *karma*, which is itself the negation of soul, and fundamental in Buddha's philosophy of existence.

But the two verses, read in connection with the whole scheme of Buddhist thought, have no reference to the soulness of soul. "Self is the Lord of self; who else could be Lord?" is, on the face of it, an atheistical asseveration denying that any god can influence any man, or any affair of any man; and the second verse, "A man who controls himself enters the untrodden land through his own self-controlled self," again is a dictum intended to rule out any supposition of divine intervention or divine assistance, and represents the highest good of human attainment as the resultant solely of human exertion. To import into this pair of atheistical dicta the Western notion of personal soul-hood, and rest the argument on that, is at once an acknowledgment that the theory of supposed contradiction between Buddha's teaching on *Nirvana* and the teaching of the later writings requires self-conscious personality, or soul as a basis: and also a tacit confession of weakness of position, in the failure to produce citations more numerous and of a more convincing sort.

As a fact, immortality as we understand it is alien to the thought of Buddhism. All that survives is *karma*, which is no more than a * "name given to the moral power working in the universe." And this *karma*, the Buddhist beholds as the source of all misery and pain, and consequently it becomes the chief end and aim of the "Noble Path" to destroy and extinguish it. A passage in point is this from the *Mahasudassana Sutta* (ii., 42):

"How transient are all component things,
Growth is their nature, and decay;
And then is best when they have sunk to rest."

"This," says Kellogg,† who quotes the lines, "is the constant refrain of all Buddhist teaching. It is the one assumption, which is never lost sight of in their whole system of doctrines and morals."

* Davids' Buddhism, p. 150.

† Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p. 279.

Nothing lives but *Karma*, but even *Karma* will die. Davids expounds the parable of the lamp on this wise:* "If there is no oil in the lamp, it will go out, though not until the oil, which the wick has drawn up, is exhausted; and then no flame can be lighted there. And so the parts and powers of the sinless man will be dissolved, and no new being will be born to sorrow. The wise will pass away, will go out like the flame of a lamp, and their *Karma* will be individualized no longer."

To postulate the possibility of immortality in the face of a doctrine like this is to attribute the qualities of the eternal to the perishing, and of endless felicity to the abbreviated shadow of nothingness.

But according to all the legends, and to Prof. Muller† as well, Buddha attained *Nirvana* before he was removed by death. This consideration will clear away much misconception, and bring to utter ruin the hypothesis of open contradiction between Buddha's teaching and the dogmas of the later canon as to the nature of *Nirvana*. To grasp the secret of Buddha's system it is necessary to remember him as the child of luxury, the pampered prince, surrounded by abundance and all incitements to pleasure, and yet weary of it all, oppressed by a constantly widening consciousness of the pain and misery of man. He is overborne by a profound and remediless *welt-schmerz*, which enjoyment cannot banish: for, in the midst of pleasure he recognizes its transitory nature, the roses fading, smiles waning, life ageing, all things hastening away and as they go, beckoning on to approaching anguish and sorrow. And the evil of it is, so to him it seems, that it must be so, for the burden falling on life comes from previous lives: the *Karma* advances from the past, bearing its freight of demerit, insuring trial; and so the circle of being wheels on into the future, making more and more misery for lives still to come.

Dwelling on such thoughts as these he finally evolves a way of escape from the plague of existence by the system of the Noble Path, constructed on the four Noble Truths, which are:

1. The fact of sorrow as inseparable from existence.

* Buddhism, p. 114.

† Science of Religion, p. 179.

2. The cause of sorrow, namely, thirst or desire.
3. Destruction of sorrow, to be effected by destruction of this thirst.
4. The way to this end, namely, the eightfold Holy Path that leads to the quieting of pain.

In all this teaching, which is at the centre of Buddhist philosophy, it is to be observed that the great end sought is the overcoming of pain.

As Prof. Childers* has noticed, "A creed, which begins by saying that all existence is suffering must end by saying that release from suffering is the highest good."

How to escape evil and suffering according to the Buddhist system is thus explained by Mr. Hardy:† "The cleaving to existing objects is *upadana*. . . . As it is the grand tenet of Buddhism that all existence is an evil, it thus becomes consistent with right reason to seek the destruction of *upadana*, which alone can secure the reception of *Nirvana*." If by moral restraint this grasping thirst and desire can be destroyed, if the mind can content itself with itself; if it can hope nothing, crave nothing, be inclined to nothing and indifferent to everything, trouble will cease to trouble, and every horizon will be sweet with perfect calm. And precisely this is the Buddhist's highest good, a state of rest, of unruffled peace of mind, to be attained somewhere, in this world or in some other.

So Rhys Davids explains *Nirvana*, saying,‡ "It is the same thing as a sinless, calm state of mind, and, if translated at all, may best perhaps be rendered 'holiness'—holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, perfect peace, goodness and wisdom." And this is set before the disciple as an attainment possible during the earthly life. Gautama is said to have gained *Nirvana* while living, and tradition relates that about midnight the night of his death he discoursed with the Brahman Subhadra, declaring that many had attained *Nirvana* already, even in this life. He says,§ "To true wisdom there is only one way, the path that is

* Pali Dic. Art. Nibbana.

† Manual of Buddhism, p. 394.

‡ Buddhism, p. 112.

§ Enc. Britt., Art. Buddhism, p. 431.

laid down in my law. Many have already followed it, and conquering the lust and pride and anger of their own hearts, have become free from ignorance and doubt and wrong belief, have entered the calm state of universal kindness, and reached *Nirvana* even in this life."

Rhys Davids, after consulting the *Pali* texts, and tracing the subject through translations into the Chinese, renders this opinion:* "The early Sanscrit texts of the Northern Buddhists like the *Pali* texts of the *Pitakas*, look upon *Nirvana* as a moral condition, to be reached here, in this world, and in this life."

With this statement Prof. Muller agrees, when he says of *Nirvana*:† "It represented the entrance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to joy and pain, to good and evil, an absorption of the soul in itself, and a freedom from the circle of existence from birth to death, and from death to a new birth." To all this there can be no dissent, except as to Prof. Muller's use of the word "soul." Let it be understood that this is the meaning of *Nirvana*, whether reached in the present life or another, and the discussion terminates. But with this *Nirvana* Prof. Muller is not content, and, to suit his theory, supercharges it with a meaning pregnant with Western thought. He would make this rest, gained by Buddha and others in this world, an immortality; an idea foreign from Buddha's chief aim.

And the occasion of Prof. Muller's slipping into the fog is of easy finding. He is balancing‡ "aut, aut," the *Nirvana* of prolonged existence, and the *Nirvana* of immediate annihilation. He cannot accept the latter, and consequently leaps to the conclusion that *Nirvana* with existence afterward is immortality, endless felicity, the Heaven of Western thought.

As to the point that *Nirvana* is not equivalent to immediate extinction of being he is doubtless in the right. *Nirvana* is not extinction directly, it is surcease of pain and misery.

As to the other, that *Nirvana* is endless existence, immortality, he is in error; for while *Nirvana* is not extinction

* Buddhism, p. 117.

† Science of Religion, p. 184.

‡ Science of Religion, p. 184.

per se, it necessarily conditions extinction, and precedes extinction by an interval of narrow measure.

This is apparent in one of Gautama's parable teachings here given in his own words : * "Existence is a tree : the merit or demerit of the actions of men is the fruit of that tree, and the seed of future trees : death is the withering away of the old tree from which the others have sprung : wisdom and virtue take away the germinating faculty, so that when the tree dies there is no reproduction. This is *Nirvana*."

Possibly Davids' portraiture of the spirit of Buddhism may be less picturesque than this, but it is no less accurate : † "Now," he remarks, "when a Buddhist has become an *arahat*, when he has reached *Nirvana*, the fruit of the fourth path, he has extinguished *upadana* and *klesa*, *i. e.*, sin, but he is still alive : the *upadi*, the *skandhas*, his body with all its powers, that is to say, the fruit of his former sin, remain. These, however, are impermanent, they will soon pass away : there will then be nothing left to bring about this rise of a new set of *skandhas* of a new individual : and the *arahat* will be no longer alive, or existent in any sense at all : he will have reached *pari-nibbana*, complete extinction, or *Nir upadi sesa nibbana dhatu*, extinction so complete that the *upadi*, the five *skandhas* survive no longer, that is in one word, death."

So far, in fact, was immortality no part of Gautama's system, or of his conception of *Nirvana*, that he did not attempt to claim a future for himself. When dying, so tradition relates, he called Amanda to his side, and comforting him, said : ‡ "Amanda, when I am gone you must not think there is no Buddha : the discourses I have delivered, and the precepts I have enjoined (*i. e.*, *Dharma*) must be my successor and representative, and be to you a Buddha."

And so Edwin Arnold had good reason, when in his "Light of Asia" he painted Gautama's life as passing out, not into im-

* Quoted from Wilsom, II., 364, by Dods, in *Mohammed, Buddhism and Christ*, p. 166.

† Buddhism, p. 114.

‡ Mohammed, *Buddhism and Christ* : Dods, pp. 183, 184.

mortality, but into the impersonal elements, as a dew drop mingles with the ocean :*

“ The dew is on the lotos ! rise, great sun,
And lift my leaf, and mix me with the wave ;
Om, mane padme, om : the sunrise comes.
The dew drop slips into the shining sea.”

But the passages of the *Dharmapada*, to which Prof. Muller refers, remain to be considered. Searching for the open contradiction, which he avers between the sayings of Buddha, and those of the later canon, we are willing to examine not only the thirty verses which he has noticed, but also to add seventeen others, which traverse similar lines. In these an inconsistency with the idea of *Nirvana* as an equivalent of immediate extinction, or annihilation is granted ; but it is also insisted that none of them imply immortality according to the plea of Prof. Muller, but, contrariwise, all are perfectly consistent with that notion of *Nirvana* which, in this life or another, is perfect tranquillity, the end of pain, the extinction of *trishna* and *upadana*; which, however, according to the Buddhist philosophy, condition annihilation. Taking Prof. Muller's citations, adding others of similar import, and completing the classification commenced by the professor, it is found that they naturally fall into the following divisions :

(1) The passages which pledge rest, peace, quietness and absence of passion. Prof. Muller refers to these :

Verse 134. If like a trumpet trampled under foot, thou utter not, then thou hast reached *Nirvana* ; anger is not known in thee.

Verse 184. The awakened calls patience the highest penance, long-suffering the highest *Nirvana* ; for he is not an anchorite (*Pravragita*), who strikes others ; he is not an ascetic (*Sramana*), who insults others.

Verse 202. There is no fire like passion : there is no unlucky † die like hatred ; there is no pain like this body.

Verse 285. Cut out the love of self, like an autumn lotos, with thy hand ! Cherish the road of peace. *Nirvana* has been shown by *Sughata* (Buddha).

Verse 368. The *Bhikshu*, who acts with kindness, who is

* Closing lines of the Light of Asia.

† “ An unlucky die, which makes a player lose his game.”—Science of Religion, p. 250. Note.

calm in the doctrine of Buddha, will reach the quiet place, *Nirvana*, cessation of natural desire and happiness.

Verse 369. Oh ! *Bhikshu*, empty this boat ! If emptied it will go quickly : Having cut off passion and hatred thou wilt go to *Nirvana*.

Verse 381. The *Bhikshu*, full of delight, who is calm in the doctrine of Buddha, will reach the quiet place, *Nirvana*, cessation of natural desires, and happiness.

Of all these passages, Prof. Muller justly remarks : * " In several passages of the *Dharmapada*, *Nirvana* occurs in the purely ethical sense of rest, quietness, absence of passion."

His inference, implied, is to the effect that this rest is the rest of immortality. But plain terms in the passages themselves oppose this construction. There is to be rest, the end and aim of Buddhist longing ; but it is to be the rest from struggle and misery : and it may be gained here and now.

The sage, who like a trumpet trampled under foot utters not, and knows not anger has "reached *Nirvana*."—Verse 134.

The anchorite and ascetic calls his "long suffering the highest *Nirvana*."—Verse 184.

To be rid of passion—verse 202 ; to empty the boat and let it go quickly—verse 369 ; to have cessation of natural desire—verses 368, 381 ; this is *Nirvana*.

But in all this there is not a suggestion of immortal life, but instead the delusion of misguidance teaching that hope lies in throttling life out of life.

The same weariness of existence and longing to be relieved from the ills of it appears in the passages here added to Prof. Muller's list.

Verse 83. Good people walk on, whatever befall : the good do not murmur longing for pleasure. Whether touched by happiness or sorrow, wise people never appear elated or depressed.

Verse 187. Even in heavenly pleasures he finds no satisfaction. The disciple who is fully awakened delights only in the destruction of all desire.

Verse 211. Let, therefore, no man love anything: love of the beloved is evil. Those who love nothing, and hate nothing have no fetters.

Verses 271, 272. Not only by discipline and vows, not only by much learning, not by entering into a trance, not by sleeping alone, do I learn the happiness of release which no worldling can

* Science of Religion, p. 181.

know. A *Bhikshu* receives confidence when he has reached the complete destruction of all desires.

Verse 275. If you go on this way you will make an end of pain. The way preached by me, when I had understood the removal of the thorns (in the flesh).

Here are repeated the yearnings for end of pain, 275; for extinction of desire and the happiness of release, 271, 272; but to never long for pleasure, 83; to love nothing, 211; is not the Christian hope or the homeopathic adumbration of it. In fact, as if to blot out all longing for Heaven, Buddha teaches, 187, "Even in heavenly pleasures there is no satisfaction."

(2) A second class of passages to be noticed appears in those in which * "*Nirvana* is described as the result of right knowledge."

Verse 203. Hunger is the worst of disease, the body the greatest of pains: if one knows this truly, that is *Nirvana*, the highest happiness.

Verse 372. Without knowledge there is no meditation, without meditation there is no knowledge: he who has knowledge and meditation is near unto *Nirvana*.

But this prospect offered as the result of right knowledge is not immortality, or a hint of it. It conducts by a repetition of the formula of the Eightfold Path, to the goal of Buddhist longing, the quieting of pain.

(3) A third class of passages teaches the end of birth, decay and death. Prof. Muller cites one verse:

Verse 238. Make thyself an island: work hard, be wise. When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt not enter again into birth and decay.

To this the six following are added:

Verse 131. He who for his own sake punishes, or kills beings longing for happiness, will not find happiness after death.

Verse 46. He who knows that this body is like froth, and has learned that it is unsubstantial as a mirage, will break the flower pointed arrow of *māra*,† and will never see the king of death.

Verse 95. Such an one who does his duty is tolerant like the earth, like *Indra's*‡ bolt; he is like a lake without mud: no new births are in store for him.

Verse 423. He who knows his former abodes, who sees Heaven and hell, has reached an end of births, is perfect in

* Science of Religion, p. 182.

† Death.

‡ The rain goddess.

knowledge, and a sage. He whose perfections are all perfect, him I call indeed a Brahmana.

Verses 153, 154. Without ceasing shall I run through a course of many births, looking for the maker of this tabernacle, and painful is birth again and again. But now, maker of this tabernacle, thou hast been seen, thou shalt not make up this tabernacle again. All thy rafters are broken, thy ridge pole is sundered ; the mind being sundered, has attained to the extinction of all desires.

But these verses, far from inculcating the hope, so common in our Western thought, of eternal life, are simply reiteration of Buddha's doctrine of the extinction of desire, the annihilation of *Karma* and with it the end of birth and rebirth and their attendant pain. The impurities once blown away, 238, there is no entering again into birth and decay. The slayer for the sake of pleasure may fear death, 131, for he has increased the demerit of his *Karma*, lengthened its duration, and added burden to its pain. Who knows that the body is like froth, 46, unsubstantial, like a mirage, has no ground of fear in death. All its terrors are swept away. Who does his duty has no fear of any new births, 95. And all this conquest of fear may be attained in the present life, for the Brahmana, 423, the sage, perfect in knowledge, is he who understands heaven and hell and has reached an end of births.

Verses 153, 154, are historical among Buddhists. Mr. Hardy states that Gautama is supposed to have uttered them at the moment when he became a Buddha.* But they manifestly teach an end of desire, and an end of being. The maker of the tabernacle, *Karma* has been discovered. Desire has been extinguished. There is an end of births. The rafters are broken, the ridge pole shattered, the tabernacle shall not be set up again.

(4) Prof. Muller cites two passages which teach of the changeless place.

Verse 225. The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place, (*Nirvana*), where if they have gone, they will suffer no more.

Verse 226. Those who are always watchful, who study day and night, and who strive after *Nirvana*, their passions will come to an end.

* Manual of Buddhism, p. 180.

But these verses add nothing to the material already observed. They predicate an end of passion, 226, and an end of suffering, 225; and these, unchangeable. But this, far from involving immortality conditions evidently extinction, first of desire and second, of being.

(5) A fifth class of passages contrasts the hope of the Buddhist with the fear of destruction and hell.

Verse 97. The man, who is free from credulity, but knows the uncreated, who has cut all ties, removed all temptations, removed all desires, he is the greatest of men.

Verse 277. "All created things perish," he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain: this is the way to purity.

Verse 383. Stop the stream valiantly, drive away the desires, *O Brahmana!* When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made.

To these are added the following:

Verse 32. A *Bhikshu* (mendicant) who delights in reflection, who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, will not go to destruction: he is near to *Nirvana*.

Verse 140. (He who inflicts pain.) Lightning will burn his houses, and when his body is destroyed, the fool will go to hell.

Searching in these verses for immortality, we find the quest a delusion. The nearest approach to the thought is in verse 140, where it is declared that the fool who inflicts pain, will go to hell. But the Buddhist hell is only another form of changing form. And the threat of destruction, 32, and hell set before the sinner is merely the menace of prolonged existence, and a heavier load for the *Karma* to bear.

(6) A sixth class of passages is that which presents "the shore," or "the other shore." Of these, Prof. Muller says:* "There may be some doubt whether *para* the shore, and particularly 'the other shore,' stands always for *Nirvana*, and whether those who are said to have reached the other shore are to be supposed to have entered *Nirvana*."

But in another place,† he regains courage and remarks: "The other shore is meant for *Nirvana*, this shore for common life. On reaching *Nirvana* the dominion of death is overcome."

* Science of Religion, p. 183.

† p. 217, n.

In yet another place, however,* a doubt gathers upon his mind, and he confesses, "The exact meaning of the two shores, is not quite clear."

The passages he cites are these:

Verse 384. If the Brahmana has reached the other shore in both laws (restraint and contemplation), all bonds vanish from him who has obtained knowledge.

Verse 385. He for whom there is neither this nor that shore, nor both: him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed, a Brahmana.

Verse 85. Few there are among men who arrive at the other shore; the other people have run up and down the shore.

Verse 86. But those who, when the law has been well preached to them, follow the law, will pass across the dominion of death; however difficult to overcome.

Verse 347. Those who are slaves to passion, run up and down the stream (of desire) as a spider runs up and down the web which he has made for himself: when they have cut this, people will enter upon their pilgrimage free from care, leaving desires and pleasure behind.

Verse 348. Give up what is before, give up what is behind, give up what is in the middle, when thou goest to the other shore of existences; if thy mind is altogether free thou will not again enter into birth and decay.

Verse 358. Pleasures destroy the foolish, if they look not for the other shore: the foolish by his thirst for pleasures destroys himself, as if he were his own enemy.

Verse 414. He who has traversed this mazy, impervious world and its vanity, who is through, and has reached the other shore, is thoughtful, guileless, free from doubts, free from attachment and content: him I call indeed, a Brahmana.

In these references to "the shore," and "the other shore," the student will find little difficulty. "The other shore" cannot be a future life, as Prof. Muller would have us infer, since the Brahmana, 414, who is thoughtful, guileless, free from doubts, has already reached the other shore.

So the Brahmana may have reached the other shore, 384, in the laws of restraint and contemplation.

The clue to interpretation appears in verse 347, where the stream of desire separates the land of the foolish, who run, spider like, up and down the stream, from that of the wise, who

* p. 293, n.

leave desires and pleasures behind. "This shore" then, is the shore of common life; "the other shore" the state of *Arahatship*, the condition of those who in this world have restrained passion and overcome desire.

(7) Prof. Muller furnishes three passages, which may be ranged into the seventh class, those which speak of "happiness," or "highest happiness."

Verse 23. Those wise people, meditative, steady, always possessed of strong powers, attain to *Nirvana*, the highest happiness.

Verse 203. Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains : if one knows this truly, that is *Nirvana*, the highest happiness.

Verse 204. Health is the greatest of gifts ; contentedness the best riches ; trust is the best of relatives ; *Nirvana* the highest happiness.

These phrases, "happiness" and "highest happiness" are suggestive to Prof. Muller of a hereafter of immortality. And so they would seem to any person trained in the habitudes and expression of Western thought. But to the Buddhist their interpretation will depend on his ideal of happiness. And what that is we have already seen. It was extinction of pain, to succeed the extinction of desire. Dr. Fairbairn declares the goal of Buddhist ambition to be the loss of consciousness.* That interprets his highest happiness not to be immortality.

(8) For the eighth class of passages, Prof. Muller, in order to sustain his assertion,† "*Nirvana* is certainly more than heaven or heavenly joy," quotes, v. 126: "Some people are born again; evil doers go to hell, righteous people go to heaven ; those who are free from all worldly desires enter *Nirvana*."

The similar thought which the passage conveys, runs also through the three following :

Verse 174. This world is dark, few only can see here ; a few only go to heaven, like birds escaped from the nest.

* A religion without a God could hardly promise a restful, but conscious immortality. *Nirvana* cannot be absorption, for Buddhism knew no world soul, no Brahma, into which the perfect man could enter ; nor can it be any conscious state of being, for the loss of consciousness was the goal of Buddhist ambition.—Art., "Belief in Immortality," *Cont. Rev.*, A. M. Fairbairn, 1872.

† Page 182.

Verse 178. Better than sovereignty over the earth, better than going to heaven, better than lordship over all worlds, is the reward of the first step in holiness.

Verse 236. Make thyself an island, work hard, be wise. When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt enter into the heavenly world of the elect (*Ariya*).

But in surveying these passages verse 178 assures us that the first step in holiness is "better than going to heaven." This indicates that the Buddhist heaven, whatever it may be, is infinitely less than the Christian Heaven. And this is surely the case when it is remembered that in the Buddhist conception the hells and heavens are in constant change, and that even the gods, so far as Buddhism acknowledges the gods, are weary of existence and anxious most of all for the circle of their births and deaths to cease. To bring pause to this monotonous round, to make full end of foreboding and discontent is better far than this caricature of Heaven.

(9) But it is on the words "immortal" and "immortality" that Prof. Muller lays the stress of his plea. He presents four passages :

Verse 21. Reflection is the path of immortality, thoughtlessness the path of death. Those who reflect do not die. Those who are thoughtless are as if dead already.

Verse 114. And he who lives a hundred years, not seeing the immortal place, a life of one day is better if a man sees the immortal place.

Verse 374. As soon as he has considered the origin and destruction of the elements (*skandhas*) of the body, he finds happiness and joy which belongs to those who know the immortal (*Nirvana*).

Verse 411. He who has no interests, and when he has understood the truth, does not say, how ! how ! He who can dive into the immortal, him I call indeed a Brahmana.

Respecting the first of these (No. 21), Prof. Muller remarks :
 "If the goal at which the followers of Buddha have to aim had been in the mind of Buddha, perfect annihilation, '*amata*,' i. e., immortality, would have been the very last word he could have chosen as its name."

But as it happens, the terms "immortality" and "immortal" in the verses quoted are expressions of Prof. Muller's own making. As translator of Buddha he arranges the drapery of Buddha's thought. The whole force of the notion of futurity in the verses mentioned is an importation of the translation. Competent critics and scholars assure us that "*amata*" does not mean "immortal" or "immortality" when properly rendered.

Prof. Childers in his *Pali* dictionary* considers the word an adjective, and says that whatever it means it cannot mean immortality, while Rhys Davids interprets the same word as a name applied to *Nirvana*, as being the drink of the wise who are above the gods. Not only does he deny that "*amata*" ever means immortality, but he adds that it could not grammatically have that sense.

To do Prof. Muller no injustice in the matter of these translations, we will compare them with others through the *Pali*, and the Chinese.

MULLER. Verse 21. Reflection is the path of immortality, thoughtlessness the path of death. Those who reflect do not die, those who are thoughtless are as if dead already.

GRAY.† Verse 21. Reflection is the road to *Nibbana*, thoughtlessness the road to death.

ROCKHILL.‡ Verse 21. The pure man knows not death; he who is impure dwells with death. He who is pure will not die. (Commentary: For he has obtained *Nirvana*.)

MULLER.§ Verse 114. And he who lives a hundred years not seeing the immortal place, etc.

ROCKHILL.|| Verse 114. "And he who lives a hundred years not seeing the unchanging place."¶ Upon this, Rockhill re-

* Art. Nibbana.

† Dharmapada. Gray. Rangoon, 1881, p. 3.

‡ Udanavarga (through the Chinese), p. 17.

§ Science of Religion, p. 226.

|| Udanavarga, p. 103, n.

¶ "Let me here call attention to the use made throughout the Udanavarga of the word *Nirvana*. In the greater number of cases it only implies the condition of Arhat, in which 'sorrow has been left behind,' 'the *Nirvana* of the Arhat' (xxvi., 10), or in *Pali*, *Kilesanibbanam*. On the other hand it cannot be understood to imply anything else but annihilation in such verses as xxvi., 27, in which it is defined as 'not existence,' 'not to be born.' Here then it is in the destruction of every particle of the elements of being (*skandhas*) or *Anupadisesannibbanam*."—Udanavarga, p. 13. Introduction Northern Buddhist version of *Dharmapada*.

marks,* “*Mi-gyo*, unchanging, seems to be used in the same way as *amatam* for *Nirvana*, i. e., it is unchangeable because there is neither birth nor death.”

MULLER.† Verse 374. As soon as he has considered the origin and destruction of the elements (*skandhas*) of the body, he finds happiness and joy, which belong to those who know the immortal (*Nirvana*).

GRAY.‡ Verse 374 (numbered 372). Whenever he considers the origin and extinction of the bodily constituents, even then does he derive joy and happiness. That joy and happiness is *Nibban* to the wise.

ROCKHILL.§ Verse 374. As soon as he has rightly understood the creation and destruction of the *skandhas* he will find joy and ravishment. The *Bhixu* filled with joy will find a way to put an end to suffering.

And thus we behold the immortality which Prof. Muller would fain read into Buddhism melting into thinnest air. Doubtless some Buddhists dream of immortality exactly as some among them, in opposition to the orthodox atheism have created their five separate Trinities of Gods; not because their system, however, inculcates such doctrine, but because the thought of immortality || is a necessity of the human mind.

But to import into Buddhism this thought of immortality we have found Prof. Muller constructing a contradiction between the teachings of the later canon and the teachings of Buddha in the *Dharmapada*.

But if a contradiction there, then there is the same contradiction between the various verses of the *Dharmapada* itself; all of which Prof. Muller understands to be the very words of Buddha. The theory is too ponderous. It breaks down under its own weight.

* Udanavarga, p. 103, n.

† Science of Religion, p. 291.

‡ Dhar. Gray, p. 37.

§ Udanavarga, p. 176.

|| “A religion never assumes or exercises its full authority, never awakens or satisfies the highest hopes of man, until it can command obedience here, and reward it with everlasting happiness hereafter. And this neither implies nor rests upon any religious utilitarianism, in Leigh Hunt's phrase, other worldliness; but on the simple fact that the immortal nature of man demands a religion which can evoke and satisfy his demands after immortality.”—A. M. Fairbairn, *Belief in Immortality. Cont. Review.* 1872.

But with the view of *Nirvana*, which has been herein incidentally outlined, not primarily cessation of consciousness, but end of desire and pain, succeeded by end of conscious being, all contradiction vanishes, all difficulties retire, and Buddha's faith, however barren and unsatisfying remains at least consistent with itself.

This is the view of Davids, who observes : * " Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, is then the result of, but it is not *Nirvana*."

The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not on death, but on a virtuous life here and now that the *Pitakas* lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to *Nirvana* as the fruit of the Fourth Path, or Arahatsip.

But while this is true, after it come the consequences, which Mr. Kellogg, citing Prof. Childers, declares to be the teaching of that eminent *Pali* scholar.† " In a word then his conclusion is that the word *Nibbana* (*Nirvana*) sometimes denotes a mental state such as is above described, attainable in this life ; a state which, however, infallibly issues in total and everlasting extinction of being."

Just this, when we consider the Buddhist doctrine of selfhood as an illusion, and of *karma* as the carrier of demerit and desire, we perceive must be the issue.

Existence evil, then non-existence must be good. No soul to exist, then no existence for the soul. Hope, grasping, aspiration, all to be repressed till nothing remains to be hoped for, then the future a blank. The oil to cease in the lamp, then the flame must flicker and die forever. And this end of deaths and births, this extinction of outlook, this melting away into nothingness of all conscious joy and of existence itself is the one goal of thought, the same in the later canon, the same in the *Dharmapada*, the same in all the philosophy, the legends, and the law of Buddhism, whether taught by later sages of the *Sangha* or by Buddha himself, the highest happiness, the immortality of nothingness.

* Buddhism, pp. 104, 105.

† Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p. 221, n.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION.—Some young persons are deterred from the study of natural science lest it should lead to infidelity ; and perhaps the same fear may account for the remarkable fact that a Western University, with good endowment, more than a score of professors, and half that number of different courses for selection in graduating, does not contain in its catalogue of 1887 (so far as I could see, after diligent search) even the mention of the word geology. In the catalogue of 1888, one term of geology is given in the Preparatory Department. Nevertheless, most enquiring minds, at the present day, would scarcely be willing to forego all questions regarding the revelations of science concerning the development of our earth ; and religious teachers ought to be prepared to answer them. That no conflict necessarily exists between science and religion (indeed that there is a general concord between the Mosaic and geologic record) has been most ably demonstrated by such writers as Hugh Miller and Prof. I. D. Dana, besides many others.* But in order to admit the correlation, or parallelism, we must consider the day and night as mentioned in Genesis, susceptible of representing, not literally a period of twenty-four hours, but one of prolonged age, embracing probably thousands of years ; inasmuch as in the Psalms, and again in Peter's Epistle, we read, " One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day."

Taking every word in the Bible literally must always prove a stumbling-block to any student of science : hence the object of this communication is to show that this is neither necessary, nor consistent with reason. Even at the present day, and among Western nations the power of an allegory (or continued metaphor) is abundantly proved by the unbounded popularity of Bunyan's " Pilgrim's Progress."

Here perhaps some one may object that if we do not accept

* See " Bible Account of the Creation in the Light of Modern Science," in vol. v., No. 4, of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

all the teachings as literal, we cannot be certain when to cease thus interpreting the Scriptures. The answer is, whenever reason and common sense demand an allegorical or metaphorical interpretation, we should be satisfied thus to explain the difficulty.

Can any student of science for a moment believe that the instructive history of Lazarus and Dives (although not introduced by Luke, chap. xvi., under the name of parable) is other than metaphorical? It is a forcible manner of showing that the great inequalities, in our earthly lives, will be righted in the next world. That there is metaphorically a great gulf between the abode of the blessed, and of those debarred from the light of God's countenance, all can readily understand; but that there is *actually* a physical gulf, across which the different occupants could converse, no one should ever be asked to accept as literal. Again, does any one suppose that Christ is a vine, a door, a way, a bridegroom, etc., except in a metaphorical sense? Does any Protestant believe that the sacramental bread is the body of Christ, and the wine His blood, instead of being only emblems? In several of the Gospels, and the Epistles, the expression is used: "Christ sitteth at the right hand of God," and the same idea is introduced into the Apostles' creed. Yet Christians believe that God is a Divine Spirit, not with a corporal body, and the metaphorical language is merely designed to show the equality of Father and Son—the right hand being considered the post of honor.

Some good people in their prayers and teachings seem to talk as if they really believed, from the beautiful, metaphorical description in the Revelation, that Heaven is a city with streets of gold and gates of pearl, etc., whereas the Evangelist John only presents in forcible language, pictures that to any mind, but especially to the oriental, would convey ideas of exquisite beauty, pleasure, etc.

In the old Testament, the instructive book of Job is regarded by many as an allegory admirably adapted to render us submissive and patient in adversity, after we have done all that wisdom dictates to mitigate an unavoidable evil. Further, unless the Song of Solomon is considered as an allegory, it

should have been omitted from the accepted Scriptures and relegated to the apocrypha.

Then, too, in the light of science, when astronomers have so far learned to interpret some of God's immutable laws as to predict the moment at which eclipses will take place, and when the earth, and other planets, will occupy certain positions, we are compelled to accept as a fact that the earth and other planets move round the sun. What then becomes of the statements in the Bible that the sun rises and sets, and that at the prayer of Joshua, the sun stood still? Astronomers and almanacs still use that same language, because the sun *appears* to rise and set, instead of the earth revolving on its axis to meet the sun; just as our railroad train may appear to move, when it is really the adjoining train, or *vice versa*. If the Almighty desired to prolong the light for the benefit of the Jewish combatants, there are various well-known optical phenomena, by which the apparent arrest of the orb of day (or prolonged daylight) could be effected, without deviation from existing law.

Lastly, the student may ask: "But what of the Darwinian theory? How reconcile Scripture with evolution?" This much may be said in answer. Evolution is not yet proved; yet it seems reasonable, when rightly interpreted, and has been accepted by various believers in religion, notably the late Prof. Asa Gray.

To my mind, evolution does not seem unreasonable, if taken as analogous to other laws of progression. It is *not* according to analogy to conceive, as some contend, that there is evolution or self-development of an inanimate clod into an organism, however low in the scale of organic beings; but that gradual additions of higher organs, or differentiation in the functions of an organ, may take place in animals, as their surroundings demand; for continued existence under new circumstances, seems explicable in accordance with known laws, and, if proved, would only tend, from my stand-point, to increase, if such were possible, the wonder, and awe, and admiration with which I behold the astounding works of creation, in which nothing happens by chance—all is governed by law. These

immutable laws *may* preclude any necessity for *special* divine interpretation.

To illustrate, by analogy, let us take the example of a watch, which, as Paley remarks, at once conveys to our minds the reality of the watch-maker who constructed it, although we have not seen him. Suppose the watchmaker to possess unlimited power and knowledge, he could construct a watch which, at first, would only mark the equations of day and night, but which would contain, within its case, mechanism capable, later, of showing hours, then minutes, and finally seconds. This would, in many respects, resemble the humble plant, which, from the simple undifferentiated *thallus*, should, under the stimulus of environment, gradually develop more advanced differentiated organs, until it presents the beauty and the safety evinced in the magnificent flowering and fructification of some *angiosperm exogens*. In the same manner, the protozoön of a simple sac (performing all the functions of nutrition, respiration, circulation and reproduction) may, through evolution, in time, usher, through the various gradation, finally the perfect mammal, with all functions differentiated.

The above comparison does not necessarily imply that the original simple wheel of the watch, registering only the divisions into days, is converted into works finally indicating seconds; nor yet does it necessarily deny that possibility. It may be that the other works were there, concealed from view; or applying the thought to the organism, the rudiments of higher organs may have been present, requiring only the suitable environment for development; as when the fishes and insects in dark caves (*e. g.*, the Kentucky Mammoth Cave) have the rudiments of eyes never developed, for want of the stimulus of light.

As regards many so-called miracles (phenomena inexplicable or any known laws) there is none greater to my mind (although not usually classed as such) than that a minute acorn should develop into a towering oak, or the human ovum 1.240 of an inch in diameter, become ultimately a being physically, morally and intellectually worthy of its Great Creator.

It transcends human imagination to conceive how divine wisdom can control the lives and destinies of twelve hundred

million human beings, on this comparatively petty globe; but when we come to reflect that our earth is only one of many planets revolving around our sun, and that there are myriads of such suns, with their attendant planets and satellites, the human mind, in contemplating these works of the Great Architect of the Universe, may well give voice to the thought, as did the Psalmist, "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?"

It seems then a logical deduction to infer, from the above, that the intimate study of the laws governing the world, instead of leading to infidelity, ought powerfully to promote, and for ever confirm, the belief in an Omnipotent and Omniscient Law-giver.—*Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT by Richard Owen, M.D., LL.D.*

IN a recent number of "*Our Day*," the Rev. Dr. Daniel Dorchester, after giving other reasons why he believes the Bible to be the Word of God, adds the following:

We have also the testimonies of men *outside of the usually accepted Christian beliefs*—which they give in their better moods, as the result of their observation in regard to what the Bible does for the human soul.

Thomas Carlyle said, "In the poorest cottages are books; is one Book, wherein for several thousands of years, the spirit of man has found light and nourishment, and an interpreting response to whatever is deepest in him."

Matthew Arnold said, "To the Bible men will return because they cannot do without it; because happiness is a being's end and aim, and happiness belongs to righteousness, and righteousness is revealed in the Bible. For this simple reason men will return to the Bible, just as a man who has tried to give up food, thinking it was a vain thing and that he would do without it, would return to food; or a man who tried to give up sleep, thinking it was a vain thing and he could do without it, would return to sleep."

Prof. Huxley says, "I have always been strongly in favor of secular education, in the sense of education without theology; but I must confess I have been no less seriously perplexed to

know by what practical measures the religious feeling, which is the essential basis of conduct, was to be kept up, in the present utterly chaotic state of opinion in these matters, without the use of the Bible."

Mr. Leckey ("History of European Morals," i., p. 413) thus accounts for the triumph of Christianity in the old Roman world: "The chief cause of its success was *the congruity of its teachings with the spiritual nature of mankind*. It was because it was true to the moral sentiments of the age, because it represented faithfully *the supreme type of excellence* to which men were then tending; because it *corresponded with their religious wants, aims, and emotions*, because *the whole spiritual being could expand and expatiate under its influence*, that it planted its roots so deeply in the hearts of men."

Such are the acknowledgments of even unbelievers.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, Publisher and Bookseller, 71 Bible House, New York.]

"THE ATONEMENT: In its Relation to the Covenant, the Priesthood, and the Intercession of our Lord." By Hugh Martin, D.D. Fourth British Edition. (8vo, cloth, 324 pp. New York: Wilbur B. Ketcham.) Here is a most excellent book for the thoughtful young Christian, especially the young minister of the Gospel. It deals with a subject of surpassing importance. Lax, erratic and shallow theology is too common in our day. All the more refreshing, therefore, is this vigorous, terse, earnest and scriptural presentation of the truth of the divine plan for the salvation of men through the atonement accomplished by the Lord Jesus Christ. The combination of strong thought and warm devotion displayed in this volume makes it one of no ordinary kind. Spurgeon speaking of Dr. Martin's book says, "Something like theology. We wish our young divines would feed on such meat as this."

"FIFTEENTH CENTURY BIBLES." A Study in Bibliography. By Wendell Prime. Large 8vo., cloth, 98 pp. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. 1888.

Every lover of old and rare books, and every lover of the Bible will welcome this brief but satisfactory volume from the graceful pen of Dr. Prime. It contains thirteen short chapters and yet without sacrificing completeness to brevity it tells in a fascinating way the whole story of the "Fifteenth Century Bibles." The titles of the chapters happily indicate their contents, and are as follows: The Biblical Kingdom, The Biblical Conflict, Manuscripts, Block Books, The Guttenberg Bible, The Mentz Psalter, The Bamberg Bible, The Mentelin Bible, The First Dated Bible, Latin Bibles and Vernacular Bibles. The publishers have done their work well, and have given the public a book which ought to be in the library of every student of the Holy Scriptures as well as every lover of literature.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

"THE FUTURE, AS REVEALED IN DIVINE PREDICTION." By the Rev. John Storie Late Minister of St. Andrew's, Hobart; Author of "The Paganism of Rome," etc. Cr., 8vo, cloth, 356 pp. New York: Wilbur B. Ketcham.

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CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

THE MESSIANIC ELEMENT IN THE BOOK OF JOB.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, August 7th, 1888.]

BY J. G. LANSING, D.D.,

Professor in the Theological Seminary, New Brunswick, N. J.

IN what sense and to what extent a Messianic element is predicated of the Book of Job is to be ascertained by the consideration of the following passages: Job ix., 32-35; xvi., 19-22; xix., 25-27; xxxiii., 23, 24.

In considering these passages only two lines of thought will be followed: an exegetical and an Egyptological.

EXEGETICAL—JOB IX., 32-35.

A preliminary note may be made of the character of Job's religion as indicated in what precedes this passage.

The days of feasting having ended, Job sends for his children and as patriarchal priest sanctifies them according to the rites observed before the Mosaic economy. He rises in the morning and offers burnt offerings according to the number of his children, lest they should have cursed, sinned against, taken leave of God in their hearts. Thus did Job all the days.

In the very outset, therefore, Job's religion is seen to be,

1st. *Sacrificial*. Job's covenant with God was a covenant by sacrifice. By offering sacrifice according to God's command Abel, Noah, Abraham, Job and others gave expression to their submission to the divine will, their sense of guilt, and their dependence for reconciliation and acceptance on some other ground than their own or any human merit or effort. Did Job, then, regarding all human merit and effort as of no avail, regard as sufficient the dumb animal to be an adequate ground of accept-

ance with God? The opening words of Job's reply to Bildad in chap. ix. give a negative answer. It was after Job's long observance of the sacrifice, and after Bildad's argument asserting the divine justice and recommending the old way of the natural man of works and ways of purity, that Job still propounded the query, "But how can man be just with God?"

2d. *Spiritual.* Job's religion was of the heart, intensely spiritual. It was not enough for him to know that outwardly his sons had conducted themselves in a correct and moral manner, but the point was whether they had cursed, sinned against, taken leave of God *in their hearts*.

3d. May be noted also the divine testimony as to Job's religion, its truth as to kind, and its matchlessness as to degree.

With the above there should be noted also,

1st. The condition of Job as that of one dispossessed, suffering, persecuted to the extreme; and the lamentation, despondency and doubt which, to the best of men, in all ages, such circumstances would occasionally give rise.

2d. That the problem suddenly thrust upon him by his friends could not be answered by a reference to the grounds of his faith. That problem, which they thought easy of being solved and answered to their satisfaction, was difficult. They had no idea of merit, but personal; no system of reconciliation or retribution, except in the present life; no purer motive than that of selfishness; and no higher aim than that of personal ease and gain. Job was a great sufferer and therefore a great sinner. All his hope in this life was removed, and there was no hereafter. A God who should alike be trusted, loved and obeyed; a God who cherished and chastised; a God of absolute sovereignty and tenderest kindness, had not entered into their theological conceptions.

Job, having made confession of sin in chap. 7, been interrupted by Bildad's naturalistic argument in chap. 8, opens his reply to Bildad in chap. 9 with the question,—“But how can man be just with God?” From his direct reply to Bildad Job passes to soliloquizing and to addressing God. In hours of torture he for an instant questions God. God had filled his life with bitterness. God held him guilty. He defies God. And yet in the same in-

stant he looks entreatingly to and longs for God. For not only does Job feel himself to be under the divine displeasure, but his own mouth condemns him. Why then should he toil in vain to justify himself? Do what he might in this respect, still of God he would be held guilty. For God was not a man like himself to whom he might go directly, personally, and on personal grounds to answer him. This introduces the passage ix., 32-35 which is rendered according to the R. V., which differs but little from the A. V.,

- 32. For He is not a man, as I am, that I should answer Him,
That we should come together in judgment.
- 33. There is no daysman betwixt us,
That might lay His hand upon us both.
- 34. Let Him take away His rod from me,
And let not His terror make me afraid:
- 35. Then would I speak, and not fear Him;
For I am not so in myself.

The statements then of verse 32 are,

1st. Job as he is cannot draw near to God to answer Him, or come together with Him in judgment.

2d. God is not a man to whom Job then could give answer, and come together with Him in judgment.

3d. And, therefore, the implication necessarily is, that if God were a man, or rather, if God were humanized, then Job could answer Him, and come together with Him in judgment. This is manifestly Job's conviction in this verse. But this conviction amounts to a desire, a longing, if not a hope. So interprets the editor of the *Expositor* (Samuel Cox) on verse 32: "Hence Job longs to have God *humanized*, to see Him in a human form, and is evidently persuaded that, could he see God in man, he and God might 'come together in judgment.'"

God then must be God and yet in a certain sense man, if Job can answer Him and meet Him in judgment. According to verse 32, this God apparently is not. Can then God become man, become humanized? If not, is there then a divine-human being who, representing the two, can adjudicate between the two? Verse 33 following would seem to give a negative answer:

- "There is no daysman betwixt us,
That might lay His hand upon us both."

In the light of the preceding verse the statements of this verse are:

1st. This "daysman" means *an arguer, an advocate, a pleader, an arbiter, an umpire; one who appears for, argues upon, and adjudges as to a certain case.*

2d. This Daysman, according to the preceding verse, must either be God humanized, or a divine-human being; that is, He must so far forth be a partaker of the divine nature as to have power with God, on the one hand; and on the other hand He must so far forth be a partaker of human nature as that Job, as that man can speak to Him, or to God through Him without fear (v. 35).

3d. The offices of this arbiter, and the results of this arbitration, as set forth thus far in these two verses, are threefold:

(a) He must make it possible for Job to answer, speak to God, either directly, or through Him and without fear.

(b) He must come between the two, God and Job, and laying one hand on God and the other on Job He must span, bridge the separation between them, connect, unite them.

(c) He must, *in the judgment (Bamishpat)*, that is, when the case is adjudged and settled between God and Job, bring the two, God and Job, together; or according to the more precise as well as more forcible Hebrew expression of the text, which anticipates the apostolic expression, He must make of "both one," of the "twain one" (*Yahdaw*).

4th. In its form this verse is taken both as a negative statement, and as the expression of a desire or longing. Thus, "There is no daysman betwixt us," etc., or, according to the LXX., Peshito, and others,— "Would that there were a daysman betwixt us," etc. While the latter is perhaps preferable (in which case the *Low* would correspond to the Arabic *Low* = *if, O that*, as *e. g.*, *Low Kan* = *O that there were one*), still, in the final analysis, the two amount to the same thing. For, if the text sets forth the then absence of the daysman in fact, it as certainly expresses a knowledge and the need of Him, while this in turn is only the subjective expression of a desire for Him.

Additional statements in regard to God and the daysman follow in verse 34, which reads,

"Let Him take away His rod from me,
And let not His terror make me afraid."

It must be observed as to this verse,

1st. That a difference of interpretation exists as to whom the personal pronoun first used is to be referred,—the daysman or God. Is it,

Let Him (the daysman) take away His (God's) rod from me? or is it,

Let Him (God) take away His (God's) rod from me? The former interpretation, which refers the first used pronoun to the daysman, would seem to be the preferable interpretation for the following reasons:

(a) Because the daysman and not God is the nearer subject.

(b) Because the form and order of the words indicate that the person who takes away the rod is the same person who in the preceding verse lays his hand on both, that is, the daysman. Thus *Yashaith* and following it *Yasair*, *Yasair* being the complement of *Yashaith*.

(c) Because the result of the taking away of the rod is the speaking without fear, and this, according to verse 32, is a hypothecated impossibility with regard to God, while according to verse 33 it is the hypothecated possibility with regard to the daysman.

However, in the end, the two interpretations must become identical; for, according to what precedes, Job's speaking to God without fear must come about either through the arbitration of the daysman, or through that humanization of God of which the daysman is the description or alternative substitute.

2d. The additional, reiterated or expanded result of this verse is stated to be the removal of God's rod and terror from Job so that Job shall no longer be made afraid. What this means is ascertained by what follows:

"Then would I speak, and not fear Him."

The result of the removal of God's rod and terror is Job's speaking without fear. This is to be effected either through the humanization of God or the arbitration of the daysman, for in both cases the result is one and the same. Thus (verse 32) if God were a man, were humanized, appeared embodied, then Job would answer Him. Or again (vv. 33-35), if there were a daysman to bring the two, God and Job, together, then Job would speak, either directly or mediately, through the daysman to God without fear.

In both cases the result is one and the same,—*answer—speak*. The result being one and the same, the thought is suggested here, expanded later, may not God and the daysman be or become one and the same?

The conclusion of this section and its contents is given in verse 35 as follows:

“Then would I speak, and not fear Him;
For I am not so in myself.”

The statements contained in the verse are two:

1st. The result that is desired and would be realized either through the humanization of God, or the mediation of the daysman, viz., Job's speaking to God without fear, with boldness.

2d. The statement that, at the time of his speaking, this was not the case with Job;

“For I am not so in myself.”

Or literally,

“For not thus I with myself;”

which, while recognizing the force of other interpretations, I prefer to explain by a common oriental idiom, one of those numerous Arabianisms with which the Book of Job is crowded, and according to which the expression means: This is not the case with me,—The matter does not stand thus with me; that is, on the one hand, God has not appeared to me thus humanized, embodied, to whom I can speak; and on the other hand, I have not now this daysman, this divine substitute through whom I can speak.

From this analysis the section considered may be entitled to be titled,—Job's general knowledge as to, need of, and desire for a God-humanization.

Then follows the next passage to be considered and the next stage in the development, viz.:

JOB. XVI., 19-22,

which is rendered as follows:

A. V.	R. V.
19. Also now, behold, my witness is in Heaven, and my record is on high.	19. Even now, behold, my witness is in Heaven, And He that voucheth for me is on high.
20. My friends scorn me; but mine eye poureth out tears unto God.	20. My friends scorn me; But mine eye poureth out tears unto God.

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| 21. O that one might plead for a man with
God, as a man pleadeth for his
neighbour.
22. When a few years are come, then I
shall go the way whence I shall not
return. | 21. That He would maintain the right of
a man with God, and of a son of
man with his neighbour.
22. For when a few years are come, I
shall go the way whence I shall not
return. |
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PROPOSED RENDERING.

19. Also now, behold, in the Heavens is my witness,
 And my testimony-bearer in the heights,—
20. My interpreter, my friend !
 Unto God mine eye poureth out tears.
21. And He shall plead for a man with God,
 And a son of man for his neighbour.
22. When a few years shall have come,
 Then a way that I shall not return, I shall go.

The following textual comments must be made:

1st. On verse 19. The two words rendered in the A. V. "witness" and "record," in the R. V., "witness" and "he that voucheth for me," and in the proposed rendering "witness" and "testimony-bearer,"—have, both of them, reference to a personal witness or testimony-bearer; as, *e. g.*, Deut. xvii., 6; xix., 15; Isa. viii., 12, etc. Only twice does the former of the two words seem to be used impersonally, but even then it is evidently by the figure of personification, as when Laban said to Jacob,—“This heap be a witness,” etc., while the latter only means *to testify*, and, in this form, is nowhere else used in Scripture. (Arabic *Shahid*.)

2d. On verse 20. The great difference between the received renderings and the proposed rendering is in the first member of the parallelism. The received renderings are,—“My friends scorn me.” The proposed rendering is,—“My interpreter, my friend.” The expression consists of two nouns, with the first person possessive pronoun attached to each, and their form is such that they may be either plural or singular, but the context evidently demands the singular, as shall be seen. But the great radical change of meaning comes in connection with the first of these two words, viz., from *scorner* to *interpreter*. To justify this radical change, and to prove that the word means *interpreter* and not *scorner*, it is to be noted:

(a) Because the rendering—“My friends scorn me,” or “My friends are my scornors,” interjects a sentiment with regard to

the contempt of Job's friends which is utterly inconsistent with and violently interrupts that which immediately precedes and follows, wherein Job is speaking of God as his personal witness to whom his eye poureth out tears.

(b) Because the rendering—"My friends scorn me," or "are my scorers," necessitates the supplying of a contrastive particle that has no existence in the original.

(c) And chiefly, because the rendering of *scorner* instead of *interpreter* is contrary,—and that according to the received renderings and interpretations too,—is contrary to every other Scripture usage of this word in this grammatical form. Scripture usage, in all other passages where this word in this form occurs, and the received renderings and interpretations of all those other passages in which this word in this form occurs, are unanimous in giving to the word the sense of *interpreter* and not of *scorner*.

Why then this passage should be made an exception, and why this word here should be given a meaning different, and indeed opposite to that which the Scriptures everywhere else give, authorize and require, is difficult to see. But in proof, all the other passages in which this word in this form occurs, may be quoted.

Gen. xlii., 23. "And they (Joseph's brethren) knew not that Joseph understood them; for he spake unto them by an *interpreter*." Onkelos explains the word *interpreter* here by the familiar Arabic, *Muturgaman*.

II. Chron. xxxii., 31. "Howbeit in the business of the *ambassadors* (Margin in A. V. and R. V., *interpreters*) of the princes of Babylon, who sent unto him to inquire of the wonder that was done in the land, God left him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart." The *ambassadors* were, according to universal acceptation, the *interpreters* between the princes of Babylon and Hezekiah.

Isa. xliii., 27. "Thy first father sinned, and thine *interpreters* (A. V. reads *teachers* with *interpreters* in the margin) have transgressed against me." The reference is to the prophets and priests who were the *interpreters*, *mediators* (Delitzsch) between God and men.

Job xxxiii., 23, 24. Besides the passage under consideration, and those already quoted, this is the only other passage in which this word in this form occurs, and it is important because it also occurs in Job. It reads: "If there be a messenger with him, an *interpreter* (so R. V.), one among a thousand, to shew unto man his uprightness; then he is gracious unto him, and saith, Deliver him from going down to the pit; I have found a ransom." This is explicit as to the meaning of the word in question here, while the fuller consideration of this passage comes later.

Certainly then this is conclusive evidence, when all the Scripture usages of this word in this form require the meaning of *interpreter* and not *scorner*, and when also, in the passage in question, the rendering of *scorner* does violence to the text and context, while that of *interpreter* is in perfect agreement.

(d) The two nouns have been rendered in the singular, while in the received renderings they are given as plural. They may be either, so far as the consonantal text is concerned. If they are plural then they are in the construct state, but there is no evidence of the construct state of these words unless it be in the Massoretic pointing. On the other hand the plain, simple arrangement of the words in the text, and the sense of the context seem to demand the singular. So we render, "my witness," "my testimony-bearer"; so "my interpreter," "my friend," all having reference to God.

3d. On verse 21, which with what immediately precedes, reads:

"Unto God mine eye poureth out tears,
21. And He shall plead for a man with God,
And (or *even*) a son of man for his neighbor."

With regard to which it must be observed:

(a) The verb *he shall plead* used here, is the verb from which the substantive *daysman*, *arbiter*, *pleader*,—in the section previously considered,—is derived; and thus recalling and pointing back to that passage.

(b) The subject of *he shall plead* is *God* according to what immediately precedes. We have then, "And He—God—shall plead for a man with God." That is, we have a dual conception of God. The first conception is that of God as Job's personal

witness, testimony-bearer, interpreter, friend, who shall plead for him with,—now the other conception,—God conceived of as the one who afflicts and holds him guilty. This same dual conception is observable in the section previously considered, for the daysman is only God humanized, through whom Job can speak without fear to God, conceived of as holding him guilty.

(c) In regard to the expression, “a son of man,” I prefer to follow the margin of the R. V. and several other leading authorities by whom it is treated as a figure and has reference to God. Thus, “And He shall plead for a man with God, as (or, even as) a son of man pleadeth for his neighbor.” The expression “son of man” as applied here to God, and also the *personality* of the “witness,” “testimony-bearer,” “interpreter,” “friend,” suggest and point back to the thought of the previous section, that of God becoming or appearing humanized, of God being in human form.

The statements of this section then may be summarized as follows :

1st. Job’s conviction that he possesses in Heaven one who is to him,

(a) A witness and testimony-bearer, that is, one who deposes, testifies as to him before God.

(b) An interpreter, that is, one through whom he speaks to God, precisely what is predicated of the daysman or of God humanized in the previous section.

(c) A friend, that is, adhering to the radical meaning, a shepherding one, who cares for all interests and keeps in all events.

(d) One who pleads for and ultimately settles the case as to him with God, precisely what is said of the daysman in the previous section, whose very name there is taken from the word used here.

2d. Of this one, thus described, and whom Job is convinced that he possesses, there are predicated further—personality, individuality, humanization—the being in human, bodily form. Thus the personal use throughout Scripture of the terms “witness,” “testimony-bearer,” etc., and thus the correspondence between this one and what is predicated of him in this section, and the daysman or God humanized, and what is predicated of him in the preceding section.

3d. This one, thus characterized, and whom Job is convinced he possesses, is specifically God, according to verses 20, 21. It is God in one of the dual conceptions, the conception of God humanized, daysman, pleader, according to the preceding section, the conception of God as witness, interpreter, friend, pleader, according to this section. The dual conception in the previous section is, God humanized to whom Job can speak without fear, over against God not-a-man who holds Job guilty: God the daysman who in the judgment brings together and makes one, Job and—then the other side—God who afflicts and holds Job guilty. The dual conception in this section is—God the personal witness, interpreter, friend, over against the God who charges Job with guilt: God who pleads for Job as a son of man, for his friend, over against the God with whom, in Job's behalf, this God pleads. This is the dual conception of God, or may we not the rather say, the conception of the dual relations in which the one God stands to Job, to mankind.

4th. There is an intimation of immortality in the concluding verse of this section,

“When a few years shall have come

Then a way that I shall not return, I shall go.”

Job is simply to go whence he is not to return to this scene of his suffering and trial. It implies that he is still to exist or there would be no force in his saying that he would not return. It is always, “*I am* the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” “God is not the God of the dead but of the living.”

If the preceding section may be titled, Job's need of and desire for a God-humanization for his deliverance, then this section should be titled, Job's conviction and announcement of his possession in God of a personal, God-humanized witness, interpreter, friend, pleader—in short, deliverer.

Then follows the passage,

JOB xix., 25-27,

which is rendered as follows :

A. V.

25. For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth :

R. V.

25. But I know that my Redeemer liveth, And that He shall stand up at the last upon the earth :

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| 26. And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God :
27. Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another; though my reins be consumed within me. | 26. And after my skin hath been thus destroyed,
Yet from my flesh shall I see God :
27. Whom I shall see for myself,
And mine eyes shall behold, and not another.
My reins are consumed within me. |
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PROPOSED RENDERING.

25. And I know that my Redeemer lives,
 And He, the Last One, on the earth shall stand.
26. And after my skin shall have compassed this,
 Even from my flesh shall I see God.
27. Whom I shall see as mine
 And mine eyes shall see Him, no more a stranger.
 My reins (conscience) consume within me.

This section may be considered as treating of, the Redeemer, the Redemption, the Revelation.

1st. The Redeemer. He is named here the *Goel*.

The verb means *to redeem, reclaim, avenge bloodshed, be near of kin*.

The noun is variously rendered, *redeemer, reclainer, avenger, kinsman, deliverer*.

According to the Levitical law, the *Goel* was the next of kin, and it was his duty, to redeem the pledged inheritance of his impoverished kinsman, to redeem his person from servitude, to avenge his blood on his murderer, to marry the widow of his deceased relative, and the right to claim the restitution to him of property of which his near relatives had been wronged together with the addition of a fifth.

Throughout the Scriptures the term *Goel* is frequently applied to God, as the Deliverer of individuals and of His people from various distresses.

This *Goel*, Redeemer, Deliverer of Job, Job afterwards (v. 26) declares to be God. And this is Job's conviction and proclamation, that his Redeemer, Deliverer-God, lives. The expression points back to and stands in close relation with Job's declaration in the preceding section where he called God his "witness," "testimony-bearer," etc.

This Redeemer, God, is also called the Last One, in the sense in which it is said of God, He is the First and the Last. The term

is also rendered Survivor, Vindicator. An ambiguity exists inasmuch as the term may refer either to God as the Last, or to the time when God shall stand upon the earth; thus,

" And in the aftertime He on the earth shall stand."

Perhaps this is the better rendering. In the final analysis, however, the two interpretations unite.

In the name of Goel it is first of all predicated of God that He reclaims, redeems, delivers. Job announces it as his firm and final conviction that God will redeem, deliver him out of all his distress; that God is his Redeemer-God, delivering-God.

It is further predicated of God here that He lives and that He shall yet stand on the earth. Job's conviction and proclamation is as to a Redeemer then living, and who is yet in aftertime to stand upon the earth—not in one who was yet to be brought into existence, and come to Job's rescue. He lives, and He is yet to stand on the earth, the God humanized, the daysman whom Job desired to see, and could speak to without fear, according to the first section. He lives, He is yet to stand on the earth, does not now stand manifested on the earth, but is His personal witness in the heavens, according to the second section. He lives, He is yet to stand on the earth—his Redeemer. The One who then lives is the One who is yet to stand upon earth. The One who is yet to stand upon the earth is the One who then lives. And this is God. Job's conviction as to God is that He then lives and is yet to stand manifested on the earth. This is not incarnation, but a *manifestation* of God who is already and all along incarnate, embodied.

This is in agreement with what is predicated of God a little further on, as we shall see, where God is said to be seen; seen not only with spiritual sight, but with the physical sight of the bodily eyes; seen as a visible, embodied personality.

2d. The Redemption. The redemption or deliverance contemplated here by Job is practical, complete, final, unending. It is to include, but it is not to conclude with deliverance from his present distresses. It is to terminate his present troubles, but it is only to terminate in the continued sight of God. In this redemption, therefore, we have comprehended not only present

deliverance, but resurrection and immortality. Of the truth of this we shall see.

The R.V. then renders the first member of verse 26,

"And after my skin has been thus destroyed."

The proposed rendering is,

"And after my skin shall have compassed this."

The point is as to the meaning of the word (*Nikfoo*) rendered "destroyed." Does it mean "destroyed" or "compassed"? That it means "compassed" and not "destroyed" there is this safest and strongest evidence, that, according to its uniform usage in Scripture, the word always means to compass, surround, enclose, and never to destroy. There is only one passage in Scripture where it has the remotest idea of destroying, and that is in Isaiah, where it is used of the felling of a tree, which in the East is done by encompassing, digging away the earth from around the tree, and the word has reference to this encompassing, and not to the destroying of the tree. The word is used, and is properly rendered by both the A.V. and the R.V. in this very chapter of Job, verse 6, where we read, "Know now that God hath overthrown me, and hath compassed me with His net." Unanimous Scripture usage then decides in favor of the meaning *compassed*. Therefore, and leaving out the italicized words of the A.V. which have no place in the original, we read,

"And after my skin shall have compassed this."

It is to be observed that the word *worms*, introduced by the A. V., seems to have been supplied from a conceived necessity of supplying a fitting plural nominative for the plural transitive verb rendered *destroy*. But the word *skin* occupies the position of the nominative in the sentence, and unless this be its position, it is difficult to see what it is. The use of *skin* as a collective noun, followed by a verb in the plural, is explained in the speech of Bildad in the preceding chapter, and which Job is answering. In v. 13 we read, "It shall devour the strength of his skin; even the first-born of death shall devour his strength." Here the word twice rendered "strength" is a noun in the plural from a verb meaning to *disjoin*, *divide*, *separate*, from the notion of *cutting* or *tearing apart* (Gesenius). As the noun means *shreds* or *strips*, or, according to the R. V., "members," of his body. It

was a cruel taunt of Bildad, when he said to and of Job, The first-born of death shall devour the shreds or strips of his skin; he shall devour even his shreds not only of his skin alone, but of his whole body. Job in his reply admits the justice of the taunt by treating the word skin as a collective noun, and without using in full the objectionable phrase, but, he answers, these shreds and strips of skin shall yet, sound and whole, encompass this body. It involuntarily calls to mind the Pauline description of the resurrection body: "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory: for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."

It is to be observed also that the reason for the omission of the word *body*, as the object of the verb is probably due to that law of Eastern usage which prohibits the mentioning of any disagreeable object. The demonstrative *this* with a gesture to his body, especially in view of what Bildad had said, was sufficient.

The second member of this verse reads,

"And from my flesh shall I see God."

The question is as to the preposition *from*. Does it mean *from*, that is, *without* my flesh, disembodied? This would be an unusual use of the preposition. Besides, how is Job, disembodied, to see God with his own eyes, bodily eyes, as he is afterwards said to do? The more common use of this *from* is preferable which regards it as a preposition of *locality, position*; that is, from the position of, in his flesh, Job shall see God.

But all this, as well as what comes after, implies resurrection, bodily resurrection, and immortality? Certainly. That is what is intimated when Job says that he shall go whence he shall not return. That is what is implied when Job speaks of all this as taking place *after* God comes and stands upon the earth. And it is taught elsewhere in Job. Thus chap. xiv., 14, reads: "If a man die, shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come." To some the question of the first clause of this verse might seem to imply a doubt, and the word "change" in the second clause to refer to the change of death. The context shows that neither is the case. The chapter opens with Job saying, "Man that is born of wo-

man, is of few days, and full of trouble." And the first six verses are occupied with a description of the fleetness and vanity of this earthly, mortal life. He then continues in verse 7, "For there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again." But this "sprout again" is precisely the same word that in verse 14 is rendered "change." It is not merely a change. It is a sprouting again. It is regermination from apparent death, as Job goes on to describe. So that Job's language is—He first asks the question—"If a man die, shall he live again?" And then he answers it,—All the days of my appointed time will I wait till—that takes place to me which takes place to the tree,—sprout again, live again.

3d. The Revelation. The revelation is the sight of God, as expressed in the words:

"And from my flesh shall I see God,
Whom I shall see as mine.
And mine eyes shall see Him,—no more a stranger."

This sight of God is then, according to this language,

1st. *Personal* and *certain*. Thus the reiterated personal pronoun, and the reiterated declaration of his conviction as to seeing God: I shall see God; I shall see Him as mine; mine eyes shall see Him.

2d. This sight is also *spiritual* and *physical*. There are two different verbs of seeing used in the original. The one is general, used of spiritual sight. The other is generally used of physical sight. Job says, "I shall see God—I shall see Him as mine." This is spiritual sight, according to the word used. But this is not all. He continues, "Mine eyes shall see Him." This is physical sight, according to the word used, while it is also necessarily implied in his saying that this sight shall be with his *eyes*, and which, coming after and in addition to what has already been said as to spiritual sight, can only properly be referred to the physical sight of the bodily eyes, and which further corresponds to his seeing God in his flesh. But this also implies that he shall see God as a real, visible, embodied person. True; the God humanized of the first section, the personal witness of the second section, the living and standing-on-earth Redeemer of this section.

3d. This sight is the sight of God as one who is "no more a stranger." This description as being *no more a stranger* refers us right back to Job's dual conception of God, a dual conception which now and with those words ceases. The dual conception was,—God humanized whom he could see and to whom he could speak,—over against God his accuser whom he could not see and to whom he could not speak; God his personal witness and friend,—over against God who afflicted and held him guilty. The God who held him guilty and afflicted him, this was the God whom he could not speak unto or see; the God whom he could not speak unto or see, this was indeed God the *stranger*. But now God is "no more a stranger." The duality is gone. The stranger-God has become lost, merged into the one God-Redeemer.

The last passage to be considered is

JOB xxxiii., 23, 24.

Which reads according to

A. V.	R. V.
23. If there be a messenger with him, an interpreter, one among a thousand, to shew unto man his uprightness;	23. If there be with him an angel, An interpreter, one among a thousand, To show unto man what is right for him,
24. Then he is gracious unto him, and saith, Deliver him from going down to the pit; I have found a ransom.	24. Then he is gracious unto him, and saith, Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom.

It may be preferable to follow the more finely poetic and finely critical rendering of Tayler Lewis:

"And is there then an angel on his side,
The interceding one—of thousands chief—
To make it known to man,—His righteousness;
So will He show him grace, and say:
Deliver him from going down to death;
A ransom I have found."

Of this passage it is to be observed:

1st. That this is the language of Elihu and not of Job.

2d. That the word used here by Elihu for *interpreter*,—when he says, "An interpreter, one among a thousand,"—is the same word as that which Job used in xvi., 20, where Job was seen to be speaking of God as His personal witness, testimony-bearer, interpreter, friend. So Elihu refers back directly to what Job had

said, and this passage stands closely related to that. There the interpreter was seen to be God Himself, and here it is practically the same when what is predicated is considered.

3d. This interpreter is just previously called an angel, an angel who is one among a thousand—chief. This necessarily brings to mind the Angel of Jehovah, the Angel of the Presence, and especially Jacob's Goel-angel, delivering-angel, "the Angel that redeemed him from all evil." So here the angel is the announcer or bringer of deliverance—"Deliver him from going down to the pit." So these words of Elihu directly recall and refer back to Job's language in the 19th chapter. And there the Goel, deliverer, redeemer was God. It is to be remembered also, as to the term and idea of *Angel*, that it is the oldest prefigurement that we have connected with the deliverance, redemption of the race—a prefigurement without which the Old Testament becomes an inexplicable book.

4th. Verse 23 closes with the words : "To show, make known, reveal unto man his righteousness or uprightness." Does this mean man's or God's righteousness, uprightness? In favor of the view that it is God's righteousness revealed to man, it is to be noted that otherwise there is ascribed to man a merit, an uprightness that is inconsistent with the context, where man is represented as a penitent turning to God through warnings and judgments given; that the idea of man's being in possession of a merit and uprightness which needs to be *revealed* to him is also inconsistent with what is stated; that in verse 26 this uprightness or righteousness is said to be returned to man of God. However, in the end the two interpretations amount to the same thing.

5th. The 24th verse makes three statements as to God :

(a) That He is gracious.

(b) That, in His graciousness, He hath made provision for man's deliverance from the pit. Does this mean from bodily ills and infirmities? but man is not delivered from them. Does it mean from spiritual disease, sin? for that there is a deliverance. Does it mean death? but man is not delivered from that; and if he is, then it implies another, unending life.

(c) The deliverance consists in the ransom that God has found. The word for *ransom* here is the common one used

throughout Scripture for the *covering up, blotting out* of human sin. The inference is, that while this deliverance may include temporal, physical deliverance, yet it combines with and consists chiefly in spiritual, eternal deliverance.

In regard then to the speeches of Elihu in general, especially this passage in his speech, and as over against the speeches of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar it must be observed,

1st. That it presents to us in truer light, and with a finer Christian consciousness, the doctrine of sin, than given by the three friends.

2d. That it gives us a truer and sublimer conception of God, His graciousness and righteousness, than is anywhere afforded in the speeches of the three friends.

3d. That, while the three friends are silent, Elihu sets forth the truth of man's bodily, spiritual and eternal deliverance in language that directly recalls and connects itself with every passage wherein Job had expressed that truth to be first his longing and then his conviction; which is, moreover, an indication of the unity of the book as over against a plurality of authorship. Thus the Angel of Elihu is *interpreter, interceder, mediator*, but this is precisely the "daysman" of Job ix., 33, and the personal "witness," "interpreter," "friend" of Job xvi., 19-21. According to Elihu there is for man in God, and through repentance, deliverance, redemption from going down to destruction—precisely the Goel, Deliverer, Redeemer of Job xix., 25, which was God.

When therefore modern negative criticism, with its customary proclivity toward assertion rather than argument, asserts that these speeches of Elihu are an interpolation or a later addition, inasmuch as they show no advance in thought over the speeches of the three friends, they entirely ignore the foregoing facts.

With this examination of these principal passages before us, the question now properly comes up, In what sense and to what extent is a Messianic element predicated of the Book of Job? I reply,

1st. That by a Messianic element in the Book of Job it is intended to predicate first of all not so much a *person* as a *work*; and that work the work which is ascribed as belonging to the

office and being brought by the historical Messiah—Jesus Christ.

2d. This work, according to the passages examined, embraces:

(a) Sacrifice, substitution, atonement as an offering for sin and a ground of acceptance with God.

(b) The need of and reception from another of a divine merit, righteousness which shall make man acceptable to God.

(c) The necessity of, desire for, and actual existence of a mediation, an intercession in behalf of man, before God, on the part of a divine daysman, arbiter, witness, interpreter, pleader, advocate, friend.

(d) The bringing together in judgment of God and man, reconciled, the two made one, through the efficacy of this mediation.

(e) The necessity of this mediation being carried on by one who shall be either a divine-human being, or on the part of God Himself through a God-humanization, a theophany, a manifestation of Himself as One who is incarnate, embodied.

(f) The finding of this mediatorial character, and mediatorial relationship to man in God Himself, the Goel, the Redeemer, the Kinsman-Deliverer, who even as He shall stand in the aftertime upon the earth, even so and then lives.

(g) The reconciliation and union of Job's dual conception of God in that one conception of the one God who was now to him no more a stranger, at once suggesting the statement that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.

(h) The finding in this God of a ransom, a covering for, a blotting out of human sin, and a salvation from destruction.

(i) The spiritual and physical sight of God as a glorious embodied personality.

(j) Bodily resurrection, eternal life, immortality, for Job regards and speaks of the betterment of his condition, his deliverance from distresses, his true and lasting redemption, his clear and abiding sight of God—as taking place only after death—after every earthly hope had vanished and he stood ready to be received of the grave.

These and other things connected therewith and set forth in

the Book of Job, we predicate of the historical Messiah—Jesus Christ. In such a sense and to such an extent we find a Messianic element in the Book of Job.

3d. This is the Messianic work, but who is the personal worker? According to Job this is God, the one God of Job's pure, sublime, monotheistic belief. According to Christian conceptions it is Christ. The work identifies and unifies the worker, —even God; the one God whom Job knew to be then living, whom he desired to see manifested, whom he was convinced he yet would see manifested; the God who afterwards did manifest Himself, who became God manifest in flesh, and who said of Himself—I and the Father are one; the God who shall yet once again manifest Himself, and every eye shall see Him. Be the conception of God, or of God's relationships to the world, single, dual, or threefold; be the work described within the sphere of Old Testament Messianism or New Testament Evangelism, still the work is one and the worker is One,—the one Messiah-God, besides whom there is no other.

EGYPTOLOGICAL.

Considering that, as to its structure and contents, the Book of Job is so thoroughly Arabian and Egyptian rather than Palestinian in its cast, it would be reasonably expected that Arabia and Egypt could throw much light upon it, and so they do, as is generally admitted. But in the contribution which Egyptology makes and by which it casts wave after wave of light upon the Book of Job as well as upon other portions of Old Testament Scripture, we find also the cogent and sufficient answer to all the main objections urged by recent negative criticism against the Book of Job, especially when there is any great antiquity or a single authorship ascribed to it. In fact it is only by utterly and wilfully blinding its eyes to the facts and discoveries of Egyptology that negative criticism can continue to urge its main objections to the book in favor of a recent date and a plurality of authorship.

But it is to only one of these objections, and to only one point in Egyptology in reply, that reference can here be made, viz., that which concerns the subject treated of in this paper. In

the treatment of this subject three things have been brought out as being set forth in the Book of Job, viz.:

Monotheism.

Messianism.

Immortality.

The objection, generally stated, is that any writing that treats of any one or all of these things as an accepted truth and entertained belief, belongs to a period not earlier than 900 B.C. and more probably to a period from two to five centuries later. The ground of this objection is the assumption that not until this era had the human race, in any of its branches, become sufficiently developed in civilization, literature, science, and religion to entertain and announce these things as the statements of truth and the objects of belief.

Therefore, the objection as to

1st. Monotheism. Job announces the truth of and the belief in—the one God, the true God. His religion was the religion of pure Monotheism.

Now, the general objection is that “ethical monotheism” was a “creation” of the Hebrew prophets after 900 B.C. The particular or specific objection, expressed in so many words by one of the most recent writers on Job, is “that the pure monotheism of the Book of Job makes an earlier date than the period between Isaiah and Jeremiah, on historical principles, hardly conceivable.” (Cheyne, and apparently Davidson, is of a similar opinion, to say nothing of Ewald, Renan, Kuenen, Dillman and others who hold the same.)

What has Egyptology to answer to this objection?

According to the majority of leading Egyptologists, including Brugsch, Chabas, Mariette, Pierret, Renouf, de Rougé, Tiele and others, a pure monotheism was the basis and original form of the old Egyptian religion in the ages anterior to 2000 B.C. And all Egyptologists agree that pure monotheism was the prevailing religion of the Egyptians during the 18th and 19th dynasties, that is 1700–1200 B.C. The evidences of this are overwhelming. And yet in the face of this accurate and scientific result of archæological research, a writer of our own day can put forth the assertion “that pure monotheism of an earlier

date than 700 B.C. is, on historical principles, hardly conceivable."

The one God of the old Egyptian monotheistic belief is expressed in the name that was given him, which was *Nutar*. *Nutar* means the *powerful, almighty*, which corresponds precisely with the name and meaning of the biblical *El Elohim*. So truly does this old Egyptian name express the unity of God, and according to the biblical conception of that unity, that the translators of the Bible into Coptic, with a strong bias to use Greek words, nevertheless adopted this old Egyptian name as best expressive of the biblical idea of God. As the Hebrews, so the old Egyptians had various names for God, among them another which has the same derivation and meaning in old Egyptian as the Hebrew Jehovah.

It should be remarked here that the many names and symbols of the Deity occurring in the old Egyptian religion, and which, at first sight, seem to give to it a polytheistic aspect, have all of them reference to the one only God, as has been clearly shown by Le Page Renouf and others. Thus one chapter in the Book of the Dead consists entirely of names of Osiris,—over a hundred; while in the Litanies inscribed on the walls of the royal tombs at Biban al Mulook, Ra is invoked under seventy-five different names, and yet all are only names and symbols of the one God, just as there are different names and symbols of God in the Scriptures.

But out of a multitude of Egyptian texts setting forth in multitudes of instances the pure monotheism of the old Egyptian religion, only a few quotations may be made. These quotations will set forth not only the pure monotheistic belief of the ancient Egyptians but many of the attributes of this one God.

"The One above." "The One Maker of beings." "The One alone without a peer." "The One alone in all His works." "The Holy One." "The Great One." "He is the Infinite." "There is none who worketh with Him." "There is no building that can contain Him." "He is not graven in marble." "Vain are all representations." "He has made everything, and He alone has not been made." "The One Maker of existences." "Lord of all beings." "Support of all things." "He raises the

heavens and fixes the earth." "Maker of men." "Creator of beasts." "Maker of herbs and all fruitful things." "Maker of things above and below." "Thou hast made us and we praise Thee." "We worship Thy Spirit that alone hath made us." "He made the world with His hands, its waters, its air, its plants, its flocks, all its flying things, all its fish, all its reptiles, all its cattle. For Him the ground brings forth in abundance." "He affords plentifulness, and gives it to all the earth." "He causeth growth to fulfil all desires." "Every creature receives nourishment." "He filleth all men with fatness." "His moisture brings to life," "He maketh even and noon-tide." "There is no god can do what He hath done. He is the Lord of life, and we live by His creation; no man can live without His will." "Thou hast hung the heavens and planted the earth. Author of all things, Creator of blessings, Prince supreme. We adore Thy majesty at the moment in which Thou producest us. Thou begetteth us, and we cry out to Thee to dwell within us." "O give glory to God who hath raised the sky, formed men, made all lands and the great sea in His name of Let-the-earth-be." "Hail to Thee, the One alone, awake while all lie asleep." "He commands mankind, Ruler of men." "Thou directest all as King. Thy law is established in the whole earth." "All things are perfectly ordered." "He filleth all granaries, He enricheth all store-houses, He careth for the estate of the poor." "Thou maker of men, who supporteth their works, who giveth them life, who knoweth how one differeth from another, who listeneth to the poor that is in distress, who art gentle of heart when a man crieth unto Thee." "Lord of magnanimity, strong in apparel." "Behold the mighty one in His strength." "His might produceth all." "He hath done glorious deeds with His mighty arm; and many shall turn their backs on a few, and one shall rout a thousand." "My Lord is my defender. He is a strong defender. There is none mighty except Him alone." "Hail to Thee, Lord of truth." "At whose goodness all rejoice." "Gracious Ruler crowned with the crown." "Listening to the poor who is in distress; gentle of heart when one cries unto Him. Deliverer of the timid man from the violent; judging the poor and oppressed." "His love is in the south, His grace is

in the north, His beauty taketh possession of all hearts, His love maketh the arms grow weak." "The truth is indestructible as the sun." "He is truth itself." "He is love." "Thou causest pleasure and light, at Thy goodness all rejoice, their hearts rejoice when they see Thee." "Thou art the Lord of righteousness, hating iniquity." "Lord of mercy most loving, at whose coming men live." "We give Thee praise on account of Thy mercy to us." "The great One, a buckler in front of men." "He maketh His might a buckler." "Grant to us to be under Thy shadow. The shadow of Thy wings." "He never grows weary." "Lord of eternity, Maker everlasting." "Living in truth forever." "Heaven and earth stand in awe of Him." "I come to Thee, O Lord, who hast existed from the beginning; Eternal God who hast made all things that are. Thy name be my protection." "Mortals extol Him, Lord of all."

These are some out of numerous other quotations that might be made. Nearly all of these expressions or statements quoted are contemporaneous with or, more generally, antedate the Mosaic era. Very many of them antedate the period of Abraham or that of the received dates of the Flood. Now I turn over and read it again, what this most recent writer on the Book of Job—and who is only one of the most recent followers of the school of negative criticism—has to say, "that the pure monotheism of the Book of Job makes an earlier date than 700 B.C., on historical principles, hardly conceivable." This is almost unique. Here is anachronism indeed! But this is only an indication of that barren, dreary flow of gratuitous assumption and blind prejudice that characterizes this school of negative criticism. "Pure monotheism, earlier than 700 B.C., on historical grounds hardly conceivable." And this too in the face of all these quotations, in the face of all ancient Egyptian texts, in the face of discoveries and authenticated results of all Egyptologists, in the face of all the conclusions of archæological research and scholarship! The time for postulating the opinion that religion develops from polytheism into monotheism, is past, even as scientific Egyptology shows that the polytheism of the last stages of the Egyptian monarchy was a degeneration from the pure monotheism of the Early and Middle empires.

But in this connection a bare allusion may be made to that idea in the Book of Job of a God-humanization, a theophany, of God being, and ultimately being manifested in bodily form. With the old Egyptians, while God was not seen, still He was not invisible; and while He was spiritually conceived of, still He was not conceived of as being simply a Spirit. Says Renouf, "Nothing can be more clear than that under the name of God the Egyptians did not understand as we do a being without body, parts or passions. The body is spoken of as well as the soul." It may also be added that this is further indicated by those old Egyptian representations of God that give Him a human form surmounted either by a human head, or that animal head which symbolized a particular attribute in God. Egyptian texts, like the Hebrew Scriptures, speak rather of God's having and giving the spirit than of His being a Spirit. According to the old Egyptian theology then, God had a form, an embodiment, corresponding to the Old Testament *Selem Demouth* and the New Testament *morfe eidolon*. Only two or three quotations may be made. "Of mankind in shape being after the divine type." "Thy form was first while still Thou shinest forth." "Thy luminous body ever golden for an age and ever." "Each divinity has assumed Thine appearance, but without shape is their type compared to Thy form. Where is there a god like Thee?" "Hail to Thee, Creator, body of God, who buildeth His own body when heaven was not and earth was not." In regard to this teaching of the form of God, later Egyptian, as early Christian, theology became influenced by what may be called the exclusive spiritism of Plato and Aristotle.

It may be remarked, in view of Job's dual conception and after Christian thought, that according to the old Egyptians the one God was spoken of as exhibiting two persons or relationships, that of Father and Son. On this point the old Egyptian creed, in brief, was, "God is self-existent; He is the only being who has not been begotten"; hence the idea of considering God under two aspects, the Father and the Son. Thus old Egyptian texts speak of God as, "The One of One." "Gracious Father." "Gracious Son." All the symbolical deities or divine attributes, manifestations, are called persons, and it is said fre-

quently that "the society of the divine persons subsists by truth every day." A *stèle* of the 19th dynasty (1400 B.C.) speaks of God as "Father and Son." On the coffin of Seti I. (1366 B.C.) these words are put in the mouth of the deity: "I am the son proceeding from the father, I am the father proceeding from the son."

But this leads us to,

2d. Messianism: that is, the knowledge of, belief in, and announcement of a divine Redeemer, either as existing in and being God Himself, or as connected with a coming divine deliverer who shall be the embodiment and manifestation of God, and who shall save from sin.

As in the case of monotheism, so, on the same ground, objection is brought against the Book of Job, or against such a Messianism as existing in the Book of Job, especially if there be assigned to it any great antiquity. The human race was not sufficiently developed as yet to know anything of a divine God-man Deliverer.

And yet it is a well-known fact that various nations in all ages have had the teaching or tradition of a moral benefactor and divine deliverer of their race, "who came from above, bore human ills, sought to scatter happiness and enlightenment among men, and then perhaps perished at last in the struggle with evil on earth, to appear again among the stars, or to await his faithful followers in the region of the blessed." But let us see a little as to what Egyptology again furnishes in answer to the objection.

The prayers, sacrifices, priestly mediations, and like religious observances and institutions among the ancient Egyptians show that they felt the need of other than human merit to be a ground of acceptance with God, the need of a divine person to be a reconciliation, a mediator between God and man, a saviour from sin. Only a few quotations showing this sense of sin and need of a Saviour. "O Lord, Deliverer of hundreds of thousands, the Defender of him who calls to Him, reproach me not with my sins." "Chase all the anguish which is in our hearts. Let not Thy face be turned from us. It is life for us to behold Thy countenance." "I will not sin against Thee, I will not transgress what Thou ordainest." "Give me a new heart in the place of

my heart." "Pray humbly to God with a loving heart. He will protect thee in thine affairs; He will listen to thy words; He will accept thine offerings." "Grant unto me to come to the country of eternity, to the region of those who are justified."

The personal, divine mediator and deliverer was Osiris. It is now sometimes called the myth of Osiris. Very well; but it must be remembered that all myth is based upon and contains more or less truth. With the old Egyptians then, this felt need of and belief in a priestly, sacrificial, divine mediator and mediation is especially brought out in connection with the character and works of Osiris. Note some of the remarkable statements made in regard to him in a number of the old texts, especially in the Book of the Dead. He was born of a human mother. He is called the son of God. His birth was accompanied with remarkable signs. At his birth a voice was heard announcing that the Lord of all things had stepped into the light. He is merciful and the manifestation of God's goodness. His love is mild and great. He is represented as having lived and died for the good of men. He taught men of the Divine Being, and gave them an example of obedience to Him. He won men by his influence, teachings, persuasions. His sweetness carried him to other peoples and lands where he brought the good news of human brotherhood and devotion to God. Before him war ceased and hearts were turned. He suffered for others and therefore could sympathize with them. He destroys the great serpent, the devourer of souls. He is slain when about thirty years old. In this connection he is spoken of as one who having gone forth from heaven came to earth to offer a special sacrifice for sin. Finally he rose again from the dead, became the first fruits of the dead, and was made the judge of quick and dead. And the dying dream and hope of all the Egyptians was to see him, to be like him, to be with him, to be one with him.

Let me conclude this part by quoting a prayer taken from one of the old Egyptian texts wherein this need of and belief in a personal mediator between God and man stands out with peculiar spiritual distinctness and force,—a prayer vividly recalling by its resemblance the Messianic passages in Job examined: "Thy countenance is upon me. My being is separated from its

sin; thy servant is cleansed from his pride. I beseech thee, take my goods into thy treasury, the gold and all the precious stones. O grant that a messenger may come to me as a reconciler: let him remove terror from my heart; let me go to the temple in his presence: let me purify myself with a vow."

3d. Immortality. Resurrection, eternal life, immortality we saw to be set forth in the Book of Job. But the objection is again urged against the doctrine of immortality being in the Book of Job and at the same time the book being of any great age, while many deny that it is in the book at all even after they have brought it down to 700 B.C. And yet an immortality and a heaven were believed in by the ancient Egyptians as early as the 5th dynasty, 3500 B.C. Maspero speaks of the primitive notion of the Egyptians as being to continue living on and on after death so long as to amount almost if not quite to immortality. One of the ancient books was entitled, *A Book of Learning what there is in the Other World*.

After death the person passed to the Last Judgment. The Judge was Osiris; called Lord of Eternity, the Judge of quick and dead. The judgment was called the "day of the account of words." It was a day of moral reckoning and purifying, as we read of it that it was a day when "the destruction of the faults of the dead was made" and "when he had wiped away the stain (of sin) in him."

Resurrection was that of the body, the body purified and the soul restored to it. It was not precisely the same body, nor was it a new soul, but it was the justified soul restored to a purified body, according to the ancient book called, *The Breaths of Life*. The human form was retained (Maspero), but it shone with heavenly splendor; hence those who had died and were risen again were called the luminous, the shining ones. As implying the resurrection of the body, Osiris was called "the first-born of the dead," and the day of death was called the "day of birth." It is said of the dead that "the mouth of no worm shall devour him," that "he seeth with his eyes, heareth with his ears." The dead pays adoration to God that He "allows me to be a glorious soul in heaven, rich upon earth, true-voiced in the under-ground." Of the justified dead it is said that they shall not suffer "the second death" but "live for eternity."

The locality of heaven was variously described, but it was viewed as being a real place, a place where, to quote their texts, the dead rose to "live the period of their second existence," where "they should not be rejected," where "God wipes away tears from all eyes," where "the joy of their hearts is in seeing Him," where "to be like Him and united with Him will be the joy of eternity," where "they shall lave in the stream of the heavenly river," where "it shall be granted them to shine like a star forever in heaven."

The passage of the person from this world to the next was also variously viewed. It was now an ascent by a heavenly ladder to the eternal home. Or again, the soul after death and burial took to itself wings and flew upward to the door of heaven. Or still again, the person was represented as passing safely on over the heavenly river in the golden barges of the gods, or in the ark of the sun, on into the darkness, and through the darkness into the light, till it entered the region of the sky occupied by Osiris where it dwelt with him forever in his Field of the Asphodel.

Such are some of the teachings of the old Egyptians; teachings that engaged their minds, chiselled their eternal monuments, and uplifted their souls as to heaven; teachings whose truths can only be accounted for as coming to them and being preserved by them from the primal revelations of God to the human race, and which read again in these days come to the confirmation of God's revealed eternal Word. And so these noted truths of the Book of Job, announced in the sublimest language of inspiration by the patriarch of Uz on the sands of Arabia, find their indorsement in the voice and language of those historic hymns of praises that were chanted by the subjects of the Pharaohs as on their papyrus skiffs, and in the morning of time, they skimmed the sacred waters of the mighty Nile.

FINAL CAUSES.

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BY REV. JESSE F. FORBES, NEW YORK CITY.

A RISTOTLE and the Schoolmen distinguish four classes of causes; material, formal, efficient, and final. Material cause includes the elements of being, both material and spiritual. Formal cause is the aggregation of properties that constitute the essence of existence. Efficient cause includes the more prominent of the agents which originate effects, and so far corresponds with the modern definition of cause. The term final cause, *causa finalis*, comes from the Scholastics. It is the τὸ οὐκ ἔνεκα καὶ τὰγαθόν of Aristotle. It is that on account of which the action is done. It is a cause which begins in an idea and works into an end or final result. Certain phenomena are either cause or result according to the stand-point of the observer. The web of a spider ensnares a fly. In a certain sense the web is the cause of the entanglement of the fly, but viewed in another aspect, the imprisonment of the fly was the cause of the web, for the spider prepared the snare to capture its prey. Another illustration: The ear is the cause of hearing, that is we could not hear without an ear, but on the other hand, there would be no ear except for the purpose of hearing. The purpose is the cause prompting the end. Hence the term, final cause. A final cause is in a certain sense the cause of its own cause. It is an anticipated consequence. It is a predetermined effect which conditions the phenomena of which it is apparently the result.

Is there an *a priori* principle of final causes?

President Porter asserts that* the principle of final causes "is believed *a priori* to pervade all existence, and must be assumed as the ground of the scientific explanation of the facts and phenomenon of the universe." He calls it "a necessary relation of things and a first principle or axiom of thought." If this be

* Porter's "Human Intellect," page 594.

true, final cause has necessity and universality, the characters which are the marks of *a priori* principles. Most writers agree that these predicates can be assumed of simple cause and effect. No phenomena without a cause is an axiom. It is as self-evident as the statement, every body is in space, or every event takes place in time. Whoever denies causality must deny science or any form of classified knowledge. Is it equally evident that every thing produced has an end? Does the mind instinctively ask, what for, as certainly as it seeks the why and how? Whatever may be individual opinion, it is certain that some philosophers regard such a claim as a mere assumption. There is a prejudice among many scientific men against final causes. The argument from design for the existence of an intelligent first cause is regarded with suspicion, even sneered at, as effete and exploded reasoning. The search for final causes has been regarded as an obstacle to the investigation of physical causes. If, however, finality be considered as a law of nature, established by induction and observation, much of the objection is done away among candid reasoners. If finality can be demonstrated from the facts of experience then the principle becomes a valid cognition.

Again, certain thinkers, who admit the principle of finality to some extent, assert that this principle is by no means universal. They claim there are certain phenomena for which the mind seeks causes without concerning itself with ends. Hence they deny any *a priori* principle of finality. They reason in this wise: A stone drops from an overhanging cliff. The attraction of gravity is sufficient to account for the fall of the stone. This satisfies the mind. The effect is sufficiently accounted for in the cause. There is no compelling necessity, no law of mind that requires us to seek a foreseen purpose in the fall of the stone. They ask, Why multiply causes without necessity?

Manifestly this class of thinkers are not to be convinced by any demonstration to prove the *a priori* law of finality. To refute their objections we must have recourse to the empirical method. Facts must be gathered and classified, scientific experience must register results and thus we may finally rise to a philosophy above observation which shall establish finality as a

law of the universe, the method of working of a Supreme Personality, a Conscious Will.

Let us then enter the province of nature and see if we can deduce from her phenomena the principle of final causes.

In this study we are met at the outset with the fact that there is something more in nature than a simple, indefinite chain composed of countless links of simple cause and effect. Phenomena act and react upon each other. There are coincidences and combinations producing certain phenomena so orderly and harmonious that the mind instinctively seeks an explanation for the order and harmony. The frequency of these combinations attracts attention. A single stone in a roadway might be passed without special notice. If the entire road bed be covered with stones, laid in a systematic, orderly arrangement, one cannot escape the thought of foreseen intention and of directed labor. Regular arrangement precludes chance. The child of the Scottish philosopher Beattie, who saw the initial letters of his name in the shape of freshly springing vegetation, scouted the thought that this could come by accidental sowing. Crusoe's foot-print in the sand could not be explained by any chance washing of the waves. The mind seeks a cause not only for simple phenomena, but also for the arrangement and orderly working of these phenomena one with another.

Nature abounds in examples of concordance. Heat dries the skin, which would parch and crack were it not that this same heat opens certain glands underneath the cuticle which give out a secretion to moisten the skin when necessary. The greater the heat the more active the flow of perspiration. Is this agreement a chance happening of certain phenomena?

Again, a physiologist studies the human stomach.* He discovers that gastric juice is a necessity of digestion. By means of this fluid food is changed and made ready for assimilation. Pepsin digests milk, meat, vegetables. How is it that the gastric juice which digests food does not digest the stomach itself? Observation discloses that the stomach is lined by a glutinous mucus, called epithelium, impermeable by the gastric juice.

* Compare "Final Causes," by Paul Janet, second ed., page 33, to whose masterly work the author acknowledges his indebtedness.

While this remains intact the pepsin cannot come in contact with the walls of the stomach. Without epithelium, digestion were impossible. Here are two series of phenomena, the one effecting the digestion of food, the other protecting the stomach itself during digestion. Whence comes this agreement without which animal life were impossible? Is it simple accident or was the end seen from the beginning?

As we extend our study of the alimentary system we find other causes producing effects in harmony one with another. The albuminose parts of food are absorbed by the coats of the stomach and pass directly into the circulation, while the sugar, the starch and the fat are subjected to the action of the pancreatic juice, the bile, and the intestinal fluids. By means of these secretions the starch and cane sugar are converted into grape sugar which is absorbed into the circulation to nourish the body. Chemist and physiologist might explain each step in the process as the result of certain causes, but when every cause has been ascertained, and each step of the conversion of food into muscle, nerve and bone has been examined, there still remains the question: How is it that these phenomena coincide with such agreement and harmony?

The need of this explanation becomes more imperative as we consider other organs of the body. Bones and muscle provide for movement and locomotion, the skin protects the delicate internal organs, the nerves warn of danger, the eye and ear communicate with the outer world. Moreover, the organs are responsible one for the other. For example: respiration depends upon the means of locomotion. The respiration of a bird that flies differs from a reptile that crawls. The circulation of a mammal that walks differs from a fish that swims. Granting there is nothing strange that neighboring organs adapt themselves one to another, how is it that the teeth are in harmony with the feet or the heart with the lungs or the stomach with the nerves? If one of the more remote members is changed, it necessitates a corresponding change in the entire organism. It has been objected that this rule does not strictly hold in some of the lower orders of animals. Certain organisms can be cut in twain without ceasing to live, and in some instances different

sections will reproduce the entire animal, but even in the lowest types of animal and vegetable life there are necessary correlations without which life would cease. In short,* "Every organized being forms a whole, a close system, whose parts mutually correspond and concur in one and the same definitive action by a reciprocal reaction." As Kant says, "The organized being is the being in which all is reciprocally ends and means."

The discovery that living bodies are aggregations of cells each having an independent life does not militate against the doctrine of final causes. It is an additional proof. Each of the millions of cells in an organism lives not only for itself but for the whole, and in turn each cell is supported by the entire organism and is dependent upon it. How does it come to pass that such a number of cells concur in producing any organism?

So orderly and harmonious is the working of organic life, so nicely are organs adapted one to another that the physiologist if given any portion of the body can reconstruct the whole. Cuvier says,† "A tooth that is sharp and adapted to tear flesh will never co-exist in the same species with a foot enveloped in horn which can only bear the animal and with which it cannot seize its prey. Whence the rule that every hoofed animal is herbivorous and the still more detailed rules which are only corollaries of the first, that hoofs on the feet indicate molar teeth with flat crowns, a very long alimentary canal, a large or multiplied stomach and a great number of relations of the same kind." It may be objected that recent science has successfully refuted some of Cuvier's propositions. The great naturalist himself was at fault. The *tapyrium giganteum*, which he had determined from a single complete tooth, when the whole head was discovered proved to be a dinotherium, a pachyderm entirely different from Cuvier's reconstruction. Granting all this, allowing naturalists to restrict Cuvier's law as much as possible, there still remains the fact of harmonious connection in organisms. How can we explain this interdependence of parts? Nature might produce cutting teeth, but how account for the fact that with cutting teeth she produces claws to seize and tear the prey, rather than

* Janet, "Final Causes," page 48.

† Quoted by Janet, page 48.

feet covered with horn and useful for locomotion only? Doth not this arrangement of parts conforming to the idea of the whole suggest a predetermination of the parts by the idea of the whole? In another's words,* "The agreement of several phenomena, bound together with a future determinate phenomenon, supposes a cause in which that future phenomenon is ideally represented and the probability of this presumption increases with the complexity of the concordant phenomena and the number of the relations which unite them to the final phenomenon."

If this agreement of phenomena does not prove finality it at least leads us toward it. John Stuart Mill acknowledges that the preceding reasoning is based upon the legitimate rules of induction. He instances the adaptation of the eye to the light, where an almost infinite number of phenomena coincide to produce vision. Vision is thus the circumstance in which they all coincide. It is, therefore, the cause of their coincidence, but on the other hand it is their effect, for vision cannot exist without the agreement and coincidence of all these phenomena. Therefore not the vision itself but the idea of vision is the true cause which is expressed by saying that the eye is made for seeing.

It were false likewise to the law of causality to leave unexplained the many instances of accord of the past with the future. Every organism from the simplest protozoon to that most highly complex being, man, is a link between that which has gone before and that which is to come. The perpetuation of species reveals a marvellous agreement of many phenomena bound together for a future determinate result. Sex cannot be explained outside of finality and predetermination to continue life after it once existed.

The same facts are observed in the instinct of animals. Instinct is not the result of observation and experience. Its effects may be modified by experience, but they never depend upon it. The actions of instinct are performed without any foreknowledge of the result or of their utility. Instinct is an "inherent urgency to action in a determinate direction."† It is a blind impulse impelling the animal "solely from the urgency of an in-

* Janet, page 61.

† Hickok's "Mental Science," page 142.

trinsic congeniality in the sensation to the end induced." Ants and squirrels lay up food for a winter they have never experienced. Bees return to the hive loaded with wax the same day they are transformed. Their wings are not dried before they know all they are to do during the rest of life. Wasps take their part in feeding the young grubs as soon as they cease to be wasps themselves. The spider weaves its web before it has tasted of a fly. The bird builds its nest without having seen any other bird bring so much as a single stick or straw. The young crocodile swims the moment it touches the water. The caterpillar spins its cocoon without instruction. The honey-bee builds its cell after the most difficult laws of mathematics. The angle at which the planes meet in the bottom of the cell has been demonstrated by Maclaurin to be that which the law of maxima and minima in the calculus demands for the greatest economy in material united with the largest strength. The moth makes itself a coat as soon as it is born, and when it outgrows this garment it enlarges it by the most approved patching. Insects provide a supply of food for their young differing entirely from their own. The larvæ of certain honey eating insects are carnivorous, so the mother places in a nest provided for the purpose, beside her eggs, the bodies of spiders and other insects. Such are a few of many, many facts which might be mentioned to show that combinations of heterogeneous phenomena do agree in bringing about certain results. Is not the mind almost forced to the belief that the future act was previously seen in an ideal form, thereby transforming the result to an end?

At this point we are met by an objection. Granted the foregoing results appear, which no one denies, on what ground are you warranted in ascribing them to a final rather than an efficient cause? Does every agreement of phenomena with the future suppose an end? This objection is well stated by Aristotle in his "Physics": * "Why, it is said, may not nature act without having an end and without seeking the best of things? Jupiter, for instance, does not send rain to develop and nourish the grain, but it rains by a necessary law; for in rising, the vapor must grow cool, and the cooled vapor becoming water must necessarily

* Quoted by Janet, page 476.

fall. But, if this phenomenon taking place the grain profits by it to germinate and grow, it is a simple accident. And so again, if the grain which some one has put into the barn is destroyed in consequence of the rain, it does not rain apparently in order to rot the grain, and it is a simple accident if it be lost. What hinders us from saying, as well, that in nature, the bodily organs themselves are subject to the same law, and that the teeth, for instance, necessarily grow—those in front incisive and capable of tearing food, and the molars large and fitted for grinding it, although it is not in order to this function that they have been made and this is only a simple coincidence? What hinders us from making the same remark for all those organs where there seems to be an end and a special destination?"

This objection reproduced by Lucretius finds modern statement in mechanism. The adherents of mechanism maintain that there is no final cause in nature, but only consequences and results. Their argument runs as follows. Birds fly because they have wings, but this does not prove that wings were given them to fly. Modern science has little to say about organ and function. It deals entirely with molecular associations. With science the cell is the unit. What we call an individual is really an aggregation of cells or countless individuals. In the mineral world, molecules arrange themselves after certain geometric laws. Quartz crystallizes in hexagonal prisms, natural sulphur in octohedrons. No one claims that the molecules arrange themselves through any mutual understanding to form cones, pyramids or prisms. Why not suppose that the cells of organic bodies arrange themselves after the same law, so that one combination makes a shell-fish, another a reptile and still a third a mammal? If the molecules of salt crystallize in cubes, why may not other molecules unite to form muscle, bone, sinew or nerve? What wonder that bones being hard support the body, or that the eye, composed of different humors, should refract the light to a single point? Why speak of organ and function? Function is simply an organ acting. What warrants any one in affirming that action predetermines the form? Why refer any thing to final cause when efficient causes explain these agreeing phenomena? Nature has a direct series leading from cause to

effect. Why reverse the order in the effort to ascertain a final cause? On this wise reason the upholders of mechanism. The reply is, if mechanism were sufficient to explain the formation of crystals and of animal organisms, it utterly fails to account for intelligence in man. If mechanism be accepted at all, it must account for all the phenomena of nature. If an animal is only a machine, why should man be anything more than a mere automaton, without intelligence, sensibility or will? If there are no ends in nature, how does it come to pass that we find a being capable of proposing an end and adapting means to that end? How can thought originate from that which has no thought? How can there be thought without a thinker? To deny intelligence in other men is to violate the laws of reasoning. The effort of a mechanician to explain his philosophy refutes it. In the very attempt he proposes to himself an end; that is to convince others that his explanation is correct and he adapts means to that end. A mechanic makes a loom. Every advocate of mechanism must admit it is designed to weave cloth. The bioplasts of an animal organism weave a muscle here, a nerve there. What is the difference? Do you say, The one is internal; the other external? This does not do away with the analogy. The weaving of the cloth is the result of design. Why not the weaving of muscle or nerve? If a man built a flying machine we should hail him a wonderful designer. Can we escape the feeling of design or of predetermined arrangement in the marvellous adaptations for the flight of an insect or bird? Mechanism is constrained to admit finality in man and this admission suffices for its refutation, for if mechanism fails in one point it breaks down in all.

This argument is so ably presented by Paul Janet that I am sure the reader will pardon a quotation of his statement. He says, "The question is this: How in a nature without an end does there appear all at once a being capable of pursuing an end? This capacity, it is said, is the product of his organization. But how should an organization, which by hypothesis would only be a result of physical causes happily introduced, give birth to a product such that the being thus formed could divine, foresee, calculate, propose means to an end? To this

point the series of phenomena has only followed the descending course, that which goes from cause to effect. All that is produced is produced by the past without being in any way determined, modified, or regulated by the necessities of the future. All at once in this mechanical series is produced a being that changes all, that transports into the future the cause of the present; that is capable, for instance, having beforehand the idea of a town, to collect stones, conformably to mechanical laws, yet so that at a given moment they may form a town. He is able to dig the earth so as to guide the course of rivers; to replace forests by crops of grain; in a word, to regulate the evolution of natural phenomena in such a way that the series of these phenomena may be determined by a future predetermined phenomenon. This is indeed, it must be confessed, a final cause. Well, then, can it be conceived that the agent, thus endowed with the power of co-ordinating nature for ends, is himself a simple result that nature has realized without proposing to itself an end? Is it not a sort of miracle to admit into the mechanical series of phenomena a link which suddenly should have the power to reverse, in some sort, the order of the series, and which, being itself only a consequent resulting from an infinite number of antecedents, should henceforth impose on the series this new and unforeseen law which makes of the consequent the law and rule of the antecedents."

Again, the nomenclature of science opposes mechanism. Types, not individuals, dominate the names given genera and species. Classification proceeds upon the assumption of design. Agassiz thought that the existence of God ought to be sought in the plan of animals as well as in the adaptation of organs. Plan supposes design. If there is design, there must be a designer. Finality penetrates everywhere. Nature is full of agreement, proportion, harmony. Man is a part of nature and no explanation of phenomena can be sufficient that does not account for him, at once the child and to a certain extent the lord of nature.

Does evolution exclude finality in nature?

Let us walk carefully. If by evolution is meant the teaching of Haeckel and others that matter contains the promise and

potency of all things and all organisms are the products of fortuitous combinations of atoms, it must exclude finality. Such a system is materialistic, living without God and hope in the world. It is mechanical in philosophy and is refuted by the preceding reasoning. But if by evolution, one is to understand nothing more than gradation and development, then this very order appeals to finality for explanation. It is not necessary for us to enter into any extended discussion of this theory. All that we need consider is whether the *discoveries* of Lamarck, Darwin and Spencer have rendered final causes impossible or useless. According to evolution, nature produces nothing in a complete or finished form at first. Everything commenced in the rudest and most elementary combinations, and passes by successive degrees to the higher and more complex. All organisms are potentially present in the first aggregations of atoms and by means of continued developments nature has attained its present conditions. As Gladstone states it, "In evolution all is done by steps; nothing by strides, leaps or bounds; all from protoplasm up to Shakespeare, and again from all primal night and chaos up to protoplasm." The most remarkable application of this theory is "transformism." Lamarck employs three principles to explain the progressive development of animals—medium, habit, need. By medium, he means the combination of external circumstances which influence the growth of animals. By habit, he wishes us to understand the effect of repeated action continued through many generations. By need, he means the effort of the organism to adapt itself to varying conditions. He claims that as habit develops organs so need produces them. In the last analysis all organs are one and the same. Exercise and habit have produced the diversities of form. That is, the need of seeing produced eyes; of hearing, ears. We ask in reply, how can there be need without the apprehension of deprivation? How does a plant know it needs the light? Whence the accord between the need and the action that tends to supply the need? What is this but the principle of finality, everywhere present, viz.: the recognition of a want and the struggle to attain it? It is a law of nature that accidental differences tend to eliminate themselves in the reproduction of species. It is possible for a farmer

to increase certain characteristics within fixed limits by careful pairing of animals possessing the characteristics required, but this implies finality on his part. It is the adaptation of means to a predetermined end. Mr. Darwin sees this difficulty and seeks to avoid it by distinguishing between artificial and unconscious selection. Unconscious selection obtains whenever a modification occurs without having been sought. In the struggle for life, those individuals succeed best which by some accident find themselves possessed of certain characteristics needed to cope with the difficulties about them. Mr. Wallace instances a kind of butterfly called *Leptalis*, whose color is protective since it causes them to resemble the *Ithomia* which birds avoid on account of their tainted smell. The explanation is, that what at first was an accidental resemblance in color gave certain butterflies the immunity resulting from their resemblance to the *Ithomia*, and this advantage was continued through successive generations until all the species came to have their present color. Mr. Alfred W. Bennett, in a work entitled "The Theory of Natural Selection from a Mathematical Point of View," has opposed this argument by the following ingenious reasoning.* "It is evident that to pass from their ordinary to their protective form, the *Leptalis* must have undergone a series of gradual transformations; and we can hardly estimate at less than a thousand the number of forms that must have succeeded between the first deviation and the form at last observed. On the other hand, it is clear that the first degenerate *Leptalis* cannot have differed sufficiently from their sisters to deceive the appetite of birds interested in recognizing them under their disguise, and it is a moderate supposition that during the first fifth part of the period of supposed transformation, the birds were not deceived. If so, the butterflies not being yet preserved by their new dress, every reason of selection disappears, and we must regard as entirely left to chance the continuation of their metamorphosis. The chances which this has of being realized, can then be very approximately calculated. Let us take in effect a couple of *Leptalis*, and suppose that the species had a tendency to vary in twenty different directions, of which only one tends to approach

* Quoted from Janet, "Final Causes," page 250.

the *Ithomia*. In the first generation, the chances a favorable variation has of being produced are represented by the fraction $\frac{1}{20}$; and even this valuation is very favorable to the hypothesis of Mr. Wallace, for among the numerous offspring of a pair of butterflies there would certainly be found more than twenty forms very little different and deviating from a determinate form,

“In the second generation the forms that already had a tendency to remove from the form *Ithomia* will have no reason to return to it; and it is solely in the twentieth part of the offspring of the first couple that we can reasonably hope to find forms more or less approximating to the protective form. But in this twentieth, selection does not yet act; chance will still preside over the production of the form sought for; a twentieth only will assume that form. But this will only represent the twentieth of the twentieth; thus the chances will be represented by the fraction $1-20^2$. At the end of ten generations the chances will be reduced to $1-20^{10}$ —that is to say that in the ten billions of individuals only one will have preserved the marks of the primitive deviation. This is an absolutely negative result and compels us to reject the hypothesis of selection, since, before even the latter could have had any reason to produce it, the accidental primitive variation would have completely disappeared.”

Whatever may be thought of Mr. Bennett's reasoning one thing is certain. Natural selection alone is insufficient to account for change in species. You cannot evolve what has not been involved. Modifications obtained by natural selection must either be accidental and, hence, transitory in effect, or there must be a growth force which tends in a fixed direction, that is, toward a predetermined end. To admit this is to concede there are final causes in nature. According to this statement, evolution is nothing more than a modified form of development. It allows that the end was seen from the beginning and that the primordial germs had wrapped in them by the Creator all the potency of the subsequent forms. If this doctrine is susceptible of proof and if in the days to come this method of the world's development is established, if we are to believe that the myriad species of nature are thus mysteriously bound together, this belief will not exclude finality but will simply enlarge the argument for design.

"If the species are entirely distinct we might not argue from one to the other for elements of a common design; but if they are so closely related as to proceed one from another by such minute variations as are scarce perceptible, then indeed in each individual there is not only the record of all that is passed but also the prophecy of all there is to come. Then every link in the chain, every transition from one form to another suggests a predetermined end, toward which the whole movement is tending. The more of refinement and of steady approach toward an ideal is recognized, the more irresistible becomes the conclusion that some higher intelligence has enwrapped all these eventualities in that concurrence of atoms and arrangement of forces conspiring toward the final result." Herbert Spencer defines evolution as that "continuous change from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, coherent heterogeneity of structure and function, through successive differentiations and integrations." This contains nothing essentially new. Long ago Leibnitz said that "the present is big with the future." Evolution must be an evolution out of something, and there is no scientific proof that there is such a thing as a universal law of evolution. Its proofs are nebulous, crepuscular. Its teachings are in the twilight. Whether this is the twilight before the dawn or whether it has had its day and will cease to be, matters not so far as the doctrine of final causes is concerned. We have no fear that any scientific discovery will ever enthrone blind chance as the ruler or creator of the universe. At the most, evolution is only a method of the working of the great First Cause.

We come now to the question to what end does the discussion of final causes tend? Is not this search a detriment to science? Bacon writes,* "The habit of seeking final causes in physics has expelled and, as it were, banished from it the physical causes. All explanations of this kind are like those sea-lampreys which, as certain navigators have imagined, fasten upon vessels and stop them." To such objections the reply is this. The doctrine of final causes rightly understood does not encourage a slothful philosophy or hasty generalizations in science. On the contrary, belief in design encourages the search for efficient causes.

* Bacon, "De Dignitate Scientiarum."

When Harvey observed the valves at the outlet of veins and the beginning of arteries so arranged as to admit the passage of blood in one direction and exclude it in another, he believed this arrangement existed for some purpose. This belief encouraged a search which resulted in the discovery of the circulation of the blood. There is no true science save one believes there is a rational arrangement of powers and laws. No number of observed facts constitutes science any more than simple chronicles make history. Science is classified knowledge but classification supposes arrangement and arrangement leads to design. Let the scientist be as careful in ascertaining causes as he can, let him not be misled by hasty generalizations, or by foolish or trivial applications of the doctrine of final causes, let him give no occasion for Voltaire's sneer, "Noses are made to bear spectacles; let us wear them," but when his facts are collected let him understand that he cannot combine them into a rational system without coming back to the belief forced upon the candid mind by the very facts that have been gathered, that in all the play and interplay of heterogeneous phenomena there *is* a design or a predetermined effect toward which all these phenomena are conspiring. Bacon himself writes,* "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend and the Talmud and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is without a mind. . . . For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them, corporate and linked together it must needs fly to providence and the diety."

Were there no other reason to admit or to search for final causes in nature there were sufficient need to secure a firm basis for morality. Kant declares that "morality is the supreme end in nature." The ultimate end of rational being is worthiness of spiritual approbation.† But‡ "if there are no ends in the universe there are none for man any more than for nature. There is no reason why the series of causes should be mechanical up to the appearance of man and become teleological from man onwards.

* Essay XVI.

† *Vide* Hickok, "Moral Science," page 43. Third edition.

‡ Janet, page 425.

If mechanism reigns in nature, it reigns everywhere and in ethics as well as physics. No doubt there might be subjective or contingent ends, pleasure or utility, but not unconditional or absolute, not truly moral ends. Morality is therefore at once the accomplishment and the ultimate proof of the law of finality." The objective rule of right is the claim of the intrinsic excellency of spiritual being, but this is apprehended by the reason only in light of the fact that there is an ultimate end for which man was created and toward which it is his duty to strive. This rule must be embodied in an infinite personality, an absolute will. This leads us to consider the argument from design for the existence of God.

The argument from design is not the only proof of Theism. To many minds it is not the strongest proof. A "single sigh towards the future and the better" may be of more value than the most convincing proof of the divine existence. Still, this is certain: whoever denies finality shuts out all knowledge of God. Mechanism necessitates agnosticism and atheism. It contradicts the first word of inspired Scripture. "In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth." It leaves us without a Christ to love or a Heavenly Father to serve. The Christian cannot surrender the doctrine of finality in nature. The question arises does finality in nature prove the existence of a conscious and intelligent first cause? Does design reveal unto us the existence of Him whom to know aright is eternal life? Such has been the conclusion of many of the most profound thinkers from Socrates to Leibnitz. Kepler questions his wife Barbara at the dinner table, "Dost think if from the creation plates of tin, leaves of lettuce, grains of salt, drops of oil and vinegar and fragments of hard-boiled eggs were floating in space in all directions and without order, chance could assemble them to-day to form a salad"? She replied, "Certainly not so good a one nor so well seasoned as this." Such is the instinctive reply of every pious heart concerning the creation of the world. Chance could not bring about a world so fair and beautiful, so orderly and harmonious as this.

The argument for the existence of God from the proofs of design in nature may be stated as follows: All adaptations of means to ends supposes intelligence. Nature has means adapted

to ends. Therefore nature teaches intelligence. Kant says this proof demonstrates an *architect*, but it does not prove there is a *creator* of the world. Design has to do with the arrangement and not with the creation of matter. Moreover, design does not prove the existence of an *infinite* Being, but one wise enough to arrange matter as we find it. Concerning these objections we note: if matter has not been created, it is self-existent and eternal. If self-existent, it should be sufficient in and for itself or else the cause that gives form to the matter is likewise necessary and self-existent, for non-necessary cause would not have the power to act upon necessary matter. No philosophy is complete until it has found an adequate cause and sufficient reason for not only the physical facts but also all the vital, mental and spiritual facts in human consciousness. Intelligence and will, *i. e.*, personality in man, imply an infinite intelligence an infinite will, that is, a personal, infinite God.

At this point we are met with the query, Granting that order implies intelligence, may not this intelligence be immanent in nature? No thinker has stated this objection more acutely than the philosopher Hegel. His doctrine upon final causes has been ably presented by Paul Janet in three fundamental points:

“1st. There are final causes in nature, and even all is final cause. The domain of efficient causes is that of blind necessity. The final cause is the sole veritable cause, for it alone has in itself the reason of its determinations.

“2d. It is not necessary to conceive the final cause in the form that it has in consciousness; that is, as an anticipated representation of the end. The ends that are in nature are not like the ends we realize, which are the results of choice, foresight and voluntary activity. There are two ways of attaining an end—the one, of which we find an example in human industry; the other, which is rational, without being conscious and reflective, and which is the activity of nature.

“3d. The finality of nature is an immanent, internal finality. It is not as in the works of human industry, an external cause that produces certain means to attain an end that is foreign to them—the cause, the means and the end constituting three terms, separated from each other. In nature, all is united in

the same principle; the end realizes itself. The cause attains its end by self-development. The image of this development is in the seed that contains the whole being it has to realize. It attains the end without going outside itself. It may be said of entire nature what Kant said of the organized being, that in it everything is reciprocally end and means. Internal finality thus becomes immanent finality."*

In answering these objections we note immanent finality up to a certain point need not exclude external finality. The theist can admit the idea of an internal principle of action in nature if this be derived from an external First Cause. Pantheism is faulty in that it refuses to finite beings all proper activity. It relegates all activity to the absolute cause and substance. †"The Hegelian makes a total individuality of nature, and then discarding the individuality, the abstract spontaneity is made soul of nature, and concrete with the pure thinking process it becomes reason or objective mind, which is competent to reduplicate itself by using, at pleasure, either its sentient or thinking side. Hegel puts spontaneity into matter and makes nature out of it. and then its soul is put into the pure thinking, and the particularity and universality together become absolute, the philosophy cognizing itself and all things as within itself. The real is discarded and its ideal pursued, but all in such a mode that its ideal is as unimaginable as its discarded real." Such a philosophy is insufficient.

Nature is in constant flux. It seeks to become what it is not. That which is eternal, self-caused and self-existent should find its end in itself. Unchanged and unchangeable it abides the same "yesterday, to-day and forever." Nature, on the other hand, can be comprehended only as moving toward a predetermined terminus. Nature cannot be the absolute, for the absolute would never need to seek itself.

Pantheism, likewise, contradicts the longing of the human heart. Man is not absolute nor a part of the absolute. His cry has been and it ever will be: "Where is God that I might find Him?" "My heart and my flesh crieth out after God." The

* See "Final Causes," pp. 334, 335.

† Hickok's "Empirical Psychology," p. 252.

soul cannot rest until it finds a God outside, beyond, above itself; a God absolute, self-existent and eternal. Philosophy cannot ignore this longing of the individual, this cry of all people and all ages. It is voiced in art, religion and philosophy. The soul refuses to bow before a blind God. It will never worship chance. Conscious of its own personality it seeks for a personal God. It longs for a heart beating in sympathy with its own heart. It demands a God to love, worship and adore.

Moreover, finality in nature includes finality in man. Man proposes an end and adopts means to attain that end. It is contradictory to assert that man has intelligence and then to deny intelligence in his Creator. Intelligence is the highest cause in nature. Plato ascribes intelligence, life and motion to ideas. Therefore he placed in Jupiter a royal soul. Without force, activity, being, the idea cannot exist. Intelligent activity implies will. Will in its highest manifestation must be an Absolute Will. Finality in nature implies design, an end seen from the beginning, an intelligent Cause who hath made all things after the counsel of His will. God hath not left Himself without a witness in the human heart. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead." Christianity has nothing to fear from Science. On the contrary every discovery is an added blow welding more tightly the links in the chain that binds the world to God. The reverent mind sees in each discovery the handiwork of Him "by whom and for whom all things were made, and without whom there was not anything made that was made."

THE ATTITUDE OF THE SECULAR PRESS TOWARD RELIGION.

[A paper read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, April 4th, 1889.]

BY A. H. SIEGFRIED,* NEW YORK.

THE subject of this discussion gives room for a deal of talk quite apart from the real point that we have in mind. The "secular press" clearly includes all regular and periodical publications not distinctively religious; and "religion"—what may that *not* include in these later days! Before defining the obvious purpose and limitations of what we are to consider, let us not appear to ignore as an important part of the secular press all that multitude of publications given to commerce, science, art, literature, youth, music, amusement, education, illustration, and, chief of all, those superb monthly periodicals which seem to combine in a large sense all these others with inclusiveness and completeness peculiarly American, and best exemplified in all the world by New York's great magazines. For if all this side of journalistic secularity is left out of the question, we lose sight at the outset of much that is of high value in the secular press, and of much that is all the while working in lines more or less close alongside of religion. Some of us little knew, and many of us have forgotten the notable and valuable essay at religious teaching made by the younger of our then two great monthlies years ago, when it had everything to make or lose, yet had the nerve, sagacity and aggressiveness to venture upon such ground as was gone over by Dr. Wilkinson in his "Bondage of the Pulpit," and Dr. Blauvelt in his "Modern Scepticism," "Christ's Resurrection," "Christ's Supernaturalism," etc., and yet the fairness to present the prompt and sturdy rejoinders of Mr. Duffield and Dr. Atwater. Many and sharp differences of opinion there were and there was room for concerning those lines of discussion, but there and then an important division of the secular press indi-

* Eastern manager of *The Chicago Daily News*.

cated one of its true and useful relations to religious thought, and right there and then Scribner's Monthly planted one of its deepest and strongest roots for The Century.

But our present thought must chiefly take hold of the attitude of the general newspaper—not toward religion in its broad and all-inclusive sense, but as we now know and are in and of it—the newspaper press as towards Christianity. My contribution to the discussion is of a very simple, and, as I have at least tried to make it, of a strictly practical sort. Whatever else it may or may not be, it is the view of a newspaper man, and from the newspaper standpoint. To some extent it is the attempt of one all his life in newspaper work, and knowing something of its inner motives, and forces and workings, to show to those outside a little of the average newspaper's inner thought of its own relation to religion—not what should be or what may be made its attitude, but what is its actual and active attitude.

As a means to this practical end, and as measuring somewhat the strength and pervasiveness of this secular force, please be patient under a very few details and figures. According to the latest issue of the American Newspaper Directory, of New York, April 1st, 1889, there are in the United States, the territories and the British American provinces 17,107 regular publications. Excluding from these the 662 that are distinctively religious, and the 2,300 specifically class publications, there remain in America 14,145 of the secular sort of daily and weekly newspapers that we have in mind for our present purpose. Then when we know that these have an aggregate circulation for each separate issue—not for each week or month, or for the year, but for each separate issue of each individual publication, of more than 40,000,000 of copies—many of them repeating themselves each day, some each alternate day, some each third day, and the remainder at least each week, and the whole, as shown by *Printers' Ink*, making an aggregate for each year of 2,959,566, 500 copies, we have some impression of the numerical strength of this mighty force which holds some relation to and bears a strong influence upon religious life, thought and work, and which, measured by its units, is almost as the June leaves on the trees—in its vast aggregate almost numberless ; a force expan-

sive, aggressive, pervasive; going everywhere, stopping nowhere; ceasing never.

We of the town are apt to forget and to discount the importance as to moral and religious influence of what are familiarly, and often in a half contemptuous way, called the "country papers"—the papers whose quick anger Mr. Watterson once brought upon his always breezy head when, in one of his lively fights against political bourbonism, years ago he called them "rural roosters." We cannot afford to forget that as to their number and the number of communities in which they live and work, these are vastly the greater part of the secular press. The country editor has little to do with the formation of general thought and opinion as to religion, yet as to practical religious work he is about the best and truest friend religion has among purely secular influences. A greatly larger proportion of country than of city newspaper men is personally and professedly interested in religion. If he is not a professed Christian, the country editor, by the nature of his place, work and surroundings feels an immediate personal interest in local religious organization and effort, and in the relatively few cases where he has not in himself either a direct or indirect interest in and kindly disposition toward religion as it lives and moves around him, he is compelled by his merely business interests to give it help and countenance. But, better than this, in the small communities, where everybody knows everybody, and all individual knowledge and doing blend and intertwine, there is intimate merging of business, society, church, churchmen, clergy, newspaper, so that, whether it will or will not, the local newspaper, moved and controlled, almost always, by a single mind, and not by a great, complex, selfish, confounding and confounded mental machine, drops into the general drift and becomes part and parcel of every general interest, and so of the religious interest. If the village editor is in heart and life a Christian man, so much the surer and better his friendship for religion; but if he is not, the close contact, direct relation and interdependence of village life so shape and control all the elements and movements of such life, that on one ground or another village religion can always count upon the help and favor of the local newspaper.

When we remember the vastness of village life, the nearly 10,000 American village newspapers and the direct bearing of their influence, we shall be stupid students of the question before us if we leave the country secular press out of the account.

But, drawing now a third and smaller circle, and shutting out by a great deal the larger number of secular publications, we come to the 1,584 daily newspapers which produce an immense proportion of the whole secular circulation ; which make by much the larger part of the world's noise, which chiefly set the pace for the quick thought and nervous movement of the people,—and here the real trouble begins. At the Hartford meeting of The American Congress of Churches, Dr. Washington Gladden said : “The attitude of the average American editor toward religion is one of calm superiority.” There is some truth in the statement, but if thirty-odd years of newspaper work and observation go for anything, and if one of the lines of study which have been applied to the present use of this question reveal anything, it is plain that Dr. Gladden would better have substituted for “calm superiority,” friendly indifference. True is it that the daily press has much to say of and at religion, and that here and there sincerity and genuine piety are behind the saying ; but taking the American daily press in the lump, it is neither untrue nor ungenerous, nor, when fully considered, is it surprising to say that, aside from the dollar-and-cent interest inherent in religion as a part of the great whole to be reported, discussed, scandalized, supported, commended, and turned over with all the rest of the world's doing, fact and fancy, to be sold as part of the publisher's merchandise, neither the thought, spirit nor works of religion have special place or value in the real regard of the daily secular press. When I began really to think on this subject—and one of the lesser proofs that Dr. Gladden should have said “indifference” instead of “superiority,” is in the fact that during many years of newspaper work I never had really thought of its *relation to religion*—early in such thought as my share in this evening's talk forced upon me, came the conviction that the newspaper press is not hostile, but rather friendly to religion when there is occasion for any showing of its feeling at all, but that as the daily grind goes on, the wide world

thinks and feels and reads so much more about the thousand and one things outside of religion, that the matter as to religion is simply indifference. Out of this came the idea that I might do two things by direct correspondence with newspaper men—confirm or combat this conviction of their religious indifference, and at the same time secure their own personal, direct and characteristic expressions on the whole subject. Wherefore the average and representative American daily newspaper was given a dose of its own medicine, and the face of the interviewer was turned newspaperward. Seven perfectly simple and obvious questions were formulated—none of them aimed at securing novel ideas or original information, but designed to secure from the American editor, without the intervention of the professional “we,” his own personal ideas as to his own professional relation to religion. These seven inquiries, briefly stated, asked for individual opinion as to the attitude of the secular press toward religion in its broad sense; then as limited or defined by creeds and formulations; then as a practical force for the good of mankind; then an inquiry as to the average space or prominence given to religious matter of any and all sorts; then, in order to get at the direct personal interest of those who manage and shape and make newspapers, there were questions as to the professed religious conviction of the editor and publisher, and, based either upon actual knowledge or general estimate, inquiry as to the proportion of staff writers, managing editors and reporters who are openly and professedly in religious connection and communion. These inquiries were printed on a convenient sheet, each with ample space for easy reply. Each sheet was accompanied by a separate and personal letter stating the purpose of the inquiry, and each bore assurance that the name of no answerer should be publicly given out contrary to his expressed wish. Each was accompanied, also, by a stamped and addressed envelope for return of the answer. In short, the questions were easy and convenient to answer, and the reason for and manner of putting them were at least as good as usually attend the advance of the newspaper interviewer when he goes out seeking whom he may put to inquisition. These were sent to all the leading daily newspapers printed in English and German in the

United States and Canada—106 English and 35 German—141 in all, and from the 141 papers just 28 answers were received—23 from papers printed in English and 5 from those printed in German. So, after allowing for all the real or fancied reasons which might fairly be given for not attending to such a request, the silence of the 113 would seem to reasonably support the theory that religious indifference is a characteristic of the average American editor. That you may know the widely representative character of newspapers sought in this way, and the thoroughness with which the country was covered by the inquiry, let me say that it was sent to the papers here named :

BOSTON—Advertiser, Herald, Globe, Journal, Post, Transcript, Traveller and Evening Record ;
 PROVIDENCE—Journal ;
 HARTFORD—Courant ;
 NEW HAVEN—Palladium ;
 ALBANY—Argus and Evening Journal ;
 BROOKLYN—Eagle, Times and Union ;
 BUFFALO—Courier and Express ;
 NEW YORK—Commercial Advertiser, Evening Post, Evening Telegram, Graphic, Herald, Journal of Commerce, Mail and Express, News, Morning Journal, Sun, Times, Tribune, Star and World ;
 ROCHESTER—Democrat and Chronicle, and Morning Herald ;
 SYRACUSE—Journal and Standard ;
 TROY—Times ;
 UTICA—Morning Herald and Observer ;
 PHILADELPHIA—Press, Ledger, Record and Times ;
 PITTSBURGH—Dispatch, Chronicle, Telegraph, Commercial Gazette, Leader and Post ;
 NEWARK—Advertiser and Evening News ;
 JERSEY CITY—Evening Journal ;
 BALTIMORE—American, Herald, News and Sun ;
 WASHINGTON—Evening Star, Post and National Republican ;
 RICHMOND—Dispatch ;
 CHARLESTON—News and Courier ;
 ATLANTA—Constitution ;
 MOBILE—Register ;

NEW ORLEANS—Picayune, Times-Democrat ;
 GALVESTON—News ;
 LOUISVILLE—Courier-Journal, Commercial ;
 CINCINNATI—Commercial-Gazette and Enquirer ;
 CLEVELAND—Leader and Plaindealer ;
 COLUMBUS—State Journal ;
 INDIANAPOLIS—Sentinel and Journal ;
 CHICAGO—Tribune, Times, Inter-Ocean, Herald, Evening Journal and Daily News ;
 DETROIT—Tribune and Free Press ;
 MILWAUKEE—Sentinel and Evening Wisconsin ;
 ST. LOUIS—Republican, Globe-Democrat, and Post-Dispatch ;
 KANSAS CITY—Times and Journal ;
 DES MOINES—State Register ;
 ST. PAUL—Pioneer Press and Globe ;
 MINNEAPOLIS—Tribune ;
 DENVER—Tribune ;
 SAN FRANCISCO—Call, Bulletin, Alta California and Examiner ;
 PORTLAND, OREGON—Oregonian ;
 TORONTO—Globe, Mail and News ;
 MONTREAL—Gazette and Witness ;
 OTTAWA—Citizen and Free Press.

The answers received were from the Boston Traveller, one out of eight, from Boston ; New Haven Palladium ; Albany Argus and Evening Journal ; Brooklyn Times ; New York Journal of Commerce, one out of 14 ; Rochester Democrat and Chronicle ; Pittsburgh Chronicle-Telegraph ; Newark Advertiser and Evening News ; Washington National Republican ; Atlanta Constitution ; Louisville Commercial ; Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette ; Columbus State Journal ; Indianapolis Sentinel ; Chicago Evening Journal and Daily News ; Milwaukee Evening Wisconsin ; Kansas City Times ; St. Paul Globe ; Minneapolis Tribune ; Montreal Witness, and one from Toronto, sent anonymously, of which no account is taken, according to newspaper rules.

Of the 83 German dailies the expressions of 35 of the leading ones in 19 towns were sought, and responses were received from five of the 35—Rochester Volksblatt ; Indianapolis Tribune, Chicago Staats-Zeitung ; and St. Louis Anzeiger des Westens and Westliche Post.

Two of the return envelopes came back from Philadelphia, *sealed and empty*,—which probably were meant as indicative of the average Philadelphia newspaper opinion; and, whereas these inquiries were sent out on the 19th of *December*, there came from the Boston Herald, on the 5th of *March*, a letter from the member of its staff to whom the matter had been referred, saying that he was engaged in a similar work himself, and that he could not respond without giving away his own points—which may be taken as another indication that Boston is, as some one has said, losing her intellectual supremacy, but with genuine Bostonian thrift is determined to hold fast what she yet has on hand.

The interest and value of the results of this correspondence chiefly rest in getting some idea of the personal religious interest and association of those who immediately produce the American newspaper, and in securing such cues, clues and sidelights as come from their own individual and characteristic expressions. Present time will not allow the complete reproduction of even the 28 responses received, but I give such as I can from each one—using the exact language of each. The report from all the German papers is that not one man on the editorial, reportorial or business staffs has any sort of connection with any religious body. The editor of one leading St. Louis paper says he is an agnostic. Three of the five give no space whatever to religion or religious matter, and the other two only what is necessary to report daily happenings.

The editor of the Chicago Staats-Zeitung says:—"My idea is to let religion severely alone. All creeds and formulations are of equal value, viz.: to those who hold them, paramount; to all others, rubbish. The practical force of religion for the good of mankind is not apparent to the student of history, who knows that millions of men, women and children have been murdered in the name of religion."

The St. Louis Westliche Post says:—"My attitude toward religion is one of respectful indifference."

Indianapolis Tribuene:—"The attitude of the secular press toward religion is that of a business man, who likes to please everybody and offend no one, so as to make as much money as possible."

Rochester Volksblatt:—"The secular press has nothing to do with religion."

St. Louis Anzeiger des Westens:—"Perfect neutrality" towards religion in general; "assistance" to it as a force for the good of mankind. "I am of the sincere conviction that an educated man who dares to think and to follow out the necessary conclusions of his thought, cannot be a believer."

As to the 23 papers printed in English, from which responses came, the reports show that of their editors 13 are professors of religion; of their publishers, 9. Of the proportion of staff writers and reporters who are in religious connection, the Minneapolis Tribune says—"very small indeed;" the Louisville Commercial says—"one-fifth;" Atlanta Constitution—"three-fourths;" St. Paul Globe—"probably 10 per cent.;" Albany Evening Journal—"at least one-half;" Pittsburgh Chronicle-Telegraph—"8 out of a writing force of 24;" Brooklyn Times—"about one-third in actual church communion—all in sympathy with the practical ideas of religion;" New York Journal of Commerce—"five-ninths;" Newark Advertiser—"not many;" Rochester Democrat and Chronicle—"a very small portion;" Boston Traveller—"one-third;" New Haven Palladium—"1 out of 4;" Newark Evening News—"one-third;" Washington National Republican—"about one per cent.;" Columbus, Ohio, State Journal—"just one-half;" Chicago Evening Journal—"1 in 5;" Montreal Witness—"12 or 13 out of 14 of regular staff, and the same proportion in other departments;" Milwaukee Evening Wisconsin—"probably one-fourth;" Indianapolis Sentinel—"probably 2 out of the 6;" Chicago Daily News—"less than one-half;" as to the other papers—none at all.

From the individual expressions of the several papers I quote as follows:

" 'Towards religion in a broad sense,' the attitude of the Minneapolis Tribune and, we think, of other leading northwestern papers, is that of generous appreciation and practical co-operation. We believe in what Canon Farrar calls 'the work of the Church in America.' We pay small attention to the tweedledums and tweedle-dees, but always abet the practical good works and philanthropies of the various denominations. Secular

papers have no concern with 'creeds and conventional formulations.' The press in general has a pragmatic view of the subject. Religion *is*, and is as appreciably a beneficent fact as the sunshine is a beneficent fact. The press, as an exponent of the soundest public opinion could not do otherwise than value highly the practical force of religion."

"The St. Paul Globe inculcates a strong and vigorous religious sentiment in its broadest and most catholic sense; a faith in the elevating and refining influences of a religious life. It treats religious creeds as it does political creeds—upholding that in them which seems to it good, and deferentially criticising that which fails to commend itself to its judgment."

Louisville Commercial:—"The secular press should sustain religion as the cheapest and best agency for securing an orderly and moral society, which is always the strongest and most prosperous society. Churches do better work than policemen. As to creeds, non-interference. Let religious and sectarian papers discuss these. As a matter of fact, the treatment of religion by the secular press is not exactly what it should be; though, barring flippancy, irreverence and an impatience with what seems a survival of narrowness and bigotry, or cant and goody-goodishness, the press usually gives religion its due."

Albany Evening Journal:—"The secular press, toward religion generally considered, is friendly; as defined by creeds, not unfriendly; as a practical force friendly and sympathetic."

Albany Argus:—"The attitude of the secular press toward religion should be profoundly respectful, and fully imbued with the important bearing and beneficial influence of religion on society and the nation; as to creeds entirely independent and swayed by no sectarian prejudices. The man without religion is a ready tool for the enemies of society and mankind generally. Religion is a necessary element in the healthful progress and happiness of the world."

The Pittsburgh Chronicle-Telegraph says:—"A newspaper must exert either a good or bad influence upon the community of which it is a part. If bad, it will lose the respect and support of society, and eventually be forced out of existence. It follows logically that established and successful newspapers recognize

their responsibility to the usages of society and foster the religious feeling. They support the Church in a broad sense as they support the state; respect religion as they respect the law. The secular press has nothing to do with creeds. The very existence of the press is a practical force toward public morality."

The Brooklyn Times says:—"Towards religion as a practical force the secular press is in the main friendly—almost universally so. It is not hostile to religion as a practical and vital force, but rather to creeds and dogmatic theology."

New York Journal of Commerce:—"Whether from the personal respect of the controllers of the press or an enlightened deference to the best public opinion, the secular press manifests a profound regard for religious thought and sentiment. There is some impatience of religious intolerance, and creeds are less kindly treated than religious principles. The common sentiment of the secular press is that without the influence of religious thought and culture the world would retrograde toward barbarism. The time has gone by when any prominent secular newspaper can make anything in the way of capital for itself by sneering at revealed religion."

Newark Advertiser:—"Very favorable toward religion broadly considered; less so as defined and limited by creeds: decidedly favorable to it as a practical force; thoroughly orthodox, and in line with every religious, moral and benevolent movement, regardless of denomination, creed, race or color."

Newark Evening News:—"The secular press should uphold religion in its broad sense, at least for its refining and uplifting moral forces. With creeds and formulations the secular press should have no concern. It is because of the heterogeneous character of the readers of the newspaper that denominational lines should never be crossed, unless encroachment upon the constitutional or traditional liberties or rights of the people is attempted. In such an event the secular press should be outspoken."

Rochester Democrat and Chronicle:—"Exceedingly sympathetic with religion in its best and broadest sense; sees the good in all creeds, and is tolerant toward the errors of all; freely acknowledges religion as a practical force for the good of man-

kind, and recognizes Christianity as the basal principle of free institutions, but hostile to any control of the state by the Church; there is a false impression, too studiously cultivated by the cloth, that the secular press is the foe of religion."

Boston Traveller:—"Towards religion in its broad sense the secular press is one-third friendly, one-third patronizing and one-third indifferent or unfriendly. As to creeds, a majority of newspapers are critical, and some are ignorant of the influence and spirit of creeds and forms. As to religion as a practical force, a majority fail to appreciate it."

Kansas City Times:—"Toward religion in its broad sense the secular press is generally friendly and in a measure co-operative. Newspapers as a rule treat religion broadly, without reference to creeds. As a practical force for the general good, religion is the greatest."

New Haven Palladium:—"Nothing of human interest falls without the scope of the daily press. Religion is always a matter of interest to a large class of newspaper readers. The business of a newspaper is to publish news about those subjects in which its readers are interested. As to creeds the newspaper should be absolutely non-partisan—fair to all, biased toward none. The duty of the secular press is that of all good citizens—to foster, encourage and applaud everything tending toward the good of mankind."

Washington National Republican:—"Toward religion as a general principle, very friendly, and earnestly desirous of promoting it; as to creeds and dogma, tolerant. It is the policy of the secular press to treat all sects with unvarying and equal courtesy, as is shown by the ridicule or contempt with which assaults on religion are generally treated."

Columbus Ohio State Journal:—"Religion is the best organized element of society, and the secular press stands by it as such. It should treat all creeds alike. While it may do most for the orthodox churches and their auxiliaries, it should treat all others with deference and recognize their worth to the community."

From the editor-in-chief of the Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette came an observation, the force of which, I presume, is in the

application of it. He wrote:—"The only observation that I have time to make on this whole subject is that I have not yet succeeded in conquering this world, and have not had time to invade the other to any great extent."

Milwaukee Evening Wisconsin:—"The attitude of the secular press towards religion is far more conciliatory, even far more Christian, than the present attitude of average religion is toward the secular press. The press, in its best elements, is a co-worker, not yet acknowledged, but to be acknowledged and prized, too, next to the church and the home, as religion's most helpful co-adjutor. With the sort of limitation that puts creed or profession before practice, the press is at war. The concrete work of the Church, done for the actual betterment of human conditions, the press notes and applauds; the professions of the Church—the mere religious abstractions—it takes no stock in. Intelligent, thoughtful men of the press recognize that applied religion is an essential factor in both the moral and material welfare of the individual, community and nation. So far as the temper of their readers permits, they give proof in their every day work of such recognition."

Indianapolis Sentinel:—"The secular press should be to a large extent the earnest supporter of religion. The editor should allow himself large freedom in the discussion of creeds and formulations. The more these are fairly discussed the better for religion. If by religion is meant Christianity, every phase of the good of mankind will be enhanced by the preaching of the Gospel throughout the world, and this should be the position of the secular press."

Montreal * ————— :—"In Canada the most immoral and irreligious of the English papers publish much about religion. Their attitude toward religion is negative—treating all views alike, which is positively bad. In this matter the morals of a paper are much more important than its professions. The majority of our newspapers are distinctively pro-religious, and in a broad sense pro-orthodox. The Catholic secular papers are in the sense of creed very religious. The Protestant secular papers are non-denominational, and only reveal in a very general

* Name omitted by request.

way the creeds of their conductors. Some of the papers which are the strongest forces in Canada are conducted by religious men in a religious spirit."

Chicago Evening Journal:—"The secular press is disposed to give all reasonable facilities to the interests of general religion. We know of not a single exception. The secular press steers clear of sectarian bias, and abhors creeds as such. The disposition of newspaper editors is exceeding liberal toward practical religion—not only willing always, but anxious ever to advance it. Religionists who rail at the secular press do so thoughtlessly. 'They know not what they do.' The secular press is their chief ally—much more ready and willing to co-operate with them than they seem to suppose."

Chicago Daily News:—"A newspaper should represent the convictions of its editor, and these convictions being of infinite variety, it follows that no two newspapers may preserve a like attitude. Nor can a rule of action be laid down. As I hold to the view that the Christian religion works a betterment of mankind, I aim to impress that view upon the attention of my readers. I see no difference between the personal relation which I sustain to society and the official or editorial relation, save that because I edit a newspaper my influence and hence my responsibility is much greater than usual. The same rule applies to creeds. A conscientious editor will do precisely what any conscientious man will do, viz.: teach the doctrines in which he believes. The theory that a newspaper is anything different from the exponent of the honest views of an editor is a most pernicious one. If an editor believes in evangelical religion, he will use the opportunity furnished him through his newspaper to be of practical service to his readers, to the world at large, and to his Master. I aim to treat religious topics as I should any other class of topics, proportionately to their news value. *I do think* the history of the religious progress of the world as important as the history of the material or political progress. Hence I think I give more space to religious subjects than is customary. I believe that the facts concerning a great religious movement are more valuable from a merely *news* standpoint than the facts respecting a burglary, a murder, a dog fight, or a game of base ball."

Now we have before us the personal, candid, straightforward expressions of these average and fairly representative daily newspapers, given in the exact words of their editors. Whatever else we may gather from them, a few points can hardly have failed to impress us all alike. These expressions of opinion give out the ring of genuineness and sincerity. Those of German source excepted, the open friendship, even the earnest championship, of the general principles of the Christian religion, and of their application to the practical good of mankind are distinctive features of all but one, and the pith of their aggregate opinion and argument may be set down as hopeful and helpful. But these expressions almost entirely come from the smaller towns. Only nine are from large centres of population, and but six of the larger American cities are represented. Yet I am fully persuaded by acquaintance with many of the unrepresented papers, and by a good general impression of all of them, that if we had heard from the silent 113 of the 141, all would have spoken with a fair average of sincerity, substantially in line with those whose responses we have heard. Measured by the data before us, the press of the smaller cities has a truer and deeper interest in religion than that of the great cities, and what has been said of the village press needs only slight qualification to make it applicable to that of the smaller and middle class cities. Whether as to small or great papers and centres, I think that we may gather out of it all that, not "calm superiority," not hostility, not, all things considered, more than natural indifference, mark the attitude of the secular press toward religion: but rather, friendship, alliance, when religion moves in its even and wonted course; strong helpfulness and prominence to religious affairs and interests when special events and conditions make them dominant; often outspoken censure and criticism when religion pushes forward her differential dogma, her millinery and mechanism; but swift, sharp, rifle-shotted, bayonet-fixed, knife-to-the-hilt war *for* religion when she is unfairly, needlessly or unworthily assailed.

I entirely leave a well-nigh boundless field of general discussion bristling with salient points, to speak briefly on a very few detached but related branches of this subject, trusting to their

direct practical bearing, rather than to the treatment of them, as reason for asking further attention.

A distinguished, observant and every-way-to-be honored clergyman has said that the *Sunday* newspaper must go. He never made a greater mistake. The Sunday newspaper has come to stay. Scolding it, anathematizing it, fighting it, legislating against it, boycotting it, will not down it or much hurt it. Every Christian man in America may refuse to buy it or its advertising space, but it will stay and grow. No single branch of trade or manufactures in existence twenty-five years ago, shows so large a relative growth as the making and sale of the Sunday newspaper. I do not speak for it or against it, but simply of the fact of its growth and permanence, so that I may state another fact—that there neither is nor has been such another force working toward the mere secularization of the Christian Sabbath as the Sunday newspaper. I do not even stop to consider whether Sunday secularization is a good or a bad thing, but, out of long experience upon daily papers having Sunday editions, and others not having them, and out of careful observation of the Sunday newspaper from its origin during the war and up through its wonderful development, I say to the religionist and the Sabbatarian that—not because it so designs or seeks or wishes, but because of the nature and outcome of the thing itself—the Sunday newspaper has done more than any and all things else for Sunday secularization. Consider an example of but one sort and with but one trend. Who, ten years ago, would have dreamed of a great Sunday night entertainment in New York, at the staid old Academy of Music, abetted and patronized by certainly not the vicious classes? Something of the baser sort might have been possible in Mulberry Street or the Bowery, but let me give you the chief points in an advertisement which appeared—not ten years ago, but Sunday, March 14, 1886, in every New York newspaper, and which I have taken from the one which calls itself “the leading American newspaper.”

“Academy of Music, Sunday evening, March 21, 1886. Absolutely grand testimonial benefit tendered to Mr. So-and-so. Very great pleasure is taken in announcing the appearance on

that occasion of the famous orator—Col. Robert Ingersoll ; the great star of the Metropolitan Opera House, Miss So-and-so; the distinguished contralto of the American Opera Co., Miss So-and-so; a renowned basso, a very eminent oratorio soprano, a famous cornet virtuoso, a superb piano virtuoso, a distinguished and ever popular maestro, an absolutely startling array of eminent, celebrated and popular comedians—naming nine such; select readings by members of two popular theatrical companies, the appearance entirely or nearly so of six theatrical companies, ending and climaxing with that of Tony Pastor, the grand chorus of the Metropolitan Opera House, the combined choruses of the popular opera companies, and Gilmore's entire band." I have given these phrases from the advertisement *verbatim*, and a special line at the foot of the advertisement reads—"Particularly observe the date—SUNDAY EVENING, March 21." Furthermore, in the adjacent column are flattering letters to the beneficiary, strongly commending this *Sunday* performance, signed by names of influence—among which are those of an ex-governor, the editors-in-chief of the New York Tribune, N. Y. Sun, and Philadelphia Transcript, and the managing editor of the N. Y. World. And still furthermore, in that same paper are the advertisements for Sunday services of two heterodox quasi-religious societies, one great religious benevolence and fifteen good and regular Christian churches. This was three years ago. But a short time before then Sunday amusements were hardly known. Saturday, March 23, last, the city superintendent of police gave a list of many places of amusement now regularly open, among which were eleven theatres and public halls—not in the slums, but in the best streets of New York. This is but one feature of Sunday secularization, but in many and possibly worse forms it is here. And the Sunday paper is here ; it will stay ; it will grow ; you cannot down it, or even ignore it. What is religion going to do for it and with it ? Shall it be the Sunday paper of the present and worse, or a paper of and for the Sabbath ?

Religion, as embodied in its clergy and more active laity, often weakens its own case by holding the secular press amenable to a too high and close religious test, and by overlooking

the simple and controlling motive of secular newspaper production. Railway and steamship companies are organized by capital for the one purpose of making money. In an indirect way they are aids and agents of religion, but who ever considers their attitude or amenity to religion as such? Common schools are conducted not at all to make money, but for a high and unselfish purpose, and because through them intellect works upon intellect we hold them bound to teach sound morals and the one great principle of universal religion, but who holds the general common school system to any closer religious responsibility? The average secular newspaper is made for the one purpose of financial profit. Newspapers are sometimes started and conducted, even at a loss, to serve party, political, social, or other ends, but I think no daily newspaper ever had birth in America that did not have as its distinct and controlling purpose the making of money, aside from any real or fancied good it might do. It is distinctively within evidence that the first newspapers never dreamed of teaching or influencing men, but were made simply to collect and deal in news and entertainment, as in any other commodity. But because this was the work of intelligence upon intelligence, and because of the conditions inherent in this kind of business, it soon took higher form and service, and came into a moral and even religious responsibility, of which in its origin it never took thought. I have recently gone carefully through Wingate's "Views and Interviews on Journalism" as to this one point of newspaper motive and work. Its compiler sought the opinions of the leading editors and publishers of 1875 on this subject, and the first notable utterance was by Mr. Whitelaw Reid, who said that the idea and object of the modern daily newspaper is to collect and give *news*, with the promptest and best elucidation and discussion thereof—that is, the selling of these in the open market—primarily, "a merchant of news." The question was asked of and answered in substantially the same way by Henry Watterson, Samuel Bowles, William Cullen Bryant, Charles A. Dana, Henry J. Raymond, Horace White, David G. Croly, Murat Halstead, Frederick Hudson, George William Curtis, Horace Greeley, E. L. Godkin, Manton Marble, Parke Godwin, George W. Smalley, James Gordon Bennett, Sr.

and Jr., and others. The book is of 360 pages, and full of discussion by eminent newspaper men as to the motives and methods and ethics of their profession, but only two of them speak even indirectly of religion as in any wise entering into their work. I am not justifying this silence as to man's really greatest concern—for I gladly believe that both the average and the eminent editor have moved upward and forward in the last decade—but I cite the fact as showing that the primary motive and controlling principle of the newspaper are in no wise different or better or worse than those of Wall street and Broadway. After the secular press admits its duty to teach morality and reinforce religion, does religion get to herself anything more or better if she demands of the secular press more than an earnest, upright and conscientious walk in the secular pathway?

Finally, as a detective and corrective force, the newspaper can and does go where religion cannot without smirching her garments, and so becomes her willing, strong and sometimes indispensable ally. In the line of discovering, exposing, strangling and driving to the wall vices and corruptions, which seem at times to make a load too grievous to be borne, but almost too weighty to be removed—say what you will of the often viciously impure, scandalous and demoralizing tone and contents of a portion of the secular press—there do come occasions when the best religious and moral organization falls short of the end, and the facilities and power of the press come in to do indispensable work on its own account, or to prepare the way for and cooperate with the gentler force. There do come times of moral sultriness and miasma when purity and healthfulness are only possible after the cyclone's whirl and the tornado's blast, and something other than religion must raise the wind. The old Tweed ring was damned, downed and driven out by a New York newspaper. The Ku Klux of Kentucky were discovered, hounded, corralled and destroyed by a then managing editor who planned, and a reporter who executed his plans—both commissioned by and working through the Democratic Louisville Courier-Journal. The gamblers of Louisville, stronger and bolder than in any other American city, and even respected by a considerable part of the population, were driven out and for a

long time kept out of their dens by the Louisville Commercial. When a New York policeman, sworn and set apart to protect virtue, assailed it and outraged society, and systematic and powerful efforts were made to hide the crime, buy off and drive off witnesses, and delay and hinder the natural course of justice by all manner of evasion and technicality, one of the very newspaper men who had strangled the Kentucky Ku Klux, now on a New York newspaper, quick to see the crime and its demoralizing police influence, and the trend toward obstructing law and justice, threw all his detective skill and journalistic force into the fight, aroused right sentiment, aided the prosecution, and landed the official scoundrel and personal criminal in Sing Sing for eighteen years. When the foulest plague spot in New York—that threaded by West 27th Street—at last made an unbearable moral stench three year ago, it was the newspaper reporters of the city who led and fought the way to its purification. The most daring, cunning and powerful ballot-box stuffer and municipal political corruptionist in America—Mackin, of Chicago—who had come to open pride in his unholy political power, who could make or unmake majorities, control courts and police, who was feared by his enemies and dreaded even by the friends who had to use him, was pursued by a Chicago newspaper for eighteen months against all the odds, through all the intricacies and over all the obstacles that men, law and lawlessness could devise and money buy—but at last the newspaper locked him inside the state prison. Whatever of moral bluntness, bribery and corruption have been or may be in pan-electric telephones, Broadway railroads, boodle aldermen, legislative ceilings, Croton aqueducts, new market stalls, and the whole list of infernalities born of man's cupidity, have been and are being investigated, rooted out and punished—not by public sentiment alive and alert of itself, but stirred, and poked and prodded and walked up and down like a man in an opium stupor, first by the secular press of New York, and then, when once aroused, by that of the whole country. And these are but examples of a hateful and uncanny work that no one wants to do; that religion cannot do, that something or somebody must do, and that the secular press *does*, not always nor often because it wants to, but because

no one and nothing else will do it, and because by virtue of its pluck, power, facilities, responsibility, and at the last its honest and earnest care for good against evil, and for right against wrong, it is sure to get into, and usually on the right side of, every great fight.

THOMAS ARNOLD AND HIS SON.—Had he lived until Christmas Eve, 1888, Matthew Arnold would have been sixty-six years old. He was allotted nineteen years more than his father in which to do his life-work. Did he choose so excellent a sphere? Did he fill it so well? Different men will return diverse answers to these questions. We can only speak from our own standpoint. That Matthew was more brilliantly endowed than his father few will doubt; that he stirred about more in the world and led a life more exposed to the public gaze is simply matter of fact; that he will fill a larger place in the history of English literature, as poet and critic, is hardly open to question. But if we apply the Master's test, "He that would be chiefest among you, let him become the servant of all," who will dare to challenge the chieftainship of Thomas Arnold of Rugby? Many thousands of people in England and America have been captivated with Matthew Arnold's "Culture and Anarchy" (1869), "St. Paul and Protestantism" (1870), "Literature and Dogma" (1873), "God and the Bible" (1875), "Last Essays on Church and Religion" (1877). Many may be grateful that, in casting off the shackles of positive religion, Matthew still preached what he considered a gospel of righteousness. And it may be true that he hindered a desperate, despairing agnosticism from filling some hearts and dominating some lives. But who can take these intangible subtleties of this apostle of another gospel—which is not a gospel—his "sweetness and light," his "stream of tenderness," and his "something not ourselves which makes for righteousness," and put them in the stead of those masculine truths of the gospel of the Son of God which glowed in his father's heart, nerved his arm for the conflict, and taught him through blissful experiences that this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith? The apotheosis of doubt, which has characterized our age, is being fast transmuted into the paralysis of despair. Men are looking for teachers and leaders who can give them of their faith; they have doubts enough of their own. The blessed reaction toward the eternal Christian verities has already set in, and happy is that man who may come to the kingdom—in literature, in art, in teaching, in preaching—for such a time as this. The world will soon be crying out for ten thousand *Thomas Arnolds*.—*The Preacher Himself*.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

BY THE SECRETARY.

FEBRUARY.—The regular monthly meeting of the Institute was held at the rooms, No. 4 Winthrop Place, Feb. 7, at 8 P.M., the President, Dr. Deems, being in the chair. The devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. Jesse F. Forbes, New York. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. Announcement was made of the death of a valued member of the Institute, Rev. Isaac Errett, D.D., of Cincinnati. The President paid a tribute to the high Christian character and scholarship of Dr. Errett, and spoke of the warm interest he took in the affairs of the Institute, and the influence he exerted in its behalf through the columns of his very able paper, *The Christian Standard*.

The names of new members were announced as follows :

Mr. A. H. De Haven, New York ; Prof. Dr. M. J. Cramer, East Orange, N. J. ; Ezra A. Stafford, D.D., Toronto, Canada ; Rev. David C. Hughes, New York ; Mr. Joseph Chambers, Covington, Ky. ; Henry E. Johnson, D.D., Greenville, Pa. ; Prof. Martyn Summerbell, Lewiston, Me. ; Wilbur G. Williams, D.D., Pres. Allegheny Col., Meadville, Pa. ; James A. Orman, M.D., D.D., Murfreesboro, Tenn. ; Mr. and Mrs. Henry G. Ludlow, Troy, N. Y. ; David Waters, D.D., LL.D., Newark, N. J. ; Marcuis H. Hutton, D.D., New Brunswick, N. J. ; Albert G. Lawson, D.D., Boston, Mass.

The paper of the evening was by Rev. Anson P. Atterbury, whose subject was "Five Points in an Evolutionary Confession of Faith." A discussion followed, in which President Deems, Rev. Mr. Messaros and others took part. A resolution was passed, thanking the lecturer for his valuable and interesting paper, and requesting a copy for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

MARCH.—Owing to unavoidable circumstances, the meeting for this month was held on the second Thursday (March 14), instead of on the first. In the absence of the President, Rev. Ed-

ward M. Deems presided. The meeting was opened with reading of the Scriptures by Prof. Martyn Summerbell, and prayer by Rev. J. Benson Hamilton. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. The following names of new members were announced :

Rev. James Chambers, New York ; Rev. George S. Chambers, D.D., Harrisburg, Pa. ; Rt. Rev. Wm. R. Nicholson, D.D., Bishop Ref. E. Church, Philadelphia ; Mr. George H. Rust, Minneapolis, Minn. ; Hon. Joseph K. Sumrall, Judge of Ky. Court, Danville, Ky. ; Rev. John W. Newman, Huntsville, Ala. ; Alfred Wheeler, M.D., D.D., Greenville, Pa. ; G. Frederic Krotel, D.D., LL.D., New York ; J. Spangler Kieffen, D.D., Hagerstown, Md. ; Frederick W. Conrad, D.D., Philadelphia ; Rev. Henry E. Dosker, A.M., Holland, Mich. ; Rev. A. B. Kendig, D.D., Brooklyn, N. Y. ; Rt. Rev. Frederic D. Huntington, S.T.D., LL.D., Bishop of Central New York ; Abbott E. Kittredge, D.D., New York ; Rev. David V. Price, Tazewell C. H., Va. ; Prof. J. P. Landis, D.D., Dayton, Ohio ; Rev. J. Benson Hamilton, A.M., Brooklyn, N. Y. ; Denis Wortman, D.D., Saugerties, N. Y. ; Prof. Warren Holden, A.M., Girard College, Philadelphia ; Prof. Geo. Macloskie, D.Sc., LL.D., Princeton College, N. J. ; Henry M. Ladd, D.D., Cleveland, Ohio ; Rev. E. B. Kephart, D.D., LL.D., Bishop U. B. Church, Toledo, Ohio.

It was announced that Mr. A. H. Siegfried, New York manager Chicago *Daily News*, would read a paper at the next meeting. The death was announced of Holland N. McTyeire, D.D., senior bishop of the M. E. Church, South. It was ordered that the following minute be placed in the journal of the Institute :

"Almost at the beginning of our Institute, Bishop McTyeire was made our Vice-President for Tennessee. His high character, his great ability, his ecclesiastical position entitled him to the respect everywhere paid him. The Institute will lament his death as a bereavement, and cherish his memory as that of one of its earliest and ablest friends."

The Secretary was requested to transmit a copy of these minutes to the family of the deceased bishop.

The regular paper of the evening was by Jerome Allen, Ph.D., Prof. of Pedagogics in the University of the City of New York.

The paper was entitled, "The Necessary Relations between Pedagogics and Christian Philosophy."

After a discussion of the paper and the subject, the Institute adjourned.

APRIL.—The Institute met in its rooms, Thursday, April 4, at 8 P.M., the President being in the chair. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. Wm. D. Grant, of New York. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. The following names of new members were read: Rev. George C. Yeisley, A.M., Hudson, N. Y.; Prof. John H. Denison, Williams College; Prof. R. K. Smoot, D.D., LL.D., Theo. School, Austin, Texas.

The regular paper of the evening was by Mr. A. H. Siegfried, Eastern business manager of the Chicago *Daily News*. His subject was, "The Attitude of the Secular Press in America towards Religion." The paper and subject were discussed by Revs. Wm. D. Grant, Edward M. Deems and the President.

The next number of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT will begin our seventh volume. The statement of this fact is encouraging. Ours is not a *popular* magazine. It is not addressed to the mass of unthinking people, but only to those who are willing to take some pains with their intellectual improvement. It is now acknowledged to be the leading periodical in its department. Will not each member of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy and each subscriber to the magazine look among his acquaintance for some growing young man or thoughtful older man who will subscribe to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT a year even if he will not become a member of the Institute?

Before our next number the Summer School will have held its session. Examine the programme in this number and see what a feast is prepared. All those lectures and papers are to appear in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. We urge all members of the Institute to try to make their arrangements to spend a week with us at Key-East.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, Publisher and Bookseller, 13 Cooper Union, New York.]

DAVID HUNTER, B.D., late scholar and fellow in the University of Glasgow, did valuable service for thoughtful people when he translated from the second French edition, with the author's own corrections and revision, "A HISTORY OF THE CANON OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH," by Edward Reuss, Professor in the University of Strasburg. (8vo, cloth, 416 pp., \$3. New York: Wilbur B. Ketcham.) This is not a new work, nor is it antiquated. It holds a place in the first rank of the works of its kind. If we take the author's theories "with a grain of salt," because of his tendency to push too far the methods of modern biblical criticism, we shall find the book delightful in style and rich in helpful thoughts. Earnestness, honesty, scholarship and keen historical insight are displayed by the author in dealing with this exceedingly important subject. We are particularly impressed by his extensive knowledge of Church history and his just weighing of the evidence of facts. The headings of the chapters are as follows, and show the comprehensiveness of Prof. Reuss' treatment of his subject: Use of the Old Testament in the Apostolic Church, The Writings of the Apostles in the Primitive Church, First Beginnings of a Collection of Apostolic Writings, Heresy, Catholicism, The Collections in Use towards the End of the Second Century, Bibliography, The Third Century, The Fourth Century, Attempts at Codification by the Eastern Church and the Western Church, Theory and Terminology, The Middle Ages, The Renaissance, Official and Modern Catholicism, The Theology of the Reformers, The Confessional Schools, Criticism and the Church.

There is one book we should be pleased to have placed in the hands of every theological student in the land. We know no

recent book which would do him more good. It is the "LIFE OF JOHN PRICE DURBIN," by Rev. Dr. John A. Roche. Dr. Durbin was a Methodist minister, was President of Dickinson College, editor of *The Christian Advocate*, which is the chief organ of his denomination and was the missionary secretary of his Church. To unusual ability for organization he united a rare gift of eloquence. He was a prince among preachers. He has probably never been surpassed in America for his power over great congregations. Our young ministers may not attain to that, but they can learn very much from Dr. Durbin's methods of self-culture. It is a very stimulating book. His subject was surpassingly fine and Dr. Roche addressed himself to the portraiture with an ardent affection which makes his pages glow. The price is \$1.50. (Wilbur B. Ketcham, 13 Cooper Union.)

A timely and tasteful little volume is "LANG SYNE; OR, THE WARDS OF MT. VERNON." It is a true story of our Revolutionary times by Mrs. Mary Stuart Smith, who, we believe, is a descendant of Gen. Washington's sister. To the very interesting story is a delightful essay on "The Women of the Revolution," showing the services rendered to freedom by the women of the North and South, during our Revolutionary struggle. (J. B. Alden, Publisher.)

The lovers of Robert Browning's poetry, a growing company, will welcome "AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POETRY OF ROBERT BROWNING," by William John Alexander, Ph.D., Munro Professor of English Language and Literature, Dalhousie College and University, Halifax, N. S., and formerly Fellow of Johns Hopkins University. (8vo., cloth, 210 pp. Ginn & Co., Boston. \$1.10.) The book opens with an account of Browning's most striking peculiarities in method and style, and attempts to find an explanation of these in the conditions amidst which the poet has worked, and in the nature of the themes which he treats. In the next place an exposition is given of those general ideas pervading his work, which can only be gathered from the study of many of his poems, and yet are needful for the full understanding of almost any one of them. This exposition is con-

tained in a series of chapters treating of "Browning's Philosophy," "Christianity as Presented in Browning's Works," and "Browning's Theory of Art." These chapters are followed by a brief chronological review of his writings and characterization of his development. The various points treated throughout the Introduction are illustrated by a series of selected poems furnished with careful analyses and copious critical comments. It is hoped that by thus unfolding, in a few typical examples, the characteristics and merits of Browning, the reader may at once be enabled to acquire a real knowledge of his poetry, and be prepared for further unassisted study of his work. The attention of those already familiar with Browning is especially directed to the analysis of "Sordello," much fuller and more exact, we believe, than any heretofore published.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

"HOW I FOUND MY BEST FRIEND." By Rev. H. W. Kemper. 8vo, paper, 128 pp. Christian Colportage Society, 15 Stagg St., Brooklyn, N. Y. Twenty-five cents.

"THE AMARANTH AND THE BERYL." An Elegy. By Charles Edward Barnes. 12mo, 237 pp. Bond parchment paper binding, exquisitely printed on antique laid paper, with engraved title-pages, etc. New York, 18 W. 4th Street, Willard Facker & Co. Fifty cents.

"SOLITARIUS TO HIS DÆMON." Three papers by Charles Edward Barnes. Details of publication the same as those of the preceding work. Price, fifty cents.

"THE CHORAL BOOK," for Home, School and Church. Translated from the German by Friedrich Zuchtmann, Principal of Conservatory of Music, Springfield, Mass., and Edwin L. Kirtland, Superintendent of Schools, Holyoke, Mass. Large 8vo, boards, 96 pp., 70 cts. Boston: Ginn & Co.

Messrs. Ginn & Co. have also sent us as recent publications the following textbooks:

"ANALYTIC GEOMETRY," by A. S. Hardy, Professor of Mathematics in Dartmouth College, and author of "Elements of Quaternions." Cloth, large 8vo, 229 pp., \$1.60.

"HOMER'S ODYSSEY," Books I.-IV. Based on the edition of Ameis-Heutze, edited by Professor Perrin, of Adalbert College, Cleveland. Text and Notes with Text; 8vo, 230 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Text, separate (75 pp.) 20 cents.

"OUTLINES OF LESSONS IN BOTANY." For the use of teachers or mothers studying with their children. By Jane H. Newell. Illustrated by H. P. Symmes. 12mo, cloth, 140 pp., 55 cents.

"A FIRST READER," by J. H. Stickney. 8vo, cloth, 104 pp. Prices: for introduction, 24 cents; mailing price, 30 cents.

"A SECOND READER," by J. H. Stickney. 8vo, cloth, 198 pp. Prices: for introduction, 32 cents; mailing price, 40 cents.

"A THIRD READER," by J. H. Stickney. 8vo, cloth, 248 pp. Prices: for introduction, 40 cents; mailing price, 50 cents.

"A FOURTH READER," by J. H. Stickney. 8vo, cloth, 362 pp. Prices: for introduction, 50 cents; mailing price, 60 cents.